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ABSTRACT 
 
Task switching produces a number of reliable behavioural measures, the main focus 
of interest here being ‘switch cost’, the increase in response time when switching between 
tasks as opposed to performing them separately. Switch costs are typically measured between 
two tasks and compared to a single-task repeat condition. Current explanations of switch cost 
fall broadly into either active reconfiguration based accounts (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995) 
whereby the extra time taken to switch between tasks is attributable to reconfiguration of task 
set, or passive carryover accounts (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) where extra time is accrued 
by the need to overcome conflict between the current task set and the enduring activity of the 
previous task set.  
 
This thesis used the Continuous Series II (Gurd, 1995), a novel continuous verbal 
switching task which requires individuals to switch continuously between increasing numbers 
of overlearned sequences (e.g. days, numbers). The aim was to investigate the application of 
general (whole-task) switch costs (RT costs), memory-based switching and the differential 
pattern of errors produced by the task, with a view to determining the most appropriate 
theoretical model to explain costs in the task. General switch costs are measured over the 
whole time course of the task from beginning to end, instead of the more usual measurement 
of switch cost over a single switch or repeat within the whole task. Such long-term measures 
of switch cost account for ‘global representational structures’ in the task, which are said to 
contribute to the cost of switching yet are absent from local transitional measures 
(Kleinsorge, Heuer & Schmidtke, 2004). Global representational structures account for not 
only the current and preceding trials actually performed but also the possible alternatives for 
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the preceding, current and subsequent trials, thereby reflecting all representations relating to 
performance of the tasks. The Continuous Series II (Gurd, 1995) measures costs continuously 
over time between increasing numbers of verbal tasks and as yet has not been linked to either 
a reconfiguration or carryover-based account.  
 
Initial administration to healthy controls and neurological patients confirmed 
difficulty-related increasing costs and revealed a dissociation of errors between two versions 
of the task, one including semantic categories. This suggested differential sources of control 
overseeing conflict detection and resolution, linked in this work to Kahneman’s dual system 
model (Kahneman, 2011) and suggesting the implication of active control. Further work with 
monozygotic twins mirrored for handedness revealed no predicted effect of handedness but 
did reveal the employment of vocalised inner-speech as a successful self cueing device, 
known to be supportive of active reconfiguration in switching (Monsell, 2005). Such cueing 
was employed by this sample of older adults but had not appeared to benefit the neurological 
patients who clearly had reconfiguration deficits. Further development of the two versions of 
the task also allowed rejection of a passive carryover explanation of switch-cost on the basis 
that switching to the easier task was not more difficult, counter to the prediction of Allport, 
Styles & Hsieh (1994). At this stage it was evident that some portion of general cost for the 
task may be artefactual, as participants displayed behaviour suggesting the order of tasks and 
their updating nature (task content) may be inflating cost beyond a pure measure of switching 
(an inevitable risk of general switch cost measurement). Investigation of task order showed 
that production of the category ‘days’ appeared to conflate sources of error. Reducing the 
difficultly of component tasks (removing the need to update items) demonstrated that a 
substantial proportion of general cost was indeed purely switch-related. Returning to the 
question of cueing (previously demonstrated to be beneficial when self-generated), the final 
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study introduced explicit external cues, consistently predicted to benefit switching (Monsell, 
2005). These cues did not reduce time costs in verbal task switching and furthermore failed to 
prevent errors of task order. The lack of external cue benefit supports an amended version of 
the Rogers & Monsell (1995) task-set reconfiguration model as the best explanation of switch 
costs in verbal task-switching. This amended model relies entirely on internally generated 
representations in a closed system and supports the role of active control in generating 
switch-cost. General cost, while incorporating task-related artefacts, rehearsals and error 
recovery, nevertheless has at its core a switch related element. Furthermore, the failure of 
cues to extinguish between-task errors negates excessive reliance on working memory and 
further supports the rejection of passive carryover accounts of task switch cost. 
 
 
  
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
18 
 
Consider, briefly, that you are sitting on a couch, playing a video game in 
which your character is struggling to vanquish a seemingly unassailable 
enemy, when suddenly your phone, in the real world, rings. It’s the pizza 
delivery person, lost and asking for directions. Instead of pausing the 
game, you continue your battle, simultaneously guiding your sword 
toward your enemy and the pizza toward your home. Left swing for the 
armor, “Right turn on Main Street.” But as the skirmish heats up, does 
your ability to direct the delivery person waiver? As your character 
sustains damage, sending a twang of empathy through your real-world 
heart, do you temporarily forget about the rumblings of your real-world 
stomach? More to the point, do you guide the delivery driver according to 
the game-play map, or even notice when you do? 
Ratan, Santa Cruz & Vorderer (2007), p. 167 
 
“Blink. Blink. Blink. It's an instant message from my wife. I'll check it as 
soon as I finish this paragraph. Blink. Blink. Could be important. Okay, 
I'll check it after this sentence. Blink. I'd better just check it. I multitask all 
day and I'm not using "multitask" in that buzz-term kind of way.” 
Northrup (2004) 
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW – PART ONE: 
THEORIES OF TASK SWITCHING  
 
1 Introduction and chapter overview 
In an increasingly information rich and time poor world, task switching is something 
most of us encounter on a daily basis. True multi-tasking is virtually impossible to achieve 
without detriment to performance – while we may be able to carry out more than one task at a 
time this will always and immediately be subject to time and accuracy costs (‘switch cost’). 
Constituent tasks may be relatively simple, such as searching for your car keys, making a cup 
of coffee or speaking on the telephone. However, these tasks will generally take longer to 
complete simultaneously than consecutively and will very likely be more prone to error than 
when they are carried out individually (Monsell, 2003). To what degree we succeed will also 
depend on a number of other factors. Performance can depend on how easy or well practiced 
the tasks are, although familiar tasks are not necessarily easier when multitasking (see 
Monsell, Yeung & Azuma, 2000), and practice does not seem to ‘make perfect’ (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). How far in advance we know we need to switch to another task can also have 
an effect. Sufficient preparation time is generally acknowledged as advantageous (Logan, 
2003; Monsell, 2003), although Altmann (2004) asserts that when only a single option for 
preparation is available it will fail to have an effect, regardless of how long it is. More than 
eighty years ago it was suggested that switching between easier tasks took longer than 
switching between harder tasks (Jersild, 1927) and more latterly it has been proposed that it is 
more difficult to switch to an easier task (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994). Performance is also 
affected by what type of tasks we try to carry out in concert. It has been speculated by Meyer 
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(as reported in Motluk, 2007) that common everyday combinations within a single domain 
such as instant messaging and report writing are doomed to failure, although research into 
real world multitasking is currently limited. Switching between tasks in this manner requires 
us to actively maintain the processes required to complete each task (what Rogers and 
Monsell (1995) termed task set), correctly selecting the appropriate set of processes for the 
task at hand and successfully changing those processes when they become redundant.  
 
Experimentally, the task switching paradigm has long been used as a measure of 
cognitive control in action. Keeping the cognitive system updated in light of changing task 
demands is a fundamental aspect of such control processes. Dependent on tasks, the 
switching paradigm could include all five1 areas flagged by Norman and Shallice (2000) as 
requiring focused cognitive control, although it is already clear that the relationship between 
executive and switching processes is far from straightforward. Task switches can occur 
within a single cognitive domain or between domains. Examples of single domain switches 
include Jersild (1927), who used addition and subtraction in some experiments and also Gurd 
(1995) who used verbal fluency for ordinal sequences and semantic categories. An example 
of switching between domains is that of Sohn & Anderson (2001; 2003) who used a 
combination of vowel/ consonant letter and odd/ even number decisions. Gurd and colleagues 
(2002) specified three main distinctions of the type of switch that can be made: changing 
sorting criteria, as in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Berg, 1948), categorising bi- or 
multivalent stimuli according to differing features (e.g. colour then shape); dual task 
performance, typically manifesting as divided attention tasks, with switches determined by 
internal or external demands according to the need to maintain or monitor tasks; alternating 
                                                           
1
 Planning and decision making; error resolution; novel behaviours; difficult tasks, and the requirement to 
overcome habitual behaviours. 
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task demands, switching between several tasks according to a defined alternation sequence. 
Clearly any consensus over the source of switch cost has to account for the variation in 
stimulus and response demands to be found in the literature.  
 
Although stimuli are varied there are some commonalities. Stimuli often used are 
letters, numbers or symbols (e.g. Koch, 2008) – tasks might involve deciding if, for example, 
a symbol is a mathematical or text symbol. One marked exception to this is the Continuous 
Series II task (Gurd 1995), which uses no external stimuli but instead requires participants to 
switch between producing items in order from increasing numbers of overlearned word 
sequences such as months and letters. Participants start switching between two sequences 
then work through three and four sequences. Sequences cycle (when ‘December’ is reached 
in months the next correct response is ‘January’) and performance is continuous and self 
paced for a set number of iterations. For example, switching between three sequences might 
result in the responses “January, 3, Wednesday, February, 4, Thursday...” and so on, 
continuing to both update each sequence and switch between them (see Appendix A for full 
instructions for the task).  The task is unusual in having verbal responses rather than button 
presses. One benefit of verbal responses is that it allows for analysis of the type of errors 
made rather than just a calculation of accuracy.  
 
In this thesis the Continuous Series II will be investigated to establish which existing 
theoretical account of the causes of switch cost can be used to describe the behavioural data. 
Thus far (e.g. Gurd 1995, Gurd et al., 2002) the verbal task has not been associated with any 
one theoretical account of switch cost. In addition it is not clear how the unique features of 
the task contribute to the calculation of switch cost and the type of errors produced. For 
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example, what is the contribution of switching between several tasks in isolation from the 
complex content of those tasks? Does the order in which the tasks are presented have any 
effect? What contribution is made by the lack of external stimuli and reliance on memory for 
the task order? Switching within working memory of this nature is noted to be quite separable 
from the more usual perceptual switching (Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2007) and so 
investigation of the contribution of WM (working memory) processes to the overall 
calculation of switch cost in the Continuous Series II is an important factor to investigate. 
The involvement of WM within the task is a relevant factor in determining which account of 
switch cost is most useful for explaining behavioural effects.  
 
The first study will assess the effect of manipulating the Continuous Series II to 
contain alternating tasks of greater and lesser difficulty (the Mixed Category task). Using a 
single case series of neurological patients and a healthy control sample, the Mixed Category 
task will be investigated to assess the explanatory suitability of the task-set inertia hypothesis 
(Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994). The second study uses the same two tasks with a sample of 
monozygotic twins mirrored for handedness, assessing the combined effects of left and right 
hemisphere language processing and split frontal control (left and right) during commission 
of more than one task. The data is assessed to see if this results in differential processing of 
frontally controlled verbal tasks, as evidenced by differences in switch cost and errors. The 
third study extends the number of switching categories for the Mixed Category task (the 
Mixed Category II task), looking specifically for evidence of asymmetry in switch cost 
between individual categories (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994), relating again to the task-set 
inertia (TSI) hypothesis. The fourth study examines a methodological issue with the 
Continuous Series II task, namely whether the order of the categories has any effect on switch 
cost – this also addresses the previously noted phenomenon of most errors occurring in the 
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category ‘days’. The fifth study further probes methodological issues, assessing the 
contribution to costs of switching between four categories in the absence of any complex 
content for those categories – this is done by using repeating colour names instead of 
continually updated overlearned sequences. The sixth study addresses the memory load 
implicit in the task by introducing initial letter and whole word cues – this allows for further 
assessment of proactive interference accounts of switch cost which propose memory of the 
preceding task set interferes with establishment of the upcoming set. Finally the results from 
these studies will be used to propose the task-set reconfiguration (TSR) model offered by 
Rogers & Monsell (1995) as the most suitable explanation of behavioural measures for 
complex verbal task switching.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will review the relevant literature in order to identify 
research issues that the rest of the thesis will address. This review will be presented as 
follows: The first part of the rest of this chapter examines a range of theoretical accounts of 
task switching and switch cost. This starts with an overview of the original alternating tasks 
paradigm (Jersild, 1927), comparing blocks of switching and non-switching trials, followed 
by a discussion of bivalent stimuli, tasks which can afford two possible responses (as in 
Stroop stimuli). The question of asymmetric costs is addressed, whereby costs are greater 
when switching to an easier task, linked to the passive task-set inertia (TSI) hypothesis 
(Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994). This is countered with the task-set reconfiguration (TSR) 
hypothesis (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) whereby switch cost reflects active control and requires 
the arrival of external stimuli for this switch to complete. This includes description of 
residual switch costs, a preparation-resistant portion of cost that reflects this external 
component of reconfiguration. The failure to engage hypothesis (De Jong, 2000) is addressed, 
an explanation of residual cost that relies on the failure of an individual to take advantage of 
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preparation time. The thesis then moves to look back to redevelopment of the passive TSI 
account, considering associative interference (Wylie & Allport, 2000) a build up of 
interference from previous task associations. Another interference-based account is that of 
backward inhibition (Mayr & Keele, 2000), whereby repetition of a recently practiced task 
increases switch cost more than executing a new task. The role of cues is addressed (Meiran, 
1996) considering how closely cues are associated to tasks, whether there is an additional 
cost of cue processing (Logan & Bundesen, 2003) and the use of inner speech as a self cuing 
device (Emerson & Miyake, 2003). Finally the section considers combined dual mechanism 
models (Braver, Reynolds & Donaldson, 2003) which account for elements of both passive 
carryover and active reconfiguration accounts.  
 
 The second half of this chapter turns to look in depth at the verbal switching paradigm 
(Gurd, 1995), initially giving an overview of the task and its aims, identifying two important 
features related to the early presentation of the task (Gurd et al., 2002, 2003) – namely the 
specific pattern of neural activation seen during the task and the relationship (for this uncued 
task) to working memory. Each of these questions is explored in more detail, looking first at 
neural activity associated with task switching in terms of both existing models and the 
Continuous Series II. The issue of memory load is considered in relation to the verbal task 
and to its contribution to wider measures of switch cost. A number of pertinent 
methodological issues are considered: The calculation of general switch cost (e.g. Kray & 
Linedenberger, 2000), a measure comparing blocks of switching and non-switching trials as 
opposed to individual switches or repeats within a mixed block. The contribution of global 
task difficulty and the unusual issue of switching between multiple tasks rather than just two. 
The use of verbal rather than manual responses and its relationship to inner speech and task 
verbalisation. The classification of errors committed during the task, positing a model based 
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on Kahneman’s (2011) two-system model of attention and thinking. The section then moves 
to consider in some depth the relationship of the Continuous Series II to existing models of 
task switch cost, finally touching on the real world relevance of the task and ending with the 
thesis aims. 
 
2 The origins of task switching – the alternating tasks paradigm 
To switch effectively from one task to another involves the cognitive system activating and 
inhibiting relevant task sets as they become, and cease to be, required (Baddeley, Emslie, 
Kolodny and Duncan, 1998). The majority of theorists place the switch cost at this response 
selection stage, relating either to inhibiting the previous task set or activating the upcoming 
one (Table 1 gives an overview of the main theories covered in this literature review). The 
earliest account (Jersild, 1927) used an “A-B-A-B…” alternating tasks design, comparing 
time taken to alternate between tasks A and B with that to complete each task separately, 
identifying a clear time disadvantage for certain switching conditions. The additional time 
cost of switching, taken over the additive costs of the individual tasks, was proposed as a 
direct measure of the time taken to exert executive control. Jersild’s tasks used stimuli 
presented in the form of lists, either single task (Task A performed on every item) or 
alternating tasks (Task A performed on odd numbered items and Task B on even numbered 
items). In addition, items within both kinds of lists could be either bivalent (as later termed by 
Fagot, 1994 – items affording a response from either Task A or Task B), or univalent (as 
termed by Pashler, 2000 – items could only be responded to using one task). An example of a 
bivalent stimulus would be a digit affording responses from both Task A (making an odd or 
even decision) and Task B (making a parity decision). Task time costs were measured as the 
total amount of time taken to work through the list, with alternating performance compared to 
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single task. Jersild found performance on bivalent alternating lists to be slower than bivalent 
single task lists. Conversely, performance on univalent alternating lists was faster than 
univalent single tasks lists. It is somewhat surprising that Jersild only found what we now call 
switch costs (Jersild’s ‘shift loss’) when using bivalent stimuli and even more surprising that 
univalent alternating lists demonstrated a time advantage over the non-switching condition. 
Jersild concluded that the bivalent-only switch cost was due to the lack of explicit cueing of 
the correct response. The ‘negative’ switch cost for the univalent switching condition was 
attributed to a more efficient single ‘mental set’ encompassing both clearly distinguishable 
tasks. These results were partially replicated by Spector and Biederman (1976). While there 
was still a cost for bivalent items (albeit a more modest one than that found by Jersild) they 
were able to extinguish the univalent switching advantage by presenting stimuli on single 
cards instead of as a list. This removed foreknowledge of the upcoming task2. The reduction 
in bivalent switch cost was attributed to the introduction of an additional ‘disambiguating 
cue’. 
 
  
                                                           
2
 While there is largely agreement in later work that advance preparation affords a time advantage (Altmann 
(2004); Kray (2006); Meiran & Daichman (2005)), internally generated foreknowledge is taken to be less 
efficacious than externally generated cues (e.g. Kleinsorge & Gajewski, 2008). Advance preparation effects 
therefore more commonly refer to those processes occurring between the presentation of a task-specific cue and 
execution of the task, rather than having advance warning of the task order at the beginning of the switching 
session. 
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Table 1 Overview of Main Theoretical Accounts of Task Switching presented in the Literature 
Review 
Theory/ model Overview Author  
Alternating tasks 
paradigm 
Alternating task lists take longer than single task lists, 
signifying cognitive control. Criticised for disparate memory 
load between alternating/ single lists.  
Jersild (1927) 
Task-set inertia 
(TSI) hypothesis  
Switch cost reflects carryover of activation from the preceding 
task set – there is an inertial effect in instigating the second 
task. Criticised for being restricted to Stroop-like stimuli. 
Allport, Styles 
& Hsieh, 
(1994)  
Task-set 
reconfiguration 
(TSR) 
Uses the alternating runs paradigm (A_A_B_B_A_A...). 
Switch cost represents active top-down reconfiguration of task 
set. Cost is reduced by sufficient preparation time. A portion of 
switch cost (residual cost) is resistant to preparation time, 
representing reconfiguration, which can only complete once 
the stimulus arrives. Criticised for the interpretation of residual 
cost. 
Rogers & 
Monsell 
(1995) 
Failure to engage 
(FTE) hypothesis 
Residual switch cost represents a failure to take advantage of 
preparation time. Criticised for a failure to replicate results. 
De Jong 
(2000) 
Mixing costs The phenomenon of repeats within a mixing block taking 
longer to complete than repeats within a single task block, thus 
inflating switch cost. 
Fagot (1994) 
Associative 
interference 
hypothesis 
Previously learned associations between task and stimuli 
(where one stimulus affords two tasks) build up over time. 
Costs are also related to starting a task, whether switching 
occurs or not (restart costs) – this may inflate residual switch 
cost. 
Wylie & 
Allport (2000) 
Backward 
inhibition 
Previously learned associations cause interference – the third 
task of an A-B-A sequence is more costly than a C-B-A 
sequence, due to the recency of the task A appearance. 
Mayr & Keele 
(2000) 
Explicit cueing 
paradigm 
Allows for random presentation of trials (unlike alternating 
runs) and accurate manipulation of the pre- and post-stimulus 
interval, determining the point at which switch processes 
engage. There may be cue processing costs. 
Meiran (1996) 
Dual-mechanism 
models 
Both passive carryover and active reconfiguration processes 
act in concert with each other. Some models posit more than 
one type of active control.  
Braver, 
Reynolds & 
Donaldson 
(2003) 
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This particular method used by Jersild of calculating switch cost, by subtracting non-
switching from switching reaction time, has continued to attract adherents e.g. Rogers and 
Monsell, 19953; Gurd, 1995; Gurd et al., 2002; Logan, 2006. However, the alternating tasks 
paradigm itself has not held as much favour, being largely superseded by approaches 
designed to address perceived disparity in processing demands between single and alternating 
task lists (e.g. the alternating runs design presented by Rogers & Monsell (1995) as described 
on page 33). Specifically, the alternating tasks approach was viewed by Rogers & Monsell to 
be flawed, in that switching and non-switching blocks (or lists) had very different 
requirements that may contribute to what was being classed purely as a switch-related cost. 
Alternating required two task sets to be held active and for reconfiguration between these two 
task sets to occur for every item, which was not the case for single task blocks. These 
additional processes may have contributed to the overall cost for completing the list or block. 
Nevertheless, the alternating tasks design has continued to be used for studies with specific 
design requirements. For example, Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans (2001) and also Gurd (1995) 
and Gurd et al. (2002) using continuously updating verbal categories which required a task 
switch on every response and could not encompass a repeat within trial blocks (as per the 
Rogers & Monsell (1995) design).  
 
2.1 The use of bivalent stimuli 
As well as the alternating tasks design itself, it is proposed that the use of bivalent 
stimuli could also be a possible contributor to switch cost. Much research subsequent to 
Spector and Biederman (1976) has concentrated on bivalent stimuli. More recent work has 
speculated again on the role of bivalency and whether it adds a further confound to the 
                                                           
3
 Rogers & Monsell (1995) applied their subtractive calculation to individual switches within a block rather than 
comparison of switching blocks to non-switching blocks. 
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switching process. Although already interpreted as being more costly due to an absence of 
explicit cueing (Jersild) or unresolved ambiguity (Spector & Biederman), its effects appear to 
be more far reaching. Rather than just reflecting reaction to the stimulus, it has been proposed 
that increased costs associated with bivalency reflect uncertainty in response selection, in 
addition to activation of the upcoming task set and inhibition of the previous one (Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000). This has been reframed as ‘cognitive caution’ in the face of response 
choice (Woodward, Meier, Tipper and Graf, 2003), from findings that the addition of a small 
number of bivalent stimuli to an otherwise univalent switching block resulted in larger time 
costs but often reduced errors. Slowing is incurred by all tasks, not just those afforded by the 
bivalent stimuli, known as bivalency cost (Woodward et al., 2003). The idea that additional 
cost was due to an increase in the number of active task sets to be inhibited was rejected 
(Woodward et al., 2003). Arguably this could be a case of interference from prolonged 
priming of control processes (Meier, Woodward, Rey-Mermet and Graf, 2009), which could 
also explain costs spreading over to univalent stimuli. Task uncertainty is seen as being a 
relatively short lived phenomenon (Woodward et al., 2009). That the bivalency cost persisted 
over long inter-trial intervals (up to 5000 msec) showed that top-down caution was the cause 
of cost. Bivalency effects have also been interpreted (Meiran, 2008) as evidence of the need 
to recode responses between each stimulus presentation. Meiran used the ‘alternating runs’ 
switching paradigm (described in detail on page 33), which alternates between runs of tasks 
(AABB…) rather than Jersild’s consecutive task alternation (ABAB…)  Response recoding 
would be required when repeating responses as well as switching responses in the alternating 
runs paradigm, explaining the univalent advantage in earlier work and evidenced by a 
bivalent-only preparation advantage – enough time to prepare for the upcoming task reduced 
switch cost but only for bivalent stimuli.  
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Repeated recoding and ‘cautious hesitancy’ both offer plausible explanations for these 
cost patterns. Additional evidence from imaging data indicating increased parietal activity 
during responses to bivalent stimuli (Woodward, Metzak, Meier & Holroyd, 2008) is 
consistent with both attention shifting and storing of phonological material in working 
memory. This could possibly account for (at the single stimulus level) confirmatory verbal 
representation or recall of task instructions to assist in response checking (or recoding). While 
bivalency affords flexible task design, like many aspects of the wider task switching 
paradigm it seems to bring with it an additional source of cost, namely response selection 
uncertainty (‘bivalency cost’) and the need for repeated encoding. Extinguishing or 
subtracting the effect of these additional ‘inflationary’ processes is for many the ‘holy grail’ 
of task switching research. For others, such as Allport, Styles & Hsieh (1994) and Altmann 
(2002; 2003), costs accrued by switching between tasks reflect nothing but these additional 
processes. 
 
3 Asymmetric Switch Costs: Task Set Inertia and Task Set 
Reconfiguration Accounts 
The notion that task switch cost represents not active top-down executive processes 
but instead passive bottom-up peripheral processes represents one of the first major revisits to 
the topic since Spector & Biederman (1976) replicated Jersild’s work. While most theories 
agree that switch cost occurs at the response selection stage, there is much debate as to 
exactly what causes that cost. Theories can be broadly divided into passive inhibition/ 
interference or active reconfiguration accounts. Examples of passive interference accounts 
include interference from the last task performed (Allport Styles & Hsieh, 1994), varying 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
31 
 
interference from recent and less recently performed tasks (Mayr & Keele, 2000) or sustained 
interference from previously made stimulus-response mappings (Wylie & Allport, 2000). 
Alternatively, many still follow Jersild’s assertion that switch cost instead reflects active 
cognitive control in reconfiguring the system from one task set to the next (e.g. Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001) , albeit using a less direct translation of time costs to 
control.  
 
3.1 Task set inertia (TSI) 
Further replication of Jersild’s experiments was carried out by Allport, Styles and 
Hsieh (1994); they completed a series of experiments including use of a Stroop switching 
task, switching between colour naming and word reading in a single block. In addition to 
expected Stroop incongruency effects (slowing for incongruent colour naming but not word 
reading, as per Stroop (1935)), they found much larger switch costs when switching from 
colour naming to word reading than vice versa (Experiment 5). Switching to the ‘easier’ more 
dominant task appeared to be more difficult to achieve, producing asymmetric switch costs. 
That the asymmetry runs in the opposite direction to that of the Stroop (while it is easier to 
read words, the task results in greater switch cost) is surprising. This seemingly runs counter 
to the argument that switch cost directly reflects the cognitive control used to switch task set, 
which would predict that the harder task would require more executive input to be initiated. If 
switch cost represents the time taken to exert cognitive control then tasks requiring more 
control will result in larger switch costs – colour-naming in the Stroop is taken to be “…the 
very paradigm of a ‘controlled’ task…” (Wylie & Allport, 2000, p.215). As larger switch 
costs are found for the task which requires less control (word reading) then it would seem that 
switch cost cannot be a direct measure of such control processes.  
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Advocates of reconfiguration-based accounts, which ally themselves to a control-
based interpretation of switch cost, concede that asymmetry initially seems incompatible with 
such an explanation (for example, see Monsell, 2003). Allport and colleagues interpreted this 
asymmetry as interference from the previous ‘harder’ task set delaying activation of the 
upcoming ‘easier’ one. Task sets are proposed to endure over the time course of a switching 
scenario, having a dynamic inertial effect on the activation of a new task set. Harder tasks, 
requiring more executive support, will exert more of this active interference on easier tasks, 
resulting in larger ‘harder-to-easier’ switch costs; this asymmetric interference effect was 
termed task set inertia (TSI). When features of one task set had previously been associated 
with different S-R mappings in the previous task set (as is the case for Stroop switching) then 
proactive interference from Task A to Task B occurred. Further strong evidence of 
asymmetry from bilingual task switching (digit naming in alternating languages, Meuter & 
Allport (1999)) was taken to add support to the TSI theory of switch cost in tasks of unequal 
difficulty; asymmetry was reduced as language proficiency converged. Additionally, there 
was no evidence of a cumulative inhibition effect (the degree of interference from word-
reading to colour-naming did not increase over the time course of the task), suggesting that 
TSI is a localised pre-stimulus event.  
 
The drawback of the TSI hypothesis is that evidence to support it comes almost 
exclusively from asymmetric task pairings. Allport’s argument is that such pairings, resulting 
in asymmetric costs, cannot (and do not) reflect actively imposed control processes which 
shift the cognitive system from one task set to the next. Asymmetric tasks are therefore an 
exemplar of TSI in action – proactive interference is greater when tasks are asymmetric. The 
assertion of Allport and colleagues that such tasks do not show evidence of any costs which 
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reflect the time taken to switch task set leads them to question the suitability of control 
processes as an explanation for switch costs.  
 
But does the specific nature of the tasks used to demonstrate TSI limit its 
applicability? One later study by Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson & Cohen (2006) looked for 
associated brain activation that would support enduring residual activity related to the 
previously performed task, thus supporting a hypothesis of TSI interference as a source of 
cost. The study used far more symmetric tasks, face and word classification (gender or two/ 
not two syllables), with no overlap of S-R mappings. Findings indicated a correlation 
between switch cost and neural activity for the now irrelevant task following a switch, 
supporting the existence of task set inertia, but crucially not as the sole source of switch cost. 
Separable activation was also found for the task being switched to – further analysis 
identified these as two distinct processes rather than a blanket level of activation over time 
during switching. While this evidence supports some role for TSI it does not do so at the 
exclusion of concomitant executive control processes, which is a departure from Allport’s 
original presentation of the hypothesis (Allport, Styles & Hseieh, 1994). It also extends the 
application of proactive interference beyond the confines of S-R overlap between tasks, 
suggesting that such interference may be more widely indicated in conjunction with 
controlled task set switching processes. 
 
While interference from the non-current task set is intuitively appealing as a source of 
switch cost, the reliance of TSI on counter-intuitive asymmetric costs limits its explanatory 
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usefulness4. Competing theories of switch cost relying on input from active control processes 
(such as that of Rogers & Monsell, 1995) acknowledge the contribution of inhibition but 
question the cause of asymmetry, having found it occurring in both ‘directions’ (Yeung & 
Monsell, 2003a; see also Glaser & Glaser, 1995) using a Stroop-style task with both 
simultaneous and word-delayed presentation of the word-colour combination. Presenting 
word and colour simultaneously (a black word on a coloured background) as per the normal 
Stroop allowed for replication of Allport’s asymmetric switch cost. When presentation of the 
word occurred 160ms after presentation of the colour, a reverse asymmetry effect was found 
with greater switch costs being attached to the harder task of colour naming. This change in 
asymmetry direction is attributed to the extent to which the strong task is able to interfere 
with the weaker one, suggesting a ‘suppression threshold’ for interference. This reverse effect 
was repeated using both the feature-delayed Stroop (as described above) and differing 
response modalities for the tasks (key press versus spoken response) (Yeung & Monsell, 
2003a).    
   
So in what way is this ‘suppression threshold’ explained? Asymmetry was ascribed to 
a combination of priming for the difficult task in the face of competition from the stronger, 
easier task (difficult to easy switch) and control of the easier task to reduce competition with 
the harder task (easy to difficult switch). The ability of one task to interfere with the other is 
relative to the initial strength of the tasks (prior task-stimuli associations), the requirement to 
switch or not and to the direction of that switch. Greater interference may require greater 
suppression of the easier task during harder task performance, resulting in difficulty 
                                                           
4
 Sumner and Ahmed (2006) later specified three possible sources for this interference, including stimulus-
response associations for the previous task (accounted for in a later adaptation of the TSI model (Wylie & 
Allport, 2000)) and interference control active for the last task (controlling interference from the now current, 
but previously unwanted, task set).  
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switching from hard to easy, but this is dependent upon the level of initial activation required 
for each task as demonstrated by the ability to reverse asymmetry through feature 
manipulation (Yeung & Monsell (2003a) as reported in Monsell, Yueng & Azuma (2000)5, 
namely temporal separation of the presentation of colour and word.  
 
Further examples of reverse asymmetry (e.g. Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 2001; 
Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2006) add weight to the conclusion that the asymmetry effect is 
confined to specific pairings of tasks that not only differ on difficulty but do so to a specific 
degree. A high degree of variability in the Rubinstein data (using arithmetic tasks) fits well 
with the relative interference hypothesis component of baseline task strength. Passive 
carryover of inhibition (as evidenced by asymmetry, itself dependent on disparate, threshold-
related task difficulty) is inflexible as a sole descriptor of switch cost and so the TSI account 
is limited in its application to explain all instances of switch cost. The phenomenon of 
asymmetric costs continues to attract interest (for example, Schneider & Anderson, 2010) but 
explanations have not remained confined to offering support for the TSI hypothesis. 
Manipulation of the direction of asymmetry (Yeung & Monsell, 2003a) and proposals that 
costs relate to preceding task difficulty regardless of the need to switch (i.e. also on repeat 
trials) (Schneider & Anderson, 2010) somewhat dilute the initially strong TSI-based role for 
asymmetric costs. 
 
Later work which also utilised asymmetry is that looking at the phenomenon of 
backward inhibition, which is the active (rather than passive) sequential inhibition of the 
                                                           
5
 Support from connectionist modelling of Stroop-type switching (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002) indicates easy tasks 
require little activation and little inhibition of competing nodes, due to their strong associative profile; harder 
tasks require the opposite, manifesting as greater input to the network, and result in hard to easy asymmetry. 
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immediately preceding task set. Asymmetry (greater costs associated with switching from a 
harder to an easier task than vice versa) was used when switching to indicate a role of both 
inhibition and activation processes. Backward inhibition dictates that if three tasks are 
performed in the sequence A-B-A then the third task will be slower than in the sequence C-B-
A, because the inhibition of Task A from its first appearance needs to be ‘undone’ when it 
reappears6 (e.g. Koch, Gade & Phillipp (2004), Mayr & Keele (2000) as described on page 
53). In investigating the effect of asymmetry on backward inhibition, Arbuthnott (2008) 
found both asymmetric and reverse-asymmetric costs were shown, depending on the relative 
strength of the tasks, in accordance with Yeung & Monsell's (2003a) active control threshold 
account. The active control threshold account proposed that the presence of asymmetry or 
reverse asymmetry depends on the ability of the harder task to interfere with the weaker, 
which may be variable and is dependent upon some threshold. Independently of asymmetric 
switch costs, asymmetric backward inhibition occurred when task sequence A-B-A took the 
form easy-difficult-easy, regardless of relative task strength and highlighting the role of 
inhibition. The backward inhibition hypothesis therefore accommodates both activation and 
inhibition processes as a source of cost. 
 
Returning to the question of relative difficulty between asymmetric tasks, it is also 
worthy of note that Jersild (1927) found switching between two easy tasks to be more costly 
than switching between two harder tasks. Introducing the cost related to switching to two 
tasks that are relatively unpractised resulted in less loss in terms of time. Jersild related this to 
the relative difference in practice or familiarity between two harder tasks being less than that 
between two easy tasks. The effect of the introduction of switching was likened to the 
                                                           
6
 When switching between three tasks, performance on task 3 is slower when it is a repeat of task 1 than if all 
tasks are different, attributed to dissipation of inhibition over time. 
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introduction of any other disrupting effect to a well practiced (easy) or less practiced (hard) 
behaviour – the interruption has more effect on the more habitual behaviour, due to the 
stronger S-R associations built up for the easier tasks. Jersild’s interpretation does not make 
sense in terms of an additive interpretation of switch cost (time Task A + time Task B + time 
switch) but does suggest some effect of inhibition. Coupled with the relative strength 
hypothesis of Yeung & Monsell (2003a) this would seem to suggest that in certain 
combinations tasks do have the ability to interfere with one another. 
 
Some eighty years later (and apparently independently from Jersild’s findings) Bryck 
and Mayr (2008) cited asymmetry in the absence of switching as evidence of interference 
from long term memory traces rather than a localised transient switch-dependent effect. That 
both difficulty for easier tasks and asymmetry should occur without a switch questions 
whether some proportion of the asymmetric cost is in fact a non-switch related measure. 
Further to this, a confound from coinciding task and difficulty of switches has been proposed 
as masking the contribution of the latter (Schneider & Anderson, 2010). The contribution of 
the change in difficulty is not fully accounted for when the task itself also changes. The 
ensuing “…sequential difficulty effects” (Schneider & Anderson, 2010, p.1873) impair 
performance following a difficult task regardless of the need to switch, resulting in 
asymmetry. It is not, they argue, the switch that causes the difficulty but the fact that the 
previous task was difficult. Difficult tasks require more (unspecified) resources, leaving less 
available for subsequent tasks and taking time for the ‘resource’ to recover.  
 
Continuing with this question of relative task difficulty and how the tasks relate to 
each other, Allport’s passive interference account of asymmetry was eventually abandoned in 
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favour of a continuous (rather than transient) build up of interference from previous task set 
associations during switching (Wylie & Allport, 2000, described in more detail on page 46). 
This latter model has also consistently resisted the inclusion of an executive component. This 
is despite asymmetry-based evidence that activation and inhibition are not mutually exclusive 
descriptors, such as was proposed in Arbuthnott’s activation-inhibition hypothesis 
(Arbuthnott, 2008) and in Schneider and Anderson’s conclusion that both executive control 
and working memory are plausible candidates for their difficulty-related resource (Schneider 
& Anderson, 2010).  
 
Some years earlier to his work with proactive and continuous interference, Allport 
(1980) had posited that divided attention studies, while seeking to specify some generalised 
processing (resource) capacity limit, were often using tasks which instead imposed a ‘data-
limit’, with overlapping task requirements (for example listening to speech and reading text ) 
being responsible for much of the time costs. In seeking to avoid such a data-limit, Allport 
introduced an additional task-bound cost. Task switch inertia (TSI) might be an artefact of 
Stroop stimuli – asymmetric costs are reliant upon tasks of differing difficulty and, it seems, 
differing relative strength above a certain threshold (according to Yeung & Monsell (2003a). 
Therefore any interpretation of asymmetric costs must be equally task specific.  Enduring 
inhibition of the easier task has not remained a popular explanation for asymmetric switch 
cost (and indeed is not a necessary one, as evidenced by reverse switch cost asymmetry) but, 
as demonstrated by Arbuthnott (2008), it may well contribute to costs indirectly and in 
tandem with activation processes.  
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3.2 Task-set reconfiguration: Alternating runs 
The thesis now turns to look at a second theory of task switching, developed 
concomitantly to the TSI hypothesis of Allport, Styles & Hsieh (1994). This second 
reconsideration of Jersild’s work (Roger & Monsell, 1995), concurring with Jersild’s much 
earlier proposition that switch cost reflected active cognitive control – this was a hypothesis 
reliant on top-down processing. However, in the original task Jersild (1927) assumed no 
additional processes to executive control to be inherent in switching. As the thesis has already 
examined (page 21-24, relating to ‘switching and non-switching blocks (or lists) had very 
different requirements’) processes such as holding more than one task set active during 
switching and reconfiguring for every item during switching (when compared to non-
switching) were additional to the actual switch itself. Rogers and Monsell (1995) questioned 
the contribution to switch cost from the additional load on working memory of maintaining 
two tasks sets for the switching trial compared to one for the non-switching trial. They 
proposed an alternating runs design (AABBAABB…), comparing task repetitions (AA or 
BB) and task switches (AB) within a single trial block, ensuring comparable memory load for 
both repeats and switches, as two tasks sets had be maintained throughout7. Like Jersild they 
used letter and number decision tasks (vowel/ consonant, odd/ even), presenting stimuli pairs 
e.g. ‘G7’ consecutively and clockwise on a 2 x 2 grid, with grid position providing an explicit 
cue for the task to be carried out e.g. top row/ letter decision. The presentation pattern meant 
that two letter decisions were followed by two number decisions, and so on.  
 
                                                           
7
 In their original set of experiments, Rogers and Monsell were unable to directly address asymmetry (as per 
Allport, Styles & Hsieh (1994) Experiment 5) as tasks were deliberately chosen to be comparably difficult. 
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3.2.1 Residual switch cost 
Unlike Allport and colleagues, Rogers and Monsell posited the view that switch cost 
(at least for alternating runs of AABB...) reflected the input of intentional control, through the 
need to reconfigure the system between one task and the next. Their more regimented method 
of presenting stimuli (using a grid pattern to cue response) triggered specific response 
selection rather than task set selection. This method allowed the time between a response and 
the next stimulus (response to stimulus interval – RSI) to be manipulated and used as a 
measure of preparation time for the upcoming task. Switch cost decreased as RSI increased, 
but was not fully extinguishable even at the longest interval of 1,200 msec 8. Rogers and 
Monsell termed this practice-resistant portion of cost residual switch cost, located specifically 
to the first trial of a run (their Experiment 6). This was attributed to an exogenously 
controlled part of reconfiguration, which could only complete once stimuli were presented. 
Exogenous control of reconfiguration is manifest from “...the availability, frequency and 
recency of the alternative tasks afforded by the stimulus…” (Monsell, 2003, p.134). 
Endogenous control processes are afforded by internally generated goals. The exogenously 
controlled component was thus not able to benefit from any amount of practice time. While 
endogenous control was intentional, self initiated and a pre-stimulus preparatory process, 
exogenous control was an involuntary, stimulus-bound action. As noted by Monsell, "…there 
is ample evidence that stimuli can of themselves activate or evoke in a person a tendency to 
perform actions (or tasks) habitually associated with them, irrespective of prior intention, and 
sometimes in conflict with prior intentions" (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, p. 208). 
 
                                                           
8
 Interestingly Rogers & Monsell (1995) found no reduction in switch cost when RSI was randomly varied 
within a single block (Experiment 2), which they interpreted as conscious reluctance to reconfigure in advance 
when there was a possibility that the process would be interrupted due to an unpredictably short RSI, resonating 
with the ‘cognitive caution’ explanation of responses to bivalent stimuli (Woodward et al., 2003). 
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However, the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous components of 
control was under specified by Rogers and Monsell (see Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003). 
While an external ‘trigger’ for completion of the reconfiguration process fitted their residual 
cost data, the exact role of this trigger was not clear (their explanation stops short of a 
confirmatory feedback role). The notion of exogenous and endogenous control per se is well 
established (Pashler, Johnston & Ruthruff (2001) offer an extensive review), but definitive 
and consistent evidence supporting Rogers & Monsell’s exogenous completion hypothesis is 
elusive. Using tasks that differed in familiarity (unfamiliar or familiar), rule complexity 
(simple or complex) and presence of visual cues (present or absent), Rubinstein, Meyer & 
Evans (2001) determined what portions of the switching process are additive. They found that 
task switching and task difficulty (as indicated by the complexity of rules) are additive 
contributors to switch cost. They interpreted this as favouring a model that included a 
separate pre-stimulus goal shift (in line with Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and a rule activation 
process that was stimulus dependent. They found that this post-stimulus completion of 
reconfiguration did act in a confirmatory role to the pre-stimulus goal shift. As noted this was 
not established by Rogers & Monsell (1995).  
 
Further ‘circumstantial’ evidence can be taken from the identification of neurally 
separable processes for endogenous preparation and exogenously triggered modification of 
task sets (Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger & Carter, 2000). In this instance, lack of 
foreknowledge maximises exogenous reliance, although motor response selection and 
execution cannot be ruled out entirely as a major contributor to the parietal component of 
their model. In a separate study, Sohn & Carlson (2000) found foreknowledge facilitated 
faster task performance but did not extinguish switch cost, suggesting a role for the 
exogenous (stimulus) component. They proposed the exogenous ‘controller’ facilitated 
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application of the endogenously triggered current task set by completing disengagement of 
the previous task set. In this model, residual costs reflect the need for the fully prepared 
current task to wait for confirmation that the previous task is no longer applicable, rather than 
confirmation that the current task is applicable. The exogenous component, while seemingly 
necessary and present in residual costs, is separable from the preparation stage. While 
concurring with the notion of reconfiguration as a “…sort of mental ‘gear changing’…” 
(Monsell, 2003, p.135), the exogenous element of the task ‘clears a path’ for the gear change 
rather than finalising it – an exogenous-disengagement hypothesis.  
 
3.2.2 Response selection, cue processing and asymmetry as sources for residual switch 
cost 
As an alternative to this somewhat piecemeal picture of the role exogenous control 
might take, attempting to eliminate residual costs altogether would seem a more 
straightforward approach to defining this exogenous-completion hypothesis. Monsell has 
described such attempts as “...rare and...problematic” (Elchlepp, Lavric’ Mizon & Monsell, 
2012, p.1138), citing only two examples9 (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck and 
Demanet, 2007; Lien, Ruthruff, Remington & Johnston, 2005). Verbruggen and colleagues 
were able to reduce (and in one case completely remove, Experiment 2) residual switch cost 
by reducing the availability of the cue during preparation. Short cue presentation forced the 
cue to be used early on in the process, purportedly encouraging early completion of advance 
preparation. It was hypothesised that residual costs were cue- rather than stimulus-bound. The 
criticism from Elchlepp et al. was that the potential existed for a confound between the task 
switch cost and the cue switch cost, a phenomenon identified by Monsell & Mizon (2006) 
(cue switch costs are discussed in more detail on p.46 of this document). Such confounds are 
                                                           
9
 Perhaps in itself an example of the overly-judicious choice of literature so decried by Altmann (2000). 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
43 
 
reported to be overcome by the use of two cues per task (Monsell & Mizon, 2006) – the 
Verbruggen study used only one. However, there is not complete agreement on the 
contribution of cue switches to switch costs (see Altmann 2006: Schneider & Logan, 2007).  
 
A second possible source for residual cost is as an artefact of the response selection 
process. Examining response-switches as well as task-switches and task-repeats, Meiran 
(2000) interpreted residual costs as a reflection of post-stimulus/ post-switch response-bound 
processes. Costs are accrued after the stimulus is presented and after the switch is made – 
residual costs are bound to response selection. According to Meiran’s model, residual costs 
reflect reconfiguration of ‘response set’, associations made between specific responses and 
salient features of the current task, for example ‘press Z key’ might denote ‘small’ in a size 
decision task and ‘red’ in a colour decision task. The response set is reconfigured separately 
from reconfiguration of task set; TSR can occur in advance (in response to a cue or 
foreknowledge) but response set reconfiguration must by necessity occur after the current 
task has been completed. Similarly, Hunt and Klein (2002) also linked residual costs to 
response selection. They were able to extinguish residual costs, by affecting a ‘hyper-
compatibility’ of response and stimulus. The task/ response involved looking towards or 
away from a shaded box – they proposed that this bypassed the motor response selection 
stage, drastically reducing the need to actively select a response. The S-R mapping is so 
strong that very little attention or memory is required to exact it. Such S-R mappings have 
previously been described to include tasks with high ideomotor compatibility (such as 
repeating something that is heard, Greenwald (1970)) or those with highly overlearned 
responses10 (Mowbray & Rhodes, 1959). Alternatively, the hyper-compatibility may be so 
                                                           
10
 As such this has resonance with the Continuous Series II verbal switching task which uses verbal overlearned 
sequences  
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close as to skip rule activation (rather than response selection), causing completion to be 
triggered by the cue rather the stimulus; the net effect would be approximately the same, 
albeit mediated by cue rather than response.  
 
A further example of response dependent residual cost also been cited by González, 
Milán, Pereda & Hochel (2005), using a pre-switch task-related response (key press during 
inter-trial interval) to extrapolate processes related to the response set. The aim was to see 
whether residual costs could be eliminated by an extra response – this had the effect of 
determining how much response selection contributed to costs. The extra response was 
completed before completing the switch trial. An extra key was pressed during the inter-trial 
interval in order to proceed with the task – this time was seen as an opportunity for task 
preparation. Inclusion of this extra ‘task-free’ response resulted in an elimination of residual 
switch cost. It was concluded that the additional response was enough to trigger the 
completion of reconfiguration – it was making a response rather than making a task-specific 
response that triggered this. This effect only occurred when there was a choice to be made 
between responses (either related to the two tasks or not) – it did not occur when a non-
choice response of pressing the space bar was made. The supposition was made that only 
tasks requiring different S-R decisions could result in such an effect. However, the 
application of this interpretation is again limited to particular circumstances. Meiran’s 
interpretation, of residual costs being response bound, is only applicable for tasks in which 
there is an arbitrary additional response requirement, such as using the same response to 
mean different things for different tasks. In those using verbal responses e.g. Arbuthnott & 
Frank (2000) and those where task and response sets are intrinsically bound, this response-
bound hypothesis is negated. An example of such binding would be Gurd’s (2000) use of 
sequential incremental switching between verbal categories such as numbers and months 
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where, for example, the response ‘Tuesday’ is intrinsic to the category ‘days’. Although these 
are overlearned sequences they are not compatible with Hunt & Klein’s definition of ‘hyper-
compatibility’, where the S-R mapping (including those which are overlearned) is so strong 
as to dispense with the need for active response selection. This is because of the need to 
update the category on every response – responses are explicitly bound to tasks but not 
hyper-compatible. Indeed, caution should also be exercised in interpreting evidence from 
‘cognitively stripped-down’ tasks such as Hunt & Klein’s (2002) which are so exogenously 
bound as to almost eliminate the need to actively impose switching. 
 
Finally, credence should be given to the notion that asymmetry is a potential source of 
residual-type costs without recourse to an exogenous reconfiguration component (Hübner, 
Kluwe, Luna-Rodriguez and Peters, 2004). Response repetitions, particularly of the more 
difficult task, inflated switch cost in such a way as to mimic results attributed to exogenous 
reconfiguration, due to a lack of control over the task sequence. If residual costs are greater 
for more complex tasks needing more reconfiguration then an exogenous account can be 
accepted. In the Hübner study, complexity and familiarity of S-R rules was varied. It was 
found that if tasks were more complex or less familiar there was no increase in switch cost. 
This was taken to exclude an explanation using exogenously based reconfiguration. In 
particular, stimulus repetitions (excluded from the analysis) were found to inflate switch 
costs, particularly for more difficult tasks with increased difficulty of response selection. It 
was posited that inclusion of such repetitions in the wider literature inflated switch cost – 
inclusion of such repetitions, particularly for more difficult tasks, could lead to erroneous 
conclusions of residual costs. Hübner concludes that task switch costs relate to different 
processing strategies on switches and repeats rather than exogenous reconfiguration or 
proactive interference, stating that a lack of control over the task sequence may account for 
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residual costs. As previously discussed, sequential effects can mask task contribution in 
asymmetry (Schneider & Anderson, 2010), adding weight to just such a faux effect. 
Arbuthnott & Frank (2000) have suggested the need to overcome previous inhibition of a 
current task (‘backward inhibition’ as described on page 53) may be a major component of 
residual costs. Switch costs in that study were significant for series of two tasks but not of 
three, suggesting inhibition dissipated over time rather than being entirely stimulus bound. 
Paradoxically, Sohn & Carlson (2000) found that performance was faster with foreknowledge 
for the task but that switch cost was not reduced, leading them to conclude that switch cost is 
dependent upon reconfiguration rather than inadequate preparation time.  
 
In summary, Monsell says attempts to eliminate residual costs are not consistent and 
the evidence would seem to support that. Attempts to do so seem reliant on potentially 
confounding issues such as cue presentation. Selection of response rather than task set can be 
limited by a lack of cognitive input to the task (Hunt & Klein’s ‘hyper-compatibility’) and 
does not apply to tasks where the response is implicitly bound to the task (e.g. Gurd, 1995). 
Hübner and colleagues state that inclusion of repetitions may inflate switch cost in a way that 
mimics residual costs particularly for more difficult or asymmetric tasks.  However, like the 
original TSI hypothesis (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) this explanation is limited by its 
choice of stimuli. Not all studies include more difficult tasks; in particular the study which 
proposes reconfiguration as a source of cost, Rogers & Monsell (1995) chose tasks to be of 
comparable difficulty. The verbal paradigm of Gurd (1995) also includes entirely comparable 
tasks, those being overlearned sequences. It would seem that while there are examples of 
eliminating residual costs these are far from consistent.  
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4 The failure to engage hypothesis of residual switch cost 
One further prominent explanation of residual costs is the suggestion that residual 
switch costs are due to a failure to engage (FTE) advance preparation time (for a proportion 
of trials) rather than an inability to complete reconfiguration endogenously (a reliance on 
exogenous completion) (De Jong, 2000). In this explanation advance preparation is seen as 
optional and advantageous, rather than a necessary requirement as advocated by Rogers and 
Monsell. Advance preparation may be faster, but reconfiguring after the stimulus has arrived 
achieves the same outcome, noted by De Jong as a slower, more accurate process. Analysis of 
data to confirm the FTE hypothesis involves considering the whole distribution of RT rather 
than just means, in order to find the instances where there is a failure to engage with advance 
preparation. Like Hübner et al. (2004) who questioned the inclusion of repetitions in the last 
section of this thesis, this questions the calculation of switch cost for the alternating runs 
paradigm as masking some of the effects. Long RSI should therefore produce a mixture of 
outcomes rather than just evidence of residual costs on every first trial.  
 
Failure to engage may be due to a failure to grasp the advantages of preparation 
(results gained by Allport et al. (1994) and Roger & Monsell (1995) are cited as possible 
examples of this). There needs to be an additional intention to use the advance preparation 
time, extra to the intention to change task set. The intention must be retrieved at the 
appropriate time to be used. Individuals need to hold in memory an associative cue-action 
pairing in order to subsequently retrieve the intention for action – in such a pairing the action 
would be taking advantage of advance preparation time. It is possible that in some 
circumstances such a pairing is never made. This is proposed to be due to a failure to 
appreciate the benefits of advance preparation time. It is posited that this may account for 
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studies where preparation has not found to be advantageous (Allport, Styles, and Hsieh 1994; 
Rogers and Monsell 1995, Experiment 2). A second reason for failure to engage is that of a 
low threshold representation of the cue and its associated task (S-R mappings). In this case 
the activation level or strength of the cue-action association is too low for the cue to act as a 
trigger to prepare in advance. There may be several reasons for this – low subjective utility of 
the expected benefits of the action; limited capacity for maintaining intentions in WM; the 
effort related to maintaining the cue-action representation at a high level of readiness. De 
Jong notes the possibility that instructional specificity may have a part to play in this; his 
instructions explicitly directed participants to make use of the RSI to prepare, a method also 
employed by Altmann (2004, Experiment 3).  
 
Failure to take advantage of preparation time is also noted to occur when only one 
option for preparation time is available (Altmann, 2004). Residual costs are said to occur only 
in situations (e.g. experimental procedures) where the amount of time to prepare is varied. In 
light of this variation of available preparation times, the cognitive system will take advantage 
of the longer preparation time (SOA/ RSI). When there is no variation in available 
preparation times the system will fail to make use of this time, even if the length of time 
matches that which gave an advantage in varied experimental conditions. Both De Jong’s and 
Altmann’s descriptions bear close resemblance to the ‘cognitive caution’ explanation for 
bivalency effects (Woodward et al., 2003), whereby inclusion of a small number of bivalent 
stimuli in a univalent switching block results in a pervasive slowing on all trials regardless of 
bi- or univalent status. A mix of stimulus affordances or preparation availability appears to 
have a similar effect. The bi- and univalent mix employed by Woodward and colleagues 
would have differing requirements for response-set reconfiguration, as in the Meiran (2000) 
model – there switches and repeats contributed differentially to switch cost. De Jong proposes 
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that reconfiguration in failed preparation trials occurs as a post-stimulus event, seen by 
Meiran as the site of consequential response reconfiguration. This is in contrast to the 
stimulus led completion of reconfiguration proposed by Rogers & Monsell (1995). It seems 
difficult to rule out even partial response bound inflation in such mixture-models; while 
response-set reconfiguration as proposed by Meiran may not be a sole source of residual 
costs, it would seem more likely as a contributory factor if we are to accept such a mixture of 
preparation (or Woodward’s response affordance) during switching. Acceptance of De Jong’s 
model would seem to imply the need for this element of post-switch disambiguation and thus 
an alternative (or dichotomous) source of cost. 
 
However, De Jong’s explanation has not gone unchallenged – Monsell has replicated 
key elements of the study with quite different outcomes. In addressing De Jong’s model, 
Nieuwenhuis & Monsell (2002) were able to reduce but not extinguish residual costs by 
maximising motivation to engage advance preparation, noting “…our carefully instructed, 
highly motivated, young, bright, and nonfatigued participants, were still failing to engage… It 
is interesting to speculate what one could do to increase the probability of preparation 
further.” (Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002, p.91). De Jong’s finding of zero residual cost was 
linked, they speculated, to the presence of highly explicit cues11. If these were a necessary 
component for successful endogenous activation in advance of the stimulus, they would in 
effect constitute a variation of their own exogenous completion hypothesis (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). The explicit nature of the cue (e.g. the cue containing the two colours that 
have to be distinguished between for the task) might constitute an exogenous driving force to 
successfully engage intention activation on all trials. While this proposition does no more to 
specify the role of the exogenous controller from their earlier work (other than to allude to its 
                                                           
11
 Monsell (2005) later noted that he had still not seen evidence of such an effect 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
50 
 
necessity), it does suggest another possible contributor to the zero cost result (De Jong, 
2000). It can be argued that, in the presence of highly explicit cues, all of the complexity 
requirements (and thus much of the control requirements) of the task are stripped away, 
resulting not in exogenously-controlled completion of endogenously-activated control, but 
removal of an entire processing step in the task, as previously noted in relation to Hunt & 
Klein’s (2002) hyper-compatibility hypothesis.  
 
There are further challenges to the FTE hypothesis. De Jong’s model has been 
criticised for insufficient demonstration that repeat trials are fully prepared (Kiesel et al., 
2010). Indeed, Meiran & Chorev (2005) believe a single preparation process to be inadequate 
and cite a second ‘phasic alertness’ process (potentially enhanced by increased incentive) as 
responsible for extinguishing residual costs. Phasic alertness is the optimisation of response 
readiness subsequent to a cue in a cued RT task (Sturm & Willmes, 2001). Lien, Ruthruff, 
Remington and Johnston (2005) sought to increase incentive even further by applying a rigid 
response time limit (cost-reflecting responses violated the limit and resulted in errors), with 
highly explicit positive and negative visual feedback embedded within a game scenario12. 
They concluded that partial rather than full preparation was possible (by virtue of preparation 
occurring for only one task relevant S-R mapping13, not all) and that it occurred on all trials. 
It is possible that failure to fully utilise preparation time occurs at a more intrinsic level than 
that suggested by De Jong, thus not fulfilling his ‘all or nothing’ trial preparation 
requirement, or that preparation is not a single time-dependent process.  
 
                                                           
12
 Nieuwenhuis & Monsell (2002) had used a performance related monetary incentive, with negative feedback 
on repeated errors. Lien et al. (2005) believed the avoidance of negative feedback within their game scenario 
task to be a more rigorous incentive. Feedback consisted of a yellow smiley face (positive) and an affected 
explosion (negative) for Experiments 2 and 3. 
13
 They manipulated instructional presentation for three S-R mappings (left, centre, right) to take advantage of  
left-right reading direction and encouraging preparation for the first presented. 
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5 Mixing costs 
The issue of repeat trials, however, has further relevance than just an unspecified 
element of the FTE hypothesis (De Jong, 2000) and the thesis will now turn to look at the 
relevance of these repeats in more detail. It has been proposed that an additional source for 
time costs in the alternating runs paradigm is that of mixing costs (Fagot, 1994) 14, the 
reaction time difference between repetitions in switching blocks and pure task blocks. These 
are in effect the time cost of mixing tasks together but not switching between them. While 
this would potentially inflate measures of general or whole-task switch cost, it could also 
render mixed block repeats a questionable basis for calculating local costs (see Kiesel et al., 
2010). A method used to counter additional working memory load during switching is the 
alternating runs paradigm (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Wylie, Murray, Javitt and Foxe 
(2009) maintain the value of separate pure task blocks (as per Jersild’s alternating tasks) as a 
baseline in extrapolating cue and task switch costs in mixed blocks.  
 
Mixing costs were initially thought to reflect working memory load in relation to the 
number of task sets (Los, 1996). More recently this has been refined to task or response 
conflicts attributable to the use of bivalent stimuli (Rubin & Meiran, 2005) – mixing costs 
were not found in switching trials using univalent stimuli (their Experiment 1). This is 
attributed to competition rather than merely having to hold the task sets in working memory. 
The less predictable the set of S-R mappings for the task, for example as demonstrated by 
Koch, Prinz and Allport (2005) (also Poljac, Koch & Bekkering, 2009) using consistent and 
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 There is a notable lack of consistency in the definition of mixing costs which can be problematic in comparing 
studies on the phenomenon. For example, Schneider & Anderson (2010, p.1875, emphasis is mine) “...mixing 
costs, which are performance decrements for easy stimuli in mixed blocks (consisting of easy and difficult 
stimuli for the same task) compared with pure blocks (consisting of easy stimuli only)”. Kiesal et al. (2010, 
p.850) state that: “Mixing costs reflect the “general” costs associated with task switching compared with 
performance in single-task situations” – general costs reflect both mixing and switch costs e.g. Verhaegen and 
Hoyer (2007) 
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varied mappings, the greater the mixing costs. This was viewed as indicative of involuntary 
interference for both repeats and switches, in line with earlier inhibition-based accounts of 
switch cost (e.g. Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994; Wylie & Allport, 2000). Later work (Phillip, 
Kalinich, Koch & Schobotz, 2008) further defined mixing costs as reflecting conflict 
resolution on the current trial. Switch costs were found to reflect both this current trial 
conflict and carryover of proactive interference from the preceding trial. Thus mixing costs 
do appear to contribute to switch costs. 
 
However, mixing costs in the absence of time switch costs15 (and vice versa, see 
Allport & Wylie, 2000) as reported by Koch et al. (2005), may be indicative of a task or 
response-type specific phenomenon. More specifically, mixing costs were found in the 
absence of RT switch costs, although switch related error costs were found. Mixing costs 
were greater for bivalent than univalent stimuli. It was proposed that these bivalent mixing 
costs reflected appropriate task and or/ response retrieval. This relates again to Meiran’s 
(2000) response (rather than task set) selection explanation of residual costs. Thus there is 
further overlap between mixing costs and specifically the residual portion of switch cost. To 
take this selection idea further, as an alternative to localised ‘inhibitionist’ interference 
Steinhauser and Hübner (2005) suggested sequential selection for task components rather 
than task set or individual tasks. Mixing costs reflect a sequential process of elimination of 
irrelevant components with each choice further restraining the eventual response16. Control is 
data driven, which would be sufficient for repetitions as the task doesn’t change – the 
response is afforded by a repeat of the last one made. This cognitively economical ‘increasing 
reduction’ explanation could be plausible as a low-level switching mechanism (in effect, 
                                                           
15
 Error switch costs were reported. 
16
 Whether the selection process is additional to (Mayr, 2001) or slower than (Hübner ,Futterer & Steinhauser, 
2001) is not definitively demonstrated, but both possibilities are cited as plausible from the data.  
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treating everything as a repeat until proven otherwise). This would encompass the assertion 
by Phillip et al. (2008) that interference responsible for mixing cost also contributes to switch 
cost, without having to accept this interference at the level of task set, thus still 
accommodating a role for reconfiguration.  
 
Mixing costs therefore appear, with a degree of consensus, to be indicative of 
competition between task related representations at some level. However, while the 
underlying processes may additionally contribute to switch cost, the two are seemingly 
separable phenomena and so do not necessitate extensive reliance on resolution of 
competitive S-R mappings (as opposed to reconfiguration) as a source of practice-
ameliorated slowing (see Wylie & Allport (2000) and Wylie, Javitt & Foxe (2003) as 
exponents of this competitive model). Evidence for separable mechanisms comes, for 
example, from behavioural dissociation from restart costs, with mixing costs alone 
benefitting from predictability (Poljac et al., 2009). Restart cost is a first trial cost effect 
regardless of whether that trial is a switch or repeat (Allport & Wylie, 2000). There is also 
identification of functionally distinct neural mechanisms17 attributed to different forms of 
control indicated for mixing and switching costs (Braver, Reynolds and Donaldson, 2003).  
 
However, in a study using ERP data, Wylie, Murray, Javitt and Foxe (2009) say the 
same mechanisms are responsible for mixing and switching, albeit with differences in the 
strength of involvement. They found ERP amplitude differences18 between pure and repeat/ 
switch trials but not between repeat and switch. Thus they further expound an associative 
                                                           
17
 Right anterior PFC in relation to mixing costs, lateral PFC in relation to advance use of cues and left superior 
parietal in relation to switching between tasks. 
18
 Some numerical rather than statistical similarities between pure and repeat trials were apparent. 
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competition and control-free model of task switching, by virtue of the absence of competition 
during pure task trials and presence of competition in both mixing and switching. Fronto-
parietal involvement is interpreted as more competition than control oriented. That mixing 
costs (and a proportion of switch costs) are suggestive of associative competition seems a 
safe assumption on the current evidence. However, disregarding the potential role of 
reconfiguration (without demonstrating its absence) on the basis that this process also 
contributes to switch cost does not seem so safe.  
 
6 Inhibitory Accounts of Switch Cost: Revising the Inertial Account 
– Associative Interference and Restart Costs 
Mixing costs therefore appear to be contributory to residual switch costs, yet this 
explanation of costs alone is not able to discount the plausibility of a reconfiguration account. 
One hypothesis that sought to do this was the associative interference account of Wylie & 
Allport (2000). They sought to address this enduring issue of residual switch cost using 
similar Stroop style stimuli as before (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) and Monsell’s 
alternating runs paradigm. While there was still evidence of forward interference, they 
conceded that TSI (and, indeed, all pre-existing theories pertaining to switch cost) could not 
adequately account for such costs under conditions allowing for adequate task preparation (as 
was noted by Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This was particularly as Allport and colleagues 
demonstrated interference effects in non-switching baseline trials. They had in effect moved 
from an inhibition to a retrieval-based account of switch cost, stating that “…a new 
hypothesis, based on the learned associations between stimulus representative representations 
and response representations, does very much better.” (Wylie & Allport, 2000, p.231). In a 
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complete revision of the original TSI theory, they proposed model interference occurred not 
just because of lingering overactive control from the preceding task, but because of 
previously activated (and now erroneous) stimulus-response (S-R) mappings to the non-
current bivalent attribute. For example, if a digit stimulus afforded both a subtraction and 
addition task, the previously associated subtraction attribute might interfere with associating 
the stimulus with the current addition attribute.  Every time a task is associated with a 
particular stimulus they become bound, not only to the particular response for that S-R 
mapping but also to other properties such as the context and goal of the task (Monsell, 2005). 
Associative interference is proposed to be a major contributor to residual switch cost. This 
was demonstrated by Waszak, Hommel & Allport (2003). They used a stimulus set of object 
pictures with an object name superimposed, the task being to name either the object or the 
word, using an alternating runs design. Costs were greater for words that had previously been 
picture named, even after a gap of more than one hundred trials between the two related 
events. This can be said to occur for retrieval of task set rather than just retrieval of task 
response because it happened for congruent stimuli, where the same response was made on 
the previous trial – if it were only the response being retrieved there would be no difference 
in switch cost (Monsell, 2005). As such this would seem to have resonance again with 
accounts that report greater bivalent costs, such as Koch et al.’s (2005) report of greater 
mixing costs for bivalent stimuli. Yeung and Monsell (2003) later provided a reciprocal 
concession that TSI (not associative interference) was a contributory factor in switch cost but 
only in circumstances where both the preceding and upcoming tasks had been recently 
practiced. Associative interference was viewed as occurring only under certain circumstances 
e.g. during switching for Stroop word reading, but for switching and repeats in Stroop colour 
naming (Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003).  
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
56 
 
The associative interference model claimed that these negative priming costs (or 
“…negative transfer…” Allport & Wylie, 2000, p.64) imposed significant and enduring 
impedance in the face of S-R mapping change. However, Allport and Wylie proffered the 
caveat that their interference based model may be confined to explaining results from Stroop-
style tasks where such a reversal of mappings was implicit. Meiran’s (2000) response-bound 
source of residual cost implied competition between meaningful response dimensions as 
problematic, so Allport’s model may indeed be artefactual to Stroop-style tasks. Monsell 
(2005) concurs that associative interference occurs at a broader level (and thus contributes to 
switch cost in more general terms) than that of response selection, citing evidence (using non-
word stimuli, Monsell, Taylor & Murphy, 2001) that Stroop interference arises in part at the 
level of the whole task set for reading per se. Rather than just the response for the word 
reading/ colour naming competing, there is actually competition between task sets. This 
notion arose from the finding that non-colour words interfere with the naming of the ink 
colour. Words (regardless of their frequency) offered no greater interference than 
pseudowords. Unprimed interference was concluded to be activated by task set rather than 
response tendency. Any word prompted the act of reading, which in turn interfered with 
colour naming. Priming was interpreted to supplement rather than be solely responsible for 
this process. Additionally Rogers & Monsell (1995) found faster RT for neutral than 
congruent stimuli which (says Monsell) can only be explained by interference occurring for 
the task set – enduring activation would otherwise have facilitated response selection for the 
congruent stimuli. Monsell (2005) also offers the observation that associative interference, at 
whatever level, cannot be the only determinant of residual costs as repeated bivalent stimuli 
would inevitably become equally associated with both task sets. Any long term associations 
would seemingly cancel each other out.  Stroop stimuli are an unusually dominant bivalent 
pairing.  
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
57 
 
In addition to Monsells’ assertions, it is of note that Gurd (1995) viewed non-Stroop 
verbal task switching (producing words from alternate overlearned sequences) as inherently 
different in its requirements from Stroop switching. Ward, Roberts and Phillips (2001) 
identified fundamentally different mechanisms underlying Stroop switching as oppose to 
partially shared mechanisms relating to non-Stroop switching tasks. Similarly, Waszak & 
Hommel (2007) identified discrepancies in comparison to their earlier work (Waszak, 
Hommel & Allport, 2003), specifically a failure to incur negative priming from single 
stimulus presentation, which they attributed to the level of encoding associated with the 
Stroop-style presentation used in the earlier work. Although Allport acknowledged the 
limitations in his earlier work presenting the TSI hypothesis (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994), 
the adherence to Stroop-style switching may offer further restrictions to the application of his 
later model.  
 
In considering Allport’s proposal of reversal (i.e. swapping between one and the 
other) in S-R mappings as a retrieval-based source for switch cost, it should be noted that 
Gade & Koch (2007) have linked such a build up of associations to explicit cues as well as 
stimuli. They found the same reversal-costly effect for arbitrarily associated cues, such as a 
shape indicating a consonant decision. This suggests the effect may not be entirely task 
bound, although the potential translational requirement of such cues has been cited as an 
inflationary contributor to the long-term inhibitory costs found in backward inhibition19 
(Grange & Houghton (2010), Houghton, Pritchard & Grange (2009)). Although Wylie and 
Allport (2000) didn’t switch cues, Waszak, Hommel and Allport (2003) later extended the 
costliness of such mappings to all operations related to completing the switch and achieving 
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 An explanation of backward inhibition is given on page 61. 
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its goal, not just S-R mappings. This is confirmed by Monsell’s (2005) assertion that task 
context and goal as well as S-R mappings relate to associations.  
 
After Allport’s original presentation of associative interference, Gilbert and Shallice 
(2002) offered a computational replication of Allport’s Stroop-style task using a parallel 
distributed processing (PDP) architecture. They implemented a proportionate carryover of 
unit states into subsequent trials to mimic the persistence of previously activated dominant 
task sets as proposed by Allport et al. (1994). They used the rationale that if implementation 
of this method could duplicate human behavioural data on the task, this would negate the 
need for an exogenous element in explaining switch costs. Their production of a number of 
phenomena (switch and restart costs, asymmetric costs in both directions, first-trial 
confinement) was proposed as support for the associative interference account as a panacean 
model of task switch costs. Later work by Yeung (2010) has located carryover effects such as 
those shown by the PDP model to the response selection stage and has suggested that the 
contribution inevitably occurs in combination with (and secondary to) exogenously driven 
processes. Competition between task sets of the type posited by Allport is subsequent to a 
failure to activate the upcoming task set. While Gilbert and Shallice’s data undoubtedly 
supports the associative interference model, it would seem that this model is specifically 
confined to response selection in differentially dominant competing task sets as exist in 
Stroop. Indeed, Baddeley, Chincotta & Adlan (2001) fund no evidence for associative 
interference in Jersild’s list paradigm. Interaction between switch cost and a concurrent task 
rules out negative priming – such a hypothesis would predict additive secondary effects with 
an equal cost across all conditions.                               
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In summary the associative interference hypothesis seeks to extend the original TSI 
hypothesis, supplanting transient interference from the just performed task to long term 
interference from competing S-R mappings. Associative interference does, of course, only 
apply to tasks that use bivalent stimuli. Such an account cannot explain why switch costs 
(including residual switch costs) occur using univalent stimuli as demonstrated by Rogers & 
Monsell (1995) and Ruthruff, Remington & Johnston (2001). Clearly in this instance there is 
no associative competition between responses. Further, as pointed out by Monsell (2003) 
there are also instances where no switch costs occur for bivalent stimuli – if associative 
interference is a factor it should be consistently present. An example of such a lack of 
bivalent costs is from Hunt & Klein (2002) where switching was between prosaccades and 
antisaccades (visual movement towards or away from) to peripheral targets. Such a design 
should produce the type of interference posited by Allport – why does it only seem to occur 
for particular types of bivalent stimuli? Although there is some computational evidence 
(Gilbert & Shallice, 2002) supporting the negative priming effect, Yeung (2010) says that the 
effects from the PDP model are related only to response selection. As Monsell (2005) had 
earlier noted cost effects must be related to task-set switching rather than just the response 
tendency.  As such the associative interference model is again a limited explanation of task 
switch effects, bound specifically to Stroop-like stimuli which must be seen as a special class 
of bivalency.  
 
6.1 Restart costs 
Is the apparently Stroop-limited associative interference hypothesis completely 
inapplicable for non-Stroop stimuli? At the same time as proposing the negative priming 
account, Allport found evidence for a cost related to the first trial of a run, regardless of 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
60 
 
whether it was switch or repeat (Allport & Wylie, 2000). This was an additional contributor 
to residual switch cost and one which does not rely on competition between response or task 
set (although it was proposed to work with such interference). As previously discussed, the 
alternating runs paradigm revealed that switch cost was only increased for the first trial of a 
run, which Rogers and Monsell offered as evidence against Allport’s passive TSI account. 
The TSI account required interference to persist over several trials (although Allport 
retrospectively asserted that TSI was not inconsistent with some kind of active goal setting 
element of task switching behaviour (Allport & Wylie, 2000). However, Allport returned to 
this ‘first trial confinement’ of residual switch cost. Continuing with Stroop style switching 
and again using alternating runs, Allport and Wylie (2000) found this ‘first trial’ or restart 
effect to be evident also on the first trial of non-switching runs. Additionally, they proposed 
that the effect was compounded (for bivalent stimuli previously encountered for the 
alternative task) by associative interference from competing S-R mappings. Renewed first-
trial slowing occurred after a gap of as little as two seconds. Restart of the same task (a 
repeat) was interpreted as triggering renewed interference from earlier competing S-R 
mappings. Thus the restart cost also triggered associative interference. Rather than this restart 
effect being evidence against interference persisting over time (as cited by Rogers & Monsell, 
1995), Allport and Wylie maintained that restart costs were a feature of starting a set of 
speeded responses (quite separately from switching), often compounded by previously learnt 
stimulus associations (these augmented repeats of restart costs were termed the rebound 
effect).  
 
Another issue that comes up with restart costs is that they can be asymmetric (harder 
for the easier of two tasks) although this time such asymmetry is not explained by the TSI 
hypothesis. Asymmetric restart costs in the absence of switching were incompatible with the 
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original TSI concept of both switch cost and asymmetry being due to the repeated application 
of dominance-related task set perseveration. The associative interference model accounted for 
this mid-task first trial effect as the long term result of previously laid down associative 
learning of S-R mappings. A variation of this explanation comes from Bryck & Mayr (2008), 
who also found asymmetric restart costs – they had easy (E) and difficult (D) tasks with long 
(--) and short (-) gaps in between, presented as follows E-E—E-E—D-D—D-D—E-E—E-
E—D-D—D-D... Restart costs on repeats after a long gap were greater for the easier task. 
They say this cannot be explained by models such as the Gilbert and Shallice (2002) PDP 
model which relies on switches (not repeats) to produce asymmetries. Both task switches and 
delayed repetitions require LTM retrieval, specifically encoded as examples of prior task 
performance. The more control that is required to perform a task (for example, a difficult 
task), the more examples are encoded. When retrieval occurs, interference would come from 
irrelevant encoding examples – these would be more likely for the easier task as it had fewer 
correct encoding examples. However, Schneider & Anderson (2010) point out that the easier 
task is likely to have many more encoding examples from outside of the experimental 
structure and should therefore be dominant in LTM. The same could be said for the 
associative interference account, with previously laid down associations actually being more 
broad-ranging than the confines of the switching scenario. As such neither necessarily 
explains the occurrence of asymmetry.  
 
7 Backward Inhibition 
Both the TSI hypothesis and associative interference have been shown to be limited to 
Stroop style bivalent stimuli. However, there are other explanations reliant on effects from 
inhibition of a previous trial that go beyond this two-task bivalent paradigm. Using three 
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tasks, the backward inhibition hypothesis (Mayr & Keele, 2000) shows that switching to a 
recently inhibited task is more costly. In terms of practice effects on switch cost, Yeung and 
Monsell (2003) note that a TSI-based hypothesis would predict larger switch costs for a 
recently practiced task (the unpractised task being the ‘weaker’ one). An associative 
interference-based hypothesis would predict smaller costs for a recently practiced task as S-R 
mappings would still be current. However, persisting task set inhibition, as well as activation, 
can impinge upon subsequent switches (Baddeley et al., 1998). A number of studies have 
looked at inhibition and practice more closely, specifically the phenomenon of greater switch 
cost and error being incurred by a switch to a recently performed task than to one performed 
not so recently. This type of sequentially applied inhibition, so-called backward inhibition, 
was first demonstrated by Mayr and Keele (2000). By including three tasks in the switching 
scenario it is possible to compare the effects of both one and two intermediate tasks (e.g. A-
B-A and C-B-A), thus manipulating the recency of the task being switched to. In A-B-A 
sequences, the more recently applied inhibition of task A still persists, whereas in C-B-A 
sequences it has had time to dissipate. Mayr and Keele purportedly demonstrated this effect 
to be confined to top down control of switching, to be robust in the presence of 
foreknowledge  and to be contributory rather than additional to exogenously driven ‘shift 
costs’ (as per Monsell). 
 
Mayr & Keele (2000) had used an odd-one-out task with tasks varying on colour, 
orientation or motion. They used verbal cues indicating the next dimension to be attended to, 
which would need translating from ‘orientation’ to discerning which is the anomalous 
representation of this. However, for presentation of a cue which directly relates to what needs 
to be done i.e. a picture of the target item, the need to actually do anything in terms of active 
switching is largely superseded (as Logan noted “Executive control is the instrument of 
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volition” (Logan, 2004, p.218)). Mayr & Keele believed that backward inhibition occurred 
only in the context of endogenously driven switching and was a complex variant of Allport’s 
negative priming. Top down processing was instigated by the verbal cue, bottom up by 
merely having to find the odd one out in a display with no indication as to what dimension 
should be attended to. While the stimuli were switched between trials so that the odd one out 
followed the C-B-A sequence, there was no affordance for active preparation. While this may 
be dubious in terms of being classified as true task switching, to an extent it allows analysis 
of sequential task set activation, though there must necessarily be increased interference from 
all task sets on every ‘switch’. While ‘switching’ may have been sequential, the likelihood is 
that competition between all task sets was more equivalent on each trial and so potentially 
masked any possible backward inhibition effect. The task required participants to look for the 
odd one out, which happens to be on a different parameter each time. Task set activation and 
search was forced to an extent by including an additional distracter on one of the parameters, 
which participants were told to disregard, but switching is ultimately too passive. Backward 
inhibition is not found because task sets are comparably active on each trial. 
 
In line with Allport and Wylie (2000), Koch (e.g. Schuch & Koch, 2003; Koch, Gade 
& Philipp, 2004; Philipp & Koch, 2005) proposes that inhibition is applied to response 
processes.  For example, backward inhibition was shown to be extinguishable when no 
response was elicited for task B in an A-B-A sequence, using a go/ no-go approach (Schuch 
& Koch, 2003). Although interference at other stages is acknowledged, Koch, Gade, Schuch 
and Philipp (2010) suggest that interference occurs primarily at the response stage. Later 
work has refined this view, suggesting that it is not only response processes but those 
processes that contribute the most interference which are the target for inhibition. It has been 
proposed that backward inhibition relates to ‘cue-target translation’ (Houghton, Pritchard and 
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Grange, 2009). This is the need to convert task-cues (indicators of what task to apply to the 
upcoming stimuli, for example looking for an angled/ shaded/ outlined shape in a visual 
search) into a representation of what the task actually is. The degree of translation required 
from the cue to the target determines the amount of backward inhibition related cost. 
Externalising the site of translation by increasing the explicitness of the cue (and excluding 
Koch’s response-based inhibition by maintaining identical task response requirements) 
allowed Houghton and colleagues to remove the effects of backward inhibition. Thus cue 
ambiguity necessitates translation and backward inhibition is said to relate to this translation 
rather than to task responses per se. In addressing top down versus bottom up processing, 
Mayr and Keele say “A potential problem… was that… participants in the top down 
condition did not have to use the explicit cues because the stimulus information was not 
ambiguous” (Mayr & Keele (2000), p.13, my emphasis). However, Mayr & Keele found 
backward inhibition in an unambiguously-cued more bona fide switching paradigm – 
Houghton and colleagues’ task instigated a search of the ‘odd one out’ (Mayr & Keele, 
Experiment 3) but using such an exogenously driven task that the requirement to actively 
impose switching control is negated and thus eradication of backward inhibition must be 
considered an artefact of this very specific and very stimulus-dependent task design.  
 
8 Explicit Cueing 
Backward inhibition was particularly dependent on the role of the cue to instigate top-
down processing. As used by Mayr & Keele (2000) cues could vary in their explicitness, 
needing translating (from the word to the associated action) or being quite direct (two colours 
indicating a colour choice is to be made). This could directly access the goal or require an 
additional processing step to interpret the cue. But what other effects could the cue have 
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within the switching scenario and what additional analyses does inclusion of a cue facilitate?  
While manipulation of preparation time in the alternating runs paradigm has a clear effect on 
switch cost, there is no way of determining when (if at all, as proposed by De Jong, 2000) 
reconfiguration occurs during this interval. While stimuli act as implicit cues for the task to 
be performed, the introduction of separate explicit cues (Meiran, 1996) allows trials to be 
presented randomly with accurate manipulation of both pre- and post-stimulus intervals and 
so determines the point at which switch-related processes can be engaged. By introducing 
task-specific cues before the stimuli, Meiran (1996) proposed that preparation effects and 
residual costs did indeed represent an exogenous component of control, rather than 
dissipation of TSI during the preparation period. Meiran was able to show that the longer the 
cue to stimulus interval (CSI), the shorter the RT costs. In previous studies the CSI was said 
(by Meiran) to be confounded by ‘remoteness’ from the previous trial. A longer CSI meant 
that the subsequent stimulus was ‘further away’ from the last response than trials with a 
shorter CSI. This meant that a longer interval gives not only the chance to adequately prepare 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) but also the opportunity for carryover to dissipate (Allport, Styles 
& Hsieh, 1994). Therefore it cannot be said with certainty that longer preparation time 
actually reflects preparation. In the Meiran (1996) study while the interval between cue and 
stimulus was varied, the interval between the response on the previous trial and the stimulus 
on the current trial was kept constant. Thus the ‘distance’ between response and subsequent 
stimulus remains constant regardless of the length of the CSI. Dissipation of carryover did 
not occur and so switching was associated with advance preparation and thus executive 
control. A longer CSI resulted in fast switch cost decline; longer response-to-cue interval 
(RCI) produced a slower decline. This led Meiran to propose three separate sources for 
switch cost:  passive decay of task set A, active TSR for task B and a residual stimulus-bound 
source. With reference to this, Meiran, Chorev & Sapir (2000) had stated that switch cost 
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cannot be taken as a measure of executive function alone. There is a role for dissipating 
carryover (in tasks that do not regulate the RSI) which does not reflect executive control. 
Residual costs reflect a failure of preparation, although long CSI reduction of switch cost 
does reflect success of control to an extent. It was proposed that the relationship between 
preparation and control was not straightforward. A small preparatory contribution to cost 
could equally reflect lack of engagement (no indication of control) or fast an efficient control. 
Preparation reflected a variety of processes, including “...phasic arousal, predicting target 
onset, and reconfiguration” (Meiran, Chorev & Sapir, 2000, p.251). 
 
Cues have also been investigated from the point of view of just the type of carryover 
Meiran sought to refute. Using a cued digit parity/ magnitude task, Koch & Allport (2006) 
investigated the relative contributions of cue based preparation and stimulus based priming to 
switch cost. The cue effect was proposed to overcome priming with a long CSI to allow for 
preparation. A long response-to stimulus interval (RSI) allowed for greater decay of the 
preceding task set and so reduced switch cost, supporting (they said) the associative 
interference account of switch cost through mitigation of the priming effect. The task is 
activated by the cue – activation increases as a function of the length of CSI. This activation 
then decays as a function of the length of RSI. This does of course suffer from the non-
standardisation of the RCI as noted by Meiran, leading to the confound of remoteness from 
the previous trial. In partial agreement with Meiran they suggested separable stimulus and 
response based aspects of switch cost attributable to manipulation of CSI and RSI 
respectively. Conversely, Monsell and Mizon (2006) advocated reduction of cost with long 
CSI as evidence of endogenous reconfiguration when there was low predictability of the 
upcoming switch. Reconfiguration could not occur in the absence of foreknowledge until 
specifically cued. Meiran’s earlier model (1996) encompasses both passive decay and active 
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reconfiguration. However, the subtle disparity between tasks (independently cued bivalent 
stimuli for Allport, directional Stroop-style switching for Monsell and a directional task 
involving spatial shifts for Meiran) would urge caution in interpreting an exact overlay of 
these explanations. 
 
8.1 Cue-task association 
A secondary consideration for interpretation of the explicit cueing paradigm relates to 
the type of cue chosen to signify the task, specifically the degree to which the cue has to be 
translated, something already noted in relation to backward inhibition (Mayr & Keele, 2000). 
It has already been noted by Hougton and colleagues (Houghton, Pritchard & Grange, 2009; 
Grange & Houghton, 2010) that cues with a less logical affiliation to the task result in 
increased levels of backward inhibition. Using explicit verbalisation cues and arbitrary 
symbols Arbuthnott and Woodward (2002) found greater switch cost with the lower 
association symbolic cues. They posited this to either reflect reduced time to retrieve task set 
due to additional cue encoding or longer time required to retrieve the task set from LTM (in 
part resonating with Mayr & Kliegl’s (2003) interpretation of cue switch costs). Schneider 
and Logan (2006) later favoured the LTM position with a mediator hypothesis of transition 
cue processing. In this instance cue meaning is used in conjunction with knowledge of the 
prior trial’s task to access a mediator (suggested by Saeki & Sato (2009) to be verbal) to the 
task identity. Using multiple cues per task, they looked at situations where the cue and task 
both repeated, the cue changed but the task repeated and both the cue and task changed. 
Switch cost was lowest under conditions of frequent task alternations, higher under 
conditions of frequent cue repetition and greatest under conditions of frequent task 
repetitions. Looking at these three types of transition and using mathematical modelling they 
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were able to demonstrate that these different cost magnitudes were reliant on priming of cue 
encoding. Cues were automatically primed according to instances in memory of past task 
transitions. The frequency of the transition determines how many instances are available from 
memory20.  
 
8.2 Cue processing 
Of course, comparability between predictable uncued switching and unpredictable 
switching signified by cues is limited. Altmann (2007) draws a stark comparison between 
alternating runs and explicitly cued switch costs, favouring the latter as a less confounded 
measure and criticising the apparent lack of distinction between the two in the literature (e.g. 
reviews such as Logan, 2003 and Monsell, 2003). Predictable uncued switching requires 
internally represented implicit task sequences. Initial task instructions are processed once at 
the beginning of the task block as oppose to repeated processing of explicit task cues (Logan 
& Schneider, 2006a), arguably requiring less attention (Koch, 2008). A number of studies 
have suggested that switch cost in the explicit cues paradigm is heavily confounded by the 
need to process and switch cues rather than task (Logan & Bundesen, 2003, 2004). A similar 
structure as that of Schneider & Logan (2006, described in the last section) was used, with 
multiple cues per task and three different cue/ task transitions (repeats of both, task only 
changing and both changing). It was found that participants were responding to the 
compound of the cue and the target rather than just switching task set. Such a compound 
response brought into question the ability of switch cost to reflect executive control in the 
explicit cueing paradigm.  
                                                           
20
 This has resonance with Bryck & Mayr’s (2008) explanation of restart costs, where the more control that is 
required to perform a task the more examples of it are encoded in memory.  
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Conversely, there may also be a reverse benefit from cue encoding (priming from cue 
repetitions) rather than detriment from task switching (Arrington & Logan, 2004a; Logan & 
Schneider, 2006b). Association between the cue on the current trial and the cue on the 
previous trial led to quicker responses to task repetitions. This in turn would affect any 
measure of switch cost calculated as the difference between task alternations and repeats. The 
probability of a task switch is thus said to enable strategic memory-based priming rather than 
the automatic priming proposed by Allport and colleagues (e.g. Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 
2003). The compound strategy of the cue and stimulus is said to give unique identification of 
the correct response. One task set (encode cue, encode target, select response) can then be 
used to address every task, removing the need to switch task set. Associations between the 
current and previous cue trigger encoding examples from memory. This body of work 
substantiates the prevailing view of Logan and colleagues that task switching performance is 
essentially a memory problem. However, this stance has been radically revised to 
acknowledge the limitations of cue-encoding effects in explaining all cued switching 
performance (e.g. Arrington, Logan & Schneider, 2007). This is in line with 
neurophysiological evidence (Jost, Mayr and Rösler, 2008) that cue-switch and task-switch 
processes are dissociable (see also Altmann (2006) for a refutation of this ‘cue reductionist’ 
stance21). In addition, Mayr (2006) found probability effects rooted (at least in part) in task 
rather than cue transitions, explained in terms of task-driven adaptive reconfiguration 
(although this does assume the system is able to exert probability-based strategic control over 
inhibition processes). Cue switch costs increased and task switch cost decreased as a function 
of the probability of an upcoming task switch. It was concluded that participants were 
responding to the probability of a task switch, given the cue switch. Task switches were thus 
more important in determining switch cost. High switch probability could lead to suppressing 
                                                           
21
 Although it should be noted that Altmann is himself a fervent ‘switch cost dissenter’, stating not only that the 
alternating runs paradigm is an inadequate measure of switch cost (hopelessly confounded by restart costs), but 
that switch costs do not reflect executive control (see Altmann, 2003 and Altmann & Gray, 2002). 
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the previous task set on all trials. This would lead to costs on task repetitions, resulting in a 
net reduced switch cost (repeat/ alternation difference) which would be independent of a cue 
switch.  
 
8.3 Inner speech and self-cueing 
It has been earlier noted that uncued switching requires internal representation of task 
sequences. While cues may carry an extra processing cost (albeit extrinsic to switch cost 
itself), they do remove the requirement to hold the task sequence in memory22. It has been 
suggested (Koch, 2003) that this ‘internal cue’ of task order representation primes the system 
for more efficient use of external cues, while still facilitating successful (but slower) 
switching itself. The use of inner speech as a ‘self-cueing’ device23 to reinforce this 
representation is well established. Reliance on internal cues diminishes as external cues 
become more available and more task-specific (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Miyake, Emerson, 
Padilla & Ahn, 2004). When articulatory suppression is used to disrupt the action of inner 
speech (which it does significantly), this is ameliorated when external cues are closely linked 
to the upcoming task (Emerson & Miyake, 2003). This suggests the role of inner speech as a 
self-cuing device for retrieval and activation of a phonological representation of the task, 
which comes to the fore in the absence of explicit cues. As noted already in the discussion of 
explicit cueing, mediators to task identity, formed by the compound of cue and stimulus, are 
believed to take the form of phonological representation (Saeki & Sato, 2009). Inner speech 
and explicit cueing would seem to be fulfilling the same role in accessing this representation. 
                                                           
22
 While this internal representation may place increased demand on working memory, both Barch et al. (1997) 
and Logan (2004) found working memory load to be dissociable from other processes active during task 
switching. 
23
 Bechtel (1994) suggested inner speech, as a product of a cognitive system, must be external to it; Vygotsky 
(1934/ 1962) viewed it as an extension of ‘outer’ speech and so able to be responded to and used in the same 
way as hearing an external speaker. Such external representations of information (for example, note taking or 
presumably spoken ‘memos’) have been proposed as a form of external memory trace (e.g. Donald, 1991). 
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In a non-cued switching task it could be argued that inner speech as a self cuing device is a 
more direct route than arbitrary external cues as there is no requirement for translation 
between cue and representation. This would however need to be mediated against the 
additional (non-switching) costs of holding the task order in WM. As previously noted this 
cost is dissociable from switching costs but will contribute in an additive manner nonetheless. 
However, reliance on cues, whether externally provided and transient or internally generated 
and constant, does appear to be a necessary feature of switching between tasks. 
 
It has been found that reliance on inner speech is greater in children and older adults 
(Kray, Eber & Lindenberger, 2004; Kray, Eber & Karbach, 2008), known to have switching 
deficits. As well as compensating for paucity of explicitness in external cues (as noted 
earlier), inner speech also offers a supportive role for age-related task switching deficits 
(Kray, Eber & Karbach, 2008). Older adults are known to benefit more than children from 
overt concurrent task-congruent verbalisation during task preparation – incongruent 
verbalisation has a strong interference effect (Kray, Eber & Lindenberger, 2004), akin clearly 
to articulatory suppression. Again greater reliance in these groups on inner speech was found 
in the absence of environmental cues. Functional imaging data from younger and older adults 
on a continuous performance task (Braver, Paxton, Locke & Barch, 2009) confirms more 
response to ambiguous ‘probes’ (akin to transition cues, which indicate a task switch but not 
what that task is)  and contextual (task specific) cues respectively, in line with an adaptive24 
model of cognitive control. This age-related evidence would support accounts of switching 
control that advocate a multiplicity of mechanisms to account for varying task, response and 
perhaps even population demands. For example, Ravizza & Carter (2008) compared two 
                                                           
24
 Adaptive in terms of both task and resources. Spieler, Mayr and LaGrone (2006) suggest that age-related 
changes in switching ability are only really obvious with the use of external cues, but that this may be more of a 
case of a change in ability rather than impairment. 
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tasks requiring perceptual and rule based switches, surmising that there are multiple 
mechanisms for switching dependent on task requirements. This must include varying types 
and availability of cues and varying levels of age-related control adaptation. Age-related 
differences in the use of inner speech therefore illustrate another way in which ‘one model 
fits all’ is an ineffective construct.  
 
As already noted the application of articulatory suppression (incongruent concurrent 
speech) during the commission of inner speech leads to greater switch costs (e.g. Miyake, 
Emerson, Padilla & Ahn, 2004). One viewpoint of this effect of articulatory suppression is 
that there is a specific executive role for the phonological loop in task switching (Saeki & 
Sato, 2004).  However, this would challenge the notion of the phonological loop as a slave 
system to the central executive, positing a more active role. There is no need to take such a 
controversial view of the findings. In interpreting similar results, Baddeley (2002) agrees that 
at first sight it seems there is a role for the phonological loop. However, he cites Vygotsky’s 
(1934/ 1962) assertion that verbalisation is implicit in the control of action. As such the 
central executive rather than the phonological loop is implicated, given that such verbal 
strategies would need to be accessed from LTM. Further consideration of the role of memory 
in task switching is given in the second half of this literature review (see page 82).  
 
So, if there is a role for the central executive in the application of inner speech can we 
say that this internal verbalisation is indicative of active control processes during task 
switching? Goschke (2000) again found that verbal labelling (overtly naming the upcoming 
task) reduced switch costs. He proposed that this reflected retrieving the intention to perform 
a task and was supportive of advance reconfiguration. It was hypothesised by Goschke that 
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retrieval of the intention or task representation was an intrinsic part of advance 
reconfiguration (again, refer to Vygotsky 1934/ 1962). Crucially the length of CSI was key – 
too short and the verbal labelling had no beneficial effect as there was not time to complete 
advance preparation. Therefore the process reflected advance reconfiguration. Dissipation of 
previous task set (the TSI hypothesis) was rejected on the grounds that the content of the 
verbalisation was responsible for switch cost reduction. The endogenous aspect of control 
specifies the addition of new goals to supplant old ones (as specified by Rubinstein, Meyer & 
Evans, 2001), as actioned by intention retrieval. Overt verbalisation (and, it can be assumed, 
its internal silent counterpart) therefore represent a key aspect of top-down controlled goal 
shifting.  It is also suggested that such verbalisation actively suppresses interference from 
previous task sets. Monsell (2005) concurs that linguistic self-instruction assists task set 
reconfiguration (TSR), having noted participants intermittently verbalising task instructions 
(something that also happens frequently in the Continuous Series II verbal switching task).  
 
In summary, inner speech acts as a self cuing device, particularly when environmental 
cues are absent or when they are not explicitly linked to the task. It would appear to act in a 
supportive role to active reconfiguration. The more explicit the external cue, the less the 
reliance on inner speech (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Miyake et al., 2004). Verbalisations 
additional to inner speech are less disruptive when they are concurrent to the task (naming to 
upcoming task) (Kray, Eber & Karbach, 2008). Additionally we know that verbal cues are 
more effective than pictorial or abstract cues (e.g. Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Lavric, Mizon & 
Monsell, 2008). What then would be the effect, in a task that relies wholly on inner-speech as 
a cue, of providing verbal (visual) environmental cues that are concurrent with the upcoming 
task? The Continuous Series II is uncued and self paced, relying entirely on (according to 
Baddeley from Vygotsky) central executive retrieval of verbal strategies from LTM and use 
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of inner speech to cue retrieval of intention (Goschke, 2000). Constantly available whole 
word cues signifying the upcoming task would relieve the need to retrieve verbal strategies or 
instructions from LTM, thus reducing the net WM load (more of this on page 82). The visual 
presentation of cues would eliminate any articulatory suppressive tendencies even in a cue 
that matched the task – in previous studies matched task and verbalisation still resulted in 
some cost. Such cues would be supportive of the role of inner speech, perhaps reducing the 
need to rely on it at all or freeing up the phonological loop to rehearse items within the 
categories (e.g. Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday...) instead of the categories themselves (e.g. 
Numbers, Days, Months...). Cue free switching such as the Continuous Series II is reliant on 
inner speech – if this inner speech is indicative of the involvement of WM then the result of 
supporting this process should result in reduced switch cost and fewer errors when WM load 
is reduced. Experiment 6 in Chapter 8 explores this in full, using visual cues with varying 
degrees of verbal explicitness. Additional analysis for Experiment 2 in Chapter 4 looks at the 
effect of incidental overt verbalisations for the Continuous Series II. Although not as 
controlled of verbal labelling, this is nonetheless informative of the ways in which overt 
speech might reflect or support inner speech.  
 
9 Dual Mechanism Models of Control 
Throughout the thesis thus far there has been a stark distinction between bottom-up 
passive accounts and active top-down reconfiguration-based accounts of switch cost. The 
passive accounts propose either a transient carryover of activation of the preceding task set or 
more long term interference from previous S-R mappings of bivalent stimuli. The active TSR 
account advocates preparation for the switch occurring during adequate preparation time, 
with completion of this task set reconfiguration occurring once the stimulus arrives (an 
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exogenous component of control). However, there have been mentions of one account 
conceding the involvement of the other – for example, Yeung & Monsell (2003) 
acknowledge that transient carryover of the type advocated by the TSI hypothesis is 
implicated in some types of task switching.      
 
Proactive control (as advocated by reconfiguration-based accounts such as Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; De Jong, 2000; Rubinstein et al. 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001) relates to 
preparatory task set activation in advance of switching, requiring sufficient time to complete. 
Reactive control relates to overcoming the persistence of a previously active (and no longer 
relevant) task set (e.g. Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000). Neither Allport 
et al. (1994) nor Rogers and Monsell (1995) were able to make a definitive distinction 
between inhibition or reconfiguration effects in their data; it was not possible to entirely rule 
out one or the other. Meiran (1996) proposed three components of switch cost: passive decay, 
active reconfiguration and a stimulus-bound residual cost. Task expectancy affects the 
amount of time required to reconfigure for the upcoming task, but task recency affects the 
amount of time needed to execute this reconfiguration (Ruthruff, Remington & Johnston, 
2001), hence supporting Meiran and accounting for both TSI and TSR. While TSI and 
backward inhibition appear to be transient localised sources of interference, S-R associations 
provide a sustained source of interference throughout the task.  
 
Similarly, rather than a single central executive process controlling task switching, 
Goschke (2000) advocated a modular control ‘panel’ overseeing both maintenance and 
reconfiguration of task sets. This demonstrated advance reconfiguration, reducing cost via 
pre-stimulus verbal access of the task. Monsell (2005) has advocated such verbal 
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representations as being implicit to the reconfiguration process (see description of 
representation in inner speech page 60). As previously described, the verbal content of the 
task retrieval represented the active introduction of a replacement goal, negating the role of 
TSI dissipation.  This was in line with Woodward et al’s (2003) confirmatory verbal access 
(page 25 of this document) and Mayr & Keele’s (2000) verbal prompting of top down 
processing (page 53 of this document). Goschke’s modular ‘control panel’ model also 
established carryover of activation via stimulus evoked (bivalent) erroneous responses. 
However, involuntary or passive effects from previous task sets were not conceived of as 
entirely triggered by the stimulus. Active control was not seen as being wholly directed by 
conscious intentions. Rather, conscious intentions were said to offer constraints that 
modulated the readiness of responses automatically triggered by stimuli – in this way 
conscious intentions configure automatic processes. For Goschke the stimulus-bound cost is 
not constant but translates as a dynamic requirement for control in the face of fluctuating 
stimulus-based response constraint, such as in the case of bivalent stimuli. 
 
A further dual mechanism account of control during switching (Braver, Reynolds and 
Donaldson, 2003; Braver, Gray & Burgess, 2007) combines sustained (proactive) control 
with transient (reactive) control. Sustained control is an ‘overseeing’ function controlling fast 
switching between several tasks throughout the duration of the task. Transient control is a 
variable function relating to both internal reconfiguration of goals and linking task cues to 
their appropriate S-R mappings, akin to Goschke’s dynamic control. In light of this model, 
Meiran’s (1996) residual component would appear to equate to confirmatory stimulus-bound 
feedback. Imaging data revealed three distinct areas of activity associated with different 
phases of the switching process. Sustained control was located to right anterior prefrontal 
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cortex (PFC) and transient control was located to left superior parietal cortex25. A third area 
of activity, in the lateral PFC, was related to representation and maintenance of task set, 
separate from switching of those task sets. Left-lateral PFC has been associated with a 
“...general role in task-set representation and response preparation...” (Braver, Reynolds & 
Donaldson, 2003, p.721), a role that is not dependent on having recently switched tasks26. 
This is highlighted as agreeing with the associative interference account of Allport & Wylie 
(2000), which reported proactive interference effects on non-switch trials. Costs arising from 
transient control do so from localised switching of one task to another, with costs reflecting 
the speed or efficiency with which task set reconfiguration occurs. Sustained control, being 
long-term control for the whole time period of the task, is thought to contribute to costs 
relating to performing tasks in a mixed environment, this also being able to explain mixing 
costs. In trials where there is preparation for the upcoming task this is achieved through 
proactive sustained control, while trials that are wholly reliant on cues depend on reactive 
transient control. Thus different types of switching are reliant on different types of control, 
both of which are separable from maintenance of the task set.  
 
Reconfiguration is stimulus dependent (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) – this model allows 
control of reconfiguration to be separate from stimulus response mechanisms (Meiran’s 
(2000) response bound source of residual cost). A lack of proactive reconfiguration could be 
construed as analogous with a failure to engage (FTE) (De Jong, 2000). Variation in the 
speed or efficiency of reconfiguration is built into the model, so a serious deficiency here 
would account for FTE-type results. Conflict resolution, as occurs during frequent task 
                                                           
25
 The task relied on visually presented stimuli which may have contributed in part to this activation. 
26
 Other work (Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson & Cohen, 2006) suggests that representations in the PFC relate to TSI 
effects, although this is not at the expense of a concomitant role for active control processes.  
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switching or presentation of incongruent stimuli (and as may happen also repeatedly in the 
absence of switching) is posited by Brown, Reynolds and Braver (2007) to require top-down 
processing. Conflict may come between expected and actual responses, when switching 
frequently – this might be addressed by slowing of responses, to prevent premature 
introduction of the expected response. It may also be induced by incongruent stimuli – task 
requirements might remain similar but conflicting stimuli might appear, requiring a change in 
attentional focus. A single source for control would not be able to respond adaptively to such 
contrasting task demands. For example, response slowing would not affect a suitable shift of 
attention in a case of responding to incongruent stimuli. Replication of Goschke’s (2000) 
results of post-incongruency speeding (enhanced after a task repeat) were interpreted as 
evidence that control exerted on incongruency-conflict resulted in subsequent RT 
improvement for the same task but increased switch cost when the task had to change. 
Mechanisms for resolving conflict were proposed to detect change and incongruency 
separately, thus proposing a method by which active control accounts for asymmetry 
(Allport, Styles & Hseih, 1994).  
 
Further computational modelling of switching by the authors (Reynolds, Braver, 
Brown & Van der Stigchel, 2006) showed task switching could be controlled under a passive 
associative learning mechanism (Allport Styles & Hseih, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000) but at 
the cost of susceptibility to previous trial carryover effects. ‘Overseeing’ maintenance of the 
task in PFC-analogous units reinforced task dimension input (as per verbal reinforcement 
Goschke, 2000 and Saeki & Sato, 2009), reducing the susceptibility to carryover effects and 
arguably providing impetus in the same way as Monsell’s ‘exogenous’ cue for 
reconfiguration (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). To define more clearly, whether active 
maintenance of the task was present or absent in PFC units had a significant impact on switch 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
79 
 
cost.  When switch cost was minimal, it was predicted that there was an increase in delay-
related responses in the PFC units, reflecting active maintenance. When switch cost was 
greater, it was predicted that there would be an increase in target-related responses in the PFC 
units, reflecting task-set reactivation. Analysis showed both these predictions to be true. The 
model showed a combination of active maintenance and associative learning to be 
responsible for several features of task switching behaviour. It demonstrated that selection of 
a correct response in the absence of an actively maintained task (which happened in some 
trials) was driven by the associative learning mechanism.  However, this was at the cost of 
influence from previous activity. Such an impact is negated by active maintenance in the PFC 
units, which provides a different source of input for task dimensions. Without active 
maintenance, both target dimensions (for bivalent stimuli) competed, with one gaining an 
advantage due to prior learning. Passive maintenance of task switching is possible but is not 
the most efficient route and comes with its own source of cost. Both routes for switching are 
available, dependent on environmental and task demands. Although not tested, the model of 
Braver and colleagues (Brown Braver & Reynolds, 2007) purported to account for 
asymmetric costs. In the Stroop task they predict that colour naming is conflicted from word 
reading, leading to greater conflict activity in the model and thus more attention paid to 
colour naming, resulting in enhanced performance. The resultant increased activation to the 
harder task (colour naming), opposing a switch to the easier task. While more generally there 
are contributory effects from TSI-like carryover, asymmetric costs are accounted for via a 
mechanism of over-compensatory conflict control. 
 
Meiran (2010) came back to this concept of dual control mechanisms, proposing 
sources of rigid and flexible self control (analogous to the transient and sustained control 
posited by Braver and colleagues), with processes impeding or facilitating switching. 
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Localised inertia, such as implied by the passive mechanism in the previous model (Reynolds 
et al., 2006) and specific in Meiran’s previous (1996) account, imposes rigidity to the system 
through automotive (passive) activation of processes relating to the now defunct task set. 
Preparation and inhibition are facilitatory flexible effects which, although actively imposed, 
do not entirely outweigh the influence of rigid control processes. The search for the ‘elusive’ 
homunculus may be misplaced if control is thus modular and reactive. 
 
10 Conclusion 
Inhibition and reconfiguration are by no means mutually exclusive; Goschke (2000) 
proposed that switch costs reflect both intentional preparation for reconfiguration and 
interference from recent or previously learned task set associations.  Monsell acknowledges 
that at least part of the switch cost is attributable to inhibition in some form (Yeung & 
Monsell, 2003). Indeed, a case can be made for the under-specified, passive, stimulus-bound 
exogenous controller from the TSR account (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and Allport’s passive 
transient (and, according to Monsell, stimulus-bound) interference (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 
1994) to be one and the same thing, although agreement on this matter does not seem to be 
likely. Altmann and Logan (e.g. Altmann, 2002; Logan, 2003) take a more extreme view in 
that switch cost is nothing at all to do with control and that task switching is more of a 
memory problem than one of cognitive control. It is clear that a number of factors can inflate, 
mask and otherwise change switch cost, although it would seem that there is a core ‘value’ 
which relates to the act of switching, although how much centralised active control is 
required depends upon task and stimulus demands (e.g. Monsell, Yeung & Azuma, 2000; 
Hunt & Klein, 2002; Gurd et al., 2003).  
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The picture we have is one of a slow/ accurate or fast/ error prone route to switching – 
inhibition carryover (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) or ‘waiting for the cognitive gear 
change’ (whatever its nature) (Rogers & Monsell, 1995); or it might be that you just forget 
what you are supposed to be doing (Altmann & Gray, 2000; 2002). Few studies look at real-
time whole task (continuous) switching, instead focussing on individual switches or repeats 
within task trials. Switch cost is stripped down to isolated error-free measures of these minute 
phases of the overall process. In reality it seems that one size does not fit all; different task, 
switch and response requirements employ different processes which result in different causes 
of switch cost. While there may be a core common element of cost, its exact nature is as yet 
far from determined. Yehene & Meiran (2007) do identify a general switching ability linked 
to residual switch cost (cost remaining with ample preparation time) and mixing cost, but this 
notion of generalising only to some functions (not to switching under short CSI conditions or 
congruency effects) does not sit well with the idea of a single central function for switching. 
Given that residual costs, like other contributors to overall switch cost, are extinguishable in 
certain circumstances, the likelihood is that multi-source models (e.g. Meiran, Chorev & 
Sapir, 2000) will offer the best explanation of switch cost. We should even consider the need 
for multiple separate models to account for different types of task, response and 
circumstance, as more recent work suggests (Ravizza & Carter, 2008).  
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW – PART TWO: THE 
VERBAL TASK SWITCHING PARADIGM – CONTINUOUS 
SEQUENTIAL SWITCHING USING AUTOMATIC SPEECH 
TASKS 
 
11 Continuous Series Switching 
The Continuous Series (Gurd, 1995) was developed as a verbal task switching 
paradigm to track deterioration in the switching abilities of Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients, 
in a task with no visuo-spatial or motor demands (set shifting dysfunction in PD is well 
documented e.g. Lees & Smith, 1983; Owen et al., 1993; Woodward, Bub & Hunter, 2002). 
The task requires participants to produce items alternately, sequentially and continuously 
from increasing numbers of overlearned sequences such as numbers, days, months and 
letters. The overlearned nature of the stimuli means the task is not liable to the verbal fluency 
difficulties usually found in PD (Gurd & Ward, 1989; Gurd, Ward & Hodges, 1990). Such 
examples of ‘automatic speech’ are typified not only by a high degree of practice but also by 
syntactic and semantic simplicity (Bookheimer et al., 2000) and are known to be preserved in 
a variety of pathologies (e.g. Code (1997) cites intact automatisms in aphasic and left 
hemisphere damaged patients). Switches are predictable and uncued – participants are told in 
advance the order of the category switches and progression within each category follows their 
implicit sequential structure. No externally presented stimuli are used, allowing maximum 
preparation time and minimal additional processing requirements; response production is 
entirely self-paced (as per Jersild (1927), Spector & Beiderman (1976) and Allport, Styles & 
Hsieh (1994)).  
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Further rationale for using the task lay in the potential to address both parts of 
Shallice and Burgess’s (1991) predictions for a dysfunctional Supervisory Attentional System 
(SAS). The tasks contrasted due to the low novelty/ high switching requirements of the 
Continuous Series task and the highly novel/ minimal switching requirements of tasks such as 
the colour Stroop. This contrast allied itself to the contention scheduling and non-routine 
scenarios in which Shallice & Burgess (1991) had proposed a fully functional Supervisory 
Attentional System (SAS) was implicit. Failure of the SAS to modulate the action of 
contention scheduling would result in (1) perseverative behaviour, or (2) an inability to deal 
with novel tasks. The Continuous Series, colour Stroop and an alternating verbal fluency task 
were employed by Gurd (1995) to address the then contention that a dysfunctional SAS was 
implicated in the PD profile. An absence of correlation between Continuous Series and verbal 
fluency (both frontally mediated tasks) was taken as evidence against impairment of a unitary 
frontal function. In addition, two types of error were recorded for the PD group during the 
Continuous Series task, contention scheduling errors and WM errors. Separate cases of 
double dissociation for these two error types within the PD group highlighted the non-
universality of perseveration and so again questioned the application of an unfractionated 
SAS dysfunction. The use of verbal responses to distinguish between these two error types 
was later mirrored by Arbuthnott (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000), who identified executive 
wrong-task errors and WM decision-errors (choosing a response within a task). 
 
A modified version of the task (Continuous Series II, using non-canonical start points 
for the sequences, Gurd & Oliveira, 1996) was used to further define the dissociation between 
task switching and other abilities in PD, contrasted this time with a guided semantically-
stratified verbal fluency search task adapted from Neisser & Beller (1965). Impaired 
performance on the two tasks was again found to be dissociable, in accordance with previous 
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results from Gurd (1995). In addition to the clinical usefulness of the Continuous Series II 
task in tracking switching deterioration in PD, Gurd and Oliveira proposed that a unitary 
SAS-type dysfunction was unlikely to be the source of impaired performance for both tasks. 
Rather, executive control was said to be of differential relevance (the nature of which was 
unspecified) to each of the two tasks, concurring with Allport’s (1992) suggestion of several 
distinct fractionated central executive functions. 
 
The Continuous Series II task was further employed (Gurd et al., 2002) to assess the 
contribution of the parietal cortex during switching. As noted by Gurd and colleagues, reports 
of such switch related activation were primarily made from tasks with visual or visuo-spatial 
task demands (e.g. Kimberg et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000; Dove et al, 2000). The Continuous 
Series II offered a unique opportunity to look at switching in the absence of such demands, 
using silent self-paced repetition of the verbal task. The assertion of Gurd and colleagues, that 
verbal task switching “...had no spatial and no visual component whatsoever” (Gurd et al. 
(2002), p.1030) was pivotal to their interpretation of the data as supporting a major integral 
role for the parietal cortex in switching per se. At the time this involvement was not well 
established. However, the possibility of an abstract spatial aspect to the task should not be 
overlooked. During later work with the Continuous Series II (Essig, 2004a), participants were 
observed tapping or pointing from left to right to mark out the order of the categories; 
anecdotal reports confirmed that some were holding an image of the category order in a 
spatial configuration27. However, the strength of the assertion should not be lessened, only 
                                                           
27
 There may be some argument that the arrangement of the component tasks or the ordinal nature of the 
categories does itself constitute a spatial element – Eagleman (2009) has noted a synaesthete-like spatial 
arrangement for overlearned sequences in non-synaesthetes. Fias, Lammertyn, Caessesn & Orban (2007) detail 
processing of abstract ordinal knowledge (letters and numbers) in the horizontal segment of the intraparietal 
sulcus  – letters are seemingly processed in a way that closely mimics that of number processing, re: specificity 
of the horizontal plane of the intraparietal sulcus to ordinal number processing (see Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel & 
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tempered, by this caveat, given that the task involved no physically mediated response, no 
externally delivered stimuli (with ensuing spatial or visual attributes) and the impetus to 
switch is entirely endogenous. The verbal switching parietal activity is as a result of general 
switch cost28 (defined by Kray & Lindenberger, 2000), with (as defined by Gurd et al.) no 
exogenously driven task demands. While the ordinal nature of the overlearned sequence 
categories may be construed as having a spatial arrangement (which could partially account 
for the parietal activation in a supposedly non-spatial task). The persistence of this activity 
during non-ordered semantic category switching (as reported by Gurd et al., 2002) would 
suggest a significant switch related role.  
 
The imaging data from the Gurd et al. (2002) study revealed broad prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) activity29 and importantly increased activity in the superior posterior parietal cortex 
(PPC) as a main effect of verbal task switching compared to single verbal category fluency30. 
PFC activation was variable in its location whereas parietal activation was found to be more 
consistently bilateral and more consistently seen (64% and 82% respectively, see Gurd et al., 
2003 for further analysis). Gurd and colleagues suggested a supramodal role for the parietal 
cortex, in addition to any modality specific functions indicated by tasks with visual, spatial or 
aural task demands. Several published studies concur with this interpretation e.g. Barber and 
Carter (2005), Collette, Hogge, Salmon and van der Linden (2006), Cohen, Dehaene, 
Vinckier, Jobert and Montavont (2007) and Lu et al. (2009). It has been suggested by Wylie, 
Murray, Javitt and Foxe (2009) that the fronto-parietal network identified by Gurd and others 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Cohen (2003)). Fias & colleagues propose this may be due to transformation of letter ordination to a numerical 
form. 
28
 Costs derived from comparison of a switching block with a non-switching block, as opposed to comparison of 
switching and non-switching within the same block (alternating runs).  
29
 Bilateral anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral frontal operculum. 
30
 The nature of the Continuous Series II does not allow for comparisons with switching repetitions within a trial 
in the same way as the alternating runs paradigm. 
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(see section on page 75 ‘neural activation during task switching’) may be involved more in 
the regulation of competition than actual control. However, their own data relating to such 
competition (Wylie, Javitt and Foxe, 2004) arises from the utilisation of an explicit cued 
design (they attribute competition to the arrival of the cue), something absent from the data of 
Gurd et al. (2002). Consistent switch related activation of the superior posterior parietal 
cortex in the absence of visual, spatial or cue requirements would appear to be an unusual 
finding.  
 
 The Continuous Series II therefore represents a highly unusual form of task switching. 
There are two key themes related to the task that warrant further interpretation in relation to 
the broader task switching literature. One is the apparently switch specific activation of the 
superior posterior parietal cortex – although the involvement of a fronto-parietal network in 
task switching is well established (e.g. Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger &Carter, 2000; Brass, 
Ullsperger, Knoesche, von Cramon & Phillips, 2005), this is nearly always in the presence of 
visual and spatial task demands and often in relation to the use of cues which has been shown 
to increase activation in this area (Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger &Carter, 2000, although 
c.f. De Baene & Brass, 2011 for a recent refutation of this cue related activity). The other 
aspect of the paradigm that requires further discussion is the entirely self-paced reliance on 
internal representations. Although Gurd presents this absence of cues and stimuli as a positive 
feature of the task, it inevitably increases the load on WM, particularly as the task reaches a 
maximum of switching between four tasks.  The evidence for the effects of WM load on 
switching abilities is mixed but it is evident that switching calls on these resources 
(Vandierendonck, 2012). The fundamental question is whether taxing WM separately from 
the switching function (as holding a sequence of four tasks would do) has a detrimental effect 
on that switching function. Reliance on verbal WM is implicit, as previously noted by 
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Monsell (2005) in participant verbalisation of task sequence (see also Goschke, 2000) and by 
Baddeley, Chincotta and Adlam (2001) in the detrimental effects of articulatory suppression. 
However, other studies have shown that while WM span relates to task switching 
performance (higher span, better performance) the two abilities do not interact (low span does 
not equate to greater costs) (Kane, Conway, Hambrick & Engle, 2007). Both of these issues 
will now be addressed, as will the relevance of the Continuous Series II to major theories of 
task switching.  
 
11.1 Neural activation during task switching 
The Gurd et al. (2002) study shows a commonly found fronto-parietal network being 
activated during task switching. However, the wide range of stimuli and varied task demands 
is noted by Gurd et al. (2003) as proving problematic in determining a universal model of 
activation generally applicable to switching. It is even more difficult in applying these 
findings directly to the activation found in the Gurd study as switching occurs between tasks 
but within a single cognitive set of overlearned sequences. Additionally the lack of sensory 
stimuli means “...no disengaging, no  moving to a desired location...no modulating sensory 
inputs, and no executing motor actions to target events.” (Gurd et al., 2003. p.S55). The 
verbal task offers switching in the absence of many of the necessarily associated functions 
and so activation seen during this task may offer a purer picture of task switch relevant 
activity. Neural activity associated with verbalisation is of course implicit but this is the case 
with all task switching (Monsell, 2005). Particular credence is given to parietal activity found 
during this task, due to the lack of additional task demands usually associated with such 
activation (e.g. Kimberg, Aguirre & D’Esposito, 2000 using visuo-spatial displays). The 
parietal cortex is well established in the role of directing spatial attention (Halligan, Fink, 
Marshall & Valler, 2003), including redirection of movement or movement intention (‘motor 
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attention’) (Rushworth, Johansen-Berg, Göbel & Devlin, 2003) and has been implicated in 
switching tasks with visual input (e.g. (Sohn, Ursu, Andersen, Stenger & Carter, 2000). 
Further analysis of the role of the parietal cortex in switching has been carried out since, 
suggesting, for example, a role in the selection of action rules (Philipp, Weidner, Koch & 
Fink, 2013 – although still with visuo-spatial demands) but the suggestion that the parietal 
cortex has a supra-modal role in switching that is free from additional demands (Gurd et al., 
2002) remains notable.  
 
Evidence from lesion-based studies shows the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) to be widely 
implicated in the control of task switching. Early work related deficits to dorsolateral 
(DLPFC) damage (Rubinstein, Evans & Meyer, 1994). Deficits are commonly found in 
relation to both left and right PFC damage (Rogers et al., 1998; Aron, Monsell, Sahakian & 
Robbins, 2004) – Aron et al. (2004) particularly highlighted damage to the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG) in relation to inhibition. There is also some evidence for involvement of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Burgess, 2000; Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello & 
Shallice, 2000). This is suggested by Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese and Snyder (2001) to be 
related to response conflict resolution (see Brown, Reynolds and Braver (2007), page 65 of 
this document), similarly cited by Burgess et al. (2000) as implicit in task-related rule 
breaking. Conflict monitoring by the ACC results in appropriate recruitment of the DLPFC to 
resolve competition issues (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001). MacDonald 
III, Cohen, Stenger and Carter (2000) confirm DLPFC involvement in rule implementation 
and ACC in processing of incongruent stimuli. Incongruency would clearly represent a case 
of conflict, confirming this already established role. The PFC, while highly implicated in 
control during task switching (e.g. Dove et al., 2000; Braver, Reynolds & Donaldson, 2003; 
Brass & von Cramon, 2004) does not appear to have any area solely devoted to switch 
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control which is not also implicated at a lesser level of activation during repeat or baseline 
task trials. For example, Dreher, Koechlin, Ali and Grafman (2002) found fronto-parietal 
activation increased in switching compared to separate task performance but not in 
comparison to holding two tasks in memory without switching. 
 
As noted by Gurd et al. (2002; 2003) activation in the parietal cortex is established in 
the task switching literature, though largely in relation to tasks with visual and spatial task 
demands (Kimberg et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000; Dove et al, 2000; Sohn et al., 2000). 
Primate studies have also indicated a role for the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in attentional 
and set shifting (Yamazaki, Hashimoto & Iriki, 2009 review data supporting non-spatial 
representations in the PPC) and task encoding (Stoet & Snyder, 2006). More generally part of 
the parietal cortex (the medial superior parietal lobule) has been associated with cognitive 
control “...during shifts between perceptual, mnemonic, and [crucially] rule representations” 
(Esterman, Chiu, Tamber-Rosenau & Yantis, 2009, p.17974), although again in relation to 
perceptual-motor tasks. The relationship between frontal and parietal regions during 
switching is predictably frontally led. Using EEG Brass, Ullsperger, Knoesche, von Cramon 
and Phillips (2005) found that PFC activity temporally preceded and so biased activity in the 
parietal cortex. This was thought to relate to task representations and stimulus-response 
associations respectively (see also Rushworth, Passingham & Nobre, 2002 for similar 
results). The role for the parietal cortex seems largely stimulus bound although going beyond 
that of mere stimulus processing as might be construed by results from visual-based tasks. 
There is however evidence for a parietal role in higher order cognitive functions in the 
absence of spatial requirements (Gottlieb & Snyder, 2010). Amongst other functions this 
includes encoding task context or task rules, crucially sometimes before the presentation of 
the target stimulus as shown from single neuron studies (Stoet & Snyder, 2004; Balan & 
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Gottlieb, 2006). Liston et al. (2006) say that the PPC is sensitive to a dissociable form of 
conflict from the ACC, stimulus and response related respectively, reinforcing Gurd and 
colleagues’ assertion of a supramodal role for the PPC. Interestingly they reported activity in 
this region preceding an increase of activity in the DLPFC (unlike Brass et al., 1995), 
suggesting the possibility of an independent role for the PPC (although the study used event-
related fMRI rather than EEG). The notion of PPC-mediated conflict resolution would tie in 
with the assertion of Birn et al. (2010) that parietal activity of the type found by Gurd and 
colleagues relates to controlled retrieval; commenting specifically on Gurd et al. (2002), 
Booth, Bebko, Burman and Bitan (2007) note that the semantic nature of the task may impose 
increased retrieval demands. Retrieval may be of abstract rules rather than merely motor 
responses (Stoet and Snyder 2004; 2007), again supporting Gurd’s assertion that the parietal 
cortex has a more fundamental role in task switching. 
 
The recruitment of a fronto-parietal network (FPN) is evidently implicit to task 
switching (e.g. Dove et al., 2000). But this same network is well documented as being 
involved in a range of executively demanding tasks (e.g. Cole & Schneider, 2007; Niendam 
et al., 2012) and is implicit to goal-directed behaviour (Corbetta & Schulman, 2002). As 
noted there is no distinct area or network devoted solely to task switching. The FPN does not 
work in isolation, recruiting other networks according to task demands (Vincent, Kahn, 
Snyder, Raichle & Buckner, 2008). The ability of this network to be applicable in so many 
tasks and situations is attributed to the existence of ‘flexible hubs’ within the network – these 
are regions that are able to rapidly change their “...brain-wide functional connectivity 
patterns…” (Cole et al., 2013, p.1) and allow for cognitive control across a variety of tasks. 
Clearly then the network responsible for switching is specialised more for cognitively 
demanding goal-directed tasks than switching itself. It is noted that although switching 
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activity is seen in the parietal cortex this is in relation to different task parameters than those 
causing activity in the PFC (e.g. Badre & Wagner, 2006 show a dissociation between the two 
areas31). Although the two areas act in concert, Karayanidis et al. (2010) state that 
preparatory and task related control associated with cued switch/ repeat trials are related to at 
least partly distinct activity in the PFC and PPC. As previously noted activity in the network 
is also temporally differentiated, being frontally led (Brass et al., 2005). Additionally 
recruitment of the network differentiates according to the type of switching task being carried 
out. Although there are some common areas (the inferior frontal junction and the PPC) 
different types of task (perceptual, response or context switching) recruit differentially across 
the network (Kim, Cilles, Johnson & Gold, 2012). Recruitment of the FPN is diverse – 
although there are no switch specific areas there are switch common areas. Control of task 
switching is not carried out universally by a single set of brain regions but instead a multiple 
range of regions (perhaps mediated by the core elements of the FPN overseeing complex 
tasks per se) depending on the phase of the switching process being completed and the type 
of task.  
  
Involvement of frontal and parietal regions during task switching is therefore well 
established, but how does this relate specifically to the action of reconfiguration and 
inhibition? Determining a neural basis for reconfiguration has not been straightforward, not 
least because several imaging studies have reported no increase in activity during preparation 
for a switch compared to preparation for repeat trials. Necessarily (because of haemodynamic 
lag) studies have had to use preparation intervals of several seconds rather than the fractions 
of seconds used in behavioural studies (e.g. Kimberg et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000). 
Activation seen during this period could therefore be reflecting task maintenance rather than 
                                                           
31
 Under a situation of increased preparation there was reduced switch-repeat activity in PFC areas but 
increased activity in parietal areas. 
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reconfiguration (Lavric, Mizon & Monsell, 2008). Some cued fMRI studies have used 
techniques such as varying CSI from trial to trial or including occasional cues with no stimuli 
to separate out cue and stimulus related activity. However, as noted several of these have 
found no difference between switch and repeat preparation (e.g. Brass & von Cramon, 2002; 
Luks, Simpson, Feiwell & Miller, 2002; Ruge et al., 2005). However the picture is not all 
bleak – in a cued response task using bivalent and univalent stimuli it was found that rule 
representation and task-set reconfiguration are dissociable processes, finding a clear 
difference in activation levels for switch and repeat trials (Crone, Wendelken, Donohue & 
Bunge, 2006). Task-set reconfiguration was linked specifically to medial PFC activity. 
Further dissociation has been found between cue switch and task switch (Bryck, 2008), in a 
pattern consistent with a hypothesis of endogenous control. Use of ERP data has been more 
successful in determining the action of reconfiguration, allowing for separation of pre-
stimulus preparation and post-stimulus completion. These studies show a clear difference 
between switch and repeat trials (e.g. Nicholson, Karayanadis, Poboka, Heathcote & Michie, 
2005: Swainson, Jackson & Jackson, 2006; Astle, Jackson & Swainson, 2006). Interpretation 
of latencies, in particular a posterior positive deflection at ~400ms into the preparation period 
reported in several studies, has led to the proposition that this is a direct reflection of advance 
reconfiguration (Lavric. Mizon & Monsell, 2008). By independently manipulating cue and 
response to stimulus intervals, it has been possible to separate out the action of active 
reconfiguration from passive interference (Nicholson et al., 2005, see also Li, Wang, Zhao & 
Fogelson, 2012). While some fMRI studies have not found a switch-repeat difference (Brass 
& von Cramon, 2004; Ruge et al. 2005), the picture gleaned from ERP data is more 
consistent. Reconfiguration (along with some degree of inhibition) is clearly defined as a 
component process during task switching (Rushworth et al., 2002). This reconfiguration is 
anticipatory, as predicted by the TSR hypothesis (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Reconfiguration 
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of task set and implementation of task set are associated with distinct phases of ERP 
modulation (Rushworth et al., 2002) which would certainly fall in line with a prediction such 
of that of Meiran (2000) that switching consists of several different associated processes.  
 
As noted, the inferior frontal gyrus has been linked to inhibition (Aron et al., 2004). 
However, studies investigating inhibition are not widespread (most look at processes 
supporting active reconfiguration or preparation) and further confirmatory empirical evidence 
is sparse. Hence a piecemeal picture of inhibition-related neural activity is presented. 
Secondary evidence of residual activity in areas relating to the preceding task would suggest 
a role for carryover of the previous task set (Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & Cohen, 2006). But 
is there neural activity specifically related to inhibitory processes? Dissociation between right 
prefrontal activity for inhibition and left prefrontal for activation of task sets was gleaned 
from a small sample of individuals with focal lesions, suggesting functional separation of 
these processes (Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry & Keele, 2006) and confirming similar previous 
results for inhibition (Aron, Monsell, Sahakian & Robbins, 2004). Looking specifically at 
backward inhibition (greater costs for the third task on sequence A-B-A compared to C-B-A 
due to its recent activation) in a sample of healthy controls, there is again a finding of right 
lateral PFC increased activity in relation to greater levels of inhibition (the A-B-A sequence) 
(Dreher & Berman, 2002). More recent work on backward inhibition found switch-related 
activity in the left medial superior parietal lobule, which appeared to also recruit the left 
intraparietal sulcus and posterior cingulate cortex (Piguet et al., 2013). Inhibition of a 
previous task set (backward inhibition sequence A-B-A) resulted in deactivation of these 
parietal regions when the same task was returned to – there was no inhibition-related increase 
in activity, only a decrease in regions related to specific demands of the task. This is certainly 
in line with proposed predictions for the TSI hypothesis (Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & 
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Cohen, 2006), that activity would be decreased in switch related areas, rather than an increase 
in an inhibition specific area. However, equally one could predict an increase as more 
effortful processing is required in the face of competition. The absence of any increased 
activity in areas previously highlighted as relating to inhibition is troublesome, although the 
body of literature is frustratingly small so these apparently marked differences have little 
context. Again there is a high level of visuo-spatial task demands that could account for the 
switch-related activity. It is notable that these previous studies do not report parietal 
deactivation in relation to inhibition, perhaps highlighting the role of the specific task 
demands. As for all aspects of task switching there is no unique locus of activity for 
inhibition – all regions apparently involved are also recruited for other phases of the 
switching process.  
 
In summary there is no switch-specific area – regions involved in task switching are 
also implicated in other complex or demanding cognitive behaviours. There is a reliable 
fronto-parietal network but this is diverse in the range of component areas involved, with the 
network recruiting a number of other areas and networks, according to task demands. 
Mapping these patterns of activation to elements of key theories of task switching, namely 
reconfiguration and inhibition, have been far from straightforward. Some forms of evidence 
can be conflicting (as is the case for fMRI data relating to reconfiguration) but others (ERP 
data for reconfiguration) offer a more certain picture. Certainly it seems that more combined 
methods studies would be the way forward here (Swainson et al., 2003 being an example of 
such a combined fMRI/ ERP study). The pattern of parietal activity in relation to non-visuo-
spatial switching as in the Continuous Series II (Gurd et al., 2002) is not widely replicated in 
the literature but there is some small body of evidence that suggest this could be related to 
rule representations in the absence of such task demands (Gottlieb & Snyder, 2010). Medial 
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superior parietal lobule has been shown to be supportive of initiation of task set 
reconfiguration in a range of domains, although this has been in the realm of perceptual-
motor tasks (Esterman et al., 2009). However, given the single neuron results that parietal 
cognitive control occurs in the absence of spatial demands (Stoet & Snyder, 2004) it is 
entirely feasible that such activation is related to reconfiguration per se rather than being tied 
to a particular domain or response mode. Although there is arguably a spatial element to 
overlearned word sequences, this is far more abstract than for externally presented stimuli. As 
such the parietal activation shown in relation to the Continuous Series II can legitimately be 
taken as an early example of response-free cognitive control, perhaps relating to 
reconfiguration of task set. 
 
11.2 Memory load during uncued verbal switching 
Aside from the unusual non-spatial parietal activation seen during the Continuous 
Series II, the other outstanding feature is that it is entirely memory dependent. One obvious 
criticism of the Continuous Series II is that it is just a test of memory. Holding four tasks in 
WM with no supportive external cues or stimuli must by necessity be demanding. Are the 
increased time costs and errors seen at this level merely a reflection of an overloaded WM? 
Working memory load is implicit to all types of task switching, both cued and uncued. 
However, some types of switching (such as the Continuous Series II) require switching 
exclusively within WM. Both Barch et al. (1997) and Logan (2004) found working memory 
load to be dissociable from other processes active during task switching. Wager, Jonides & 
Smith (2007, p.1742) provide evidence that “…switching within working memory is 
separable from switching in perception.” Excessive memory load will of course result in 
reduced ability to switch attention or inhibit irrelevant task sets (Hester & Garavan, 2005) but 
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Gurd et al. (2002) assert that the constraint of using overlearned sequences minimises this as 
much as possible. Although categories have to be held in working memory during switching 
fewer items have to be maintained resulting in reduced per category iterations, rendering 
working memory possibly comparable but differently distributed between switching and non-
switching conditions. Circuits associated with verbal working memory (inferior parietal 
cortex (left supramarginal gyrus) and PFC regions as noted by e.g. Braver et al. (1997)) were 
reportedly not “maximally associated” with switching in the data collected by Gurd and 
colleagues. Parietal activity was therefore not primarily associated with active maintenance of 
items in working memory through attention shifting (e.g. Jonides et al. 1998).  
 
However, there may be additional costs relating to working memory not foreseen by 
Gurd – it has been proposed that memory switching may incur an additional cost to task 
switching in the same was as cue switching. Further manipulations of the role of working 
memory came from Mayr (2010) who used 2:1 response mappings32 (a cue-task mapping – 
two possible cues could signify one task) and concluded that use of memorised task 
representations mirrored the cue switch cost found with exogenous explicit cues. A 
significant portion of RT costs were due to the need to switch between memorised cue labels 
rather than switching between actual tasks. However, a recent review (Vandierendonck, 
2012) has shown that in some instances there is no interaction between memory load and 
costs. Undoubtedly there is a significant reliance on verbal working memory during task 
switching, as seen from the role of verbalisation (Goschke, 2000; Monsell, 2005) and the 
disruptive effects of concurrent articulatory suppression (Baddeley, Chincotta & Adlam, 
2001). Other studies (e.g. Saeki & Sato, 2004; Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, Muyllaert, 
                                                           
32
 Mayr notes Altmann’s (2006) objection to the use of 2:1 mappings as introducing an erroneous additional 
level of processing to the task, stating that just such a retrieval based cost is implicit but masked in 1:1 mapped 
tasks. 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
97 
 
Verbruggen & Vanneste, 2005) have demonstrated that taxing the phonological loop results 
in slower and more error prone switching.  
 
Conversely, other evidence has shown little link between WM and switching. Logan’s 
(2004) task-span was compared to memory span – task-span reflected the number of tasks 
carried out in the correct order and memory span the number of task names remembered in 
the correct order. Logan found no trade off between storage and task switching, suggesting 
that storage processes were separate from task performance processes. Switching involved 
processes outside of WM and the results were taken to support theories positing multiple 
executive processes. Other work, looking at switching performance in individuals with high 
and low WM span (Kane, Conway, Hambrick & Engle, 2007) has found that while a high 
span is linked to faster, more accurate switching, a low span is not linked to higher switch 
costs. Vandierendonck (2012) suggests a model containing components of declarative 
(examples of current problems) and executive (task set and rules) WM would account for 
both sides of this debate. Differences are related to the time available to rehearse - limited 
time results in detriment for recall (e.g. Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck & Camos, 
2008) and ample time means that recall does not depend on difficulty (e.g. Logan, 2004). 
Thus WM is potentially implicated in switching even when the results from studies suggest 
there is no link. However, the onus is still on declarative WM (which equates to the 
phonological loop/ visuospatial sketchpad) to maintain serial information about task order. 
While this model might seem readily applicable to the Continuous Series II, with seemingly 
ample rehearsal time, it should be remembered that the Continuous Series II elicits no 
additional activation in areas linked to verbal WM (Gurd et al., 2002). In this respect the role 
of WM in Continuous Series II is still unclear and warrants further investigation.  
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Previously in this thesis it has been noted that detrimental effects for switch cost of 
articulatory suppression in the absence of environmental cues emphasises the role of 
verbalisation in task switching. In an uncued switching task such as the Continuous Series II, 
presumably heavily reliant on inner-speech as a self cuing device, it would be of import to 
determine the relationship between memory span and switch cost. As such all experiments 
contained in this thesis assess the correlation between digit span measures and switch cost, 
partialling out any effects found. It must be assumed that involvement of the phonological 
loop (or its equivalent as presented by Vandierendonck, 2012) to the degree suggested by 
Saeki & Sato (2004) (and thus reliance, in the uncued paradigm, on WM) would consistently 
present as reduced switch costs for those individuals with greater memory span, in line with 
Kane etal. (2007). However, memory span has not been found to account consistently for 
switch cost when accounted for on statistical analyses of the Continuous Series II. A further 
way to account for the effects of WM on switch cost in an uncued paradigm would be to 
introduce cues which must necessarily reduce the requirement to hold a sequence of up to 
four tasks in WM. Rehearsal in the Continuous Series II is twofold, for both tasks and task 
items.  As such it cannot be assumed that models such as Vandierendonck’s could fully 
account for potential costs. Although verbal WM is not thought to be overly implicated in the 
task (Gurd et al., 2002) that is not to say that other aspects of WM might not be. Experiment 
6 in Chapter 8 addresses this directly, introducing continuously present cues of either low or 
high semantic content (used previously by Logan and Bundesen, 2004). WM load for task 
order is reduced, thus freeing up capacity for item rehearsal, presumably resulting in lower 
costs, fewer between category (task) errors and within category (item) errors. 
 
Working memory is thus still a pertinent question as regards the Continuous Series II, 
but what of its role in reconfiguration accounts? If WM is implicit in the Continuous Series II 
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is this evidence for reconfiguration or inhibition based accounts? Both inevitably lay claim to 
the involvement of WM. Working memory must be involved in reconfiguration and 
maintenance – for example, Vandierendonck (2012) suggests an executive aspect of WM 
which deals with task set and rules. It has been suggested by others (e.g. Rubinstein et al., 
2001) that only one task set can be present in WM (presumably addressed for 
Vandierendonck by the declarative aspect) – switching therefore necessitates executively 
mediated LTM retrieval of further task sets. Working memory therefore interacts with 
executive reconfiguration processes. Further evidence comes from Baddeley, Chincotta & 
Adlam (2001) who used articulatory suppression to interfere with switching processes, using 
a suppressive task akin to 2-category switching in the Continuous Series II. Greater 
interference occurred for switching rather than repeat conditions – the secondary tasks 
involved executive control processes and so these were not available for reconfiguration. It 
should be noted however that Rogers & Monsell (1995) themselves highlighted that WM 
processes are separate to switching. This was the basis of their criticism of Jersild’s (1927) 
assessment of switching in blocks as there was a disparate WM load between switching and 
repeat blocks. Further, there is also evidence that WM is not involved in the maintenance of 
task sets. Some studies have proposed that it is activated LTM rather than WM that holds 
things like response representations (e.g. Rubin & Meiran, 2005; Meiran & Kessler, 2008). It 
has also been proposed that when the alternating runs (AABBAA...) paradigm is executed 
with a long RSI (response-to-stimulus interval) there is the potential for the task set to be lost 
from WM, necessitating further retrieval from LTM (Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & 
Verbruggen, 2010). Such re-retrieval acts like retrieval of a new task set and so can add to 
costs in a way that might appear asymmetric. Working memory would seem to be an implicit 
co-process in a reconfiguration account by virtue of how many task sets can be maintained 
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(or lost), although some would say this can be supplanted by active LTM33, which may be 
less limited in capacity.  
 
As far as inhibition and priming accounts are concerned (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 
1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000), priming occurs through associations between stimuli and 
responses and also by repetition of instructions that indicate the upcoming task (e.g. 
Arrington & Logan, 2004b; Schneider & Logan, 2005). As such this would involve the 
phonological loop for rehearsal of instructions. Task set inertia involves the passive transient 
decay of the previous task set (or stimulus response set) in WM – this is why effects are 
locally confined and do not build up over time. Increasing the interval between stimuli 
decreases the inertial effect (Witt & Stevens, 2012), thereby reflecting memory decay. 
Although earlier studies using the Jersild (1927) switch/ repeat list approach (specifically 
Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994), potentially included the WM confound noted by Rogers & 
Monsell (1995), later studies that looked at priming effects (Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 
2003) modified the design to address these issues. Thus the involvement of WM in inhibition 
and priming accounts is confined to the passive decay of items it contains. Whereas during 
reconfiguration items are actively moved to (and rehearsed in) WM stores, inhibition 
accounts make no claims about active movement of items, being more passive and stimulus 
led. The reality is that WM acts as a supportive process to reconfiguration, allowing for 
rehearsal of task order (Monsell, 2005) and maintenance of the current task set, with decay of 
that set contributing to passive carryover effects. As previously noted, many accounts of task 
switching allow for both processes to act in concert (e.g. Meiran, 1996; Yeung & Monsell, 
2003) and WM would seem one setting in which they interact.  
                                                           
33
 Representations activated for relevant associated task sets within LTM as oppose to a peripheral portion of 
WM (Cowan, 1988).   
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 Given that the Continuous Series II does not show additional activation of areas 
associated with verbal working memory (Gurd et al., 2002), it is possible that the load on 
WM is not greater than that accrued in any other task switching paradigm, given what we 
know about verbalisation for the upcoming task (Goshcke, 2000; Monsell, 2005), even when 
explicit cues are used. However, as the Continuous Series II gives a measure of general 
(whole task) switch cost it inevitably captures a range of contributory processes. It would 
therefore be pertinent to ascertain exactly how much of this cost is memory based. 
Additionally, there is the contribution of recalling instructional cues from LTM. It has been 
noted that increasing the number of items to be maintained does not always increase switch 
cost (Liefooghe et al., 2008) so holding up to four items in WM may not inflate cost. 
Conversely though, the same study shows that task switching itself does impair the 
maintenance of items. Other work (Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck & Camos, 2008) 
confirms that the act of switching introduces a cost to WM functioning. Thus there may be a 
circuitous increase in cost as the act of switching will impair the maintenance of the four 
items, which obviously is more difficult than maintaining the usual two tasks associated with 
most traditional studies. Working memory and task difficulty have been shown to doubly 
dissociate functionally (Barch et al., 1997) so WM would be an additive contributor to cost in 
these circumstances. Attempting to alleviate WM load (and LTM instructional retrieval) 
would therefore further refine general cost in the Continuous Series II and would give an 
important indication of just how much of this cost is switch related. 
 
11.3 Calculation of switch cost during continuous verbal task switching 
As well as the unusual pattern of non-visuo-spatial parietal activity and the greater 
reliance on (although undetermined contribution of) WM, there are other features relating to 
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the structure and administration of the Continuous Series II that make it unusual in the 
literature and are worthy of comment. One of these is the calculation of general (whole-task) 
cost, rather than local per-switch cost. Unlike most of the work mentioned thus far, 
performance in the verbal switching task is measured continuously rather than on a trial by 
trial basis, lending itself to calculation of a general switch cost for completing all component 
tasks together. Switch cost is calculated over the whole time course of the task rather than for 
individual switches or repeats within the whole task, as was also the case for Jersild (1927), 
Allport, Styles & Hseieh (1994) and Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans (2001). In the Continuous 
Series II speech rate in the switching condition is compared to non-switching speech rate for 
the same categories. For example, if switching is between ‘numbers’ and ‘days’ then the non-
switching speech rate for each of those categories is added together and divided by two (the 
number of categories being switched between). It has been noted that the emphasis on 
measuring switch cost only over local task transitions disregards the inevitable influence of 
“... the global representational structures in which individual tasks are embedded” 
(Kleinsorge, Heuer & Schmidtke (2004), p.32). Mixing costs (identified by Fagot (1994) as 
the time disadvantage for repetitions occurring in a switch block instead of a single task 
block) additionally implicate the influence of task proximity as well as task transition on 
costs (although see Monsell (2003) for a critique).  
 
During the calculation of general costs, it has been found that there is evidence for 
distinct phases of executive volition in instigating tasks and inhibition requirements to 
overcome previous tasks (Rubinstein et al., 2001). Clearly general switch cost is a suitable 
tool to assess contributory processes in task switching (see also Goffaux, Phillips, Sinai & 
Pushkar, 2006). Asymmetries have also been found in general as well as specific costs 
(Ellefson, Shapiro & Chater, 2006). This type of cost is an indicator of executive function and 
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reflects the need to maintain and select between task sets (Kray & Linedenberger, 2000; 
Kray, Li & Lindenberger, 2002; Reimers & Maylor, 2005). As such it may be particularly 
sensitive to measuring proactive control as proposed in the dual mechanism model of 
cognitive control proposed by Braver, Gray & Burgess (2007), comprising of sustained 
proactive control and transient reactive control. General costs reflect the selection processes 
that prepare the cognitive system for the upcoming switch (Kray, Li & Lindenberger, 2002). 
As such they must reflect preparation and have potential to shed light on reconfiguration 
processes. Although general (per block) and specific (per trial) switch costs are dissociable 
(Kray & Lindenberger, 2000) they do still fall under the auspices of the same proposed 
control mechanisms. Blocked designs generating general switch cost have been used to 
present more widely applicable theories of task switch cost, perhaps most prominently by 
Allport, Styles & Hsieh (1994) in proposing their TSI hypothesis.  
 
One of very few studies looking at continuous switching performance is offered by 
Verhaegen and Hoyer (2007), allowing investigation of what they term ‘focus switching 
cost’. This is defined as the contribution of switching between task sets held in the focused 
and unfocused portions of Cowan’s hierarchical model of working memory (see Cowan, 
2001). The focused zone of WM in this model accommodates the momentary focus of 
attention and holds approximately four items. The unfocused zone draws on LTM but is 
limited in practical terms by the effects of interference and decay. According to Verhaegen 
and Hoyer operations on the current task set occur within focused WM and so do not require 
retrieval. The non-current task set has to be retrieved from unfocused WM – what they term 
‘focus switching cost’ reflects this unfocused retrieval. They cite tasks of serial attention, 
such as the Continuous Series II in which participants must keep track of several items, as 
being well suited to accounting for such retrieval costs.  
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However, it should be noted that, while the contribution of costs related to whole task 
representation and execution are central to the current work, they are not necessarily 
attributed wholly to working memory (such questions are considered in more detail in the 
section ‘memory load during verbal switching’ on page 82). The fundamental issue here is 
that trial by trial analysis of task switching has gleaned much information about trial by trial 
switching processes, that is to say processes which are implicated in a single transition from 
one task response to another. There has been criticism (e.g. Monsell, 2003) of  Jersild’s 
(1927) original subtractive list comparison approach (comparing performance on a single task 
list to an alternating task list) on the basis that it obscures the distinction between mixing and 
switching costs, that is the costs of performing two tasks in proximity to each other and of 
switching between them. Nevertheless, deconstructing task switching to a trial by trial basis 
inevitably loses the contribution of this ‘global representation’ of tasks over time. The effects 
of previous task switches, of the awareness of subsequent task switches and the need to 
maintain task sets as available all contribute to this global representation and may not be 
captured in a single trial transition.  
 
While some studies have examined the effect of the broader switching environment 
on the ability to switch (for example Arbuthnott (2008) looking at the effect of task location 
and type on backward inhibition), very few offer an alternative to discrete trial based 
measures of switch cost. Both Altmann & Trafton (2004) and Kleinsorge & Kajewski (2008) 
have warned against the limitations imposed by such an approach. As a caveat Gurd & 
Oliveira (1996) conceded that, when calculating continuous holistic whole-task costs, the 
contribution of switching to time costs may be difficult to fully discriminate from other 
sources of interference, such as ‘proactive inhibition’ (Allport, 1992). However, the role of 
inhibition in task switching has been found not to be so widespread throughout the task and is 
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focussed at the level of stimulus attribute and response processing in a recent review of the 
role of inhibition in task switching (Koch et al., 2010).  
 
11.4 Switching between four tasks: The contribution of global task difficulty 
to switch cost  
As well as the way switch cost is calculated, another unusual feature of the 
Continuous Series II is that it facilitates switching between up to four tasks. True ‘multi-
tasking’, switching between multiple tasks, is not common experimentally. Notable areas of 
exception are studies of backward inhibition using three tasks (e.g. Mayr & Keele, 2000: 
Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Arbuthnott, 2008) and those that use a factorial combination of 
two response choices and two S-R mappings (e.g. Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994 (Experiment 
1); Rogers & Monsell, 1995 (Experiment 6); Kleinsorge, 2004; Kleinsorge, Heuer & 
Schmidtke, 2004). The rarity of multiple task switching in the literature was noted by 
Buchler, Hoyer and Cerella (2008), who used up to four equivalent arithmetical tasks 
(addition, subtraction, magnitude – smallest, magnitude – largest). However, as the tasks had 
no fixed order the appropriate task was indicated by the colour of the stimuli. This arbitrary 
mapping introduced another level of processing (see Logan & Schneider, 2006b) not required 
in the Continuous Series II. Buchler and colleagues concluded that only the current task was 
held in active awareness and the others were equally accessible, regardless of number, but 
that response latencies were weakened as the number of tasks increased, perhaps due to a 
‘dilution’ of overall resources. A degree of general cost for the Continuous Series II may 
therefore be associated with maintenance of multiple tasks as oppose to switching between 
multiple tasks; calculation of per-task as oppose to general costs may be illustrative in this 
regard. Assessing tasks with no content, that is arbitrary load free tasks (repeating the same 
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word) that act as a ‘place holder’ instead of more complex overlearned sequences, would also 
help determine the contribution of maintaining four tasks per se. Experiment 5 in Chapter 7 
addressees this issue, using a constant range of four tasks at every switching level instead of 
increasing up from two tasks. The ratio of ‘place holder’ (repeating colour names) and 
overlearned sequence tasks is changed at each switching level, increasing the more complex 
content of the tasks but keeping them at a constant four. Thus the contribution of keeping 
four tasks active can be assessed separately from maintaining the task content for the 
overlearned sequences.  
 
11.5 The use of verbal responses 
Although not as unusual as the inclusion of four tasks or calculation of general costs, 
the Continuous Series II does deviate from the norm within the literature somewhat by using 
verbal responses.  Other studies have used verbal responses (e.g. Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000;) 
but most studies use button presses in response to stimulus decisions. Monsell (2005) says 
language supports ongoing control of task switching and reconfiguration of task set by means 
of verbal self-instruction (this is particularly noted in older adults, who rely on the facility 
more in lieu of deficits in executive functioning e.g. Kray, Eber & Lindenberger, 2004). 
Monsell (2005) also notes that participants sometimes mutter task rules to themselves – this 
has been noted extensively for the Continuous Series II (Essig, 2004a), specifically stating 
the goal “The next one is days...”, the previous response across tasks “Days then months...”, 
the previous response within a task “Monday, Tuesday...” or seemingly unrelated ‘filler’ 
utterances “What comes next?”. Concurrent articulation is generally found to increase switch 
costs when it is at odds with this internal verbalisation (e.g. Baddeley, Chicotta & Adlam, 
2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003). Goschke (2000) found irrelevant concurrent word 
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production eliminated the practice advantage but uttering the task name did not. The role of 
speech per se in task switching is evident – switch costs have been shown to be higher for 
patients with left hemisphere damage compared to right and particularly so for those with 
language disorders34 (Mecklinger, von Cramon, Springer & Matthes-von Cramon, 1999), 
further suggesting that reconfiguration is reliant on language functioning. The question is 
whether the verbal responses in the Continuous Series II are relevant or irrelevant to the 
inevitable internal verbalisation. It is possible that the use of a verbal response disrupts the 
use of inner speech as a supportive device, removing any beneficial effects of internal 
verbalisation (Holland & Low, 2010). If internal rehearsal is for task order (as would seem 
most likely from Monsell, 2005) then a verbal response of a task item might be supposed to 
interfere with that. For example, responding with the word ‘Tuesday’ might interfere with 
rehearsal of task order ‘numbers, days, months…’ However, as evidenced above sometimes 
rehearsal is for the category item in which case rehearsal would be supported. The additional 
analysis for Experiment 2 in Chapter 4 addresses the issue of whether the type of 
verbalisation produced has any differential effect on the subsequent responses made. By 
categorising both non-target utterances of the type already reviewed above and subsequent 
responses it is possible to determine whether rehearsal, regardless of its nature, has a 
beneficial effect for completion of the task. 
 
11.6 Classification of errors in the Continuous Series II  
One final area of difference within the verbal switching paradigm is the way that 
errors are classified. This leads directly on from the relevance of verbal responses, as it is just 
                                                           
34
 Interestingly previous work using the Continuous Series II (Essig, Gurd & Kischka, 2005) indicated no 
correlation between normal speech rate and switch cost in a sample of healthy controls. None of the experiments 
presented in the current work show significant correlations between normal speech rate and switch cost at any 
level. 
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these responses that allow different types of errors to be identified. Rogers and Monsell 
(1995) determined that errors were more common during switching trials, decreased with 
practice for some tasks (e.g. digit but not letter decisions, their Experiment 1) and could be 
almost extinguished with sufficient preparation time (1200 msec, their Experiment 3). Errors 
were seen to contribute to time switch costs through post-error slowing and to justify the 
requirement for an exogenous controller through the commission of ‘capture errors’ (as 
stimuli evoke concomitant task execution). Capture errors are analogous in healthy controls 
to perseverative errors in frontal patients (often seen in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, 
Grant & Berg, 1948) attributed to “absentmindedly perform[ing] an action habitually 
associated with the context instead of the action intended” (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, p. 209). 
Such errors during switching can be permanent or temporary, signifying a loss of endogenous 
control and an evocation of task set by the stimuli – task sets become exogenously controlled.  
Task set is automatically assumed by a process of contention scheduling. Errors in the 
Continuous Series II constitute more than capture errors – perseverative errors35 could be 
classed as such but within-category sequencing errors, where items are produced from the 
correct category on each iteration but in the wrong order, do not lend themselves to this 
interpretation. 
 
In the original Continuous Series study (Gurd, 1995) errors were classified as WM 
errors (sequencing errors), contention scheduling errors (repetitions or perseverations) or 
schema errors (‘wild card’ items from unrelated categories). Clearly there is agreement at 
least partially with Rogers & Monsell’s (1995) perseverative capture errors. However, the 
only other verbal response study to differentiate between different error types is that of 
                                                           
35
 Perseveration in the Continuous Series II can occur within a single category, repeating the same response over 
several iterations (‘Tuesday, Tuesday, Tuesday’ instead of ‘Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday’) or across 
categories, repeating items from the same category instead of switching to the subsequent ones (‘Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday’ instead of ‘Tuesday, April, L’) 
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Arbuthnott & Frank (2000). They defined errors as either wrong task errors (selecting the 
wrong task to carry out) or decision errors (selecting the wrong response within the correct 
task). Arbuthnott proposed decision errors to reflect task-specific processes and task errors 
relate to executive control. Earlier, Gurd (1995) had related sequencing errors to working 
memory and repetitions (perseverations) to executive control though had not made the 
distinction of whether these occurred within or between tasks. Errors as reported by Rogers 
and Monsell (1995) did not allow for such a distinction as they were ambiguous due to the 
manual response mode. Commonly, other studies report only task errors for this reason (e.g. 
Woodward et al., 2003; Meiran & Daichman, 2005). Errors occurred too infrequently for 
analysis in the original TSI study (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994). Allport and Wylie (2000) 
and Wylie and Allport (2000) report the same general error count but comment on it only in 
respect of its elevation during Stroop switching.  
 
It would seem plausible to use this distinction of wrong task (executive) and decision 
(working memory) to define errors in the Continuous Series II. Errors can either occur 
between categories/ tasks (choosing the wrong task or omitting a task) or within tasks 
(choosing the correct task but making a sequencing error). However, this is limiting in the 
scope of errors that can be made. In the Continuous Series II, perseveration can occur both 
between tasks (e.g. ‘Monday, Tuesday, A’ instead of ‘Monday, January, A’) and within tasks 
(e.g. ‘Monday, January, A, Monday, February, B’). Within category errors are clearly not 
limited to failure of WM. The type of error is relevant to defining the theoretical description 
of the task. It is not necessarily the case that errors are caused solely by forgetting or that they 
reflect WM or other memory faculties – they may not be derived from tasks that extensively 
rely on WM (Gurd et al., 2003). Instead this thesis will use a novel approach to defining error 
source, relating to Daniel Kahneman’s two-system approach to judgement and choice 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
110 
 
(Kahneman, 2011). System 1 results in fast, automatic, subconscious thinking, System 2 
results in slow, effortful, conscious thinking. Kahneman defines System 1 as adept in 
detecting simple differences automatically (e.g. the changing state of a single attribute such 
as the overlearned sequence days of the week). System 2 is more deliberate and is able to 
follow rules – a crucial function of this system is the adoption of task sets. Effortful 
deliberate switching is the domain of System 2 and automatic minimal effort updating is the 
domain of System 1. The fundamental difference is automatic reaction and intentional 
control. The first is naturally faster than the second so additionally this would predict that 
updating within a task (Monday, Tuesday…) contributes less to general costs than switching 
between tasks (numbers, days…).  
 
Adopting Kahneman’s dual-system definition for decision making in defining 
Continuous Series II errors avoids the need to recount to WM as a basis for error production. 
Such a definition limits the usefulness of error data in defining models of processing. While 
WM does undoubtedly have links to attentive and executive processes it does not need to be 
the sole descriptor of faulty response production.  To say that errors are just a case of 
forgetting is to ignore the nuances of information they can give about the way a task is 
completed. Within-category errors are indicative of a failure to correctly execute an 
automatic process – between-category errors are more systematic and are indicative of a 
failure to disengage or activate a task set. It could of course be argued that this is in fact a 
failure of memory in keeping track of the correct task order – Experiment 6 addresses this 
issue by introducing task cues to remove this memory requirement. If between-category 
errors are in fact nothing more than a case of forgetting (and it is the contention of this thesis 
that this is not the case) then cues will significantly reduce, if not eradicate, such errors. 
Interestingly none of the experiments contained within this work show a correlation between 
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within and between category errors, further suggesting that the two have a different basis – if 
an individual were forgetful of item order it would be highly likely that they would be 
forgetful of task order as well. Being forgetful is not selective.  
 
12 Theoretical accounts of task switching and the verbal switching 
paradigm 
Evidently a number of features set the Continuous Series II somewhat apart 
methodologically from more traditional measures of task switching. But do these features 
extend to separating the Continuous Series II from theoretical accounts of task switching – 
for example, can the verbal paradigm be explained in terms of passive carryover or active 
reconfiguration? Certainly drawing conclusions between alternating tasks, alternating runs 
and explicit cued/ uncued designs should be done cautiously if at all. The autonomous 
continuous nature of the verbal task and the calculation of general rather than local switch 
cost for the Continuous Series II do perhaps limit the interpretations that can be made based 
on previous research. Aspects of switching such as residual switch cost (the persistent cost 
left after ample practice) and manipulations of RSI (response to stimulus interval) are not 
immediately accessible using the verbal paradigm. Localised interference accounts based on 
asymmetry (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) require alternating tasks to be of disparate 
difficulty. Exogenously triggered completion accounts (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) relying on 
the calculation of residual cost from alternating require presentation of external stimuli and 
manipulation of the gap between response and presentation of the next stimulus. Neither 
account offers a direct ‘off the peg’ explanation for the accumulation of switch cost in 
Continuous Series II.  
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12.1 Verbal switching and the task-set inertia (TSI) hypothesis 
Stroop-style tasks (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994; Woodward et al., 2003; Gilbert & 
Shallice, 2002) require a switch between cognitive and perceptual domains (word reading and 
colour identification). Finding asymmetry when switching between such conditions may 
therefore be an inflated representation, reflecting the need to change domains rather than 
being task switch related. Much has already been said about the potential for the asymmetry 
in Stroop-style switching as an artefact of the task itself. The Continuous Series II is entirely 
cognitive, offering multiple tasks within a single cognitive domain. Gurd et al. (2003) were 
particularly critical of tasks which cross this boundary; Jersild (1927) said tasks encompassed 
by a single task set (such as language) were more efficient. However, in its current form the 
verbal task does not allow for assessment of asymmetry due to the comparability of task 
difficulty between overlearned sequences (as per the component tasks used by Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995) and so the applicability of localised interference is difficult to assess36.  
 
However, this issue is addressed in Experiment 3 (Chapter 5) which introduces a 
design entirely within the cognitive domain that has component tasks of differing difficulty. 
The Mixed Category II task involves switching alternately between producing items from 
semantic categories (e.g. fruit, vehicles) and overlearned sequences (e.g. months, days). The 
task is introduced in an earlier form in Experiments 1 and 2 but it is in Experiment 3 that it is 
extended to switching between four categories (the same as the Continuous Series II) and that 
asymmetry is assessed. During a practice session Gurd et al. (2002) found semantic category 
production to be more error prone than overlearned sequence production, thus suggesting it is 
                                                           
36
 Previous work (Essig, 2004, see page 145) combined the Continuous Series II and semantic category 
switching into a task that alternated between overlearned sequences and semantic categories – while tasks in this 
instance were of varying levels of difficulty, asymmetry between constituent tasks was not assessed as switch 
cost was calculated globally for the whole task. 
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more difficult. Additionally when producing items from semantic categories, search and 
retrieval are more effortful and there is the requirement to inhibit past responses (Kellett, 
Stevenson & Gernsbacher, 2011). This task allows the novel situation of assessing 
asymmetry in the absence of bivalency (cueing of two possible tasks by one stimulus). 
Bivalency slows all trials within a block, even if only some of the stimuli are bivalent and the 
rest are univalent (cueing one task) (e.g. Meier, Woodward, Ray-Mermet & Graf, 2009). 
Avoiding bivalent stimuli avoids this additional source of slowing, which is of particular 
importance when calculating whole-task cost over the time-course of the task as for the 
Continuous Series II. There would be a problem for traditional explanations of asymmetry 
(e.g. Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) as univalent stimuli do not afford the need to inhibit 
competing responses, suggesting an absence of inhibition (Lien, Ruthruff & Kuhns, 2006). 
However, there are computational models of task switching that give an explanation of 
asymmetry in relation to relative differences in task activation rather than inhibition of the 
easy task (Yeung & Monsell, 2003) – these depend on a threshold of activation being reached 
between the two tasks (see page 29). As such it is legitimate to look for non-bivalent 
asymmetry, based solely on the relative difference of difficulty level between the tasks.  
 
The Continuous Series II places minimal demands on response selection as the task 
and responses made to it are, in the words of Hunt and Klein37 (2002) “hyper-compatible”, 
yet switch costs don’t seem to be extinguishable (sensory and perceptual processing 
requirements are also removed). Further to this, the extensive predictability of switches in the 
verbal task does not extinguish switch cost (although it really equates to maximal preparation 
                                                           
37
 Hunt and Klein purportedly extinguished residual switch cost by using saccade rather than manual responses, 
terming their response method “hyper-compatible” with the stimuli. The task was cued for the saccade to move 
towards or away from the stimulus. They believed residual cost to be an artefact of response selection rather 
than switch related, hence their resilience to adequate practice time. Regardless of the plausibility of this view 
the notion of hyper-compatible (and indeed incompatible) responses and stimuli is a useful one.  
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time), although it may extinguish that part of it which leads to the switch cost reduction in 
predictable alternating runs tasks. Despite remaining entirely predictable the increasing 
number of switches does result in increasing switch cost. There must therefore be an 
additional source of switch cost in verbal task switching which is not thus far accounted for. 
 
12.2 Verbal task switching and the task-set reconfiguration (TSR) hypothesis  
The TSR hypothesis states that switch cost reflects intentional control and is reliant on 
top-down processing. There was a practice-resistant portion of switch cost (the residual cost) 
that could not be extinguished despite extending the RSI (response to stimulus interval) to 
upwards of one second. Residual cost is confined to the first trial of a run (AABB…) and is 
attributed to an exogenously controlled part of reconfiguration. The arrival of the stimulus 
triggers completion of the process and it cannot complete until this occurs. Whether residual 
costs are represented in the Continuous Series II is debatable – typically the first trial of a run 
is faster with switch cost building up over the first few iterations and reaching a plateau for 
the rest of the task38 (Essig, 2004b). Arrival of the stimulus is moot as no externally presented 
stimuli are presented during the verbal task. One could argue that the retrieval of the next task 
in the sequence from memory constitutes arrival of the stimulus although of course this 
would be subject to individual differences and so would be more approximate than in the 
alternating runs paradigm. Nevertheless, there would be a period between making a response 
(e.g. Tuesday) and retrieving the next task (e.g. months) that could constitute an equivalent, 
albeit non-controllable, to RSI. This would give a localised practice period – both alternating 
runs and the Continuous Series II are fully predictable so both offer the long term benefits of 
this.  
                                                           
38
 Unpublished data relating to the sample for Experiment 1 (healthy controls and neurological patients) was 
plotted to show cumulative switch cost at 10 second intervals over the time course of the task. 
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It can therefore be assumed that general cost for the Continuous Series II has the 
potential to reflect at least in part practice resistant cost. This may reflect retrieval processes 
relating to the upcoming task in a similar way to waiting for the arrival of the upcoming 
stimulus in the alternating runs paradigm. Mayr & Kliegl (2003) suggest that the preparation 
period always represents this memory retrieval, even in the presence of externally represented 
stimuli (Altmann & Gray (2008) also define preparation as the retrieval of task codes within 
WM). Clearly there is practice resistant cost in the Continuous Series II but not, it would 
seem, confined to the first trial of a run. Lack of localised measures of cost and the 
continuous nature of the task cloud this issue. It is plausible that there is ‘stimulus’ cued 
completion of reconfiguration, as suggested by Rogers & Monsell (1995). Switching 
performance is known to improve with adequate preparation time but an unknown factor in 
this uncontrolled scenario is whether the preparation time is adequate. As the task is self-
paced one would assume that individuals take full advantage of the preparation period but 
this is an unknown quantity – general cost could reflect inadequate preparation as well as 
residual-type cost and this could certainly vary between individuals. The way switch cost 
builds up over the time course of the verbal task is reminiscent of the associative interference 
account of Wylie & Allport (2000) although that of course relied on bivalent Stroop stimuli 
which offered a degree of interference not seen in the Continuous Series II. While there might 
be a degree of perseveration, a ‘day’ response can only afford days – there would not be the 
same overlap of S-R mappings.  
 
So what might be the explanation for increasing cost over the time course of the task 
and the absence of first trial confinement? At the beginning of the Continuous Series II there 
is no requirement to temper responses against those that have gone before – this would result 
in faster response times as no switching occurs ‘within’ the component tasks (there is no or 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
116 
 
little updating at the beginning). This could easily mask a first trial effect between tasks and 
contribute to the increasing and levelling of the general switch cost. Therefore an explanation 
based on reconfiguration could apply to the Continuous Series II, although extrapolation of 
residual cost would seem problematic. It is possible that each iteration of the task (each 
occurrence of, for example, the three category run of numbers, days and months) could give 
an occurrence of something similar to the first trial of a run in the alternating runs paradigm, 
although embedded within the continuous cycle of the overall task. If switching is 
represented as a continuous repeat of a three category run then it is possible that residual 
costs could be extracted by calculating local per-category (rather than per switch) costs, thus 
giving a measure of first trial costs within the framework of general switch costs. 
 
12.3 Verbal task switching and the failure to engage (FTE) hypothesis 
A further point that is worth returning to, related to the use of localised preparation 
time between the commission of a response and the retrieval of the subsequent task, is 
whether this preparation time is taken advantage of? It has already been considered that 
preparation time might not always be adequate (both within and between individuals) but 
there is also the possibility that the time is adequate but not used. This reflects the failure to 
engage hypothesis of De Jong (2000) (see page 40 of this document). It is entirely feasible 
that, if we accept retrieval of the upcoming task is akin to arrival of a stimulus (at least in 
terms of triggering access to the relevant task set) then the interval from the preceding 
response constitutes localised preparation time for the next task. It is proposed (De Jong, 
2000) that there needs to be an additional and specific intention to use this preparation time to 
actively change task set. De Jong suggests that it is failure to do this that results in residual 
switch cost. In his model there is a cue-action pairing (with the action being making use of 
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the preparation time) that retrieves the intention, with the suggestion being that sometimes 
these pairings are not made. A further reason given for the failure to engage is that activation 
level of the cue-action pairing is too low for it to effectively act as a trigger for advance 
preparation. This could relate to low subjective utility of the benefits or limited WM capacity 
for maintaining the intention.  
 
Evidently there is no cue in the Continuous Series II to make such a pairing. In De 
Jong’s model the cue triggers the knowledge of what to prepare for during the interim period. 
Indeed, Nieuwenhuis & Monsell (2002) have proposed that it is the explicitness of these cues 
that accounts for the finding that residual cost can be entirely extinguished when engagement 
is actioned. It is however still possible that there is a lack of appreciation of benefits of 
advance preparation, something De Jong highlights as intrinsic to the effect. It is possible that 
the gap between response and retrieval of the next task is not fully used to prepare for that 
switch, resulting in further delay in producing the correct task item. Again there is not the 
control over the duration of the preparation time that would allow us to definitively whether it 
is being utilised or not, but the possibility remains that it is not being fully accessed in all 
instances. Once again this would vary between individuals, particularly as it is likely that the 
duration of the preparation time varies in such a way. However, this may actually benefit 
performance. As preparation times are likely to vary within participants, according to 
Altmann (2004) individuals will take advantage of longer preparation periods. When no 
variation in preparation times is given Altmann found that there was a persistent failure to 
engage. Variations could occur for a number of reasons, including proficiency at each 
individual task. Although all sequences are overlearned and therefore produced 
automatically, examination of individual baseline rates for the separate categories in all 
experiments reveals variation in aptitude at producing category items. While a degree of this 
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will be relate to item length (e.g. months as opposed to letters) the variation appears not to be 
systematic with individuals being more proficient in one or other category. It would seem 
that, although lacking the pairing with an associated cue, there remains a possibility that the 
preparation period within the task may not always be utilised again both within and between 
individuals. A failure to engage would be more difficult to extrapolate from the data, given 
the self-paced nature of the task and the embedded nature of the preparation period, but it 
should be considered as a possible contributor to general cost for the task.  
 
12.4 Verbal task switching and dual mechanisms accounts of switch cost 
As previously noted, it is evident that no one account of task switch cost can readily 
fit the behavioural measures seen in the Continuous Series II. It may perhaps be the case that 
a dual mechanism approach may be more suited to explaining cost and error measures in the 
verbal task. As already noted, Kahneman’s (2011) dual system of attention has already been 
employed to account for the different types of error produced during the task. Recently this 
approach has also been adopted to inform theorising about costs seen using the Continuous 
Series II task (Gurd & Cowell, 2013). This system lends itself to automatic processing of 
overlearned word sequences (Kahneman’s System 1) and effortful switching between 
categories (System 2). More generally such dual system accounts allow for both passive and 
active processes to work in concert, negating the need for an all-or-nothing approach to task 
switch cost. This allows a fractionated approach to task maintenance and task reconfiguration 
– as seen earlier (section ‘Neural activation during task switching’ on page 75) these features 
of task switching are known to be functionally distinct. Some models do not fit the 
Continuous Series II so well, such as Goschke’s (2000) suggestion of a modular ‘control 
panel’ for switching. Implicit to this are stimulus evoked bivalent error responses, taken as 
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evidence of passive carryover of previous task set activation. Evidently the lack of stimuli per 
se and the lack of bivalency in the Continuous Series II would make this interpretation 
problematic.  
 
Other dual-mechanisms accounts lend themselves at least partially to interpretation of 
the Continuous Series II. The account proposed by Braver, Reynolds and Donaldson (2003, 
page 64 of this thesis) combines sustained, proactive control that oversees fast switching over 
time with transient, reactive control that relates to reconfiguration and S-R mappings with 
cues. Both types of control have been shown to be functionally distinct, with a third separate 
process related to maintenance and representation of task set also identified. Thus there are 
two distinct types of switching control, neither of which has to devote any processing to the 
holding of tasks and task sets in WM. The Braver study uses both block comparisons (as does 
the Continuous Series II) allowing for calculation of general switch cost and single trial 
comparisons within blocks giving rise to local costs39. It is noted that general (block 
comparison) switch costs are informative of the contribution of transient control, relating to 
internalised reconfiguration or updating of goals. This would equate to between-task 
switching in the Continuous Series II and to the more effortful System 2 in Kahneman’s 
model. In the Braver model, local costs (individual switches within a mixed task block) are 
said to inform questions of sustained or proactive control, relating to “…increased active 
maintenance demands associated with keeping multiple task sets at a relatively high level of 
activation…” (Braver, Reynolds & Donaldson, 2003, p.714). This does not initially appear to 
carry out the same function as Kahneman’s System 1, automatic retrieval of overlearned 
                                                           
39
 Confusingly, but not uniquely, the paper refers to block comparisons as switching cost and local comparisons 
within switching blocks as mixing costs. As noted previously, this thesis takes the definition of mixing costs to 
be the additional cost of repeating a task within a mixed block compared to single task repeat blocks – not the 
cost of switching within a mixed block.  
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sequences. However, there is the need in the Continuous Series II to keep component tasks at 
a high state of readiness. Whether this state of readiness is comparable for highly overlearned 
word sequences would be a matter for further debate. It could be that the spatial 
representation of such sequences (Gevers, Reynvoet & Fias 2003, 2004; Eagleman, 2009) 
would result in differential representation in WM40, perhaps leading to an easier route to 
readiness as there would not be as much competition with task rehearsal (numbers, days, 
months).  Task readiness therefore might not need the same degree of control (or it might be 
implicated in a different way) as in the Braver study. Additionally it should be noted that 
Braver and colleagues used explicit cues (e.g. ‘large/ small’ for a size classification task), 
something also under the management of sustained control. Thus involvement of sustained 
control would again be at a different level for the Continuous Series II.  
 
While the Continuous Series II has resonance at some level with Rogers & Monsell’s 
(1995) task-set reconfiguration (TSR) account and some of the dual-mechanisms models, it is 
apparent that thus far no model would appear to be a complete fit for the verbal switching 
paradigm. This is due in part to the previously discussed methodological issues which set the 
task apart within the literature. The lack of cues and lack of external stimuli mean that further 
work must be done before any one model can be taken to account for switching costs and 
error production within the task. Some of the proposed experiments will directly address 
theoretical issues, such as Experiment 3 looking at the potential for task-set inertia (TSI) type 
carryover of task sets. It is envisaged that the pattern of switch costs and errors gained from 
the set of experiments as a whole will further inform debates over the most suitable 
theoretical account.  
                                                           
40
 Differential from the usual verbal rehearsal noted by Goschke (2000) and Monsell (2005) as being implicit in 
task representation 
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13 Real world relevance of verbal task switching:  Media 
multitasking 
Finally some credence should be given to the real world relevance of the Continuous 
Series II. Most task switching studies require participants to make isolated judgements about 
single letters or digits, shapes, or locations of objects. Some tasks use more real world 
judgments, for example Braver, Reynolds & Donaldson (2003) asking whether an item is 
large or small (e.g. a truck or a carrot), but just about all use isolated decisions. The 
Continuous Series II is quite different in using language and in asking participants to keep 
track of the changing state of a task over time. In this respect the task the task is more akin to 
the type of switching we do in our everyday lives, keeping track of language-based activities. 
Altmann is most vociferous about the lack of ecological validity in the “tasks” (his quotation 
marks, Altman & Trafton, 2004) which make up the body of task switching literature, 
expressing the need for ‘higher-level’ tasks and real time switch costs.  
 
Switching between several tasks within a verbal cognitive domain has strong 
resonance with this aim. Additionally, it lends itself very well to the burgeoning field of 
media multitasking. In today’s world there is an increasing need for individuals to carry out 
several language based tasks at once. In work and home environments it is not unusual to find 
someone switching rapidly between sending an email, working on a word processed 
document and conducting a text conversation with music or a TV program on in the 
background, as in this example from a 14 year-old teenager from Los Angeles: “I usually 
finish my homework at school... but if not I pop an open book on my lap, and while the 
computer is loading, I’ll do a problem or write a sentence. Then, while mail is loading, I do 
more...” (Wallis, Cole, Steptoe & Dale, 2006, p.48). As noted, traditional switching tasks do 
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not consider error in greater depth than count relating to switching or repetitions; recognition 
of, and recovery from, errors are sources of interruption which the Continuous Series II 
absorbs into calculation of real-time switch cost. Czerwinski, Horvitz and Wilhite (2004) 
report on a real time analysis of the nature of task interruptions commonly experienced by 
information workers switching between a number of complex language and media based 
tasks (see also Altmann & Trafton (2004; 2007) for a consideration of the role of task 
interruptions). In real-life observations people tend to work in several ‘spheres’ or clusters of 
thematically related tasks (González & Mark, 2004), in effect a gross externalised 
manifestation of switching within and between cognitive sets as specified by Gurd et al. 
(2003). Further evidence from observational studies of information workers (Iqbal & Horvitz, 
2007) identifies conversational interruptions (analogous with non-target utterances during 
verbal switching such as “I’m not sure where I should be – I’ve lost it” (Essig, 2004 and 
Experiment 2, this thesis)). These non-target utterances may be interruptive rather than 
supportive in the Continuous Series II; interpretation of results from the verbal switching 
paradigm may have a high degree of relevance for real world language based multitasking 
behaviour. 
 
14 Conclusion 
Reservations about the efficacy of the Continuous Series II to give entirely switch-
related measures of cost within a multi-task environment (e.g. Ragland et al., 2008) are 
rightly acknowledged. However, they are deemed to be acceptable given that the task offers a 
stimulus-free representation-dependent measure of switching in real time and within a single 
cognitive domain. The calculation of general costs for the task relate to executive control and 
have been associated with the need to maintain and select between tasks sets (Kray & 
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Lindenberger, 2000) as well as internalised reconfiguration and updating of goals (Braver, 
Reynolds & Donaldson, 2003). That classic TSI and exogenous-control accounts do not seem 
to immediately fit the verbal task, coupled with the paucity of verbal-style switching in the 
literature, attests to the need for a wider range of tasks and ensuing explanations. 
 
“Until now, the vast majority of task-switching studies deal with situations in 
which participants are provided with perfectly reliable information in a just-
in-time manner. In addition, in most cases all information needed to perform 
the actual task is perceptually available when the execution of the task is 
actually required, allowing participants to perform the tasks in a largely 
stimulus-driven mode. This may have biased theories of task switching to 
focus predominantly on stimulus-related factors and to neglect the 
contribution of factors related to internal representations.” 
Kleinsorge & Gajewski (2008, p.513) 
 
The usefulness of semantic switching in clinical evaluation is acknowledged (Birn et 
al., 2010). Indeed, the ability of individuals with PD (Gurd & Oliveira, 1996) and those post-
stroke or with severe brain trauma (see Experiment 1, Chapter 3) to complete the Continuous 
Series II confirms that working memory load is not beyond acceptable levels, Monsell’s 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) assertion that un-cued sequences may excessively load working 
memory seemingly notwithstanding41.  The Continuous Series II offers a novel way to assess 
                                                           
41
 Rubinstein et al. (2001) noted very small time costs associated with signed (+/ -) addition and subtraction 
switching and suggested “…the rules for solving signed addition problems— like the rules for reading familiar 
printed words—are permanently enabled in procedural long-term memory, thereby requiring the rule-activation 
stage of executive control to take little or no extra time for fully enabling them.” (Rubinstein et al., 2001, p.784).  
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complex switching over time in a variety of populations – as such it may require a novel 
explanation of switch cost. 
 
14.1 Thesis aims 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the usefulness and reliability of the Continuous 
Series II and the verbal task switching paradigm under various conditions as a measure of 
task switching behaviour and to interpret such behaviour against existing models of task 
switch cost, determining the most suitable theoretical explanation of verbal task switching.  
 
The need for multiple types of task within the wider task switching paradigm is 
accepted (Ravizza & Carter, 2008). It is further noted that “...different switching tasks 
involve different processes and are, thus, likely to involve different brain mechanisms and 
relate to different processes. In particular, switching within working memory is separable 
from switching in perception” (Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2006, p.1742). Other than a few 
instances, switching between continuous verbal tasks has not been well researched – Gurd 
(1995) and Gurd and Oliveira (1996) administered the task to PD patients with relatively 
modest healthy control samples of around twenty, Gurd et al. (2002) tested eleven healthy 
participants (Gurd et al. (2003) further analysed the same data) and Ragland et al. (2008) 
tested individuals with schizophrenia with a control sample of thirteen, using only part of the 
Continuous Series II task. 
 
Theories may also be biased towards stimulus-related factors (Kliensorge & 
Gajewski, 2008), as explicitly presented by Rogers and Monsell (1995). Sohn and Carlson 
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(2000) showed a separable stimulus-based component of cost, although Verbruggen et al. 
(2007) posited that such costs may be cue rather than stimulus related. The Continuous Series 
II utilises neither external stimuli nor cues and so avoids having to account for such costs. 
Although the verbal task is more reliant on working memory representation the constituent 
tasks are implicit (and considered a special class of verbal category – see Pariyadath, 
Churchill and Eagleman, 2008) and require no visual or interpretive processes which might 
add to overall time costs (e.g. Grange & Houghton, 2010). Whether, however, the 
representational presence of the verbal category within the switching process can be aligned 
to the arrival of an external stimulus remains to be determined. The cue-free nature of the 
paradigm makes assumptions about the task based on cue-based theories of cost difficulty 
(see Altmann, 2007) – factors such as cue processing (Logan & Bundesen, 2003, 2004) make 
for a very different model of switch cost composition. 
 
Only one previous study (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2008) has been noted as differentiating 
between errors that occur within a task and errors that occur between tasks, by virtue of 
recording verbal responses. They cite errors between tasks (‘wrong-task errors’) as denoting 
switch-related failure in executive control and errors within tasks (‘decision errors’) as being 
specific to that particular task rather than switch related. The pattern of errors recorded for a 
particular switching scenario can therefore be interpreted much more accurately in terms of 
their relationship to executive and task related factors.  
 
 The aims of this thesis are thus to explore the limits of the Continuous Series II with a 
view to aligning it to one of the existing theoretical models of task switching  or adapting one 
of those models to best suit the action of the task. Additionally artefacts of the task design 
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will be explored to see if these impact on the theoretical model. With a view to this the 
following things will be explored: Do the number of tasks being switched between 
(Experiment 5) or the order in which the tasks are presented (Experiment 4) have an impact 
on the degree to which the measure of general switch cost purely measures switching 
behaviour? Does the dissociation between overlearned and overlearned plus semantic 
versions of the task (Experiment 1) indicate any difference in processing between these 
different types of verbal category? Further to this, Experiment 1 will consider the 
introduction of a task where there are categories of disparate difficulty (addressing the TSI 
hypothesis through error rates). To what degree is working memory load and rehearsal of task 
order a contributor to general switch cost (Experiments 5 & 6) and how does this relate to 
theoretical interpretation of the task? Further interpretation of the theoretical model most 
suited to the task will ascertained from Experiment 3 where a further version of the task will 
be used to determine whether non-bivalent asymmetry is in evidence for tasks of disparate 
difficulty. Experiment 2 will consider the introduction of self-generated verbal cues as an aid 
to subsequent item production, contrasted to the lack of usefulness of externally provided 
written cues in Experiment 6. 
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CHAPTER TWO: GENERAL METHOD 
 
1Introduction 
Much of the procedural detail for the verbal switching task is common to all versions. 
The following chapter details participant recruitment, choice and administration of 
background measures, and the basic method for the Continuous Series II. There is also an 
indication of the types of measures taken during the task and common statistical procedures 
used. Any variations to the stimuli or method peculiar to specific versions of the verbal 
switching task are detailed in the appropriate chapters. 
 
2 Participants 
2.1 Recruitment 
All participants were healthy individuals aged 18-65 years old and were recruited 
either from the University of Hertfordshire or from the wider community42. Recruitment at 
the University of Hertfordshire was largely conducted using the School of Psychology 
participant pool; students on undergraduate and taught postgraduate psychology are required 
to take part in academic research in return for course credit. Non-psychology students were 
also recruited via leaflets distributed at the College Lane campus of the University of 
Hertfordshire (see Appendix B). Participants from outside the university were recruited via 
word of mouth or personal contact. All those recruited from outside the School of Psychology 
                                                           
42
 Recruitment of neurological patients for the initial presentation of the Continuous Series II and Mixed 
Category task are outlined in chapter 3. 
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were entered into a draw to win a prize of £20, in lieu of the incentive of course credit. 
Informed consent was gained from all participants (see Appendices C and D for information 
sheet & consent form). 
 
2.2 Screening criteria 
All participants were right handed43 (self-reported) native English speakers with 
normal or corrected to normal vision and normal hearing. They were further screened to 
exclude any factors which could have extraneously affected language production, general 
processing speed or task switching performance. These included: history of drug or alcohol 
abuse; neurological or psychiatric diagnosis; known problems processing or producing 
speech or language, including (but not exclusively) dyslexia and a stutter; history of a closed 
head injury; regular use of anti-depressants, anti-psychotics, benzodiazepines or tranquilisers.   
 
2.3 Demographics 
Age, gender, total number of years spent in education since the age of 5, current 
employment classification and the highest educational or professional qualification attained 
were recorded for all participants. Age (along with background measures detailed below) was 
considered as a potential covariates to factors of interest, and were accounted for using a 
GLM-ANCOVA procedure where indicated.  
 
                                                           
43
 The prevalence of atypical language lateralisation in left-handers has been estimated (in non-clinical 
populations) at as much as 22%, around four times that found in right-handers (Szaflarski et al., 2002). Although 
it is acknowledged that such atypical distribution may not present as atypical functionality (e.g. Knecht et al. 
(2001) found no significant effect of atypical lateralisation on verbal fluency or linguistic processing speed), the 
current work adheres to the convention of excluding left-handers, due to the nature of the tasks used and sparse 
availability of data to suggest otherwise. 
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Little work has been carried out to specifically test the effects of gender on switching 
abilities; despite this, the consensus within the literature favours gender differences as not 
being significant, contrary to the popularly held belief that women out-perform men when 
multitasking44. At the time of writing, there is an indication from a single study that women 
are better able to strategically plan in a multitasking environment (Stoet, O’Connor, Connor 
& Laws, 2013). Specific switch cost for a diagrammatic search planning task was lower for 
females; specific switch cost for all other tasks showed no gender difference. An earlier 
large-scale study (Reimers & Maylor, 2005)45 found general switch cost to be faster for males 
but no gender differences for specific switch costs for component tasks. Such differences are 
likely to be strategic rather than functional; for example, males and females show remarkably 
similar neural activity during executive control tasks (Haut & Barch, 2006) and appear to be 
task specific. There is evidence that gender differences, as varied as they may be, fluctuate 
across the lifespan (see Reimers & Maylor, 2005 or Tun & Lachman, 2008)38. Credence must 
also be given to gender differences in reaction time per se; females have been found to 
perform slower (but more accurately) and with more variability on simple and multi-choice 
RT tasks (Der & Deary, 2006)38. Consequently, whilst SToet et al. (2013) propose task-
specific gender differences in switching is acknowledged, the variable (and non- executive) 
factors which may contribute to this difference and the entrenched nature of the stimuli used 
in the current study suggest that gender need not be considered as a source of variation in this 
instance. 
 
                                                           
44
 It should be noted that, while there a well-established gender effect in verbal cluster switching (as found in 
the FAS verbal fluency task e.g. Weiss et al., 2006), this does not equate to either general switching abilities or 
the type of verbal switching employed in the Continuous Series II. 
45
 Reimers and Maylor (2005) N = 6381; Der and Deary (2006) N = 7130; Tun & Lacman (2008) N = 3616. 
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3 Background measures 
3.1 National Adult Reading Test-2 (NART-2) 
The National Adult Reading Test-2 (NART-2) (Nelson & Willison, 1991) offers a 
reliable estimation of IQ for the purposes of comparison. It consists of 50 irregular words of 
increasing difficulty e.g. ‘psalm’, ‘aeon’, ‘puerperal’, which were presented to participants 
printed on two sides (items 1-25 and 25-50) of an A4 card.  Participants are scored according 
to the number of errors made46; this is used to predict full scale, verbal or performance IQ 
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981). The 
irregular nature of the words does not allow their pronunciation to be guessed phonetically, 
successful performance relying on prior knowledge (Strauss, Sherman & Spreen, 2006). This 
method of estimating IQ was used in previous studies of the Continuous Series II on both 
clinical samples and single case series (Gurd & Oliveira, 1996; Gurd et al., 2002; Essig, 
2004) and healthy populations (Gurd et al., 2002) and was retained over other predictive 
measures of IQ to preserve continuity for the purposes of comparison across these studies.  
 
3.2 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R) vocabulary subtest 
During an earlier study using the Continuous Series II (Essig, 2004) there was an 
indication of some type of bias for younger participants (<24 years) completing the NART, 
manifesting as a marked unwillingness rather than inability to pronounce words, particularly 
those in the second half of the list. Demographic effects on NART scores have previously 
been studied (Crawford et al., 1988), highlighting an age-NART score correlation which was 
dependent upon years in education and social class.  
                                                           
46
 The task has an optional discontinuation threshold (14 errors in 15 correct responses) which was not applied 
in this instance. 
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To accommodate this, the vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-R was included in the 
background test battery as a supplementary measure to the NART. This task requires 
participants to describe the meanings for a list of 35 words, presented printed on one side of 
A4 card and read out concurrently by the experimenter. The words are of increasing difficulty 
e.g. ‘breakfast’, ‘tranquil’, ‘tangible’ and responses are scored 2, 1 or 0 according to 
accuracy. The test is discontinued after 6 consecutive scores of zero. Raw scores are then 
converted to an overall subtest age-scaled score. The advantage of this test is that it allows 
the participant to give a usage example or synonym of the word being described; the 
experimenter may also ask individuals to clarify their answers. The vocabulary subtest has 
the highest correlation with full scale IQ (Wechsler, 1981) and has been indicated as a useful 
measure of IQ in normal or non-language impaired populations47 (Vanderploeg & Schinka, 
1995). 
 
3.3 Digit Span (forward and backward) 
The digit span test from the Wechsler memory and intelligence scales (e.g. Wechsler 
1955; 1987; 1997) measures immediate verbal recall.  The forward digit span primarily 
relates to the attentional aspect of recall, with any score of 5+ considered within normal 
ranges (Miller, 1956; Lezak et al., 2004). It requires individuals to recite back random digit 
sequences of increasing length, in this instance from 3 to 9 digits. The digits are read out at a 
rate of one per second and in a monotone, thus avoiding any opportunity for the participant to 
‘chunk’ digits (Miller, 1956). There are two versions of each sequence, allowing for a second 
attempt after a fail. For example, an individual failing to recite the 5-digit span correctly is 
able to make a second attempt with a new set of digits. Success at this length would allow 
                                                           
47
 It has been included in most short form versions of the WAIS-R (see Crawford, Allan & Jack (1992) and is 
indicated as a reasonable standalone estimate of premorbid IQ in clinical populations (e.g. Russell et al., 2000). 
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them to go on to attempt 6-digits; failure at that stage would mean their maximum span is 
recorded as five. 
 
The backward digit span follows the same format, with the requirement that digits are 
repeated in reverse order (1-2-3 repeated as 3-2-1). This measure is more reflective of active 
working memory, specifically central executive involvement in the manipulation of the digit 
sequence (Baddeley, 1986). Sequences range from 3 to 8 digits in length. Backward span 
scores of 4+ would be considered normal in healthy individuals48 (Lezak et al., 2004). 
 
Digit span performance was recorded as a raw score of longest span correctly 
repeated in each condition (forward and backward) and was not combined into a single score 
as per the Wechsler scoring scale. This was to preserve the differential information they 
provide regarding attention and recall span (forward) and active working memory (backward) 
(Ramsay & Reynolds, 1995). Digit span is particularly well suited for participant screening 
and analytical purposes with the Continuous Series II, given that task’s requirements for 
sustained attention and mental manipulation of verbal information.  
 
3.4 Conversational speech rate 
The Continuous Series II uses overlearned sequences as being representative of 
automatic speech. There is clear evidence for the ‘special nature’ of ordinal verbal categories; 
distinct right hemisphere neural pathways (Pariyadath, Churchill and Eagleman, 2008), 
abstract linear spatial representation (Gevers, 2004; Eagleman, 2009), and preservation of 
                                                           
48
 Scores of 3 are also considered within normal limits dependent upon educational background (Lezak et al., 
2004). 
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ordinal sequences in cases of semantic dementia (Cappelletti, Butterworth & Kopelman, 
2001) support this. However, we cannot say for certain to what degree these ordinal 
categories are produced automatically; speech is intentional and therefore subject to control 
in its own right (Fodor, 1983). Levelt (1983) surmises at least marginal forms of control are 
evident during regular fluent speech, so we must concede to the possibility that ordinal 
sequence production brings an additional need for cognitive control to the verbal task 
switching paradigm.   
 
In an attempt to account for this, a measure of normal conversational speech rate was 
taken before the experimental task. Participants were asked to talk about their last holiday for 
one minute, with one minute to prepare. The number of words produced was divided by sixty 
to give a words-per-second speech rate, which was considered for use as a potential covariate 
where appropriate. Speech rate was given additional consideration in light of the relationship 
between various verbal rate measures and memory span (e.g. positive relationship between 
span and ‘sub-vocalisation rate’ (Standing et al., 1980), speeded reading, story reading and 
digit span (Naveh-Benjamin & Ayres, 1986), inner speech for normal prose and digit span 
(Standing & Curtis, 1989)).  
 
4 Basic Method for Verbal Task Switching: Continuous Series II 
4.1 Overview 
The Continuous Series II (Gurd, 1995) task requires participants to produce items 
incrementally and alternately from increasing numbers of verbal categories. This version of 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
134 
 
the task (and most subsequent versions49) uses overlearned sequences (OS), categories with a 
predetermined and well established order; these are numbers, days of the week, months of the 
year, and letters of the alphabet.  The words per second (w/sec) rate during switching is 
compared to a preliminary non-switching condition using the same categories. The difference 
in word production rate between these two conditions is the switch cost – a reaction time 
evidenced processing cost for reciting the categories in combination. Number and type of 
errors are also recorded. 
 
4.2 Non-Switching Condition 
Participants are initially required to recite each category individually and repeatedly 
(the number sequence is truncated at 20 for this purpose) as fast as they can for a period of 15 
seconds, giving a w/sec rate for each category. These individual rates are then used to 
calculate the average w/sec rate for each combination of word categories used in the 
switching (S) conditions. For example, the non-switching (NS) rate for ‘numbers’ and ‘days’ 
would be calculated:  
Rate A (numbers) + Rate B (days) / 2 = Rate 2-cat NS (numbers/days non-switching) 
 
4.3 Switching Conditions 
Participants are then required to alternately produce items from two of the previously 
recited categories, keeping each in its correct order e.g. ‘One’, ‘Monday’, ‘two’, ‘Tuesday’. 
The categories have predetermined non-canonical start points and the task continues for a set 
number of iterations, as given in Table 2. They are required to do this as fast and as 
                                                           
49
 The Mixed Category version of the task (see Chapter 3) alternates overlearned sequences with semantic 
categories such as animals and fruit. The dummy categories task (see Chapter 5) includes arbitrary low-load 
categories consisting of a single repeated word, in this instance colour names (blue, red etc.). 
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accurately as possible, avoiding any extraneous utterances. There is no feedback during the 
task (participants are informed of this). Reaction time is measured from the beginning of the 
first response uttered to the end of the last. The same procedure is carried out for switching 
over two and three categories.  
 
Table 2 Start Points and Task Length for Switching Conditions in the Continuous Series II 
Switching condition Start point Number of iterations 
2 categories  6 – Tuesday  23 
3 categories 4 – Friday – October  21 
4 categories  9 – Wednesday – February – H  20 
  
4.3.1 Calculation of Switch Cost 
The w/sec rate for each switching condition is calculated by dividing the number of 
words produced by the time (in seconds, to 2dp.) taken to complete the task. The switch cost 
is the difference between the switching rate and the appropriate non-switching rate, expressed 
as a percentage w/sec increase. This is calculated by subtracting switching rate from non-
switching rate, dividing this by the non-switching rate and multiplying by 100, as shown 
below: 
Rate NS (w/sec) – Rate S (w/sec) / Rate NS (w/sec) x 100 = Switch cost (%) 
 
5 Procedure 
All testing took place in a quiet room either at the University of Hertfordshire or the 
participant’s own home and took approximately half an hour (the repetition study sessions 
took approximately one hour). Participants were given a written and verbal explanation of the 
rationale and requirements of the task and asked to provide written consent to take part in the 
testing session and for the session to be audio recorded (declining to be recorded did not 
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exclude participants from taking part).  Anonymity and the right to withdraw unchallenged 
were assured. After noting demographic information, background tests were administered in 
the order: NART; WAIS-R vocabulary subtest; WAIS-R digit spans and conversational 
speech rate measure. Participants were then asked to recite each of the component categories 
repeatedly and at speed, one at a time, for the baseline non-switching phase of the Continuous 
Series II. For the switching phase they were asked to produce items alternately and 
sequentially from two named categories as per the previous task description (see Appendix A 
for standardised task instructions). They used given starting points for each category and 
were asked to complete the task as fast and as accurately as possible, continuing until told to 
stop. The same switching procedure was applied using three and then four categories. 
Debriefing was carried out according to a predetermined schedule (see Appendix E). 
 
6 Data Collection 
6.1 Audio recording & timing 
All testing sessions were audio recorded as mp3 files, to allow for accurate timing and 
transcription of responses. Separate consent was obtained from all participants for recording 
to take place. Response timings were recorded using a hand held non-beeping digital 
stopwatch. Task duration typically lasted from approximately 30 seconds for 2-category 
switching to several minutes for 4-category switching, so the level of accuracy from this 
method was well within acceptable limits. The stopwatch was non-beeping to ensure that it 
wasn’t misinterpreted as a cue to start the task50. 
                                                           
50
 During piloting it had been noted that several participants interpreted the beep or click from the stopwatch as 
a cue to start, causing them to falter at the beginning of the task or stop and question whether they should wait 
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6.2 Criteria for exclusion from analysis 
6.2.1 Scores outside normal range on background test battery 
Individuals showing an impaired level of performance on the NART-2/ WAIS-R 
vocabulary subtest or the digit span were excluded from the final analysis, although it is 
acknowledged that such results in a normal population may be indicative of false-positive 
impaired scores (Axelrod & Wall, 2007). In practice, most of those showing impairment on 
the background battery also showed unusual performance on the verbal switching task. For 
example, very low score on the backward digit span coupled with consistently very high 
switch cost on all levels of the switching task, suggesting an inability to manipulate 
information in working memory.  Numbers excluded on these grounds are indicated in 
individual chapters.  
 
6.2.2 Poor performance on task baseline measures 
Participants were excluded from the final analysis if they completed the baseline part 
of the task in a manner that suggested they were not entirely fluent with overlearned sequence 
categories. Examples of this included repeatedly mixing up or missing out particular category 
items, such as reciting months January to November or missing out ‘Y’ from the alphabet.  
 
6.2.3 Completion 
Type and number of errors are intrinsic to the interpretation of behaviour during the 
verbal switching task. While switch cost is generally stable at a much lower level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for the beep. One of the prominent features of the Continuous Series II is that it does not require any external 
prompts or cues to guide performance. 
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completion51, such performance may not give a definitive portrayal of accuracy. Therefore 
any participant not completing at least 70% of the predetermined length of the task at every 
stage (switching over 2-categories = 23 iterations; 3-categoires = 21 iterations; 4-categories = 
20 iterations) had their entire set of scores excluded from the final analysis. 
 
6.3 Additional measures recorded  
6.3.1 Error types 
Errors are counted as any response that does not adhere to the predetermined category 
order or the correct sequence of items within those categories; they are recorded as total 
number per error type for each level of the task.  Figure 1 shows an excerpt from a composite 
response sheet for switching between three categories, with examples of the various possible 
types of error. The verbal switching tasks allow a greater level of error analysis than the more 
usual visuo-spatial switching tasks, which only indicate errors occurring between stimuli 
judgements, showing misapplication of task set52. Verbal switching allows errors both 
between categories and within categories to be recorded. Errors are classified as follows: 
Within category errors – an item is produced in the correct category, but not in the 
correct sequence for that category. The categories are kept in the correct order but a 
participant may produce e.g. days in the wrong order. 
(i) Within category repetition error (WR) – the previous item produced in that 
category is repeated (see WR in Figure 1). For example, “one/ Monday/ one/ 
                                                           
51
 Previous presentations of the Continuous Series II have included calculation of switch cost at 30 seconds into 
the time course of the task. This was to account for possible early discontinuation by neurological patients. No 
significant difference was found between ‘short’ and full task switch cost for healthy controls. 
52
 It has previously been noted (Gurd 2003; Essig, 2004; Essig, Gurd & Kischka, 2005) that many studies on 
task switching fail to make the distinction between tasks that switch within or between a cognitive set. Here the 
reference is to differing rules for separate stimuli judgements, which may or may not be within the same 
cognitive set.    
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Tuesday…” Two or more repetition errors in succession constitute a 
perseverative error. 
(ii) Within category sequencing error (WS) – an item from the correct category 
is produced but out of sequence. For example, “one/ Monday/ seven/ 
Tuesday…” (see WS in Figure 1) 
Between category errors – an item is produced in the wrong category position. In 
this situation the order of the categories is incorrect; items within a category e.g. days, 
may or may not be in the correct order. 
(i) Between category repetition error (BR) – the last category is repeated in the 
next category slot. For example, “one/ Monday/ two/ Tuesday/ three/ 
four…” (see see BR in Figure 1) 
(ii) Between category sequencing error (BS/ BSS) – a category is produced out 
of the prescribed sequence (but not as a repetition of the last category 
produced) (see BS in Figure 1). Between-category sequencing errors can 
occur either alone or in conjunction with within-category sequencing errors.  
i. BS example – the categories are produced in the wrong order but 
the items within them remain correctly sequential. For example 
(switching over 3-categories), “one/ Monday/ January// two/ 
February/ Tuesday// three/ March53/ Wednesday…” 
ii. BSS example – the category order is wrong and the items within 
them are no longer correctly sequential. For example (switching 
                                                           
53
 Note that although subsequent responses are out of sequence with the original task order, they are not counted 
as further errors as they carry on correctly from the last response and ‘new’ category order. 
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over 3-categories), “one/ Monday/ January/ two/ February/ 
Thursday/ three/ March/ Friday…” 
(iii) Deletion error (BD) – the category is completely missed out of the 
sequence.  
It should be noted that, with the exception of deletion errors, one occurrence of a 
between-category error must necessarily be followed by another as swapping the 
position of two categories means that both are in the wrong place and both 
constitute an error.  
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Numbers Days  Months 
4  No response             
BD 
Fri   Oct   
5   4                                         
W 
Sat   Nov   
6  5 Sun  December        
BS 
Dec  Sunday           
BS 
7  6 Mon  January Jan  Monday 
8  12                                    
WS 
Tue  February Feb  Monday               
WR 
9  13 Wed  Saturday               
B 
Mar  Tuesday 
10  Wednesday       
BR 
Thu  Sunday                   Apr  Wednesday 
 
Figure 1 Sample section of response sheet for Continuous Series II showing target responses 
(black), actual responses (blue), errors (circled red) and classification of error as within-category 
(W) or between-category (B). Note it would be unusual to see this group of error types from a 
healthy normal participant. 
 
6.3.2 Self corrections 
Self-corrections occur when individuals perceive (correctly or otherwise) that they 
had made a mistake; they are again recorded as total number per type of correction for each 
level of the task. All responses are classed as either (i) Positive corrections (SCpos), where 
participants have correctly indentified and resolved an error, or (ii) Negative corrections 
(SCneg), where a correction has been made but the result is an incorrect response. These can 
be of two types: 
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(i) Single negative (SCneg1) – an error is correctly identified but is changed to an 
incorrect response. For example, where the target response is ‘one’, 
‘Monday’... the actual response might be “one, Tuesday... no, Wednesday...” 
(ii) Double negative (SCneg2) – a correct response is erroneously identified as an 
error and changed an incorrect response. For example, where the target 
response is ‘one’, ‘Monday’... the actual response might be “one, Monday... 
no, Tuesday...” 
7 Data Analysis 
7.1 Overview  
This section details common procedures for analysing switch cost.  Changes to the 
analysis because of differing task structure or additional data being recorded are dealt with in 
individual chapters. All analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows 
17.0; data was routinely screened for missing and incorrect entries. Unless otherwise stated, 
statistical significance was set at the level α = .05. Effect sizes were interpreted according to 
Cohen (1988); .20 = a minimal effect, .50 = medium, .80 – large. 
 
7.2 General Linear Model (GLM) Analysis of Variance/ Covariance 
(ANOVA/ ANCOVA) 
The GLM repeated measures procedure was used to analyse all multi-factorial 
designs, due to the constant repeated measures factor of ‘Number of Switching Categories’. 
A number of background measures known or suspected to have an effect on task switching 
performance were considered as potential covariates: age (switch costs are known to be 
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increased in older adults, in relation to a number of aspects of the switching process – see 
Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Kray & Eppinger, 2006; Meiran & Gotler, 2001), digit span (as 
a measure of working memory capacity) and conversational speech rate (due to the nature 
and number of tasks). Binomial correlation analyses were carried out to determine whether 
there was a significant relationship between these variables and the main dependent measures 
of switch cost and task speech rate. Covariates entered into the analysis shared no common 
correlation; a number of measures were known to have this type of relationship. Both digit 
span measures correlated with each other as scores in the normal range tend to remain within 
2 points of each other (Black & Strub, 1978); NART is known to correlate highly with age 
and years spent in education (Crawford et al., 1988). Where applicable (for studies with 
several groups: order effects (Chapter 4) and cue effects (Chapter 6)), groups were matched 
for scores on these variables (Miller & Chapman, 2001).  
 
Inclusion of covariates with repeated measures factors results in what can be 
interpreted as an overcautious reduction in power for those measures (Thomas et al., 2009). 
Scores on the covariates do not differ between measurements of the dependent variables at 
different levels of the repeated measure, particularly in the current context where measures 
are temporally adjacent54 i.e. age is the same whether measuring switch cost over 2, 3 or 4 
switching categories. Main effects for repeated measures were therefore reported separately 
using a GLM ANOVA; covariate interactions were then reported using the GLM ANCOVA 
procedure (see Annaz et al. (2009) for a presentation of this approach). 
 
 
                                                           
54
 Unlike more typical repeated measures studies using treatment trials or other longitudinal measures of a single 
group. 
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CHAPTER THREE: USING VERBAL TASKS OF VARYING 
DIFFICULTY 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a study carried out using three versions of the verbal switching 
task: the Continuous Series II, Verbal Fluency switching and the Mixed Category task (Essig, 
2004). Verbal Fluency switching involves switching between producing words from different 
semantic categories and the Mixed Category task involves alternating between increasing 
numbers of overlearned sequences and semantic categories in turn. The study aimed to 
reanalyse data from a single case series of neurological patients (taken from Essig, 2004) 
using a suitably age matched replacement control sample (the original sample was not age 
matched). The aim of comparing performance on these three tasks was to assess whether 
switching between tasks of differing difficulty in the absence of both bivalency (one task 
having two possible responses) and Stroop-like interference between responses would result 
in increased switch cost. Additionally verbal fluency alternation is known to be more 
complex than overlearned sequence alternation in that it requires formations of sub-groups 
(clusters) of responses (e.g. farm animals, zoo animals) and switching between these clusters.  
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1.2 Summary of previous research 
The premise for the current thesis is based upon the results of previous work (Essig, 
2004; Essig, Kischka & Gurd, 2005), which are summarised here55. Performance on the 
Continuous Series II was compared with a Verbal Fluency switching task (producing items 
from alternating semantic categories), and the novel Mixed Category task, which alternated 
overlearned sequence categories with semantic categories. The three-task comparison was 
carried out with a sample of N = 30 healthy controls (age M = 39.23, SD = 11.37) and a 
single case series of seven neurological patients (age M = 51.29, SD = 11.62) with disparate 
diagnoses (See Table 4). It was predicted in the original study that Mixed Category task 
switch cost would not be significantly slower for 3-categories than 2-categories, due to the 
2:1 semantic category (SC) to overlearned sequence (OS) switch requirement as the task 
triplet repeated (SC-OS-SC/SC-OS-SC/SC-OS-SC…). Over a continuous run of three 
categories two semantic categories occurred next to each other (categories 3 and one of the 
repeating triplet). This resulted in fewer second-order reconfigurations; task type (OS or SC 
production) changed less often than task (production from flowers, days or sports). A second 
prediction was that Mixed Category task switch cost would be slower than either Continuous 
Series II or Verbal Fluency switching due to the ‘double’ switching requirements (switching 
not only between tasks but between types of task, OS or SC). A final prediction was that 
neurological patients would be impaired on both switch cost and error rate, particularly 
producing more between-category executive based errors. The Mixed Category task was 
found to be slower than the Continuous Series II and patients were impaired in terms of both 
cost and error rate.   
 
                                                           
55
 The section ‘Summary of previous research’ refers to work previously presented for the award of Master of 
Science at the University of Hertfordshire (2004). Any further presentation outside of that chapter section of 
statistical analyses, discussion of background theory or methodology relating to that data is additional work 
carried out after the submission of the MSc thesis. 
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1.3 Combining tasks of varying difficulty 
The Mixed Category task introduces a difference in difficulty level between alternate 
component tasks, determined by the differing level of semantic and syntactic complexity 
between semantic categories and overlearned sequences (noted by Bookheimer et al. (2000) 
and Ragland et al. (2008)). Variance in task difficulty is not entirely comparable to that 
present in Stroop-style tasks (as used by Allport and others), which rely on suppression of the 
stimulus-activated easier more dominant task of word reading in the more difficult colour 
naming condition. As such, any difference in time costs between semantic categories and 
overlearned sequences (be that costlier switching to the easier task or vice versa) may not be 
attributable to the same processes posited as causing Stroop asymmetry. Allport, Styles and 
Hsieh (1994) accredited asymmetry to a carryover of interference from the preceding harder 
task (see page 27), later framing this as long term associative interference (Allport & Wylie, 
2000). A threshold for interference was advocated by Monsell, Yeung and Azuma (2000) 
(see page 29 of this document), thus accounting for the dominance of either task relative to 
the other and allowing for the finding of reverse asymmetry (easier to switch to the easier 
task). This ‘relative-dominance’ view may better account for any such differential costs 
found in the Mixed Category task given the combination of component task completion and 
the additional switch between verbal domain as well as task, as illustrated in Figure 2. While 
the additional level of switching (between task type as well as task) in the Mixed Category 
task may account for greater time costs it may serve to more completely disengage the 
previous task set and so result in fewer between-category errors. 
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1.4 Comparing overlearned sequences and semantic categories  
 A second feature of the Mixed Category task is that the two component tasks, 
semantic category and overlearned sequence production, are controlled by different frontal 
processes rather than one unitary process. To fully comprehend the relevance of comparing 
different classes of word between and within tasks it is necessary to revisit the original basis 
for the Continuous Series II task. Gurd (1995) looked for a correlation between the 
Continuous Series task (alternating between increasing numbers of overlearned sequences) 
and semantic verbal fluency (producing items from different semantic categories). Verbal 
fluency was assessed in both single category and alternating forms. The Continuous Series 
and verbal fluency production are both frontal tasks – a lack of correlation between the two 
could be indicative of fractionated frontal functions rather than a common frontal basis. No 
significant correlation was found. Gurd therefore concluded that the frontal processes 
involved in these two tasks were separate from each other and took this as evidence for a 
fractionated SAS. As such we can assume that switching between different verbal tasks 
(overlearned sequence or semantic production) will tap into different frontal executive 
functions. Comparison of time-related switch costs and errors for such tasks will allow us to 
determine whether there is a generalised switching function (at least for all types of verbal 
task) or whether the underlying processes differ according to the task being carried out. This 
ties in also with the additional level of switching (between task type as well as task) as 
participants may be switching control process as well as task. 
 
 Additionally semantic category production involves a more subtle level of switching 
that is not seen in the Continuous Series II. Even single-category verbal fluency requires a 
degree of switching between search strategies for items, resulting in clustering of items as 
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items are produced from first one sub-category and then another.  Clustering and switching 
are two separate established features of verbal fluency production (Troyer, Moscovitch & 
Winocur, 1997). Search within and between clusters requires more abstract processing when 
alternating between two different categories. The Verbal Fluency task will therefore assess 
switching between overt categories (e.g. animals and furniture) and implicit clusters (e.g. zoo 
animals and farm animals), with the alternating requirement (particularly at three categories) 
assessing the role in complex switching of more abstract processing. In comparing Verbal 
Fluency switching to Continuous Series II it would be predicted that switch cost would be 
greater due to the need to switch between clusters within each task and would also be implicit 
in the Mixed task, adding to varying task difficulty. This could be evidence for different task-
controlling processes, one that required control for continual state updating (the Continuous 
Series II) and one that required control for cluster switching (Verbal Fluency).  
 
Switching between different verbal tasks (overlearned sequences and semantic 
categories) should also make a difference in the type of errors produced. Within-category 
errors for the Continuous Series II are determined to be automatic updating errors (according 
to Kahneman’s (2011) System 1). Within category errors for semantic categories are likely to 
reflect a different process at work. Semantic category production involves searching the 
category rather than automatically updating and recalling whether the response has already 
been made. As such within category errors reflect a more complex process for semantic 
categories. Within category errors could also reflect carryover of activation of the easier or 
harder task to the subsequent task, interfering with update of the next task. To determine this 
would necessitate a more fine grain analysis than just a count of within-category errors. If the 
task set from, for example, the category animals is still active when trying to select a response 
for the sequence days then the response for the sequence days would fail to update . A 
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perseverative error within the category (e.g. cat, Thursday, dog, Thursday…) would be 
indicative of this. By comparing within-category repetition and within-category sequencing 
(item out of sequence but not repeating – e.g. cat, Thursday, dog, Saturday…) errors it should 
be possible to determine whether such an occurrence is more common in the Mixed Category 
task, suggesting TSI-like effects (Allport, Style & Hsieh, 19954) in the absence of bivalency 
and relying only on difference in task difficulty.   
 
1.5 Neuropathology and task switching 
Both traumatic brain injury (TBI) and stroke are associated with reduced performance 
during task switching. Loss of functionality in task switching after TBI has been documented 
(e.g. Mecklinger et al., 1999). While time costs are greater than those of healthy controls, 
patients are able to complete tasks and seemingly to take advantage of preparation time to 
improve costs (Schmitter-Edgcombe & Langill, 2006). Switch costs are confined to the first 
trial of a run (in the alternating runs paradigm) so it would seem that executive processes are 
completed before this first trial. Reduced functionality is therefore possibly due to increased 
mental effort rather than fundamental impairment of underlying processes (Azouvi et al., 
2004). Chronic TBI patients have been found to recruit more areas of the brain at low levels 
of switching difficulty (LaRoux, 2010), exhibiting healthy-like behaviour but facilitated in a 
different way.  
 
During Stroop-style switching TBI has been associated with greater error rates 
(Perlstein, Larson, Dotson & Kelly, 2005) and greater error-rate interference (Sozda, Larson, 
Kaufman, Schmalfuss & Perlstein, 2011) than for healthy controls. Error-rate interference 
was calculated as the increase in error rates in the incongruent over congruent Stroop 
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condition, much as switch cost is calculated.  This increased error-rate interference was 
matched by Sozda and colleagues with increased ACC activity (already noted as implicit in 
conflict resolution during switching (Brown, Braver & Reynolds, 2007)). In less severe cases 
patients are thought to be proficient in monitoring but not adapting to conflict during 
switching (Larson, Farrer & Clayson, 2011). Given the contribution of post-error slowing to 
switch costs (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) this lack of adaptation must also feed into the 
increased time costs seen in TBI. It has been found that stroke patients exhibit a pattern of 
reduced accuracy but similar response times to healthy controls, particularly for uncued 
endogenously controlled alternating tasks (Pohl et al., 2007). It is suggested that stroke 
patients cannot maintain the combination of accuracy and speed i.e. they would be more 
accurate if they were not aiming to respond as fast as possible.  
 
The ability to differentiate between executive ‘wrong-task’ errors (producing Days 
instead of Months) and task-specific decision errors (selecting a Day out of sequence) in the 
Continuous Series II will allow for specific identification of executive failure where it occurs 
rather than general reference to accuracy as a secondary unspecified source of cost as is the 
case in the wider literature. The current study uses an ultra-cognitive neuropsychological 
perspective (as termed by Shallice, 1988), based on the principle that any non-normal 
functioning (regardless of its source) will inform the determination of underlying processes in 
normal functioning. By administering the Continuous Series II to patients with TBI and 
stroke the evidence of executive failure in the task will be more apparent than with a healthy 
control sample. It will thus be possible to infer implicit processes in verbal task switching by 
putting the behaviour ‘under the spotlight’ of non-normal functioning. If between-category 
errors are indeed indicative of executive failure then they will be more widespread in the 
patients. 
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Flowers 
switch 
Day Sports 
switch SC task 
domain 
OS task 
domain 
SC task 
domain 
switch switch 
B: Mixed Category task  
Number switch Day Month switch 
OS task domain 
A: Continuous Series II  
 
Figure 2 Example of a single iteration of switching between three verbal categories for (A) 
Continuous Series II overlearned sequences (OS) and (B) Mixed Category task OS + semantic 
categories (SC). Switching on the Continuous Series II task occurs between different categories but 
within a single task set, that of overlearned sequences. Switching on the Mixed Category task 
occurs both between the categories and between task domains (semantic search and overlearned 
sequences). 
 
 
 In summary, comparison of the Continuous Series II with the Mixed Category task 
will allow investigation of tasks of differing difficulty in a verbal paradigm. Proactive 
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interference, of the type proposed by Allport, Styles & Hsieh (1994) in their task-set inertia 
(TSI) hypothesis (transient interference from the previous task set interferes with establishing 
the current task set) would present in the Continuous Series II as slowed RT on the second 
and subsequent tasks and failure to establish the task (an error in the subsequent task). As 
between-category error are proposed to be executive and therefore not open to effects from 
non-executive processes, it is proposed that any evidence of carryover effects would result in 
increased within-category errors, specifically perseverative within category errors (repeating 
the last item e.g. Monday, February, Monday, March...). As switch cost in the verbal 
switching paradigm is measured for the whole task it is not possible to assess the effect on 
costs but it is possible to assess the effect on within-category errors. By comparing the 
Continuous Series II with a Mixed Category task comprising of (harder) semantic categories 
and (easier) overlearned sequences we are in effect replicating the harder-to-easier task 
structure that showed asymmetry in the Allport study, within a verbal paradigm. There is no 
Stroop-like interference or bivalency and so the harder-to-easier aspect of the task can be 
studied in isolation.  
 
2 Hypotheses 
1. In line with previous work (Essig, 2004) performance on all indices will deteriorate as 
the number of switching categories increases.  
2. It is predicted that the Mixed Category task will result in greater switch cost than the 
Continuous Series II, due to the contribution of switching between an easier and more 
difficult task as opposed to just easier tasks and the need to switch between tasks 
under fractionated rather than unitary frontal control (Gurd, 1995).  
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3. There are expected to be fewer between category errors for the Mixed Category task 
than the Continuous Series II, reflecting the disengagement from both the previous 
task and the previous task domain. The double switch in the Mixed Category task 
emphasises the ‘cognitive gear change’ (Monsell, 2003) implicit in the task set 
reconfiguration (TSR) (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) account. Between-category errors, 
which indicate a breakdown in System 2 (Kahneman, 2011) reflect such effortful top-
down processing.  The need to, in effect, doubly switch will result in slower (as 
previously predicted) but more complete switching.  
4. There will be a difference in the type of within-category errors found in both the 
Continuous Series II and the Mixed Category task, although at present it is unclear 
how the difference will present. Specifically, if there are more repetition (e.g. 
Wednesday, Wednesday) than sequencing (e.g. Wednesday, Saturday) errors found in 
the Mixed Category task, which has tasks of differing difficulty, this will indicate 
evidence of carryover effects interfering with establishment of subsequent tasks. The 
type of within-category errors will act as a secondary measure of the prevalence of 
TSI.  
5. It is predicted that the Verbal Fluency task will result in greater switch cost than the 
Continuous Series II due to switching solely being between ‘difficult’ tasks. 
Additionally there is the need to switch between sub-groups within categories. 
Although there will not be the contribution (in either direction, asymmetric or reverse 
asymmetric) of switching between easier and harder tasks, it is predicted that the more 
difficult task will be more time consuming overall. 
6. There will be a difference in switch cost between the Verbal Fluency task and the 
Mixed Category task. It is unclear which combination will be more costly, differing 
task difficulty/ different frontal control processes for the Mixed Category task or 
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harder task/ switching between both categories and sub-groups for the Verbal Fluency 
task.  
3 EXPERIMENT ONE 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
Healthy control data was analysed throughout as a repeated measures design, 
measuring Speech Rate (w/sec), Switch Cost (% w/sec increase) and Error Type (within or 
between categories) as detailed in Chapter 2. Due to the Verbal Fluency (VF) and Mixed 
Category (MX) tasks being truncated at 3-categories, Continuous Series II (CS) data was 
initially analysed on its own across all three levels of difficulty. The three tasks (CS, VF & 
MX) were then compared as a repeated measures 3 x 2 design (Task Type (CS, VF, MX) x 
Difficulty Level (2, 3, 4 categories)) for analysis of Task Speech Rate and Switch Cost. Error 
types were analysed using two or three levels of a single factor (either Task Type or Number 
of Categories) as appropriate. The neurological patients were treated as a series of single case 
studies. Raw scores were converted into z-scores56 ; the criterion for impaired performance 
was set at 2SD below the control mean. Positive and negative z-scores for Switch Cost were 
reversed as a higher score would indicate slower (and therefore impaired) performance.  
 
3.1.2 Single case series approach  
The single case series design adopted what Shallice (1988) termed a strong or ultra-
cognitive approach, seeking to establish the processes underlying normal cognitive 
functioning (in this case, the ability to switch between verbal tasks) by studying the 
                                                           
56
 Patient raw score minus control M divided by control SD 
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performance of people with known abnormal cognitive functioning, not to ascribe any 
relationship between specific brain processes and such functions (Coltheart, 2004). Although 
viewed by some as too extreme (e.g. Shallice, 1988) in the extent of its exclusion of 
physiological cause, this approach lends itself very well to the current aim of establishing the 
limitations of the verbal switching paradigm. No inference regarding implementation of the 
task is made (or required) at this stage of theorising (c.f. Marr & Poggio, 1976). Further, the 
approach  can be considered more robust as predictions are tested repeatedly against a 
number of individual cases, in much the same way as using a number of separate groups, by 
means of z-scores calculated against the results from a healthy control group (with an 
appropriately sized control sample c.f. Crawford & Howell, 1998; Crawford & Garthwaite, 
2002).  
 
3.1.3 Participants  
A new sample of healthy controls (n = 28) was used for the reanalysis of data from 
Essig (2004); they were a mix of postgraduate psychology students and staff from the 
University of Hertfordshire and individuals from the wider community, recruited by word of 
mouth. Six neurological patients57 from the original study were included in the analysis (see 
Table 4 for details of individual diagnoses); patient 5 (a 57-year old female, two-months post 
left hemisphere stroke) was removed from the analysis as she did not complete the Mixed 
Category task or either of the speech rate measures. All participants carried out the same core 
background measures as detailed in Chapter 2; neurological patients did not complete the 
WAIS-R vocabulary sub-test so as to avoid fatigue. The short NART (Beardsall & Brayne, 
1990) which uses only the first 25 words from the full version was used with Patient 3 as he 
appeared to have difficulty with reading (Crawford et al., 1991 confirm reliability of the short 
                                                           
57
 Patients for the original study had been recruited from the Oxford Centre for Enablement and had been 
referred by their consultant neurologist. 
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version in predicting full scale IQ when compared to full NART). The neurological patients 
carried out a picture description task (using a scene of people playing on a beach) at the end 
of the session, to give a second w/sec measure of speech rate. The intention was to compare 
this to the initial conversational speech measure to assess possible fatigue effects on speech 
rate and to end the test session with a positive activity. Two of the patients were unable to 
complete the first conversational activity as they could not think of a topic to talk about58. A 
paired sample T-test carried out on the remaining four patients showed no significant 
difference between conversational rate (M 2.63, SD .21) and picture description rate (M 2.44, 
SD .52), t(3) = .78, p = .49. The picture description measure was therefore used for the 
purpose of speech rate comparison with the control group.  A series of independent samples t-
tests showed that speech rate was the only measure showing a significant difference59 
between healthy controls (M 2.58, SD .42) and patients (M 1.98, SD .82), t(32) = 2.64, p = 
.13. 
 
 
  
                                                           
58
 The neurological patients were offered the choice of talking about a favourite or recently completed hobby or 
pastime (they all took part in occupational and art therapy sessions) as this was felt to be a more emotionally 
neutral and easily recalled alternative to a holiday. 
59
 This did not adversely affect task performance measures as Switch Cost is calculated individually against 
each participant’s speaking rate.  
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Background Test Battery (NART Predicted Full Scale IQ, WAIS-R 
Vocabulary Sub-Test, Forward and Backward Digit Span, Conversational Speech Rate and Picture 
Description Speech Rate) For Healthy Controls (N = 28) and Neurological Patients (N = 6) 
    Digit span   
Group Age NART  WAIS-
R 
vocab. 
Forw. Backw. Conv. 
speech 
(w/sec) 
Picture 
desc. 
(w/sec) 
Controls 
Mean 
SD 
 
47.25 
12.38 
 
113.04 
7.26 
 
12.5 
3.38 
 
6.57 
1.17 
 
4.93 
1.39 
 
2.58 
0.42 
 
* 
Patients 
Raw scores 
       
1 43 118 * 7 4 2.73 2.03 
2 57 102 * 4 2 ** 1.16 
3 65 87 * 7 2 ** 0.93 
4 38 112 * 6 4 2.33 2.28 
6 37 94 * 8 4 2.80 3.20 
7 61 124 * 8 6 2.65 2.26 
Patients 
Mean 
SD 
 
51.60 
13.18 
 
106.17 
14.32 
 
* 
 
6.67 
1.51 
 
3.67 
1.51 
 
2.63 
0.21 
 
1.98 
0.82 
* Task not administered; ** Did not complete task  
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Table 4 Clinical Details (Injury, Treatment and Time elapsed before Testing) for Neurological 
Patients (n = 6). 
Injury and any invasive 
treatment 
Time 
between 
injury & 
testing  
 
Neuropsychological assessment at admission 
Patient 1 (female, 43 yrs) 
Right total anterior circulation 
stroke  
2 mths Mild visual problems (especially re: locating objects in 
space) 
Problems with visual memory & IP speed (although 
good verbal recall) 
Slight executive problems (planning unstructured & 
novel tasks) 
 
Patient 2 (male, 57 yrs) 
TBI resulting in large fronto-
temporo-parietal contusion & 
subsequent right parieto-
temporal craniotomy and 
partial right frontal & 
temporal lobectomy 
7 mths Geographical disorientation (believed he was in London, 
not Oxford) 
Significant impairment of verbal and visuospatial recall 
and recognition; very slow thinking speed 
Significant executive impairment, showing 
perseveration, set shifting problems, confused & 
disorganised performance and lack of insight 
 
Patient 3 (male, 65 yrs) 
Left hemisphere stroke to the 
middle cerebral artery 
(investigated for same side 
TIAs 9 months prior to this)  
2 mths Significant reduction in IP speed 
Significant problems with planning and construction 
Difficulty learning new unstructured verbal material 
(structured verbal and visual recall good) 
Possible executive problems 
 
Patient 4 (female, 38 yrs) 
Left hemisphere intra cerebral 
haemorrhage; left craniotomy, 
evacuation of haematoma and 
embolisation of discovered 
AVM 
 
2 mths No significant cognitive difficulties found 
Difficulties recalling numbers strings, though possibly 
due to long term recall problems 
Patient 6 (male, 37 yrs) 
Closed head injury (fall from 
height onto a hard surface). 
Left frontal & right cerebellar 
contusions  
 
4 mths Mild cognitive impairment 
Retrograde amnesia regarding accident 
Patient 7 (male, 61 yrs) 
Right fronto-parietal 
intracerebral haemorrhage 
(TIA/ left occipital lobe 
ischaemic infarct 9 months 
prior to this) 
 
6 wks No noted cognitive impairments, although slight 
tendency towards impulsivity 
IP = information processing; TBI = traumatic brain injury; TIA = transient ischemic attack; AVM = arterio-
venous malformation 
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3.1.4 Stimuli 
The study used the Continuous Series II (CS; full description in Chapter 2), a Verbal 
Fluency switching task (VF) requiring participants to switch between increasing numbers of 
semantic categories and the Mixed Category task (MX), which required switching between 
increasing numbers of alternating overlearned sequences and semantic categories. Categories 
and start points used for each task are presented below; start points were pre-set and non-
canonical for overlearned sequences and free for semantic categories. 
 
Table 5 Categories and Start Points used in Continuous Series II, Verbal Fluency and Mixed 
Category Tasks. 
Task & Number of 
Categories 
Categories Start points 
Continuous Series II  2 Numbers – Days  6 – Tuesday 
 3 Numbers – Days – Months  4 – Friday – October  
 4 Numbers – Days – Months – Letters  
 
9 – Wednesday – February - H 
Verbal fluency  2 Vehicles – Clothing  Free start points 
 3 Occupations – Animals – Fruit  
 
Free start points 
Mixed Category task  2 Furniture – Months  Free – July 
 3 Flowers – Days – Sports  Free – Saturday – Free  
Number of sequence iterations: 2-cats. = 23          3-cats. = 21          4-cats. = 20  
 
 
Semantic category norms were taken from Hampton & Gardiner (1983). Several 
categories were excluded60 due to possible ambiguity or restricted set size for the 
neurological patients (such difficulties are extensively documented by Lezak et al, 2004). The 
reduced number of suitable categories resulted in the Verbal Fluency and Mixed Category 
tasks being truncated to 3-category switching. 
                                                           
60
 The excluded categories were: birds; fish; food flavourings; insects; vegetables; weapons 
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3.2 Procedure 
After completing background measures, healthy controls completed tasks in the order 
Continuous Series II, Verbal Fluency and Mixed Category task; full procedural details for 
verbal switching are described in Chapter 2. Neurological patients completed the Continuous 
Series II and Mixed Category tasks only, to reduce any possible effects of fatigue. Task order 
was fixed to ensure that neurological patients carried out what was perceived to be the most 
unfamiliar first, thus avoiding undue stress and fatigue during the session. While the Mixed 
Task was felt to be harder per se, patients were more likely to be familiar with semantic 
search and so this task was felt the most appropriate one to finish on. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Data distribution 
Normality for all variables was assessed using the Shapiro-Wilk’s test with 
significance set at .01; where appropriate skewness and kurtosis were considered using a z 
limit of + 2.71, equivalent to an α level of .01 (Field, 2009). Both digit span measures were 
found to have a non-normal distribution: forward digit span W(28) = 0.89, p = .008, with a 
leptokurtic cluster scoring at 7; reverse digit span W(28) = 0.90, p = .010.  
 
Continuous Series II rate and switch cost for 4-category switching were non-normal, 
CS4rate W(28) = 0.90, p = .009, CS4cost W(28) = 0.86, p = .002, this time with skewness just 
reaching significance at the .01 level for switch cost only. Closer investigation revealed 
CS4rate to have a peak at 0.40 w.sec and CS4cost to peak at 90%. The degree of these peaks 
beyond the normal curve and the number of participants contributing to them, as well as the 
observed normality of the rest of the sample and normal distribution of other rate and switch 
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cost variables, indicated that transformation of the data was not justified (particularly given 
the intrinsic change to the nature comparisons this would entail – see Field, 2009) and that 
parametric analyses could reasonably be applied.  
 
Rate and switch cost measures for 3-category Verbal Fluency switching exhibited a 
significantly non-normal distribution, VF3rate W(28) = 0.85, p = .001, VF3cost W(28) = 0.84, p 
= .001. Although statistically non-normal, observation of a histogramatic representation of 
the data indicated that the majority of the sample presented a normal distribution, with 
VF3rate showing a peak at around 0.20 w/sec and a single high score of 0.37 and VF3cost 
peaking less noticeably between 68-78%, with a single low (fast) score of 50%. As expected, 
all error measures for all three tasks (with the exception of CS4within) showed significantly (in 
excess of α = .01) non-normal distributions. Additionally all measures of different within-
category error type (repeat or sequencing), which were used to address hypothesis 4, were 
non-normally distributed with the exception of CS4 sequencing errors. 
 
3.3.2 Statistical tests 
Continuous Series II rate and switch cost were analysed over 2, 3 and 4 switching 
categories using GLM repeated measures ANOVA, IV1 = Number of Categories (2, 3, 4). 
Rate and switch cost for all three verbal switching tests (CS, VF and MX) were then 
compared over 2 and 3 switching categories using a GLM repeated measures 3 x 2 ANOVA, 
IV1 = Task Type (CS, VF, MX), IV2 = Number of Categories (2, 3). Post-hoc contrasts were 
carried out using t-tests or GLM repeated contrasts as appropriate, depending on whether 
scores could reasonably be expected to be incremental across levels. A bivariate correlation 
was used to identify any potential covariates from the baseline measures, which were 
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incorporated into ANCOVA analyses where appropriate (see note in Chapter 2, page 124 
regarding the use of covariates with repeated measures factors (Thomas et al., 2009)). In all 
instances of the GLM ANOVA/ ANCOVA multivariate results are reported using Wilk’s 
lambda Λ, which is more robust to violations of sphericity. Effect sizes are reported using 
partial η2, interpreted as .01 = small, .06 = medium and .14 = large (Cohen, 1988).  Error 
rates (within and between category errors) were analysed using the non-parametric 
Friedman’s ANOVA and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, with effect size reported as r, 
interpreted as .10 = small, .30 = medium and .50 = large (Cohen, 1988).  
 
Significance levels for post-hoc contrasts made using t-tests or Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests were determined using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjustment throughout (Holm, 
1979). All non-parametric significance levels are exact measures; for Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests this is indicated in the text as one or two-tailed as appropriate. Effect size r was 
calculated in the following ways (Field, 2009): t-tests, √ ((t2 ÷ (t2 + df)); Wilcoxon signed 
ranks, test statistic Z ÷ √ number of observations. 
 
3.4 Results: Healthy Controls 
3.4.1 Descriptive and preliminary statistics 
All tasks showed the predicted increase of Switch Cost and Errors, and decrease in 
Task Speech rate (see Tables 4 and 5), as the Number of Categories increased. Task Speech 
Rate and Switch Cost for the three tasks were not inversely matched as difficulty increased. 
Rate was slowest for VF (M = 0.25), then MX (M = 0.37), then CS (M = 0.96); cost was 
greatest for MX (M = 75.36), then CS (M = 69.71), then VF (M = 67.59). Rate was at a 
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comparable level for VF2 (M = 0.29) and MX3 (M = 0.28), but for the same two tasks cost 
was comparable between VF3 (M = 72.20) and MX2 (M = 71.23). 
  
Switch Cost measures showed more variation than Task Speech Rate, reducing in all 
instances as the Number of Categories increased. Conversely, variance increased in line with 
Number of categories for both Error Type measures. 
 
No correlation was evident between age and predicted NART IQ. Forward digit span 
correlated significantly with reverse digit span, r = .51, p (all significance values two-tailed) 
= .006, normal speech rate r = .38, p = .049 and all three speech rate measures for the 
Continuous Series II, CS2rate r = .42, p = .025, CS3rate r = .60, p = .001, CS4rate r = .55, p = 
.003. Similarly, reverse digit span correlated with all Continuous Series II rate measures, 
CS2rate r = .46, p = .015, CS3rate r = .63, p = .0001, CS4rate r = .65, p = .0001 and also with 
CS4cost r = -.46, p = .014 and MX2rate r = .42, p = .026. Finally, normal speech rate also 
correlated with CS2rate r = .38, p = .049. The relationship between normal speech rate and 
forward digit span/ CS2rate very likely reflected the ability to speak at a normal or near to 
normal rate during those two activities, rather than indicating any attributable share of the 
variance. Reverse digit span was deemed the most suitable of the two span measures to use as 
a covariate, given its relationship with all three tasks and some of the more complex 
switching indices, but was excluded due to its non-normal distribution. 
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3.4.2 Task speech rate 
A one-way GLM ANOVA indicated that for the Continuous Series II the Number of 
Categories (see Table 6 for means) being switched between had a highly significant effect on 
speech rate during the task, Λ = .06, F(2, 26) = 224.53, p = .0001, ηp2 = .95, with rate 
increased significantly in line with the number of categories CS2 to CS3 F(1, 27) = 291.02, p 
= .0001, ηp2 = .92, CS3 to CS4 F(1, 27) = 134.12, p = .0001, ηp2 = .83. 
 
For the cross-task comparison a two-way GLM ANOVA revealed a highly significant 
main effect of task type (see Table 6 for means), Λ = .06, F(2, 26) = 197.87, p = .0001, ηp2 = 
.94, and of number of categories (2-cats M = 0.67, 3-cats M = 0.38), Λ = .06, F(1, 27) = 
394.43, p = .0001, ηp2 = .94, as well as a highly significant interaction (see Figure 3) 
manifesting as a greater effect of Number of Categories for the CS task, Λ = .09, F(2, 26) = 
137.10, p = .0001, ηp2 = .91.  
 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics (M, SD, Range and Confidence Interval) for Healthy Controls (n = 28) 
on Task Speech Rate (w/sec) and Switch Cost (% increase). 
 Continuous Series II Verbal Fluency Mixed Category 
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 2-cats 3-cats 
Task Speech rate (w/sec)        
Mean 1.26 0.66 0.43 0.29 0.21 0.47 0.28 
SD 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.07 
Switch cost (% increase)        
Mean 61.21 78.22 87.46 62.99 72.20 71.23 79.49 
SD 9.36 8.22 5.47 7.77 5.33 7.71 6.53 
CS rate: M = 0.96, SE = 0.03 
VF rate: M = 0.25, SE = 0.01 
MX rate: M = 0.37, SE = 0.01 
2-cat rate: M = 0.67, SE = 0.02 
3-cat rate: M = 0.38, SE = 0.01 
CS cost: M = 69.71, SE = 1.55 
VF cost: M = 67.59, SE = 1.08 
MX cost: M = 75.36, SE = 1.16 
2-cat cost: M = 65.14, SE = 1.18 
3-cat cost: M = 76.64, SE = 0.92 
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3.4.3 Switch cost 
A one-way GLM ANOVA indicated that for the Continuous Series II the Number of 
Categories (see Table 6) being switched between had a highly significant effect on switch 
cost during the task, Λ = .08, F(2, 26) = 143.63, p = .0001, ηp2 = .92, again increasing 
significantly in line with categories, CS2 to CS3 F(1, 27) = 190.18, p = .0001, ηp2 = .88, CS3 
to CS4 = F(1, 27) = 127.06, p = .0001, ηp2 = .83. 
 
A two-way GLM ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect of Task Type 
(see Table 6), Λ = .40, F(2, 26) = 19.73, p = .0001, ηp2 = .60, and of Number of Categories 
(2-cats M = 69.71, 3-cats M = 67.59, 4-cats M = 75.36), Λ = .12, F(1, 27) = 206.14, p = 
.0001, ηp2 = .88, as well as a highly significant interaction again caused by the effect of 
categories for task CS, Λ = .46, F(2, 26) = 15.08, p = .0001, ηp2 = .54; the difference between 
2-cats and 3-cats was significant for task CS compared to VF, F(1, 27) = 27.12, p = .0001, 
ηp
2
 = .50, but not for VF compared to MX, F(1, 27) = 24.70, p = .610, ηp2 = .01. Figure 4 
very clearly illustrates the lack of interaction between VF and MX, with the particularly low 
cost produced by CS2 causing the interaction. 
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Figure 3 Task speech rate (w/sec) for Continuous Series II, Verbal Fluency and Mixed Category 
tasks over two and three switching categories. 
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Figure 4 Switch cost (w/sec percentage increase) for Continuous Series II, Verbal Fluency and 
Mixed Category tasks over two and three switching categories. 
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics (Sum, N producing errors, M, SD, Range and Confidence Interval) for 
Healthy Controls (n = 28) on Error Types (Count). 
  Continuous Series II Verbal Fluency Mixed 
Category 
  2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 2-cats 3-cats 
Error type (number) 
Within                         
 
Sum 
N 
 
7 
4 
 
92 
23 
 
270 
25 
 
22 
13 
 
42 
16 
 
61 
14 
 
167 
22 
 Mean 0.25 3.29 9.64 0.79 1.50 2.18 5.96 
 SD 0.7 3.23 6.90 1.07 2.42 3.40 6.90 
 
Between                      
 
Sum 
 
0 
 
5 
 
24 
 
8 
 
21 
 
0 
 
7 
 N - 3 6 2 6 - 3 
 Mean - 0.18 0.86 0.29 0.75 - 0.25 
 SD - 0.61 1.74 1.18 1.82 - 0.84 
 
 
3.4.4 Within category errors 
A Friedman’s ANOVA revealed that for the Continuous Series II (CS) the increase in 
within-category errors as a factor of Number of Categories was significant, χ2 (2) = 42.27, p = 
.0001. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed this to be uniformly significant, CS2 
to CS3, T = 0, p = .0001, r2 = -0.54, CS3 to CS4, T = 13, p = .0001, r2 = -0.55. During 4-
category switching for the Continuous Series II 68.7% of within-category errors were 
perseverative (repeating he last response made within the category) and 31.3% were 
sequencing errors. 
 
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test revealed that for the Semantic Category task there was 
no significant difference between the number of errors produced when switching between 
two and three categories, T = 65.50, p = .37. There was a highly significant increase in the 
number of within-errors produced from two to three categories for the Mixed Category task, 
T = 4, p = .0001, r2 = -0.52. 
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Errors produced when switching over 3-categories were compared between all three 
tasks using a Freidman’s ANOVA; two category switching was less informative for this 
purpose due to the paucity of errors at CS2. A significance difference was indicated, χ2 (2) = 
11.42, p = .003. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests compared the tasks in ascending 
order of number of errors – VF, CS, MX (as shown in Table 7) and showed the increase to 
only be significant from comparing the smallest (VF) with the largest (MX) number of errors, 
VF to CS, VF3 to CS3, T = 52, p = .035, VF3 to MX3, T = 47, p = .001, r2 = -0.42, CS3 to 
MX4, T = 90.50, p = .05. 
 
Types of within-category errors, either repeats (e.g. 9, Wednesday, 10, Wednesday…) 
or sequencing errors (e.g. 9, Wednesday, 10, Saturday…) were looked at overall for the two 
tasks and between category types for the Mixed Category task. Using Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests, the number of repetition and sequencing errors were found not to significantly differ for 
the first two difficulty levels of the Continuous Series II, CS2rep & CS2seq, T = -1.13, p = 
.257, CS3rep & CS3seq, T = -0.19, p = .847. The most difficult level of the Continuous Series 
II showed a significant difference with twice as many repeats as sequencing errors (see 
Tables 8 & 9), T = -2.57, p = .010. For the Mixed Category task there were significantly more 
sequencing errors than repeats at both levels of difficulty (see Tables 8 & 9), MX2rep & MX2 
seq, T = -3.20, p = .001, MX3rep & MX3seq, T = -2.23, p = .026. 
 
Looking at the categories of the Mixed Category task in detail, to see if there was a 
difference in repetition errors (signifying TSI in the easier overlearned sequences) for the two 
types of task, it was found that for 2-category switching there was no significant difference 
(see Table 9) , T = -1.41, p = .157. However, for 3-category switching there were 
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significantly more repeats for the overlearned sequence categories compared to the semantic 
categories, T = -3.75, p < .0001. 
 
 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for the Within-Category Repeat and Sequencing Errors for the 
Continuous Series II and Mixed Category Task. 
 Continuous Series II  Mixed Category task  
 CS2rep CS2seq CS3rep CS3seq CS4rep CS4seq MX2rep MX2seq MX3rep MX3seq 
Mean 0.04 0.21 1.57 1.64 6.29 3.14 0.11 2.14 1.57 4.36 
SD 0.19 0.79 2.33 1.77 5.84 2.46 032 3.40 1.60 6.11 
CS = Continuous Series II  MX = Mixed Category task rep = repeat seq = sequencing 
 
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Within-Category Repeat Errors only, comparing Rates for Semantic 
Categories and Overlearned Sequences at each Level of Difficulty. 
 Mixed Category task  
 2-categories 3-categories 
 Repetition sem Repetition OS Repetition sem Repetition OS 
Mean 0 0.07 0.04 1.61 
SD 0 0.26 0.19 1.52 
Sem = semantic category  OS = overlearned sequence 
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3.4.5 Between category errors 
As no between-category errors were produced over two categories, Continuous Series 
II errors of this type were compared for three and four categories using a Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test, showing a significant increase with categories T = 4, p = .03, r2 = -0.26. When 
switching over 4-categories of the Continuous Series II there were no perseverative errors 
(repeating the last task); 64.29% were found to be sequencing errors and 35.71% were found 
to be errors of omission. 
 
Between-category errors were compared for all three tasks over 3- categories (MX 
also producing none over 2-categories) using a Freidman’s ANOVA, but revealed no 
significant difference, χ2 (2) = 2.18, p = .337.  
 
3.5 Results: Neurological Patients 
Like the healthy controls, patients show a reduction in task speech rate as the tasks get 
harder (see Table 10), although this is much less pronounced for the Mixed Category task. 
Switch cost also follows the pattern of increasing with task difficulty, for many starting 
higher and increasing less for the Mixed Category task. Of note is P3 who maintained the 
same task speech rate for both difficulty levels of the Mixed Category task, although this was 
likely due to premature cessation over 3-categories. Patient 2 showed both reduced task 
speech rate and, unusually, switch cost as the Mixed Category task became more difficult, 
again due to premature cessation. 
 
A number of patients were impaired on task speech rate – for the Continuous Series II 
P3 and P4 were impaired over 2-categories, P3 also over 3-categories and none over 4-
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categories. For the Mixed Category task P1, P3 and P4 over 2-categories, P1 and P3 over 3-
categories. No patients showed any notable dissociation between the two tasks for task 
speech rate. There was only one impaired switch cost score, P3 on the Continuous Series II 
over 2-categories. Again no dissociations of note were evident. 
 
Generally number of errors increased as tasks became more difficult, although a 
decrease was seen from 2-categories to 3-cateogrories for within-category errors in the 
Continuous Series II for P2, possibly again due to premature cessation and in the Mixed 
Category task for P1on between-category errors, P2 on within-category errors and P6 on 
within-category errors. 
 
A dissociation for between-category errors over 3-categories on the two tasks is noted 
for P6 and P7 (see Table 11); these fall in opposite directions with P6 being impaired on the 
Continuous Series II and above control performance for the Mixed Category task and P7 
showing impairment on Mixed Category task and improved performance on the Continuous 
Series II. However, the positive performance is not comparable to the level of impairment 
(positive scores for both patients are zero); due to the opposing hemisphere damage it is 
possible that the scores of P6 and P7 are indicative of a doubly dissociative trend (both 
patients completed the full task). Patient 2 shows a broader dissociation between within-
category errors over 3-categories (lower than controls for Continuous Series II, much higher 
on Mixed Category task) but the lower score here falls just short of the impaired level. Patient 
3 also shows a mild dissociative pattern over 2-categories (Continuous Series II lower, Mixed 
Category task higher) but again the lower score is not at the impaired level. 
 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
173 
 
When looking at the type of errors produced during 4-category Continuous Series II 
switching, for within-category errors patients were found to produce 44.83% perseverative 
errors (P1, P2, P3 and P4) and 55.17% sequencing errors (P1, P2, P3 and P4). For between-
category errors they produced 17.39% perseverative errors (P1, P2 and P3), 43.48% 
sequencing errors (P1, P2, P3 and P7) and 52.94% omission errors (P2 and P3). 
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Table 10 Raw scores and z-scores for Neurological Patients (n = 6) on Speech Rate (w/sec) and 
Switch Cost (% increase). 
 
  * = impaired at < 2SD below control M  
** = z-score reversed from positive to negative  
  † = did not complete   
 Continuous Series II Mixed Category 
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 
Task Speech rate (w/sec)      
Patients       
1              Raw score 0.91 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.14 
z-score -1.67 -1.80 -1.39 * -2.36 * -2.00 
2              Raw score 1.31 0.46 0.33 0.27 0.25 
z-score +0.24 -1.00 -0.56 -1.82 -0.43 
3              Raw score 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.12 
z-score * -4.62 * -2.25 -1.17 * -3.18 * -2.29 
4              Raw score 0.77 0.42 0.08 0.25 0.18 
z-score * -2.33 -1.20 -1.94 * -2.00 -1.43 
6              Raw score 1.10 0.73 † 0.34 0.30 
z-score +0.76 +0.35  -1.18 +0.29 
7              Raw score 1.68 0.91 0.40 0.49 0.28 
z-score +2.00 +1.25 -0.17 +0.18 0.00 
      
Switch cost (% increase)**      
Patients       
1              Raw score 49.44 83.33 90.16 80.37 83.72 
z-score +1.26 -0.62 -0.49 -1.19 -0.65 
2              Raw score 58.68 85.40 89.91 81.63 66.66 
z-score +0.27 -0.87 -0.45 -1.35 +1.97 
3              Raw score 84.15 88.00 89.91 81.81 82.35 
z-score * -2.45 -1.19 -0.45 -1.37 -0.44 
4              Raw score 77.35 86.79 97.75 81.75 86.05 
z-score -1.72 -1.04 -1.88 -1.36 -1.00 
6              Raw score 54.16 69.58 † 73.82 72.97 
z-score +0.75 +1.05  -0.34 +1.00 
7              Raw score 49.09 70.74 88.17 71.68 78.63 
z-score +1.29 +0.91 -0.13 -0.06 +0.13 
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Table 11 Raw scores and z-scores for Neurological Patients (n = 6) on Error Types (Count). 
  * = impaired at < 2SD below control M  
** = z-score reversed from positive to negative  
  † = did not complete 
  ‡ = z-score not computable due to control score of zero 
  
  Continuous Series II Mixed Category 
  2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 
 Error type (count)**      
1 Within                 Raw score 1 2 14 0 4 
 z-score -1.07 +0.40 -0.63 +0.64 +0.28 
 Between              Raw score 0 0 4 2 0 
                                  z-score ‡ +0.30 -1.80 ‡ +0.30 
2 Within                 Raw score 1 9 4 8 1 
 z-score -1.07 -1.77 +0.82 -1.71 +7.19 
 Between              Raw score 0 4 9 0 2 
 z-score ‡ * -6.27 * -4.68 ‡ * -2.89 
3 Within                 Raw score 1 2 6 2 3 
 z-score -1.07 +0.40 +0.53 +0.05 +0.43 
 Between              Raw score 0 1 1 6 4 
 z-score ‡ -1.34 -0.08 ‡ * -4.46 
4 Within                 Raw score 0 1 11 2 6 
 z-score +0.36 +0.71 -0.20 +0.05 -0.01 
 Between              Raw score 0 0 0 0 0 
 z-score ‡ +0.30 +0.49 ‡ +0.30 
6 Within                 Raw score 0 2 † 2 1 
 z-score +0.36 +0.40  +0.05 +0.72 
 
Between              Raw score 0 2 † 0 0 
 z-score ‡ * -2.98  ‡ +0.30 
7 Within                 Raw score 5 2 4 1 2 
 z-score * -6.79 +0.40 +0.82 +0.35 +0.57 
 Between              Raw score 0 0 4 0 2 
 z-score ‡ +0.30 -1.80 ‡ * -2.08 
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4 Discussion 
All tasks followed general patterns predicted for the increase in task difficulty for 
both healthy controls and neurological patients61. For the healthy controls, degradation in 
performance in line with difficulty was much more pronounced for the Continuous Series II, 
for both rate and cost measures, than for the other two tasks (see Table 6). Verbal fluency 
switching was the slowest in terms of task speech rate but as predicted the Mixed Category II 
task was the costliest when compared to baseline speech rate. That verbal fluency switching 
results in the slowest task speech rate is to be expected, given the slower baseline production 
rate for categories (as evidenced by baseline rates for the mixed task in Experiment 3, see 
Table 25). Semantic category production involves semantic search and review of which 
responses have previously been made. Task speech rate results are entirely predictable from 
examination of baseline rates for the component task categories.  
 
Greater cost for the healthy controls on the Mixed Category II task overall is 
attributed to the combination of semantic category rate and the ‘double’ switch requirement 
of changing not only to the next task but to a different verbal domain (Gurd et al., 2003). 
During 3-category switching, switch cost for the Mixed Category II and Continuous Series II 
tasks converges (see Figure 4), though a large proportion of this convergence would appear to 
be due to the benefit seen in 2-category switching for the Continuous Series II. Lack of errors 
(and consequent time costly error recovery) would seem to account in part for this benefit. 
Verbal fluency switching produced three times as many within-category errors at this 
difficulty level and the Mixed Category II task produced almost nine times as many (Ragland 
et al. (2008), using only the 2-category component of the Continuous Series II, also found 
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 There were some exceptions for neurological patients but these were largely attributed to early cessation of 
the task.  
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minimal errors62). However, errors produced at the 3-category level are almost twice as 
prevalent for the Mixed Category task as for the Continuous Series II (see Table 7), while 
switch costs for this difficulty level are almost identical (see Table 6). Within-category errors 
at the 3-category difficulty level evidently contribute far less to cost for the Mixed Category 
task. Another explanation would be that an additional source of cost is encroaching for the 
Continuous Series II. 
 
Although the Mixed Category task is slower overall than the Continuous Series II, 
presumably because of the fractionated control processes needed for the differing tasks, this 
cost difference is not evident over 3-category switching. While costs converge at this level of 
difficulty the cause would seem to differ for the two tasks, indicated by the variation in 
within-category errors. For the Mixed Category task there is no significant difference 
between errors produced in semantic categories and errors produced in overlearned 
sequences, although there are about 50% more semantic than overlearned errors. If recovery 
from semantic errors is faster than overlearned sequence errors this could be a contributor. 
Three-category switching involves two semantic categories in the sequence – clarity over the 
role of differing errors types would only become clear if the task extended to 4-categories, as 
is the case in Experiment 3, Chapter 5. In addition these two categories in effect appear next 
to each other, reducing the number of times the double switch (task and task type) needs to be 
made. For example, “flowers – days – sports – flowers – days…” It is only in Experiment 5 
that the full extent of this double switch effect can be seen. Another potential contributor to 
this convergence could be the rate of increase between task levels for the Continuous Series 
II i.e. increasing difficulty might have more of an effect for this task.  
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Anecdotally there is a great difference in participant awareness of errors which may 
also account for the differing effect of such errors. Errors in overlearned sequences appear to 
be noticed much more regularly than errors in semantic categories. Very often an overlearned 
sequence error will be followed by gaps or slowing in responses as awareness of an error is 
gained, followed by comment on the commission of the error such as “…no, wait, that was 
not right…” (Experiment 2 in Chapter 4 looks in detail at the nature of these non-target 
utterances). Awareness of the error would seem to be greater due to the comparative context 
of the response – returning the response ‘Wednesday’ is set against the previous response 
‘Tuesday’, giving some context to check the suitability of the response against. A breakdown 
in this checking results in uncertainty over the response and backtracking to try and correct or 
acknowledge the error. Conversely errors in semantic categories are very often made with no 
indication of awareness at all. Quite often an item from the beginning of the task will be 
repeated near the end of the task so awareness of the repetition appears to be limited. 
 
Comparison of the two tasks at this truncated level of 3-category switching is 
therefore of limited value in determining the difference between the two tasks and their 
differing levels of involvement of top-down control, which must be returned to in more 
length in Chapter 5. However, the Mixed Category task does allow for assessment of the 
verbal switching paradigm in relation to Allport’s task-switch inertia (TSI) hypothesis, 
whereby enduring activation of the previous more difficult task set carries over and interferes 
with establishment of the following easier task set. Semantic categories, with their need to 
search and check, are deemed more difficult to produce items from than the automatic 
overlearned sequences. If TSI was in evidence (albeit in the absence of bivalency) then there 
would be a greater number of repetition errors compared to sequencing errors, particularly 
when comparing the two types of task. Repetition errors would be more in evidence in the 
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overlearned sequences as carryover would prevent updating of the task item. There were in 
fact significantly more sequencing than repetition errors for both difficulty levels of the 
Mixed Category task (see Table 8). Looking in detail at the Mixed Category task there was 
no difference in repetition errors between the two types of task for 2-category switching and 
significantly more repetition errors for overlearned sequences in 3-category switching. This is 
particularly relevant given there are more component semantic categories than overlearned 
sequences at this difficulty level. The Mixed Category task therefore does not offer any 
evidence thus far for carryover when comparing tasks of differing difficulty63.  
 
Although affordance of two tasks from one set of stimuli (bivalency) is noted as 
relevant to the outcome of carryover effects (Monsell, Yeung & Azuma, 2000), emphasis is 
also placed on the differing level of difficulty between tasks. There is no need to suppose that 
carryover of inhibition would only occur for bivalent tasks, particularly if the strength of 
disparity between the two tasks were sufficient. Production of the two types of word again 
reflects Kahneman’s (2011) two-system model, automatic and fast for overlearned sequences 
and effortful and slower for semantic categories. Monsell et al. (2000) note that inhibition of 
the type posited by Allport, Styles & Hsieh (1994) may be switch-specific rather than just 
prolonging some process that occurs when the task is carried out in a non-switching condition 
(such as response selection). Thus the carryover of inhibition would not necessarily be tied to 
the bivalent nature of the task but instead be related to the switching process and to the need 
to overcome the level of control required for the previous harder task. Continuous 
presentation of the same stimuli triggering the now erroneous task set (as in Stroop) would of 
course make the effect stronger but part of the carryover effect comes from the differing 
levels of difficulty and differing strength of activation for each task set.  
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 Issues of switch cost for the competing tasks are addressed in Experiment 3, Chapter 5.  
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Patients were generally slower than controls on Continuous Series II task speech rate, 
something which became more pronounced as the task became more difficult. This was more 
in evidence and showed more impaired performance for the Mixed Category task. Given that 
the patients were deemed to be impaired in terms of executive control and the Mixed 
Category task is proposed to involve two fractionated types of control for the component 
tasks, the level of impairment would seem to support this proposition. One patient (P3) had 
reported dysarthria and delivered impaired performance over 2 and 3-categories of both tasks 
– the lack of impairment over 4-categories was attributed to early cessation of the task at that 
level. Slower speech rate was expected given the range of pathologies (Pimm, 1997; Wang, 
Kent, Duffy & Thomas, 2005). However, impairment was seen more widely during the 
Mixed Category task, possibly again in relation to the double nature of switching between 
component tasks – patients would be expected to have greater word finding difficulties for 
the semantic categories. 
 
More than half the patients produced a faster switch cost than the controls for 2-
category Continuous Series II switching – only one, P3, was impaired. This phenomenon 
would appear to be related to the 2-category switch cost advantage (when compared to the 
other two tasks) for the healthy controls, compounded by a ceiling effect imposed by the 
slower nature of baseline non-switching speech rate for the patients. This advantage was not 
seen at greater difficulty levels for the task. The Mixed Category task saw some performance 
higher than controls at the 3-category level; two of the patients here ended the task one-third 
in, thus not affording the chance to accrue general cost contributors. Generally early ending 
of the task appeared to occur when mental effort (noted by Azouvi et al. (2004) to be the 
source of reduced switching functionality during switching for TBI patients) became 
overwhelming, accompanied by comments such as “I can’t think” or “It’s too difficult to 
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think”. On the Mixed Category task patients frequently commented they had “…run out of 
words…” suggesting that semantic search may similarly have been too effortful. Cessation of 
the task often followed a run of errors, highlighting the greater interference felt from errors in 
such patients (Perlstein et al., 2005; Pohl et al., 2007; Larson et al., in press). Both these 
phenomena highlight issues previously raised in relation to the Mixed Category task, the 
likeness to Kahneman’s 2-system model and the contribution of error recovery to cost. 
System 2 requires effort and is under conscious control, evidenced by the types of comments 
and early cessation seen in the Mixed Category task. This would suggest that in the Mixed 
Category task there is greater need for System 2, with both switching per se and one of the 
component tasks being under its control. Automatic production of overlearned sequences has 
been noted as intact in populations such as PD patients (Gurd, 1995) where there is 
impairment to the System 2 switching process. Patients appear to be largely intact in System 
1 but not so in System 2. It is therefore possible to complete switching to an extent using 
System 1 but deficits in System 2 limit the execution of the task. Between category errors are 
also widespread amongst the patients, which would further implicate a deficit of System 2. 
Other two-system models of control specifically during task switching would also fit this 
interpretation. One example is the dual-route model of motor task switching proposed by 
Imamizu, Kuroda, Yoshioka and Kawato (2004). Switching can occur through the parietal 
based parallel MOSAIC route or the frontally based serial Mixture of Experts route. 
Switching can be completed by a single route in the absence of the other, though with some 
detriment64. Finally, that cessation often followed a run of errors gives insight to the 
contribution errors make to switch cost for all participants.  Clearly recovery from errors 
takes time (as in the interruption resumption lag noted by Altmann & Trafton, 2007) – this 
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 The MOSAIC (Modular Selection And Identification for Control, Haruno, Wolpert & Kawato, 1999) is a 
parallel modular architecture combining multiple pairs of inverse and feed forward models which control and 
predict motor behaviour respectively, the act of switching being governed largely by the fit of the two internal 
models themselves. The Mixture of Experts (Jacobs & Jordan, 1991) uses a separate switching module to, 
referred to as a ‘gating network’, being more analogous with a typical executive function. 
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recovery period is magnified in patients who have less resilience to interruption of the 
switching process (governed in Kahneman’s model by System 2 which appears to be 
deficient in such a population) due to less control over that process.  
 
Patient errors followed the general overall pattern of detriment to performance as the 
task became more difficult. There is a notable double dissociation for 3-category between-
category errors between the two tasks involving patients P6 and P7 (see Table 11). Patient 6 
had suffered left frontal damage and was impaired on CS3 and performed favourably on 
MX3; P7 had right frontal damage and showed the opposite pattern of performance. Both 
patients were able and verbally competent and had performed well throughout the tasks (with 
the exception of P6 not attempting CS4). It is tempting to relate this to work mentioned in 
Chapter 4 concerning division of goal maintenance between the right and left APC (Charron 
& Koechlin, 2010) but there is no discernable functional basis for the dissociation as it 
stands. The PFC is involved in judging semantic acceptability (Dapretto & Bookheimer, 
1999) and more generally in semantic response selection and retrieval (Thompson-Schill, 
Aguirre, D’Esposito & Farah, 1999). The left inferior frontal lobe is particularly involved in 
semantic processing (Bookhemier, 2002) – as such patient P6, who had left frontal damage, 
might be expected to be impaired on the Mixed Category task but in fact was not. The pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) is associated with the System 2 abilities of detecting and resolving 
conflict (Evans, 1999) (associated in this work to between-category errors), whereas the 
ventral medial PFC is associated with the more intuitive automated System 1 responses. 
However, without more detailed background on the exact cite of damage it is difficult to 
determine the source of the dissociation. Overlearned sequences are associated with right 
temporal and parietal areas but do not relate to any frontal areas (Pariyadath et al., 2008); the 
double dissociation would therefore appear to be anomalous.  
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To continue in considering healthy controls, it is worth considering that Arbuthnott 
and Frank (2000) found almost 75% of their wrong–task errors (akin to between-category 
errors) to be perseverative in nature, with participants failing to switch from the previous 
task. In the current study (for Continuous Series II 4-category switching) this was found to 
account for none of the between-category errors with the majority being sequencing errors 
(participants switching to the wrong task but not repeating the previous one) and the rest were 
errors of omission. All of the sequencing errors involved the swapping over of two adjacent 
categories. Thus it would seem that the interpretation of such errors as System 2 failure 
would be more appropriate – this is associated with detecting and resolving conflict, which 
would be represented by mis-ordering of the tasks in this way. System 2 is rule based and 
judgements reflect a comparison of options, the breakdown of which would seem to be 
reflected by this type of failure. Perseverative between-category errors were seen in the 
patient results, accounting for almost one fifth of the total number of between-category errors 
(one third were sequencing and just over half omission). Even excluding the possibly inflated 
score of eight omission errors from one patient who omitted one category from the whole 
task, perseveration still only accounted for one third of all between-category errors. Unlike 
Arbuthnott and Frank’s (2000) sample, healthy participants here were always able to switch, 
albeit sometimes to the wrong task. Switching task type as well as task in the Mixed Category 
task is shown to be more time costly. The lack of perseverative between-category errors 
would appear to relate this to activation of the upcoming task rather than inhibition of the 
previous (Baddeley et al., 1998). In comparison at least to Arbuthnott and Frank’s (2000) 
data the verbal switching paradigm would seem to reflect the effect of preparatory processes 
more than inhibitory ones.  
 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
184 
 
8 Conclusion 
• In line with hypothesis 1 that cost would increase with difficulty, for all tasks and all 
participants switching became more taxing as the number of task being switched 
between increased (see Buchler et al., 2008).  
• Cost is inevitably inflated by inclusion of error data in the general task cost 
calculation, although as stated earlier one of the aims of the current work is to account 
for the full effects of the global switching workspace (the costs incurred by the whole 
task including error production, self corrections, gaps etc.). The contribution of 
semantic category errors would seem to be less costly to recover from than 
overlearned sequence errors. Cost here is evidently related to switching rather than 
error contribution, supporting the double switch for the Mixed Category task 
mentioned in hypothesis 3 and negating the greater recovery time from semantic 
errors predicted in hypothesis 2. The latter would seem to be more noticeable to the 
participant and requires tracking back to the correct resumption point in the sequence 
whereas semantic category errors may go unnoticed.  
• Combination of semantic and overlearned sequence categories has an increased 
combinatory effect on switch cost stemming from the need to switch not only task but 
verbal domain, resulting in a greater time taken to complete reconfiguration. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted a difference between tasks but not which would be more 
costly. This ‘double switch’ requirement however results in fewer between category 
errors as the disengagement from the previous task is more complete.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: VERBAL TASK SWITCHING IN A 
SAMPLE OF MONOZYGOTIC TWINS MIRRORED FOR 
HANDEDNESS 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a further study carried out using two versions of the verbal 
switching task, the Continuous Series II and the Mixed Category task (Essig, 2004). The 
sample for this study is a small group of left and right handed monozygotic twin pairs 
mirrored for handedness (MzTMH). They are assessed in an effort to determine whether 
control was differentially applied in accordance with disparate language lateralisation. 
Literature is discussed that suggests there is some basis for differential control for the 
component tasks (semantic category and overlearned sequence production) between 
individuals with left and right hemisphere lateralised language. Further, there is evidence that 
control for dual tasks can be split between the left and right hemispheres, suggesting that 
control of the Continuous Series II may present differently for the two groups in the sample. 
The chapter also includes some reference to post-hoc theorising, testing a hypothesis 
suggested by the data. For clarity background literature and a relevant hypothesis are 
included here, although the analysis was not determined at the start of the study. The 
hypothesis was suggested by the number of non-target utterances made during commission of 
the task with this sample, exploring the possibility that the type of utterance might affect the 
subsequent target response made. 
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1.1 Language lateralisation and verbal task switching 
Monozygotic twins mirrored for handedness have been shown to have a higher than 
average incidence for similar mirroring of language lateralisation (Somner, Ramsey, Mandl 
& Kahn, 2002: Lux et al., 2008) and spatial lateralisation (Lux et al., 2008), with strong 
behavioural manifestations of such spatial differences (Gurd, Schulz, Cherkas & Ebers, 
2006). There is also evidence of cerebellar asymmetry (Rosch, Ronan, Cherkas & Gurd, 
2010). Given the implicit role of language in switching more generally (Monsell, 2005) and 
for the Continuous Series II in particular, such differences in lateralisation may have 
implications for the nature of control processes exerted during switching. Additionally, 
processing of ordinal sequences such as days and numbers have been located to the right 
hemisphere (Pariyadath et al., 2008) which may give a time advantage for those for whom 
this is the normal locus of language processing. The supposition that there is a right 
hemisphere temporal advantage is in line with the assumption that there is greater interplay 
within verbal and non-verbal abilities (and so enhancement of both) because they share a 
hemisphere (Springer & Deutsch, 1993).  
 
There is evidence that the left and right hemispheres play a different role in task 
switching (Leite, Carvalho, Fregni, Boggio & Gonçalves, 2013). Transcranial direct current 
stimulation was used to affect performance of the left and right PFC. It was found that 
increasing LHEM activity and reducing RHEM activity resulted in decreased switch cost for 
a letter/ digit naming task. Switch cost was increased for a vowel-consonant parity task by 
the same pattern of stimulation, resulting in more time-impaired performance (but with 
greater accuracy). The parity task was seen as more cognitively demanding, suggesting that 
the more demanding task was in part under right hemisphere PFC control. Individuals with 
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right-hemisphere language lateralisation would have an atypical relationship between 
language and attention (usually located in the right hemisphere but normally hemispherically 
dissociated from language) (Flöel, Buyx, Breitenstein, Lohmann & Knecht, 2004). This 
divergence of language lateralisation and attention into the right hemisphere for the left 
handers, in conjunction with the possible right hemisphere time advantage already noted, 
would further suggest that left handed twins would perform faster than left handed twins.  
  
A number of other specific differences between left and right handers, some of which 
are switch related, also lend credence to the assumption that executive as well as language 
processing may be carried out differently. Related to the already mentioned right hemisphere 
advantage is the finding that mixed-handers are more effectively able to switch between 
clusters of category exemplars in a verbal fluency task (Sontam, Christman & Jasper, 2009). 
This is thought to be due to increased access to right hemisphere processing, which is said to 
be more diffuse (Chiarello, Burgess, Richards & Pollock, 1990). In an extensive sample of 
399 mirrored twin pairs, left handers out performed right handers on Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (a test of reasoning) and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Carter-Saltzman, 
Scarr-Salapatek, Barker & Katz, 1976). In a Stroop test, handedness-related differences in the 
execution of executive control were observed (Beratis, Rabavilas, Papadimitriou & 
Papageorgiou, 2010); left handers exhibited less Stroop interference than right handers. In a 
separate task (based on the Hayling sentence completion task, a test of executive function) 
initiation and inhibition of sentence completion (providing a context-congruent or 
incongruent completion) was found to differ between left and right handers (Beratis et al., 
2010). Left handers showed greater frontal activation during the initiation task and reduced 
activation during the inhibition task when compared to right handers. When interpreted with 
the Stroop findings (Beratis et al., 2010), this could point towards more efficient executive 
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control during the Stroop task. Finally, in recent work looking at covert verbal fluency 
production, left-handed twins were found to have differential right frontal activation from 
right-handed twins but similar behavioural results. There is clearly a different structure-
function relationship in achieving the task, which might well manifest behaviourally during 
switching. 
 
In further tasks left handers were also more likely to show prowess in mathematical 
and verbal reasoning (Benbow, 1986) and cope better than right handers with new knowledge 
(O’Boyle, Benbow & Alexander, 1995). This affinity for novelty is also highlighted using the 
Cognitive Bias Task (a measure of context-dependent responding, involving multiple-choice 
responses in the face of ambiguity), which identifies a strong relationship between 
handedness and functional lateralisation of the frontal lobes (Goldberg, Harner, Lovell, 
Podell & Riggio, 1994). It is posited by Goldberg and colleagues that there may be 
qualitative differences in cognition between left and right handers rather than simply a 
mirroring of neural arrangement.  They propose familiarity-seeking and novelty-seeking to be 
right and left handed traits respectively and link this to the high incidence of creativity in left 
handers (O’Boyle & Benbow, 1990). 
 
Overall this builds up to a picture of advantageous processing, both linguistic and 
executive, for left handers. There may be evidence of a right hemisphere advantage – 
certainly there is less interference from the competing dominant task in the Stroop (Beratis et 
al., 2010) and evidence of differential involvement of the frontal lobes in executive tasks, 
both behavioural (Goldberg et al., 1994) and neurological (Beratis et al., 2009). More 
recently Gurd et al. (2013) have found very similar frontal differences between left and right 
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handers to those indicated by Beratis et al. (2009). Evidence has also been provided by 
Charron and Koechlin (2010) that control of goals by the frontal lobes (specifically the 
medial and lateral frontal cortices) divide to simultaneously accommodate concurrent goals 
under dual-task conditions. This includes some overlap with areas identified as asymmetric65 
by Lux et al. (2008). Areas of the medial frontal cortex (particularly highlighted by Charron 
& Koechlin, 2010) have been identified as being involved in intentional reconfiguration 
during switching (Rushworth, Hadland, Paus & Sipila, 2002; Dove et al., 2000). The 
interaction of such divided control with differentially lateralised language function may well 
result in differential control for the verbal task. In conclusion, such functional and 
behavioural differences would suggest that handedness-related differences in RT and 
accuracy (particularly executive between-category errors) could be expected in the 
Continuous Series II. 
 
While not directly informing theoretical accounts of task switching with which to 
interpret the Continuous Series II, investigation of individuals with atypical language 
lateralisation will be informative about the task itself, which was one of the main aims of the 
thesis. The two hemispheres are differentially recruited during task switching, seemingly 
related to the level of cognitive demand of the task. While the Continuous Series II utilises 
automatic speech production it is nonetheless more demanding than more usual measures of 
task switching. Overall it would seem there is a right hemisphere advantage for more 
demanding tasks and a propensity in left-handers for novel tasks. Given that there is a 
differential contribution of hemispheres to task switching and that production of overlearned 
sequences is a right hemisphere function it would be useful to know whether individuals with 
a right hemisphere processing bias would be better able to complete the task. Language 
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processing is integral to task switching (Monsell, 2005) and particularly to the Continuous 
Series II – knowing whether the task is right hemisphere dominant (by virtue of the 
overlearned sequence processing) would be informative. It could be that right hemisphere 
dominance for language interacts not only with same-side lateralised attentional function but 
also the splitting of frontal goal control.  
 
 
1.2 Externalisation of inner speech as a self-cuing device 
Finally it is necessary to give theoretical background for some emergent data that 
arose while the current experiment was being analysed. Older adults (such as the current 
sample) find difficulty in switching between tasks compared to younger adults, possibly due 
to age-related deficits in executive functioning (Gratton, Wee, Rykhlevskaia, Leaver & 
Fabiani, 2009). The use of inner speech as a self-cuing device has been noted during task 
switching (Emerson & Miyake, 2003 – see page 60 of this document), particularly in older 
populations (Kray, Eber & Karbach, 2008). Disruption of inner speech during switching has 
been shown to increase mixing costs (e.g. Baddeley, Chincotta & Adlam, 2001) – mixing 
costs are the RT increase for performing a repeat of a task within a mixed (switching) block 
of trials as opposed to a single task block. Baddeley and colleagues noted that such costs are 
particularly large when the switching task does not use external cues and reliance on inner 
speech is increased. The Continuous Series II is just such a cue-free task. Although it is not 
subject to mixing costs (there is no task repeat during switching) reliance on inner speech 
does facilitate switching. There are anecdotal reports during task completion of participants 
rehearsing task and item order ‘in their heads’. Verbal labelling (naming the upcoming task in 
accordance with inner speech) is akin to this rehearsal and has been found to reduce age-
related costs (Kray et al., 2008).  
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Further anecdotal evidence from the task in all experiments shows that sometimes 
task-related non-target utterances are made during completion of the task (see Appendix F for 
a sample of such utterances). These might be indicative of a rehearsal e.g. “Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday...” or of memory loss e.g. “What was the next category?” or be more 
general in nature e.g. “This is difficult, isn’t it?” Although participants are instructed not to 
say anything except the target responses, non-target utterances still occur. When reviewing 
the recordings for the twins sample it was apparent that such utterances were more frequent. 
It is hypothesised that this is related to the age of the sample (51 years, with a number of 
individuals in their later 50s or 60s) – utterances are an externalisation of the inner speech on 
which this age group more heavily rely. Older adults use reactive control according to the 
DMC model (dual-mechanisms of cognitive control framework) (Braver, Gray & Burgess, 
2007; Czernochowski et al., 2010). Reactive control relates to reconfiguration and cue S-R 
mappings and is slower; proactive control oversees fast switching over time (Braver, 
Reynolds & Donaldson, 2003). Proactive control may be difficult for older adults (Braver et 
al., 2001). The DMC model suggests that older adults will instead rely on reactive control, 
which does not require maintenance over long periods of time (Rabbitt, 1979; Braver & 
West, 2008). Czernochowski predicts that older adults will particularly recruit reactive 
control at higher levels of difficulty. Utterances could therefore be indicative of reactive, 
reconfiguration-based control – indeed, their content does seem to signify this. It is proposed 
that utterances that reflect rehearsal (commonly the content of inner and overt speech in task 
switching, Monsell, 2005) will be more beneficial for subsequent responses in terms of 
whether an error is made as the utterance will reinforce inner speech.  
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2 Hypotheses 
1. There will be a right-hemisphere advantage for switching between overlearned 
sequences in the Continuous Series II, such that left-handed twins (who are taken to 
have right hemisphere language lateralisation) will have a lower/ faster switch cost 
than right-handed twins on the Continuous Series II. 
2. Similarly, because of more effective switching between clusters in semantic 
categories and greater access to more diffuse right-hemisphere processing for the 
harder task, the left-handed twins will have lower switch cost on the Mixed Category 
task than the right-handed twins.  
3. Following on from the general advantage for left-handers, there will be a reduced 
level of both types of error.  
4. Non-target utterances that reflect rehearsal will result in fewer subsequent errors than 
utterances that reflect memory loss or general comments.  
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3 EXPERIMENT TWO 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
The Continuous Series II was again initially assessed on its own (due to the truncated 
Mixed Category task) as a 2 x 3 (handedness x number of categories) mixed design 
measuring task speech rate (w/sec) and switch cost (% w/sec increase). Comparison between 
CS and MX was as a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 design (handedness x task x number of categories), 
again measuring task speech rate and switch cost. Error type (within or between) was 
assessed non-parametrically due to extreme non-normality of the data. 
 
3.1.2 Participants 
Thirteen pairs of monozygotic twins discordant for handedness (i.e. one left hander, 
one right) were tested. They had been recruited from the St. Thomas’s UK Adult Twin 
Registry (Kings College London: Spector & McGregor, 2002) as part of an ongoing and 
separate research programme into spatial laterality and motor control and had all agreed to 
additionally take part in the current study; individuals were recruited via postal request and 
testing took place in the Neuropsychology Unit at the Radcliffe Infirmary in Oxford. 
Handedness had previously been assessed using a 16-item handedness assessment inventory 
comprised of items from both Briggs and Nebes (1975) and the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Although individual data was not available, inclusion on the St. 
Thomas’s database was confirmation that participants satisfied this criterion. Full 
demographic data, as well as NART and digit span scores, is given in Table 9. Paired sample 
t-tests revealed no significant differences between left and right handed groups on NART, 
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WAIS-R vocabulary or digit span measures. For Continuous Series II non-target utterances a 
smaller sample was used (n = 9, 6 right handed). For non-target utterances in the Mixed 
Category task a different sample was used (n = 14, 7 right handed) – demographics are given 
in Table 13.  
 
3.1.3 Stimuli 
The Twins study used the Continuous Series II and Mixed Category tasks in the same 
format as for Experiment One. 
 
3.2 Procedure 
Participants completed the NART, WAIS-R and forward and reverse digit spans as 
background measures; conversational speech rate was not included as testing sessions were 
strictly time limited, due to the constraints of the concurrent laterality study. Presentation 
order of the Continuous Series II and Mixed Category tasks was counterbalanced evenly 
between left and right handers. 
 
3.3 Data distribution 
Background measures and task speech rate/ switch cost measures were normally 
distributed for the whole group as indicated by Shapiro-Wilk test, with the exception of 
reverse digit span, W(26) = 0.91, p = .007, which had a leptokurtic (although not 
independently significant) peak at a score of 5. In comparing left and right handed 
participants no measures significantly violated normality at the α level of .01.  
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Table 12 Demographic and Baseline Measures for Twins Sample (n = 26). 
      Digit span 
Twin pair Age Gender Handed-
ness 
NART 
IQ 
WAIS-
R 
vocab. 
Forw. Backw. 
1 – TW27 45 F Right 114 8 7 6 
2 – TW27 45 F Left 109 8 6 4 
3 – TW28 65 F Right 96 8 9 4 
4 – TW28 65 F Left 108 10 7 5 
5 – TW29 55 F Right 111 11 6 4 
6 – TW29 55 F Left 114 10 7 5 
7 – TW30 58 F Right 116 12 6 3 
8 – TW30 58 F Left 107 11 6 3 
9 – TW31 30 F Right 111 8 7 5 
10 – TW31 30 F Left 113 10 7 7 
11 – TW32 38 F Right 108 11 6 3 
12 – TW32 38 F Left 110 11 5 3 
13 – TW33 62 F Right 125 15 8 6 
14 – TW33 62 F Left 126 15 8 5 
15 – TW34 44 F Right 111 12 5 5 
16 – TW34 44 F Left 110 11 5 3 
17 – TW35 66 M Right 121 15 9 5 
18 – TW35 66 M Left 122 17 8 5 
19 – TW36 57 M Right 106 12 8 5 
20 – TW36 57 M Left 111 15 8 5 
21 – TW38 45 M Right 116 14 5 3 
22 – TW38 45 M Left 117 18 7 7 
23 – TW40 52 M Right 95 8 7 5 
24 – TW40 52 M Left 97 11 5 5 
25 – TW42 41 M Right 113 11 8 8 
26 – TW42 41 M Left 115 13 8 8 
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Whole 
sample 
       
Mean 50.86   111.75 12.31 6.86 4.86 
SD 10.48   7.54 3.04 1.24 1.43 
L-handed        
Mean 50.62   112.23 12.31 6.69 5.00 
SD 11.08   7.18 3.04 1.18 1.58 
R-handed        
Mean 50.62   111.00 11.15 7.00 4.77 
SD 11.08   8.53 2.58 1.35 1.42 
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Table 13 Demographics for Non-Target Utterances for the Continuous Series II and Mixed Category 
Task, showing Means and Standard Deviations in Parentheses. 
 
Age NART-IQ WAIS-R Digit forw. Digit 
backw. 
Continuous Series II  
Whole sample  (n = 9)  
 
51.56 
(12.63) 
 
107.56 
(6.58) 
 
10.00 
(1.23) 
 
6.78  
(1.20) 
 
4.78  
(1.39) 
 
Mixed Category task  
Whole sample (n = 14) 
 
 
54.07 
(11.27) 
 
 
111.64 
(8.48) 
 
 
11.14 
(2.21) 
 
 
6.57  
(1.34) 
 
 
4.57  
(1.40) 
 
All measures of non-target utterance (utterances and post-utterance responses) were found to 
be non-normally distributed with the exception of errors following a memory utterance and 
correct responses following a rehearsal utterance.  
 
3.3.1 Statistical tests 
Speech rate and switch cost for the tasks were analysed using mixed GLM ANOVAs, 
2 x 3 for CS only and 2 x 2 x 2 for the CS and MX comparison, as detailed above. Covariates 
were identified using a bivariate correlation analysis; any such variables were stratified 
entered as independent factors in a second ANOVA to attribute covariance (see Experiment 1 
and Chapter 2). Analysis of error types was carried out using the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test. Analysis of non-target utterances and subsequent responses was made using 
Friedman’s ANOVA, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test and the Mann-Whitney test. As for 
experiment 1, any multiple post-hoc comparisons made using t-tests used an appropriately 
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adjusted α level; effect sizes were interpreted using ηp 2 (small = .01, medium = .06, large = 
.14) and r (small = .10, medium = .20, large = .30). 
 
3.3.2 Descriptive and preliminary statistics 
Task speech rate and switch cost for both tasks displayed slowing/ increase as 
difficulty increased. Mean scores for left and right handers were highly similar, the only 
difference being a slight increase in variance for the right handed group.   
 
A number of correlations between background measures (and between background 
measures and factors) were indicated as follows: Age and forward digit r = .44, p (two-tailed) 
= .024; forward and reverse digit span, r = .53, p (two-tailed) = .005; forward digit span and 
CS3rate, r = .72, p (two-tailed) = .0001; forward digit span and CS4rate, r = .48, p (two-tailed) 
= .012; reverse digit span and CS3rate, r = .63, p (two-tailed) = .001; reverse digit span and 
CS4rate, r = .45, p (two-tailed) = .020. Reverse digit span was therefore considered as a 
potential covariate for task speech rate analyses only. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Task speech rate 
In the Continuous Series II task there was a significant effect of number of categories 
(see Table 14 for means), Λ = .07, F(2, 23) = 151.36, p = .0001, ηp2 = .93 with rate reducing 
significantly across the task as the number of categories increased, CS2rate to CS3rate, t(25) = 
14.95, p = .0001, r = 0.95, 95% CI (0.54 – 0.71); CS2rate to CS4rate, t(25) = 17.85, p = .0001, 
r = 0.96, 95% CI (0.73 – 0.92); CS3rate to CS4rate, t(25) = 10.02, p = .0001, r = 0.89, 95% CI 
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(0.16 – 0.25). There was no indication of any independent effect of handedness (left & right 
M = 0.78) on task speech rate, F(1, 24) = 0.001, p = .979 ns, ηp2 = .0001and predictably from 
such results no interaction with number of categories, Λ = .97, F(2, 23) = 0.31, p = .738 ns, 
ηp
2
 = .03.  
 
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics for Task Speech Rate (w/sec) on Continuous Series II and Mixed 
Category Tasks for Left and Right Handed Monozygotic Twins (group n = 26). 
  Continuous Series II Mixed Category task 
  2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 
Task speech rate (w/sec)      
Left handed Mean 1.27 0.65 0.43 0.47 0.28 
 SD 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.07 
 
Right handed Mean 1.25 0.64 0.45 0.40 0.29 
 SD 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.09 0.08 
L-H rate: M = 0.67, SE = 0.02 
L-H CS rate: M = 0.96, SE = 0.04 
L-H MX rate: M = 0.38, SE = 0.02 
L-H 2-cat rate: M = 0.87, SE = 0.03 
L-H 3-cat rate: M = 0.46, SE = 0.03 
 R-H rate: M = 0.65, SE = 0.02 
R-H CS rate: M = 0.95, SE = 0.04 
R-H MX rate: M = 0.35, SE = 0.02 
R-H 2-cat rate: M = 0.83, SE = 0.03 
R-H 3-cat rate: M = 0.47, SE = 0.03 
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Figure 5 Task speech rate interaction of task type (Continuous Series II and Mixed Category task) 
and number of switching categories (2 and 3) for whole twins sample (N = 26) 
 
The analysis of task speech rate for CS was re-run with the inclusion of reverse digit 
span as an independent factor (with similar cases grouped together) to determine the degree 
of covariance it accounted for in isolation from the repeated measures factor of Number of 
Categories. Scores were grouped as Low (scores of 3 or 4, N = 9, M = 0.71), Medium (scores 
of 5, N = 11, M = 0.79) and High (scores of 6, 7 or 8, N = 6, M = 0.87). Reverse digit span 
was found to have some independent effect on task speech rate, F(2, 20) = 3.67, p = .044, ηp2 
= .27, but did not differ significantly according to handedness F(2, 20) = 0.23, p = .801 ns, 
ηp
2
 = .02, nor interact with Number of Categories Λ = .77, F(4, 38) = 1.33, p = .276 ns, ηp2 = 
.12.  
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Comparing the two tasks confirmed that task speech rate was significantly slower for 
the mixed task, Λ = .05, F(1, 24) = 440.41, p = .0001, ηp2 = .95, and that switching over 2-
categories (M = 0.85) produced a faster rate than over 3-categories (M = 0.46), Λ = .09, F(1, 
24) = 255.93, p = .0001, ηp2 = .91. The two factors produced a significant interaction (see 
Figure 5) with an increase in switching categories causing a greater reduction of task speech 
rate for CS compared to MX, Λ = .20, F(1, 24) = 98.64, p = .0001, ηp2 = .80. 
 
Again handedness was not found to have a significant independent effect, F(1, 24) = 
0.48, p = .500, ηp2 = .02, nor significant interactions with task type Λ = .99, F(1, 24) = 0.07, p 
= .798 ns, ηp2 = .003, number of categories Λ = .96, F(1, 24) = 1.04, p = .318 ns, ηp2 = .04, 
nor did the previously identified interaction between these two factors differ according to 
handedness Λ = .98, F(1, 24) = 0.58, p = .452 ns, ηp2 = .02. 
 
Running the expanded analysis on the cross task comparison revealed that the 
potential covariate effect of reverse digit span (Small M = 0.61, Medium M = 0.67, High M = 
0.69) was not realised independently F(2, 20) = 2.30, p = .126 ns, ηp2 = .19 and this did not 
differ according to handedness F(2, 20) = 0.83, p = .452 ns, ηp2 = .08. Additionally there was 
no interaction with Task Type Λ = .77, F(2, 20) = 3.02, p = .072 ns, ηp2 = .23 or Number of 
Categories Λ = .91, F(2, 20) = 1.04, p = .372 ns, ηp2 = .09; the interaction between these two 
repeated measures factors also remained the same regardless of digit span score Λ = .89, F(2, 
20) = 1.24, p = .311 ns, ηp2 = .11.   
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3.4.2 Switch cost 
For the Continuous Series II task there was a significant effect of Number of 
Categories (see Table 15), on switch cost, Λ = .11, F(2, 23) = 97.29, p = .0001, ηp2 = .89, 
confirmed as significant at all levels, CS2cost to CS3cost, t(25) = -10.49, p = .0001, r = 0.90, 
95% CI (-19.67 – -13.21); CS2cost to CS4cost, t(25) = -14.46, p = .0001, r = 0.94, 95% CI (-
29.30 – -21.99); CS3cost to CS4cost, t(25) = -8.32, p = .0001, r = 0.85, 95% CI (-11.48 – -
6.93). 
 
Again there was no significant independent effect of handedness over the three levels 
of the Continuous Series II task, F(1, 24) = 0.004, p = .95 ns, ηp2 = 0001, and no significant 
interaction with the Number of Categories, Λ = .92, F(2, 23) = 1.05, p = .365 ns, ηp2 = .08. 
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Table 15 Descriptive Statistics for Switch Cost (% w/sec increase) on Continuous Series II and Mixed 
Category Tasks for Left and Right Handed Monozygotic Twins (group N = 26). 
  Continuous Series II Mixed Category 
task 
  2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 
Switch cost (% increase)      
Left handed Mean 62.00 77.12 87.76 71.41 79.37 
 SD 6.74 6.70 4.40 8.12 5.20 
 
Right handed Mean 61.05 78.81 86.59 74.93 78.33 
 SD 10.60 8.42 5.40 6.24 6.80 
L-H cost: M = 72.48, SE = 1.48 
L-H CS cost: M = 69.56, SE = 2.01 
L-H MX cost: M = 75.39, SE = 1.52 
L-H 2-cat cost: M = 66.71, SE = 1.82 
L-H 3-cat cost: M = 78.25, SE = 1.57 
R-H cost: M = 73.28, SE = 1.48 
R-H CS cost: M = 69.93, SE = 2.01 
R-H MX cost: M = 76.63, SE = 1.52 
R-H 2-cat cost: M = 67.99, SE = 1.82 
R-H 3-cat cost: M = 78.57, SE = 1.57 
 
 
Cross task comparisons indicated switch cost to be significantly higher for the mixed 
task, Λ = .55, F(1, 24) = 19.98, p = .0001, ηp2 = .45 and to increase in line with Number of 
Categories, Λ = .22, F(1, 24) = 87.11, p = .0001, ηp2 = .78, with a significant interaction 
between the two presenting as a much greater effect of increasing the number of categories 
for CS, as seen in Figure 6, Λ = .45, F(1, 24) = 29.98, p = .0001, ηp2 = .56. 
 
Once again handedness failed to have a significant independent effect, F(1, 24) = 
0.15, p = .703, ηp2 =.01 and did not significantly interact with task type Λ = .99, F(1, 24) = 
0.10, p = .759, ηp2 = .004 or number of categories Λ = .99, F(1, 24) = 0.17, p = .688, ηp2 = 
.01. The interaction between these last two factors did not differ for handedness Λ = .88, F(1, 
24) = 3.71, p = .079, ηp2 = .12.  
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Figure 6 Switch cost interaction of task type (Continuous Series II and Mixed Category task) and 
number of switching categories (2 and 3) for whole twins sample (N = 26) 
 
 
3.4.3 Within category errors 
For Continuous Series II the number of within category errors (see Table 16) made 
when switching between 2-categories was significantly greater for right handed participants 
U = 43.00, z = -2.6, p = .012, r = .51, but there was no significant difference for handedness 
over 3-categories U = 72.50, z = -0.62, p = .550 ns or 4-categories U = 80.50, z = -0.21, p = 
.849 ns. Errors on the Mixed Category task did not differ according to handedness for either 
2-categories U = 62.50, z = -1.23, p = .230 or 3-categories U = 78.50, z = -0.31, p = .769. 
Overall 62.71% of within-category errors were perseverative (65.31% right handers and 
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59.49% left handers) and 37.29% were sequencing (34.69% right handers and 40.51% left 
handers). 
 
3.4.4 Between category errors 
Left-handed participants made no between category errors during the Continuous 
Series II, with right handers producing errors over three and four categories. However, the 
difference between the two groups was found to be non-significant at both difficulty levels: 
3-categories U = 78.00, z = -1.00, p .762; 4-categories U = 71.50, z = -1.44, p = .511. For 4-
cateogory switching 66.66% of errors were sequencing and 33.34% errors of omission. 
 
On the Mixed Category task, between category errors were observed to increase in 
line with Number of Categories for the left handed group but decreased for the right handed 
group; however, the number of errors made was not found to be significantly different 
between the two groups for either 2-categories U = 78.50, z = -0.56, p = .989 or for 3-
categories U = 77.50, z = -0.65, p = .740.  
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Table 16 Within and Between Category Errors (Sum, N, Minimum and Maximum Scores) for Left 
and Right Handed Monozygotic Twins (Group N = 26). 
  Continuous Series II Mixed Category task  
  2 3 4 2 3 
Within category errors      
Left Sum 1 43 79 34 74 
 N 1 9 11 8 11 
 Mean 0.8 3.31 6.08 2.62 5.69 
 SD 0.28 
 
3.77 5.06 3.60 6.13 
Right Sum 16 54 100 23 87 
 N 7 10 11 4 10 
 Mean 1.23 4.15 7.69 1.78 6.69 
 SD 1.48 4.12 7.91 3.40 8.06 
Between category errors      
Left Sum - - - 2 5 
 N - - - 1 2 
 Mean - - - 0.15 0.38 
 SD 
 
- - - 0.56 1.12 
Right Sum - 1 5 3 1 
 N - 1 2 2 1 
 Mean  0.08 0.38 0.23 0.08 
 SD  0.28 1.12 0.60 0.28 
 
 
3.4.5 Analysis of non-target utterances 
 All test sessions for both tasks were transcribed and were initially analysed using 
content analysis. Non-target utterances were classified according to 4 pre-determined 
definitions – evidence of Memory Lapse (e.g. “I can’t remember what comes next”), 
evidence of Rehearsal (e.g. “Days come next”), evidence of a Correction (e.g. “No, I meant 
Tuesday”) and Other (e.g. “This is difficult”).  
 
For the Continuous Series II initial comparison of the values for the four utterance 
types using a Friedman’s ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference between 
them, χ2(3) = 11.03, p = .012. Post-hoc comparisons using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
(with a Bonferroni adjusted α of .008) showed that none of the individual comparisons were 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
207 
 
significant at this more stringent significance level. As Correction utterances and Other 
utterances scored only 2 and 1 responses respectively it was decided to exclude these from 
any further analysis and concentrate instead on just Memory and Rehearsal utterances. A 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test comparing these showed the difference between these two not to 
be significant, T = 4.42, p = .624.  
 
 Responses following utterances for the Continuous Series II were classified as correct, 
self-corrections or errors. For memory and rehearsal utterances no self-corrections were 
returned. Comparison of Correct and Error responses for Memory utterances showed that 
there was no significant difference, T = 4.50, p = .157.  Comparison of Correct and Error 
responses for Rehearsals showed that there was a significant difference, T = 4.50, p = .026, 
with far more correct subsequent responses than errors.  
 
There was no significant difference for any measures when comparing between 
handedness for the Continuous Series II. Using Mann-Whitney tests there was no significant 
difference between memory utterances, U = 7.00, p = .480, no significant difference between 
rehearsal utterances, U = 5.00, p = .248, no significant difference between correct responses 
following a memory utterance, U = 9.00, p = .988, between errors following a memory 
utterance, U = 5.50, p = .317, between correct responses following a rehearsal, U = 6.00, p = 
.414 or errors following a rehearsal, U = 6.00, p = .157.  
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Table 17 Descriptive Statistics for Non-Target Utterances in the Continuous Series II. 
 Utterances Post-utterance responses 
 Mem Reh Corr Other Memcorr Memerr Rehcorr Reherr 
Whole 
sample 
Mean 
 
 
1.56 
 
 
1.22 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
0.33 
 
 
0.56 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
1.67 
 
 
0.11 
SD 1.13 1.48 0.44 1.00 0.73 0.71 1.32 0.33 
Sum 14 11 2 3 5 9 15 1 
N 9 4 2 1 4 6 6 1 
Left 
handers 
Mean 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
1.33 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
0.33 
SD 1.73 1.73 0.58 * 1.16 0.58 1.73 0.58 
Sum 6 6 2 0 2 4 6 1 
N 3 2 2 0 1 3 2 1 
Right 
handers 
Mean 
 
 
1.33 
 
 
0.83 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.83 
 
 
1.5 
 
 
0.00 
SD 0.82 1.33 * 1.23 0.55 0.75 1.23 * 
Sum 8 5 0 3 3 5 9 0 
N 6 2 0 1 3 4 4 0 
Mem = memory  Reh = rehearsal  Corr = correction/ correct  Err = error  
* = non-calculable due to constancy 
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For the Mixed Category task initial comparison of the values for the three utterance 
types (no corrections were returned) using a Friedman’s ANOVA showed that there was a 
significant difference between them, χ2(3) = 28.45, p < .0001. Post-hoc comparisons using 
the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (with a Bonferroni adjusted α of .002) showed that there was 
a significant difference between Rehearsal and Memory, T  = 2.00, p  = .002 with there being 
more Rehearsal utterances than Memory and a significant difference between Other and 
Rehearsal T = 7.58, p = .004 with there again being significantly more Rehearsals.  
 
 Responses following utterances for the Mixed Category task were classified again as 
correct, self-corrections or errors. For memory and rehearsal utterances no self-corrections 
were returned. Comparison of Correct and Error responses for Memory utterances showed 
that there was no significant difference, T = 4.80, p = .366.  Comparison of Correct and Error 
responses for Rehearsals showed that there was a significant difference, T = 2.00, p = .003, 
with far more correct subsequent responses than errors (see Table 18).  
 
 In comparing handedness there is only one significant difference, between errors 
following rehearsal utterances with left-handers scoring more errors than right handers, who 
scored zero (see Table 18), U = 3.50, p = .004. The rest of the comparisons are non-
significant: memory utterances U = 21.50, p = .674, rehearsal utterances, U = 18.00, p = .401, 
correct responses following a memory utterance, U = 23.00, p = .827, errors following a 
memory utterance, U = 17.50, p = .254 and correct responses following a rehearsal, U = 
23.50, p = .895.  
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Table 18 Descriptive Statistics for Non-Target Utterances in the Mixed Category Task. 
 Utterances  Post-utterance responses 
 Mem Reh Other Memcorr Memerr Rehcorr Reherr 
Whole 
sample 
Mean 
 
 
0.79 
 
 
3.43 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
2.79 
 
 
0.64 
SD 0.70 2.03 0.84 0.65 0.47 1.72 1.08 
Sum 11 48 5 7 4 39 9 
N 9 13 3 6 4 13 6 
Left 
handers 
Mean 
 
 
0.71 
 
 
3.86 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
0.57 
 
 
0.14 
 
 
2.57 
 
 
1.29 
SD 0.76 1.77 0.49 0.79 0.38 0.98 1.25 
Sum 5 27 2 4 1 18 9 
N 4 7 2 3 1 7 6 
Right 
handers 
Mean 
 
 
0.86 
 
 
3.00 
 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.43 
 
 
3.00 
 
 
0 
SD 0.69 2.31 1.13 0.54 0.54 2.31 * 
Sum 6 21 3 3 3 21 0 
N 5 6 1 3 3 6 0 
Mem = memory  Reh = rehearsal  Corr = correction/ correct 
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4 Discussion 
Task speech rate, switch cost and number of errors for both tasks followed the same 
pattern as for Experiment 1, in that performance deteriorated as the task became more 
difficult. The Mixed Category task produced slower task speech rate and greater switch cost 
than the Continuous Series II – there was greater disparity between 2-category and 3-category 
switching for the Continuous Series II on both measures, with the Continuous Series II 
exhibiting a seeming advantage for 2-category switching and cost measures for both tasks 
converging at the 3-category difficulty level, though this convergence must again owe 
something to the degree of advantage for the Continuous Series II over 2-categories. 
Comparative paucity of errors for the Continuous Series II was again noticeable over 2-
categories (over three times fewer than for the Mixed Category task). Left and right handers 
did not display any significant difference for either rate or cost. Switch cost for the two tasks 
shows an almost identical pattern as seen in Experiment 1 with greater cost for the Mixed 
Category task again seemingly attributable to the additional domain switch (Gurd et al., 
2003).  
 
Right handers were more error prone in some conditions than left handers on the 
Continuous Series II. Within-category errors again followed the pattern of increasing with 
task difficulty for both tasks – right handed participants made significantly more within-
category errors over 2-categories for the Continuous Series II. Number of errors again 
increased with difficulty for the Mixed Category task but with no significant difference 
between left and right handers. Although left-handed participants had the advantage in that 
the committed no between-category errors on the Continuous Series II, this difference was 
found to be non-significant. Between-category errors were found to increase with task 
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difficulty for the left handers but decrease for the right handers during the Mixed Category 
task, although no significant difference was found between them at either difficulty level. On 
Continuous Series II 4-category switching most within category errors were perseverative, 
whereas just over a third were sequencing errors. Again no between-category errors were 
perseverative, with sequencing errors accounting for two thirds and the rest being omission 
errors. The lack of between-category perseveration again confirmed that participants were 
always able to switch task, unlike Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) where most errors of this type 
indicated a failure to switch. Clearly inhibition of the previous task is more successful in the 
verbal paradigm than for the two-choice decision tasks (made relating to letters, digits and 
symbols) in the Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) study. In the PDP model proposed by Gilbert 
and Shallice (2002) perseveration was avoided by ensuring each trial did not start with task 
demand units in the same state as the preceding trial; the continuous switching of tasks would 
seem to be an implementation of this facility. Each ‘trial’ in the PDP model can be equated to 
a switch from one task to the next in the verbal paradigm which must necessitate starting at a 
different point – the preceding task is never repeated and the upcoming one must always be 
different. Perseveration within a task can occur as memory for the last state of that item fails 
to update but this never translates to perseveration between tasks as a switch must occur at 
every response as each switch (trial) requires a different state to the one previously delivered. 
Each switch acts as a ‘place holder’ for a new task but the nature of the item produced within 
that task is subject to memory for the last item produced for that category. 
 
There is a slight advantage for the left handed group in terms of errors in the 
Continuous Series II. That this advantage did not present itself during the Mixed Category 
task is surprising as studies which have identified asymmetric language lateralisation have 
used semantic categorisation tasks rather than tasks utilising overlearned sequences (e.g. 
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Sommer et al., 2002). However, the answer may relate to internal representation of the 
sequential overlearned sequence categories. All task ‘runs’ (although switching is continuous 
the sequence of 2, 3 or 4-categories has a beginning point which becomes embedded within 
the continuous cycle) begin with the category ‘numbers’, which are known to be represented 
spatially from left to right (Fias & Fischer, 2005) and are subject to the SNARC effect 
(Dehaene et al., 1993) whereby numbers and responses have parity leading to improved RT 
along a low-high/ left-right number line. There is evidence of the influence of handedness in 
the SNARC effect, with left handers showing the effect (in a number parity task) which was 
absent in right handers (Fischer, 2008); this study further found that finger tapping 
contributed to the spatial representation of numbers. ‘Tapping’ in mid air or counting using 
the fingers of one hand are common occurrences during the more difficult levels of the 
Continuous Series II. It may therefore be possible that left handers have an advantage in the 
numbers-led sequence of the Continuous Series II in that they are better able to ‘anchor’ the 
sequence. Experiment 4 in Chapter 6 looks in more detail at the effect of category order in 
determining switch cost and error rates.  
 
Additionally, as previously noted, there is evidence that the frontal cortex can divide 
goal maintenance in dual task conditions (Charron & Koechlin, 2010). The areas involved in 
this (the medial and lateral frontal cortices) are particularly relevant for intentional 
reconfiguration; the left APC is also implicated in semantic encoding in language tasks 
(Posner et al., 1988). Language is known to be involved in switching outside of the verbal 
paradigm by means of self instruction which Monsell (2005) says supports reconfiguration. If 
language is right or bi-lateralised in the left handed twins then there may be a temporal 
advantage between right hemisphere processing of overlearned sequences (Pariyadath et al., 
2008) and frontally-mediated reconfiguration, resulting in fewer within-category errors and 
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no between-category errors for the left handed twins. That the advantage is seen in error 
production but not switch cost would tie in with task related semantic features rather than 
relating to switching; thus the left handed group have an advantage for task production but 
not switching. Work completed since the current study was carried out concurs with the 
finding of no behavioural Continuous Series II differences (rate or switch cost) for left and 
right handed twins (Gurd & Cowell, 2013). That study used a larger sample of 25 twin pairs, 
suggesting that the current findings are not simply due to a smaller sample size. The current 
study can confidently propose that there is no RT difference in task switching between left 
and right handed twins.   
 
The change in within-category errors (between-category errors being rare in all 
instances) from 2 to 3-category switching is much steeper for the Continuous Series II with 
errors increasing almost six-fold – errors increase threefold for the Mixed Category task; this 
would undoubtedly account for some of the advantage at the 2-category level. However, the 
much faster task speech rate for Continuous Series II 2-category switching, around three 
times as fast as for the Mixed Category task, must reflect more than the difference of 40 in 
error production at this level and more than the double-switch ‘disadvantage’ for the Mixed 
Category task. Previous work (Gurd, 1995) used a rate measure of seconds per word rather 
than words per second, finding less of a pronounced difference from 2 to 3-category 
switching. Gurd and Oliveira (1996) using a words per second measure had results more on a 
par with the current study. It is possible that the configuration of the categories facilitated 
easier switching as several participants appended a date suffix to the numbers responses in 
the 2-cateogry switching condition, although when questioned none were conscious of having 
done this. If the sequence were being thought of in some way as a date this could have 
provided a more concrete implicit cue than the task sequence alone; implicit cues as 
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presented by task sequence remain relatively unattended (Koch, 2008) and anything 
facilitating this affect could have reduced switch cost. Again, this phenomenon is further 
explored in Experiment 4, Chapter 6.   
 
The question remains – why was there no advantage for left-handed twins when one 
was so strongly indicated? Clearly there is no right-hemisphere temporal advantage in having 
language lateralised to the same side as overlearned sequence processing. There is of course 
the possibility that not all left-handed twins were right-hemisphere lateralised for language. 
One study using fMRI, for example, shows only 10% of 50 left handed individuals tested to 
be fully right-hemisphere lateralised with a further 14% showing bilateral activation (Pujol, 
Deus, Losilla & Capdevila, 1999). While right lateralisation is more prevalent it is certainly 
not universal. It could be that the contribution of the left hemisphere is more implicit in task 
switching and so right-hemisphere language/ overlearned sequence lateralisation can only 
have a limited effect. Higher costs have been shown in left-PFC damaged than right-PFC 
damaged patients (Mecklinger et al., 1999) but it is not possible to extrapolate this from the 
contribution of impaired left-hemisphere language function. Other work has linked left 
frontal damage to impaired top-down control of task set and right frontal damage to impaired 
inhibition of the previous task set (Aron, Monsell, Sahakian & Robbins, 2004). If the 
Continuous Series II is under the control of active reconfiguration then left-frontal mediated 
top-down control would be implicit to the task. The concentration of processing in the right 
hemisphere may not be such an advantage as first foreseen as the task is  not fully ‘right-
sided’. 
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Finally, there was again no effect of handedness when examining non-target 
utterances and their subsequent responses – the only difference found was that left-handed 
twins scored a total of 9 errors after a rehearsal whereas the right-handed twins scored no 
errors. If anything the advantage would have been predicted for the left handed twins, in line 
with the right-hemisphere advantage and general processing advantage outlined in the 
introduction. It is unclear why left-handed twins should commit more post-rehearsal errors, 
nor why this should be the only area of difference. Looking at the sample as a whole there are 
marked effects of the type of utterance made. For the Continuous Series II, while there was a 
general difference (although not identified pairwise) between the types of utterances made, 
there was a definite benefit of committing a rehearsal utterance – these were far more likely 
to be followed by a correct response. For the Mixed Category task there were significantly 
more rehearsal than memory lapse utterances and again these were far more likely to lead to a 
subsequent correct response. It would seem, therefore, that rehearsal utterances are reflecting 
and enhancing inner speech, which is used as a self-cueing device – according to Monsell 
(2005) such verbal self-instruction assists in reconfiguration of task set. Interfering with self-
instruction has been shown to have a detrimental effect on switching (Goschke, 2000) but 
verbalisation concurrent to the task does not have such an effect. The current experiment 
looked at the effect on subsequent responses rather than switch cost (measures of general 
switch cost are not informative about subsequent time-based performance) but undoubtedly 
errors are more time consuming (particularly for the Continuous Series II, see ‘Discussion’ in 
Experiment 1). The time taken to make the utterance of course adds to general cost, but if this 
is in accordance with inner speech then is likely to be no more time consuming overall, being 
merely an external manifestation of preparation and reconfiguration processes. Overt verbal 
rehearsal would not be considered to relate to the task-set inertia (TSI) hypothesis (Allport, 
Styles & Hsieh, 1994) as overt rehearsal reflects the updating of a category or item rather 
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than the endurance of the preceding one – it is an active progressive process. Thus the current 
findings would concur with Monsell (2055) that verbalisation reflects active reconfiguration 
and demonstrates that such processes can still have a beneficial effect when they occur 
spontaneously rather than as an instructed process. Although Monsell (2003) states that 
benefits from verbalisation would disappear with practice they would apply to the Continuous 
Series II as it is a very novel and unpractised task.  
 
5 Conclusion 
• Despite the small sample size and ensuing low power there is confidence in the 
findings due to the duplicate findings with a larger sample size from Gurd & Cowell 
(2013) 
• The verbal switching tasks seem to offer a reliable method of measuring costs using 
continuous real time switching with increasing levels of difficulty; the Mixed 
Category task is costlier due to an additional switch between verbal domains as well 
as tasks.  
• Inhibition of previous task, as evidenced by the absence of perseverative between-
category errors, was consistently successful when switching between verbal tasks; the 
majority of errors are task related and so not indicative of switching processes.  
• The sample may not be sufficiently right hemisphere lateralised for language or the 
left hemisphere may be more integral for top-down control, indicating the Continuous 
Series II is more related to a reconfiguration account of switching and there is no right 
hemisphere advantage. Consequently there is no support for hypotheses 1, 2 or 3 
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which all predicted an advantage for left-handed (right hemisphere dominant) 
participants.  
• In support of hypothesis 4 (that rehearsal utterances would result in fewer subsequent 
errors), non-target utterances that reflect rehearsal for the task seem to mirror inner 
speech rehearsal and have a beneficial effect on subsequent responses. This is again 
indicative of reconfiguration processes.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXTENSION OF DIFFICULTY LEVELS 
FOR THE MIXED CATEGORY SWITCHING TASK AND 
ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRY 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes comparison of the Continuous Series II and mixed task, this 
time using the novel Mixed Category II task which is extended to include a four category 
switching condition. This allows for further investigation of the convergence between the two 
tasks at the 3-category switching level, as seen in Experiments 1 & 2. Three-category Mixed 
Category switching was more heavily biased towards semantic categories (semantic-
overlearned-semantic). If errors in semantic categories were more quickly recovered from (by 
virtue of their lack of sequence positioning) then 3-category switching for the mixed task may 
not provide a true picture of mixed switching costs. Two further issues relating to the tasks 
are also considered. One is the phenomenon noticed (but not commented on) in the first two 
experiments of within-category errors mostly occurring within the category ‘days’, 
particularly as difficulty increases. Stimuli rather than switch related explanations are 
considered. The second issue considers possible explanations of switch cost in verbal task 
switching. Because the Mixed Category II task utilises tasks of differing difficulty it is 
possible to see whether there are differential times costs (asymmetric or otherwise) between 
semantic categories (harder task) and overlearned sequences (easier task). This might 
emphasise inertial effects already implicit to the task.  
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1.1 Contributory factors to ‘days’ producing the greatest number of errors 
 It has previously been noted with the Continuous Series II that within-category errors 
are far more likely to occur within the category ‘days’.  In Experiment 1 ‘days’ produced 
significantly more errors than the other categories in 3- and 4-category switching. In 
Experiment 2 this occurs only for 4-category switching. There seem to be two obvious 
sources for this error weighting. Either something about the category itself attracts more 
errors, or the category’s position within the task run may contribute to this. That this does not 
occur at every level of switching might suggest some combinatory effect – the level of 
difficulty may also be contributing. The position of the category is addressed in Experiment 
4, Chapter 6 – a full answer to the question will not be possible until then. However, the issue 
of error distribution is formally addressed within this chapter – literature relating to the 
features of the category is addressed here.   
 
 Recently Kray, Karbach & Blaye (2012) utilised a small stimulus set size (N = 4), 
with the assumption that this would result in stronger task-stimulus priming, increasing the 
need for control. Rogers & Monsell (1995) previously stated that use of small sets of stimuli66 
actually resulted in stronger associations between cues, attributes of the stimuli and responses 
than would be found with larger sets. The assumption was that stronger associations would 
impair the ability to reconfigure task set, resulting in greater cost. Looking at error rates, Kray 
and colleagues found that the small set size did indeed require more control as it produced 
worse conflict adaptation67 during repeat trials and larger interference costs for some 
                                                           
66
 Common in developmental studies to make the task easier. 
67
 Conflict adaptation was measured using the Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992) whereby 
interference costs are smaller following incompatible than compatible trials. The effect is explained by the need 
to exert more control to ignore irrelevant information. More attention is therefore directed towards to subsequent 
trial, resulting in less interference (e.g. as described by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001 
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participants68. In the Continuous Series II the category ‘days’ contains only 7 stimuli, 
compared 12 for ‘months’, 26 for ‘letters’ and a far greater number for ‘numbers’. Given the 
assumption that greater control is needed for a smaller set size, it might follow that this would 
also result in more errors. Braver, Cohen & Barch (2002) concur that in situations requiring 
greater cognitive control more errors are committed.  Reactive control, part of the DMC dual 
mechanism account (e.g. Braver, Reynolds & Donaldson, 2003; Braver & Hoyer, 2008) 
involves error monitoring after the fact (Alexander & Brown, 2010). Commission of an error 
is followed by longer RT (Laming, 1979) – error commission therefore involves greater 
subsequent control. Thus it could be that the greater number of errors in the category ‘days’ is 
caused by the small set size. This could occur at only the more difficult levels due to greater 
demands on cognitive control.  
 
1.2 Asymmetry and the mixed category task 
The Mixed Category II task allows for comparison of tasks of differing difficulty 
Semantic category production is more effortful and requires inhibition of past responses 
(Kellett et al., 2011), thus there is potential for transient inhibition to be a source of cost in 
the Mixed Category II task. This would be in the absence of bivalency (one stimulus 
affording two task responses) but would exclude the additional source of cost that bivalency 
brings, important in considering general switch cost. The current study calculates ‘local’ cost, 
not for individual responses but for individual categories within the task i.e. general cost for 
each category individually. Although inhibition would not be at the same level for univalent 
stimuli, there is still the potential that it would occur. Some descriptions of task switch cost 
cite relative differences in task activation as the source of asymmetry (e.g. Yeung & Monsell, 
2003). Asymmetry is most readily associated with tasks that afford competing responses but 
                                                           
68
 The sample was made up of children and young adults 
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some portion of the effect is related to the differing levels of difficulty and the differing 
involvement of control processes. More effortful (semantic) task production could well 
endure and affect overlearned sequence production by virtue of differing difficulty.  
 
2 Hypotheses 
1. Following previous results, performance for both tasks will deteriorate as the task 
becomes more difficult. 
2. Similarly following Experiments 1 & 2, the Mixed Category II task will be more 
costly than the Continuous Series II – this will be particularly noticeable in 4-category 
switching. 
3. In both tasks the greatest number of errors will occur in the category days, relating 
perhaps (but not exclusively) to the smaller category set size.  
4. There will be a difference in local switch cost (cost per individual category) between 
semantic categories and overlearned sequences. It is not clear whether inertial effects 
will be present, so no directional prediction is made.  
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3 EXPERIMENT THREE 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
The study was a repeated measures 2 x 3 design for the assessment of Task Speech 
Rate (w/sec) and Switch Cost (% w/sec increase), with factors of Task Type (CS, MX) and 
Number of Categories (2, 3, 4). Local Switch Cost for individual categories was compared 
within each of the difficulty levels using a single factor of Category Type with 2, 3 and 4 
levels as appropriate, to assess the relative contribution of categories at different levels of 
difficulty. Within and between category errors, localised error production (errors per 
Category Type) and self corrections were assessed variously as single factors of 2 or 3 levels 
within Task Types (CS, MX) appropriate to the distribution of the data. 
 
3.1.2 Participants 
The sample (n = 33, 27 females) was made up of undergraduate psychology students 
from the University of Hertfordshire, who received course credit for taking part, and 
individuals recruited from outside the University, who received no reward for their 
participation. All were right handed native English speakers, screened according to the 
criteria set out in Chapter 2. Demographic and background test results are given in Table 19. 
From the originally recruited sample of 39, four were excluded from the final analysis for 
failing to complete at least 70% of the task at all stages; two were excluded due to very low 
scores for NART (approx. 70 predicted IQ) suggesting undisclosed non-compliance with 
screening criteria. All participants were right handed native English speakers and had been 
screened according to the criteria set out in Chapter 2.  
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Table 19 Descriptive Statistics of Demographic and Background Measures for Cross Task (N = 33), 
and Mixed Category II Task (N = 20) Samples. 
 
 Age NART WAIS-R 
vocab. 
Digit span 
forward 
Digit span 
reverse 
Conv. 
speech 
(w/sec) 
Cross task  
(N = 33) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
22.61 
6.13 
 
102.00 
7.28 
 
10.94 
2.32 
 
6.94 
1.32 
 
5.39 
1.06 
 
2.64 
0.59 
Local cost 
MX (N = 20) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
22.30 
5.71 
 
103.55 
7.21 
 
10.80 
2.22 
 
7.25 
1.25 
 
5.55 
1.10 
 
2.51 
0.57 
 
 
Twenty participants from Experiment 3 (see Table 19) were included in the analysis 
of local switch cost for the Mixed Category II task, with five excluded from the original 
sample due to between category error production and eight excluded due to corrupted or 
faulty audio files.   
 
3.1.3 Stimuli 
The Continuous Series II task was presented as detailed for Experiments 1 and 2. The 
Mixed Category task was extended to include a four-category switching level of difficulty 
(with number of iterations per level remaining the same as for the Continuous Series II), 
using categories from the discarded Verbal Fluency task, with category order and starting 
points as stated below: 
2-cats = Vehicles + Months (Free + July) 
3-cats = Clothing + Numbers + Fruit (Free + 7 + Free) 
4-cats = Occupations + Days + Animals + Letters (Free + Wednesday + Free + M) 
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3.1.4 Calculation of local switch cost 
Production time for each word in a category was calculated from the end of the 
previous word to the end of the target word. Words were timed manually using XNote digital 
stopwatch software version 1.669 and Audacity 1.2.670 to allow for more accurate 
determination of word form boundaries; time was measured three times for every word and 
the mean of these three measures was used. The production time for each word in a 
category71 was added up to give the total category production time. Errors, self corrected 
responses (both justified and erroneous) and any responses accompanied by non-target 
utterances (e.g. “Have I already said that?”) were removed from the analysis as this additional 
word production clearly inflated the time taken to produce a response. Participants who made 
between-category errors were excluded from this analysis as switching could no longer be 
differentiated as occurring between pure ‘easier’ and ‘harder’ tasks. Switch cost was 
calculated using single category values of non-switching and switching w/sec rate:  
Category non-switching w/sec rate – category switching w/sec rate    x 100 = % switch cost 
               Category non-switching w/sec rate 
 
 
3.2 Procedure 
Background measures were administered to participants as for Experiment 1; the 
Continuous Series II and Mixed Category II tasks were administered as for previous 
experiments, with the exception that a 4-category switching condition was presented for the 
Mixed Category II task, in exactly the same way as for the Continuous Series II. Presentation 
of both tasks was counterbalanced. 
                                                           
69
 Produced by dnSoft Research Group 
70
 http://audacity.sourceforge.net 
71
 n – 1 for the first category as the first word had no preceding word to start timing from. 
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3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Data distribution 
Age and both digit span measures (see Table 19 for means) were non-normally 
distributed in the whole sample (N = 33): Age W(33) = 0.70, p = .0001, with 55% of the 
sample aged 19 or 20 years, as expected from a student population. Forward digit span W(33) 
= 0.89, p = .003 presented over twice as many scores of 6 and 8 than the median score of 7; 
reverse digit span W(33) = 0.88, p = .001 showed 45% of the sample scoring at 5 digits. 
Although not normally distributed these scores were within clinically normal expectations 
(Lezak et al., 2004). 
 
Task speech rate for the full sample was non-normally distributed for: CS4rate W(33) 
= 0.87, p = .001, positive skewness (attributable to a single participant scoring at 0.64 w/sec) 
z = 3.52, p = , evidence of leptokurtosis (peaking at 0.25-0.35) z = 2.95, p = and MX3rate: 
W(33) = 0.88, p = .002, positive skewness (single score of 0.54 w/sec at top end) significant z 
= 3.19, p = .002, with the rest of the distribution for both variables observed to follow normal 
expectations. Both measures were deemed acceptable for inclusion in parametric analyses 
and were not transformed.  
 
All whole-sample switch cost measures were normally distributed, with the exception 
of MX4cost W(33) = 0.88, p =.002, negative skewed by two participants scoring at 84.82% 
and 84.90%, z = 3.18, p = .002 but otherwise observed to look normal and included in 
parametric analyses. All variables included in the local switch cost analyses for both tasks 
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(CS N = 18, MX N = 20) were normally distributed using a α level of .01 for the Shapiro-
Wilk’s test.  
 
Within category errors (n = 33) were non-normal for: CS2 within W(33) = 0.58, p = 
.0001, positive skewness  z = 6.00, p < .0001 , and with a leptokurtic distribution z = 7.97, p < 
.0001and for CS3 within W(33) = 0.82, p = .0001, skewness z = 4.32, p < .0001 , kurtosis z = 
4.75, p < .0001. Such errors for CS were analysed non-parametrically. For the MX task MX2 
within: W(33) = 0.78, p = .0001, skewness was significant z = 4.03, p = .0001with two top-end 
scores of 5 and 6 but otherwise appearing normal and acceptable for parametric analysis. No 
between category errors were made for either task at the 2-category level and all other 
measures of this variable were non-normal using α = .01 and so analysed non-parametrically. 
Both right and wrong self-corrections (no wrong self-corrections were made for CS2) were 
non-normally distributed for all levels of both tasks using α = .01 and again were analysed 
non-parametrically. Variables relating to the total number of errors made in each category at 
each level of difficulty were non-normal (α = .01) for CS2 and CS3, and for all except the 
third category in CS4; all were analysed non-parametrically. All errors-per-category variables 
were non-normal (α = .01) for the MX task with the exception of MX2 and were analysed 
non-parametrically. 
 
3.3.2 Statistical tests 
Task speech rate and switch cost for both the full sample and local cost sub-sample 
were analysed over 2, 3 and 4 categories using GLM repeated measures ANOVA. Within 
category errors on the tasks were analysed using a Friedman’s ANOVA and GLM repeated 
measures ANOVA, according to the distribution of the variables; between-category errors for 
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both tasks used the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The analysis of errors according to category 
position and self corrections both used Friedman’s ANOVA.   
 
All ANOVA/ ANCOVA results are reported using Wilk’s lambda. Effect sizes are 
reported using partial η2, interpreted as .01 = small, .06 = medium and .14 = large (Cohen, 
1988).  Error rates (within and between category errors) were analysed using the non-
parametric Friedman’s ANOVA and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, with effect size reported as 
r, interpreted as .10 = small, .30 = medium and .50 = large (Cohen, 1988).  
 
Significance levels for post-hoc contrasts made using t-tests or Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests were appropriately adjust (see Experiment 1 Methods). All non-parametric significance 
levels are exact measures; for Wilcoxon signed ranks tests this is indicated in the text as one 
or two-tailed as appropriate. Effect size r was calculated as: t-tests, √ ((t2 ÷ (t2 + df)); 
Wilcoxon signed ranks, test statistic Z ÷ √ number of observations. 
 
3.3.3 Descriptive and preliminary statistics 
All variables followed predictable patterns of decreased performance as the number of 
switching categories increased, with the MX task resulting in slower and more costly in-task 
speech (see Table 20).  
 
NART IQ correlated significantly with forward digit span, r = .35, p = .044 and r = 
.35; both digit span measures correlated with each other, r = .67, p = .0001. For Task Speech 
Rate, age correlated with MX2rate r = .39, p (all correlational significance levels were two-
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tailed) = .027; NART IQ correlated with all but one measure, CS2rate r = .38, p = .028, 
CS3rate r = .54, p = .001, CS4rate r = .35, p = .046, MX2rate r = .49, p = .004, MX4rate r = .40, 
p = .023. CS4rate also correlated with forward and reverse digit spans, r = .45, p = .009 and r 
= .42, p = .015 respectively; NART IQ was entered as a potential covariate for both Task 
Speech rate measures. 
 
For Switch Cost, NART IQ correlated with CS3cost r = -.50, p = .003, CS3cost r = -.35, 
p = .048 and MX2cost r = -.55, p = .001. Forward digit span correlated with all but one cost 
measure, CS2cost r = -.47, p = .005, CS3cost r = -.42, p = .014, CS4cost r = -.60, p = .0001, 
MX2cost r = -.38, p = .029, MX3cost r = -.38, p = .029; reverse digit span correlated with 
CS2cost r = -.42, p = .005, CS4cost r = -.44, p = .010, MX2cost r = -.45, p = .009, with forward 
span indicated as a covariate for cost. 
 
Within-category errors for the MX task only correlated with forward digit span at a 
single level, MX4within r = -.41, p = .018 and so no covariates were entered. Forward digit 
span also only correlated with a single level of CS4 local errors, CS4errors 1st r = -.42, p = .015, 
again not suggesting the need for a covariate analysis. 
 
For the Continuous Series II local cost analysis (N = 20) forward and reverse digit 
span (see Table 19) again correlated, r = .62, p = .006. Forward digit span correlated with 
CS2errors 1st r = -.50, p = .033, CS4errors 3rd r = -.69, p = .002 and CS4errors 4th r = -.61, p = .007 – 
this was no considered consistent enough for inclusion as a covariate. 
 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
230 
 
For the Mixed Category II task local switch cost analysis (N = 18) the digit span 
measures correlated with each other, r = .58, p = .007. Normal speech rate was found to 
correlate with both MX2 local cost measures, MX2errors 1st r = .49, p = .037, MX2errors 2nd r = -
.53, p = .024 and two of the MX3 measures, MX3errors 2nd r = -.55, p = .017, MX3errors 3rd r = -
.54, p = .022   and was included as a covariate at both levels. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Task speech rate 
Task Speech Rate was significantly slower for task MX than for CS (see Table 20 for 
means), Λ = .05, F(1, 32) = 547.87, p = .0001, ηp2 = .95; rate also decreased in line with the 
Number of Categories increasing (see Table 20 for means), Λ = .04, F(2, 31) = 344.19, p = 
.0001, ηp2 = .96, with contrasts showing this to be significant both from 2-categories to 3-
categories, F(1, 32) = 323.232, p = .0001, ηp2 = .91 and from 3-categories to 4-categories, 
F(1, 32) = 323.232, p = .0001, ηp2 = .91. There was a significant interaction between Task 
Type and Number of Categories, Λ = .04, F(2, 31) = 333.86, p = .0001, ηp2 = .96. Contrasts 
revealed the difference in Task Speech Rate between Number of Categories to also be 
consistently significantly different when comparing the two tasks (CS & MX), 2-categories to 
3-categories F(2, 31) = 462.68, p = .0001, ηp2 = .94 and 3-categories to 4-categories F(2, 31) 
= 79.18, p = .0001, ηp2 = .71.  
 
  
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
231 
 
Table 20 Descriptive Statistics for Task Speech Rate (w/sec) and Switch Cost (% w/sec increase) on 
Continuous Series II and Mixed Category II Tasks (N = 33). 
 Continuous Series II Mixed Category task 
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
Task Speech rate (w/sec)       
Mean 1.27 0.58 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.21 
SD 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.04 
Switch cost (% increase)       
Mean 64.66 82.10 91.02 82.41 85.54 91.23 
SD 7.12 6.67 3.30 3.90 4.22 2.40 
CS rate: M = 0.73, SE = 0.03 
MX rate: M = 0.27, SE = 0.10 
2-cat rate: M = 0.79, SE = 0.02 
3-cat rate: M = 0.43, SE = 0.02 
4-cat rate: M = 0.27, SE = 0.01 
CS cost: M = 79.26, SE = 0.90 
MX cost: M = 86.39, SE = 0.52 
2-cat cost: M = 73.54, SE = 0.88 
3-cat cost: M = 83.82, SE = 0.87 
4-cat cost: M = 91.13, SE = 0.45 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Task speech rate (w/sec) at increasing levels of task difficulty (2, 3 and 4 switching 
categories) for Continuous Series II and Mixed Category II tasks (N = 33) 
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For the purposes of controlling for covariance, NART IQ was stratified into a 
categorical variable, Low (scores 86 – 98, N = 13, M = 95.08), Medium (scores 100 – 105, N 
= 10, M = 102.70), High (scores 106 – 118, N = 10, M = 110.30), allowing it to be entered as 
an independent measures variable as detailed in Chapter 2. There was an independent effect 
of the NART IQ covariate on Task Speech Rate, F(2, 30) = 5.38, p = .010, ηp2 = .26. There 
was also some interaction with the factor of Task Type, Λ = .81, F(2, 30) = 3.46, p = .044, 
ηp
2
 = .19, although none with Number of Categories, Λ = .77, F(4, 58) = 2.04, p = .101 ns, 
ηp
2
 = .12. The previously identified interaction between Task type and Number for categories 
did not differ according to NART IQ, Λ = .78, F(4, 58) = 1.94, p = .115 ns, ηp2 = .12. The 
overall pattern was interpreted as NART IQ level relating to semantic category production in 
the Mixed Category II task. 
 
3.4.2 Switch cost 
Once again there was a significant effect of both Task Type (see Table 20 for means), 
Λ = .18, F(1, 32) = 147.38, p = .0001, ηp2 = .82 and Number of Categories (see Table 20), Λ 
= .04, F(2, 31) = 367.70, p = .0001, ηp2 = .96 on Switch Cost, with further contrasts 
confirming that Number of Categories had a consistently significant effect on Switch Cost, 2-
cats to 3-cats F(1, 32) = 243.83, p = .0001, ηp2 = .88 and 3-cats to 4-cats F(1, 32) = 168.47, p 
= .0001, ηp2 = .84. Both factors again produced a significant interaction, Λ = .08, F(2, 31) = 
183.12, p = .0001, ηp2 = .92; while this was again significant across both Difficulty Level 
transitions, 2-cats to 3-cats F(1, 32) = 227.83, p = .0001, ηp2 = .88 and 3-cats to 4-cats F(1, 
32) = 16.39, p = .0001, ηp2 = .34 there was a much reduced effect size when switching from 
3-cats to 4-cats. Figure 8 shows that, unlike the Task Speech Rate transition, cost for both 
tasks converges when switching over 4-cats. 
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Forward digit span was entered as a covariate for Switch Cost, with similar scores 
clustered together as Low (scores 5-6, N = 15, M = 5.67) and High (scores 7-9, N = 18, M = 
8.00). The independent effect of forward digit span on Switch Cost was just within 
significance but with a low effect size, F(1, 31) = 4.30, p = .047, ηp2 = .12. Again the 
covariate interacted with Task Type, Λ = .87, F(1, 31) = 4.78, p = .037, ηp2 = .13, but not 
with Number of categories, Λ = .93, F(2, 30) = 1.23, p = .308 ns, ηp2 = .08. The interaction 
between Task Type and Number of Categories did not differ according to forward digit span 
score, Λ = .95, F(2, 30) = 0.87, p = .430 ns, ηp2 = .06. Again this appears indicative of a word 
production effect for the Mixed Category II task. 
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Figure 8 Switch cost (% w/sec increase) at increasing levels of task difficulty (2, 3 and 4 switching 
categories) for Continuous Series II and Mixed Category II tasks (N = 33)   
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3.4.3 Within category errors 
A Friedman’s ANOVA showed that for Continuous Series II there was a significant 
change in the number of within category errors (see Table 21) as the Number of Categories 
changed, χ2 (2) = 59.86, p = .0001. Follow up Wilcoxon tests revealed this to be uniformly 
significant increase, CS2 to CS3, T = 16.50, p = .0001, r = -0.53, CS3 to CS4, T = 3, p = 
.0001, r = -0.61. For the Continuous Series II 68.56% of within-category errors were 
perseverative and 31.44% were sequencing. 
 
Table 21 Within and Between Category Errors at each Level of Difficulty (2, 3 or 4 Categories) for 
Continuous Series II and Mixed Category II Tasks (N = 33). 
  Continuous Series II Mixed Category task  
  2 3 4 2 3 4 
Within category errors       
 Sum 16 122 393 43 75 176 
 N 10 28 33 22 28 31 
 Mean 0.48 3.70 11.91 1.30 2.27 5.33 
 SD 0.94 3.85 4.44 1.51 1.53 3.22 
Between category 
errors 
      
 Sum - 1 29 - 9 12 
 N - 1 5 - 4 4 
 Mean - 0.03 0.88 - 0.27 0.36 
 SD - 0.17 2.34 - 0.84 1.14 
 
 
A GLM repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a significant effect of Number of 
Categories on within-category errors for the Mixed Category II task, Λ = .42, F(2, 31) = 
21.88, p = .0001, ηp2 = .59, increasing significantly at all levels, 2-cat to 3cat F(1, 32) = 8.79, 
p = .006, ηp2 = .22 and 3-cat to 4-cat F(1, 32) = 36.38, p = .0001, ηp2 = .53. Overall 75.78% 
of within-category errors were perseverative and 24.22% were sequencing.  
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3.4.4 Between category errors 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed that the number of errors produced during 3-cat 
and 4-cat switching increased significantly for Continuous Series II, CS3 to CS4 T = 1.50, p 
= .023, r = -0.26 but not for the Mixed Category II task, MX3 to MX4 T = 12, p = .398, r = -
0.04. For the Continuous Series II over 4-categories 97.14% of errors were sequencing and 
2.86% were omissions – for the Mixed Category II task 91.67% were sequencing and 8.33% 
omissions. 
 
3.4.5 Analysis of errors according to category type 
Total errors per Category type were not analysed for Continuous Series II 2-category 
switching as both categories returned a total of eight errors. Error distribution for 3-category 
switching (see Table 22) changed significantly between categories χ2 (2) = 14.07, p = .001; 
this was confined to Days2nd being significantly higher than Numbers1st T = 17.50, p = .001, r 
= -0.41, with both Months3rd and Numbers1st T = 75.50, p = .652 ns, r = -0.06 and Months3rd 
and Days2nd T = 82.50, p = .027 ns, r = -0.03 being non-significant72.  
 
Four-category switching again showed a significant difference in errors per category 
χ2 (3) = 12.96, p = .004, with Days2nd producing significantly more errors than all other 
categories: Days2nd and Numbers1st T = 53, p = .0001, r = -0.43, Days2nd and Months3rd T = 
94.50, p = .011, r = -0.31, Days2nd and Letters4th T = 65, p = .001, r = -0.39. All other 
contrasts were non-significant: Numbers1st and Months3rd T = 204, p = .561 ns, r = -0.07, 
                                                           
72
 Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjustment 
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Numbers1st and Letters4th T = 192, p = .804 ns, r = -0.03, Months3rd and Letters4th T = 182, p = 
.639 ns, r = -0.06. 
 
 
Table 22 Total Errors made (Within and Between Category) occurring in each Category at each 
Difficulty Level (2, 3 or 4 Categories) for Continuous Series II (N = 33). 
 Continuous Series II  
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
 Num. Day. Num. Day. Mon. Num. Day. Mon. Let. 
Total errors          
Sum 8 8 27 59 37 93 140 100 91 
Mean 0.24 0.24 0.82 1.79 1.12 2.82 4.24 3.03 2.76 
SD 0.44 0.66 1.01 1.85 1.92 1.47 1.82 2.30 1.99 
Num. = numbers; Day. = days; Mon. = months; Let. = letters 
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                          CS2                        CS3                                     CS4 
 
Figure 9 Mean total errors per category type for each difficulty level (2, 3 and 4 categories) for 
Continuous Series II (N = 33) 
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Table 23 Total Errors made (Within and Between Category) occurring in each Category at each 
Difficulty Level (2, 3 or 4 Categories) for Mixed Category II Task (N = 33). 
 Mixed Category task  
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
 Veh. Mon. Clo. Num. Fru. Occ. Day. Ani. Let. 
Total errors          
Sum 15 28 16 46 21 9 100 18 64 
Mean 0.45 0.85 0.48 1.39 0.64 0.27 3.03 0.55 1.94 
SD 0.97 1.25 0.67 1.20 1.11 0.52 1.65 0.94 1.78 
Veh. = vehicles; Mon. = months; Clo. = clothing; Num. = numbers; Fru. = fruit; Occ. = occupations;  
Ani. = animals; Let. = letters 
 
 
For the Mixed Category II task there was no significant difference during 2-category 
switching, T = 79, p = .208 ns, r = -0.16. The difference in error distribution showed a 
significant change during 3-category switching, χ2 (2) = 11.75, p = .002, with Numbers2nd 
producing a significantly higher number of errors than either Clothing1st T = 32, p = .0001, r 
= -0.41 or Fruit3rd T = 60.50, p = .004, r = -0.28; there was no significant difference between 
Clothing1st and Fruit3rd T = 64, p = .570, r = -0.06. There was a significant change in errors 
according to Category Type during 4-category switching, χ2 (3) = 64.48, p = .0001, with only 
Occupations1st and Animals3rd showing a non-significant difference, T = 25, p = .140 ns, r = -
0.18; Occupations1st and Days2nd T = 0, p = .0001, r = -0.60, Occupations1st and Letters4th T = 
0, p = .0001, r = -0.52, Days2nd and Animals3rd T = 3.50, p = .0001, r = -0.58, Days2nd and 
Letters4th T = 42, p = .001, r = -0.39, Animals3rd and Letters4th T = 29, p = .0001, r = -0.43. 
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                          MX2                        MX3                                    MX4 
 
Figure 10 Mean total errors per category type for each difficulty level (2, 3 and 4 categories) for 
Mixed Category II task (N = 33) 
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             Continuous Series II                       Mixed Category II  
             Continuous Series II                       Mixed Category II  
(A) 
(B) 
 
Figure 11 Sum within-category errors (A) and between-category errors (B) for the Continuous 
Series II and Mixed Category II tasks 
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3.4.6 Self-corrections 
Self-corrections (SC) made by participants at each Difficulty Level of both tasks were 
observed to increase in line with the Number of Categories (as shown in Table 24) and be 
more prevalent for CS than MX; corrections were interpreted as justified (right) and 
erroneous (wrong) according to whether an error had actually been made. For the Continuous 
Series II a Friedman’s ANOVA revealed this increase to be significant for SCright, χ2 (2) = 
33.74, p = .0001 with all contrasts significant73, CS2 to CS3 T = 0, p = .0001, r = -0.52, CS2 
to CS4 T = 0, p = .0001, r = -0.52, CS3 to CS4 T = 46, p = .07, r = -0.30. No wrong 
corrections were made during CS2; a Wilcoxon signed ranks test showed the difference 
between CS3 and CS4 to be significant, T = 42, p = .027, r = -0.27. 
 
A Friedman’s ANOVA showed a significant change in SCright according to Number of 
Categories for the Mixed Category II task, χ2 (2) = 10.43, p = .005. These corrections were 
significantly greater during MX4 than either MX2 T = 45, p = .002, r = -0.35 or MX3 T = 
18.50, p = .008, r = -0.30; there was no significant difference between MX2 and MX3 T = 
68.50, p = .266 ns, r = -0.10. Wrong corrections exhibited a significant change as categories 
increased, χ2 (2) = 8, p = .014, though only in the comparison of MX2 and MX4 T = 45, p = 
.008, r = -0.31, MX2 to MX3 T = 2, p = .500 ns, r = -0.07, MX3 to MX4 T = 8, p = .057, r = 
-0.22. 
 
 
  
                                                           
73
 Wilcoxon signed ranks test significance reported as exact (1-tailed) 
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Table 24 Self-Corrections (Correct and Incorrect) made at each Difficulty Level (2, 3 and 4 
Categories) during the Continuous Series II and Mixed Category II Tasks. 
  Continuous Series II Mixed Category task  
  2 3 4 2 3 4 
Self-corrections       
Right Sum 4 39 65 11 15 30 
 Mean 0.12 1.18 1.97 0.33 0.45 0.91 
 SD 0.42 1.38 1.86 0.54 0.67 1.04 
       
Wrong Sum - 12 27 1 2 9 
 Mean - 0.36 0.82 0.03 0.06 0.27 
 SD - 0.70 1.21 0.17 0.24 0.57 
 
 
3.4.7 Local cost comparison of overlearned sequences and semantic categories  
For the Mixed Category II task a series of appropriately adjusted paired samples t-
tests were initially carried out to compare single category speech rates (see Table 23) for each 
of the difficulty level baseline measures, in order to determine whether the semantic 
categories could be deemed more difficult than the overlearned sequence categories for the 
purposes of assessing asymmetry. With the exception of baseline category rates for Clothing 
and Fruit in 3-category switching, t(32) = 0.84, p = .406, all comparisons were found to be 
significantly different to an alpha value of .0001; semantic categories produced significantly 
fewer words than their corresponding overlearned sequence categories (see Table 23) and so 
were considered to be more difficult.  
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Table 25 Baseline Speech Production Rates (w/sec) for Constituent Categories of the Mixed Category 
II Task. 
 Veh. Mon. Clo. Num. Fru. Occ. Day. Ani. Let 
Baseline 
rate 
(w/sec) 
         
Mean 0.58 2.90 0.74 4.23 0.71 0.60 2.98 0.79 5.38 
SD 0.11 0.39 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.45 0.13 1.25 
Veh. = vehicles; Mon. = months; Clo. = clothing; Num. = numbers; Fru. = fruit; Occ. = occupations;  
Ani. = animals; Let. = letters 
 
 
For the Mixed Category II task, during 2-category switching production of Vehicles1st 
(switching to Months2nd) was significantly less costly than Months2nd (switching to 
Vehicles1st) t(17) = -6.00, p = .0001, r = 0.76, 95% CI (2.05 – 5.17). During 3-category 
switching there was significant difference between the categories Λ = .23, F(2, 16) = 27.49, p 
= .0001, ηp2 = .78, manifesting significantly74 between  Clothing1st (switching to Numbers2nd) 
& Numbers2nd (switching to Fruit3rd) t(17) = -5.39, p = .0001, r = 0.79, 95% CI (-20.12 – -
8.80) and Numbers2nd (switching to Fruit3rd) and Fruit3rd (switching to Clothing1st) t(17) = 
6.87, p = .0001, r = 0.86, 95% CI (15.09 – 28.47) but not between Clothing1st (switching to 
Numbers2nd) & Fruit3rd (switching to Clothing1st) t(17) = 2.14, p = .048, r = 0.46, 95% CI 
(0.09 – 14.55).  
 
Finally, 4-category switching again revealed a main effect of Category Type, Λ = .04, 
F(3, 15) = 127.85, p = .0001, ηp2 = .96, with Letters4th (switching to Occupations1st) being 
significantly more costly than all other categories, Letters4th (switching to Occupations1st) & 
Occupations1st (switching to Days2nd) t(17) = -12.60, p = .0001, r = 0.95, 95% CI (-23.67 – -
                                                           
74
 Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjustment the significance level of .048 for pair Clothing2nd and Fruit3rd 
was non-significant to the adjusted α level of .02 
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16.88), Letters4th & Days2nd t(17) = -5.14, p = .0001, r = 0.78, 95% CI (-4.87 – -2.04), 
Letters4th (switching to Occupations1st) & Animals3rd  (switching to Letters4th) t(17) = -19.01, p 
= .0001, r = 0.98, 95% CI (-23.34 – -18.67). Days2nd (switching to Animals3rd) was similarly 
more costly than Occupations1st (switching to Days2nd) t(17) = -10.50, p = .0001, r = 0.93, 
95% CI (-20.20 – -13.44) and Animals3rd  (switching to Letters4th) t(17) = 14.82, p = .0001, r 
= 0.96, 95% CI (15.06 – 20.05). Cost for the Occupations1st (switching to Days2nd) and 
Animals3rd was (switching to Letters4th) very similar t(17) = 0.42, p = .678 ns, r = 0.01, 95% CI 
(-2.93 – 4.40). 
 
Normal speech rate was divided into clusters of similar scores, to facilitate use as an 
independent measures covariate: scores less than 2 w/sec (N = 4, M = 1.77), scores 2 to 2.50 
w/sec (N = 5, M = 2.28), scores 2.51 to 3 w/sec (N = 5, M = 2.73), scores more than 3 w/sec 
(N = 4, M = 3.32). For 2-category switching normal speech rate accounted for none of the 
variance independently, F(3,14) = 1.66, p = .220 ns, ηp2 = .26 but did interact with the 
repeated measures factor of Category Type, Λ = .41, F(3, 14) = 6.72, p = .005, ηp2 = .59. 
Over 3-cateogry switching there was no evidence covariance independently from normal 
speech rate, F(3,14) = 1.18, p = .354 ns, ηp2 = .20 and no interaction with Category Type, Λ = 
.51, F(6, 26) = 1.72, p = .157 ns, ηp2 = .28. 
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Table 26 Local Switch Cost (% w/sec increase) per Category Type at each Difficulty Level (2, 3 or 4 
categories) for Mixed Category II Task (N = 33). 
 Mixed Category II task  
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
 Veh. 
To 
Mon. 
Mon. 
To 
Veh. 
Clo. 
To 
Num. 
Num. 
To 
Fru. 
Fru. 
To 
Clo.  
Occ. 
To 
Day. 
Day. 
To 
Ani. 
Ani. 
To 
Let. 
Let. 
To 
Occ. 
Local switch cost 
(% increase) 
         
Mean 51.38 75.23 68.98 83.44 61.66 72.41 89.23 71.68 92.68 
SD 13.82 7.53 8.38 7.28 11.05 7.72 4.09 6.66 2.65 
Min 
Max 
24.53 
78.08 
56.22 
86.82 
45.00 
78.08 
62.27 
92.27 
37.74 
77.50 
55.32 
84.93 
78.28 
94.29 
56.71 
82.00 
86.25 
96.42 
Veh. = vehicles; Mon. = months; Clo. = clothing; Num. = numbers; Fru. = fruit; Occ. = occupations;  
Ani. = animals; Let. = letters 
Calculation of local cost for each category includes switching to the next category. 
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          MX2                       MX3                              MX4 
(A) 
(B) 
 
Figure 12 Mean local switch cost (A) per category type at all levels of task difficulty and baseline 
single category speech rate (B) 
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3.4.8 Comparison of constant categories over all difficulty levels 
For the Continuous Series II the first two categories, Numbers and Days, were 
compared separately over all task difficulty levels to assess how their relative contribution 
changed in relation to difficulty. A GLM repeated measures ANOVA shows a significant 
difference between Numbers 2-cats (M = 70.14, SD = 8.32), Numbers 3-cats (M = 84.06, SD = 
5.05) and Numbers 4-cats (M = 89.62, SD = 4.19), Λ = .09, F(2, 16) = 85.49, p = .0001, ηp2 = 
.91; paired-samples t-tests showed this to increase significantly with difficulty at all levels. 
 
A second GLM repeated measures ANOVA showed the difference to also be 
significant between Days 2-cats (M = 47.42, SD = 9.51), Days 3-cats (M = 71.51, SD = 10.41) 
and Days 4-cats (M = 83.77, SD = 7.80), Λ = .06, F(2, 16) = 123.63, p = .0001, ηp2 = .94; 
paired-samples t-tests again showed this to increase significantly with difficulty at all levels. 
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4 Discussion 
Task speech rate and switch cost for both tasks continued the pattern seen in the 
previous two experiments for 2 and 3-category switching. Rate reduced gradually over all 
levels of difficulty for the Mixed Category task; there was again evidence of a 2-category 
advantage for the Continuous Series II. Changes in cost appeared more dramatic than for rate 
in the Mixed Category II task when looking at the change from 3 to 4-category switching – 
both tasks converged to almost identical scores at 4-category switching. The lack of within-
category errors over 2-category switching would again seem to offer only a partial 
explanation for the Continuous Series II 2-switch advantage. Two-category switching is once 
again far more efficient for Continuous Series II than Mixed Category II task, as assessed by 
RT related measures of rate and cost (see Figures 7 & 8). It is possible that there is a ceiling 
effect for the Mixed Category II task as degradation in speech rate is much more gradual than 
for the Continuous Series II – this would intuitively seem at least in part to be attributable to 
the contribution of the slower production rate (see Table 20) for semantic items. Rate itself 
does not to change very much across the varying difficulty levels in comparison to switch 
cost which accounts for the greater similarity (and reduced variance when compared to the 
Continuous Series II) in baseline non-switching rates per category.  
 
Within-category errors for both tasks increased significantly as the tasks became more 
difficult, following the general pattern displayed in Experiments 1 and 2. The increase from 2 
to 3-categories was much more pronounced for the Continuous Series II which increased 
seven-fold as oppose to doubling for the Mixed Category II task. The Mixed Category II task 
produced around half as many within-category errors as the Continuous Series II for 4-
category switching. This reversal of previous results may mean that the difference is 
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anomalous and perhaps related to the vocabulary of the sample in relation to semantic 
category errors. Only Experiment 2, which had an older sample, showed greater errors for the 
Mixed Category task – it is possible that greater executive impairment is causing more errors. 
Between-category errors for both tasks were absent over 2-categories; the Mixed Category II 
task produced more over 3-categories whereas the Continuous Series II produced more over 
4-categories. The increased number of between-category errors at 3-categories for the Mixed 
Category II task could be due to the reconfiguration of semantic categories between this and 
the original version of the task. In the original task the category ‘sports’ led to a greater 
number of early cessations for the task at this level (though still within the 70% completion 
criterion) which gave less opportunity for errors to be made. Just over two-thirds of 
Continuous Series II within-category errors were perseverative, increasing to three-quarters 
for the Mixed Category II task. Again no between-category errors were perseverative – for 
the Continuous Series II nearly 100% were sequencing, dropping a little to around 90% for 
the Mixed Category II task. On the Mixed Category II task one participant made a sequencing 
error involving a category not present in the task at that difficulty level (4-categories) but 
which had been present at the last difficulty level; this would suggest for that individual at 
least there was evidence of enduring long term interference of the type posited by Wylie and 
Allport (2000) in their associative interference account. 
 
For 3 and 4-category Continuous Series II switching the category ‘days’ produced far 
more errors than all other categories. It is not possible at this stage to determine whether this 
was a task related or switch related phenomenon. ‘Days’ was the shortest sequence – as well 
as the effect of reduced set size, increased repetition of items as they cycled round may have 
been compounded by the repeated suffix ‘-day’. Alternatively the position of the category in 
the task sequence may have had some affect on the production of errors (as addressed in 
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Experiment 4, Chapter 6). Increased errors could be due to the category ‘days’ in a difficult 
switching scenario or the position of the category in the sequence given that it was placed 
after the first switch. In more typical per-switch calculation of switch cost made for the 
alternating runs paradigm switch cost only increases in the first trial of a run (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). If the sequence of 3 or 4-categories can be considered equivalent to this task 
run then the category ‘days’ immediately follows the first switch of the sequence, although 
the beginning of the sequence is embedded in the continuous nature of the task. Switch cost 
for the individual categories (as discussed below) indicated that ‘days’ contributed the least 
cost at all difficulty levels, although this would not appear to be at a degree sufficient to 
indicate a speed-accuracy trade off (there was no significant difference from ‘months’). It is 
feasible that the reduced set size contributed to error production but this would surely have 
resulted in a concomitant increase in cost due to increased control, which was not seen. 
Therefore the increased number of errors would seem to be either due to an artefact of the 
stimuli (the repeated suffix) or the category’s position in the run after the first switch. 
Experiment 4 will shed more light on this issue. 
 
The Mixed Category II task has only one occurrence of ‘days’ – all overlearned 
sequence categories produce more errors than semantic categories but ‘days’ produced most 
of all, although again it is placed second out of four categories so some combinatory effect 
could still be in evidence. At this stage it is unclear which explanation is more likely – further 
work on the Continuous Series II changing the placement of the category would need to be 
carried out to address this. Self-corrections were observed to increase as the task became 
more difficult. More self corrections were made during the Continuous Series II, presumably 
in line with the fact that more errors were made – this would also tie in with the fact that 
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corrections of both types increased with difficulty. Most corrections made for both tasks were 
justified suggesting that conflict monitoring and resolution were for the most part successful.  
 
As predicted, local cost (per category) for overlearned sequences and semantic 
categories differed in the Mixed Category II task. If local cost attributed to each category is 
taken as indicative of the switch to the next category (which is incorporated in the local cost 
score) then scores at all levels of difficulty for the Mixed Category II task show a pattern of 
reverse asymmetry whereby it is less costly to switch to the easier task. For example, for 2-
category switching the lower cost associated with ‘vehicles’ indicates the faster time taken to 
switch to the category ‘months’ (see first bar on chart A, Figure 12). The overall pattern is 
one of taking less time to switch to the easier task which suggests that carryover of the last 
task set is not occurring to a degree that would present a problem for switching. As noted 
earlier the nature of the component tasks in the Mixed Category II task are not as likely to 
prompt continued activation of a now erroneous task set in the same way as Stoop-style 
stimuli as responses to semantic and overlearned sequence categories do not have the same 
degree of overlap as Stroop word/ colour naming. However, the lack of asymmetry using 
stimuli outside of that requirement is further evidence that a carryover account of switch cost 
may necessarily be limited to amenable stimuli. In keeping with Yeung and Monsell (2003, 
see page 29 of this document) it is possible that the ability for the harder task to carryover and 
interfere with the easier is just not present using the current stimuli.  
 
As a caveat it should be noted that in calculation of local cost the production rate and 
consequently switch cost for each category includes both the inter-task gap (from end of 
category A to beginning of category B) during which time the switch is made to category B 
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and production of the category B task itself– there is no distinction between the relative 
contributions of the two. Although for the purposes of assessing asymmetry the cost for the 
previous category is taken as indicative of the time taken to switch to the next one, the 
merging of both sources of cost should be noted when interpreting those switching-to results. 
Future analysis of any such results should seek to extract the inter-task gap in isolation from 
production cost of the previous category. The cost for category ‘fruit’ switching to 
‘clothing’75 in 3-category switching (see Figure 12) would appear to buck the trend of reverse 
asymmetry as it is not significantly different from category ‘clothing’ switching to ‘numbers’ 
and may be indicative of a greater contribution made by the cost of the previous category, 
although it is possible that some task-specific feature of either of these two categories may 
have contributed to this anomalous result.  
 
5 Conclusion 
• In line with hypothesis 1, that difficulty would increase with the number of categories, 
rate, switch cost and general error production continued the pattern seen in the 
previous experiments, with the Mixed Category II task behaving in the same way as 
the Continuous Series II for 4-category switching.  
• The Mixed Category II task was more costly than the Continuous Series II, in 
agreement with hypothesis 2.  
• Errors again showed no perseveration between categories although repeating of items 
within categories was more widespread.  
• In agreement with hypothesis 3, ‘Days’ produced more errors in the Continuous 
Series II, suggesting either a task-related artefact or some relation to first trial 
                                                           
75
 From the end to the beginning of the 3-category iteration 
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confinement of switch cost, although the current structure of the task does not allow 
this to be probed further.  
• In agreement with hypothesis 4, that there would be a difference between local cost 
for overlearned sequences and semantic categories, the Mixed Category II task 
displayed a reverse asymmetry for switch cost between the two types of verbal 
category. This suggested that TSI-type interference based explanations of switch cost 
do not lend themselves to continuous verbal switching of this type. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INVESTIGATION OF CATEGORY ORDER 
EFFECTS 
 
1 Introduction 
Chapter four investigates whether patterns of switch cost and error distribution seen in 
earlier experiments can be attributed as an artefact of task design. During Experiment 2 (and 
in previous presentations of the task (Essig, 2004)) participants were noted to append a date 
suffix to the category ‘numbers’ during switching76 (this did not occur during baseline non-
switching word production). It is possible that this may have facilitated switching by giving 
the sequence a more meaningful structure – meaningful material is easier to recall than 
arbitrary items or sequences (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and as such both the sequence of 
categories and the position of individual items within those categories may have been easier 
to keep in memory. This could have expedited switch cost directly as well as reducing time 
taken recovering from errors, although Experiment 3 suggests that the contribution this 
makes to cost might be less than would be supposed. Certainly it could be one explanation of 
the apparent ‘2-switch advantage’ seen in the early stages of the task. Conversely, holding a 
representation of the task as a date sequence might also serve as a more explicit cue for the 
sequence with potentially negative effects. Koch (2008) has noted that sequence-related 
implicit cues remain relatively unattended, not requiring the additional processing associated 
with explicit cues (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). By reformulating the implicit sequence with 
additional date information it may be acting as a more explicit cueing device resulting in 
reprocessing of the ‘date cue’ at every iteration (acknowledging the date formulation and then 
                                                           
76
 Some participants have been noted to do this, seemingly unknown to themselves, all the way through the task. 
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the specific ‘date’ that fits). This could result in losing the advantage of a single processing of 
the sequential task instruction at the beginning of the task (Logan & Schneider, 2006a). 
 
Another feature seen in the earlier experiments was the phenomenon of errors being 
mostly committed in the second category of the task ‘days’. These would seem to be 
production errors rather than speech errors although it was unclear whether this pattern of 
errors was associated with the task (the category ‘days’) or the act of switching itself. Due to 
the shorter length of the sequence, ‘days’ are the most frequently occurring items within the 
task but (with the exception of ‘letters’ for which there is no data) the least frequently 
occurring of the categories in everyday language (Leech, Rayson & Wilson, 2001). However, 
the automatic rather than semantic nature of such speech categories should negate any 
frequency effects. 
 
Also the potential ‘anchoring’ effect of the category ‘numbers’ discussed in 
Experiment 2 may have an additional function. Participants have commented that the non-
cyclical (non-ending) nature of the category makes it easier to remember. This would also tie 
in with the supposition that the short sequence length of days may contribute to increased 
errors in that category. Coupled with the application by some participants of a date suffix it 
would seem prudent to assess the effect of moving ‘numbers’ to other positions in the 
category sequence.  
 
Given that there is evidence for spatial representation of overlearned sequences 
(Gevers, Reynvoet & Fias, 2003, 2004; Previtali, de Hevia & Girelli, 2010), it is possible that 
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the comparative length of the surface form of the various categories, single or double tokens 
for ‘letters’ and ‘numbers’ and longer for ‘days’ and ‘months’, may have had some effect on 
internal representation and subsequent production of the task. It is noted by Kleinsorge & 
Gajewski (2008) that theories relating to heavily stimulus driven switching do not account 
sufficiently for the role of internal representation of stimuli. The original Continuous Series II 
has single token categories occurring as the first and last in four-category switching, in effect 
placing them next to each other in the continuous loop of category production. If, as stated 
earlier (pages 56-57), there is some quasi-visuo-spatial element to the Continuous Series II 
then placement of categories according to surface length could have some bearing. The 
categories may be subject to some variation of the word length effect, given that both 
numbers and letters are visually, syllabically and phonemically shorter than the other two 
categories. The word length effect has been found to relate to syllables as well as visual 
length (Bireta, Neath & Suprenant, 2006). The word length effect (whereby short words are 
recalled better than longer words) traditionally relates to list recall (Cowan, Baddeley, Elliot 
& Norris, 2003; Hulme, Suprenant, Bireta, Stuart & Neath, 2004). However, in questioning 
after the Continuous Series II many participants state that they hold the categories in their 
mind’s eye in a visual list-like form. If task versions that separate visually short and long 
categories by interspersing them result in differences in switch cost or error production 
compared to the original task version then an argument can be made for a visual element to 
the verbal switching process. However, it is not predicted that the overall effect of decreasing 
performance in line with task difficulty will be negated, rather that some portion of costs 
might be attributable to task design. 
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2 Aims and Hypotheses 
As the task order in the original version of the Continuous Series II was arbitrary, the 
possibility that task structure is in some way detrimental to its validity needs to be ruled out. 
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate any possible contribution to task costs 
from the structure of the task, specifically the order of categories within the overall sequence.  
1. Rate, switch cost and error will follow the same pattern of performance deteriorating 
as the task becomes more difficult regardless of the task version. 
2. Versions of the task with a ‘spatially separated’ task sequence (versions B, C & D) 
will provide a statistically significant difference in switch cost for 4-category 
switching from the original version due to their previous placement next to each other. 
3. Versions of the task beginning with ‘numbers’ (versions A and B) will result in lower 
switch cost than other task versions. 
4. There will be a difference in the number of within-category errors produced between 
the different categories regardless of task version. It is unclear whether the bias 
towards ‘days’ will remain as it cannot yet be determined whether this relates to a 
feature of the category itself or its position within the task. If the latter i.e. increased 
error load only occurs when ‘days’ is the second category, then potentially this relates 
to the first trial confinement of cost (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In this instance the 
second category, regardless of contents, would always return the greatest number of 
errors. 
 
  
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
259 
 
3 EXPERIMENT FOUR 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
Speech rate (w/sec) and switch cost (% w/sec increase) were each analysed as a mixed 
5 x 3 design, with a between-participants factor of Category Order (A, B, C, D or E – see 
Table 28 for a description of order variation) and a within-participants factor of Difficulty 
Level (2, 3 or 4 switching categories). Error distribution presented as a mixed 5 x 3 x 2 
design, with the addition of Error Type (Within or Between categories). Additionally, all five 
variations of the task order were compared over 4-category switching only (as a 5 x 4 mixed 
design) to determine whether error production was related to either the position (factor 
Category Position (1, 2, 3 or 4)) or type of category (factor Category Type (Numbers, Days, 
Months or Letters)) within the task, as indicated by results from Experiment 3.  
 
3.1.2 Participants 
The sample (N = 115, females = 97) was recruited from the University of 
Hertfordshire; all participants were undergraduate or taught postgraduate students and 
received course credit for participation; all were right handed native English speakers, 
screened according to the criteria set out in Chapter 2. Of the original 133 tested, 6 were 
excluded from the final analysis due to production of an excessive number of between 
category errors, 2 due to very early discontinuation of the task, 5 due to subsequent disclosure 
of non-adherence to screening criteria and 5 due to low scores on background measures 
below the normal range.  Demographic and baseline measures for the sample are given in 
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Table 27; a series of one-way ANOVAs showed no significant difference between groups on 
demographic measures. 
 
Table 27 Descriptive statistics of Background Battery (NART predicted Full Scale IQ, WAIS-R 
Vocabulary sub-test, Forward and Backward Digit Span and Conversational Speech Eate) N = 115. 
Group Age NART 
IQ 
WAIS-
R 
vocab. 
Digit 
span 
forw. 
Digit 
span 
backw. 
Conv. 
speech 
rate 
Group A (n = 21)                               
Mean 
SD 
 
24.38 
7.02 
 
102.52 
7.26 
 
10.95 
2.58 
 
6.52 
1.17 
 
4.95 
0.67 
 
2.55 
0.52 
Group B (n = 24)                                   
Mean 
SD 
 
23.63 
7.73 
100.29 
8.24 
 
10.21 
2.89 
 
6.42 
1.14 
 
4.83 
0.96 
 
2.49 
0.43 
Group C (n = 24)                                   
Mean 
SD 
24.13 
8.09 
101.50 
7.65 
 
10.79 
2.04 
 
7.13 
0.85 
 
4.96 
0.91 
 
2.49 
0.36 
Group D (n = 24)                                  
Mean 
 SD 
21.67 
5.01 
 
99.96 
7.96 
 
10.25 
2.13 
 
6.63 
1.01 
 
4.88 
0.85 
 
2.51 
0.48 
Group E (n = 22)                                   
Mean 
SD 
 
23.18 
8.34 
100.91 
8.00 
 
10.77 
2.29 
 
6.77 
1.23 
 
4.95 
1.00 
 
2.66 
0.47 
Whole group (N = 115)                        
Mean 
SD 
23.37 
7.26 
 
101.00 
7.76 
 
10.58 
2.38 
 
6.70 
1.09 
 
4.91 
0.87 
 
2.54 
0.45 
 
 
3.1.3  Stimuli 
 The Continuous Series II task was used, with four additional variations of category 
order within the task (see Table 28). The format of the original version was followed, in that 
categories remained static with another added for each level of difficulty. Starting categories 
were varied so that each appeared in position one (twice for ‘Numbers’ as it appeared at the 
beginning of the original version) and subsequent categories were ordered so as to alternate 
between single symbol (numbers, letters) and whole word (days, months) item 
representations. Identical category starting points were used for 4-category switching.  
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Table 28 Category Order and Start Points for all Verbal Switching Task Versions in Experiment 
Four. 
Task & Number of 
Categories 
Categories Start points 
Version A  2 Numbers – Days  6 – Tuesday 
(original) 3 Numbers – Days – Months  4 – Friday – October  
 4 Numbers – Days – Months – Letters  
 
9 – Wednesday – February – H  
Version B 2 Numbers – Days  6 – Tuesday 
 3 Numbers – Days – Letters  4 – Friday – P  
 4 
 
Numbers – Days – Letters – Months  
 
9 – Wednesday – H – February  
Version C 2 Days – Letters  Tuesday – P  
 3 Days – Letters – Months  Friday – C – October  
 4 
 
Days – Letters – Months – Numbers  Wednesday – H – February – 9  
Version D 2 Letters – Months  P – October  
 3 Letters – Months – Numbers  C – April – 6  
 4 
 
Letters – Months – Numbers – Days  H – February – 9 – Wednesday  
Version E 2 Months – Numbers  October – 6  
 3 Months – Numbers – Days  April – 4 – Tuesday  
 4 Months – Numbers – Days – Letters  February – 9 – Wednesday – H  
 
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
3.2.1 Data distribution 
 Normality of all variables was assessed using the Shapiro-Wilk's tests with 
significance set at .01 and a z limit of + 2.71 (equivalent to an α level of .01(Field, 2009)) for 
assessment of skewness and kurtosis, where separate examination was carried out. Age was 
found to be non-normally distributed across all groups with an α level of .0001. All other 
background measures were normal with the exception of Digit Span measures (again with an 
α level of .0001) specifically presenting as: Digit Span Forward for Group C, W(24) = 0.87, p 
= .01 and Group D, W(24) = 0.87, p = .01; Digit Span Backward for Group A, W(21) = 0.80, 
p = .001; Group B, W(24) = 0.77, p = .0001; Group C, W(24) = 0.84, p = .002; Group D, 
W(24) = 0.87, p = .006. 
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Continuous Series II rate was non-normal for 3 and 4-categories, CS3rate W(115) = 
0.95, p = .0001, CS4rate W(115) = 0.94, p = .0001; this was specifically linked to Group D for 
3-categories and Group A for 4-categories. As the deviation of distribution was not 
widespread through the sample transformations were not considered.  
 
Continuous Series II switch cost was again non-normal for 3 and 4-categories, CS3cost 
W(115) = 0.94, p = .0001, CS4cost W(115) = 0.95, p = .0001; closer inspection showed this to 
be related to Group D for 3-categories and Group A for 4-categories. Once again the variation 
was considered to be sufficiently localised to allow parametric analyses to be carried out on 
non-transformed data. 
  
 All measures of within category errors at the 2-category switching level were non-
normally distributed to p = .0001; CS3within Group C, W(24) = 0.85, p = .002, CS3within Group 
E, W(22) = 0.75, p = .0001, CS4within Group C, W(24) = 0.88, p = .007. No between category 
errors were made when switching between 2-categories and only by Group B during 3-
category switching; all between category errors made during 4-category switching were non-
normally distributed at p = .0001. Self-corrections right and self-corrections wrong were all non-
normally distributed at p = .0001; self-corrections wrong were only made by Groups D & E 
when switching between 2-categories. Error and self-correction variables were not able to be 
corrected by transformation of the data and so were subject to non-parametric evaluation.  
 
 During 4-category switching the number of errors per category type (numbers, days, 
months or letters = e.g. CS4error numbers) were also analysed. All measures were found to be 
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non-normally distributed p = .0001 – this distribution was not normalised by any type of 
transformation and so non-parametric measures were applied. 
  
3.2.2 Statistical tests 
Significance levels for post-hoc contrasts made using t-tests or Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests were determined using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjustment throughout (Holm, 
1979). All non-parametric significance levels are exact measures; for Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests this is indicated in the text as one or two-tailed as appropriate. Effect size r was 
calculated in the following ways (Field, 2009): t-tests, √ ((t2 ÷ (t2 + df)); Wilcoxon signed 
ranks, test statistic Z ÷ √ number of observations. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive and preliminary statistics 
All versions of the Continuous Series II showed the same increase in switch cost and 
errors and decrease in speech rate seen in the previous three experiments to occur in line with 
increasing task difficulty. Task versions showed greater disparity in rate and cost over 2-
category switching with convergence of scores over 4-categories. Two-category rate was 
slowest for version D (M = 0.65) and fastest for version A (the original version) (M = 1.24); 
rate measures at 4-categories were all within 0.06 w/sec of each other. Task version D 
displayed far less of the previously seen 2-switch advantage for either rate or switch cost. 
Again matching to rate the lowest switch cost over 2-categories was version A (M = 64.63) 
and the highest was version D (M = 78.63), with convergence of scores again at 4-categories.  
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Age correlated with predicted NART IQ, r = .56, p = .0001. Additionally predicted 
NART IQ was found to correlate with forward digit span r = .30, p = .001, reverse digit span 
r = .23, p = .014 and CS4rate r = .27, p = .003. Forward digit span was found to correlate with 
reverse digit span r = .64, p = .0001, CS3rate r = .36, p = .0001, CS4rate r = .43, p = .0001, 
CS3cost r = -.29, p - .001 and CS4cost r = -.33, p = .0001. Reverse digit span correlated with all 
rate measures CS2rate r = .22, p = .019, CS3rate r = .48, p = .0001, CS4rate r = .44, p = .0001 
and two cost measures CS3cost r = -.37, p - .0001 and CS4cost r = -.30, p = .001. Normal 
speech rate correlated only with CS2rate r = .20, p = .036. Reverse digit span was considered 
a potential covariate for both rate and cost measures. 
 
3.3.2 Task speech rate 
There was a significant effect of number of categories (for means see Table 30), Λ = 
.09, F (2, 109) = 528.93, p = .0001, ηp2 = .91 with rate reducing significantly across the task 
as difficulty increased (alpha = .017) CS2rate to CS3rate t(114) = 20.19, p = .0001, r = 1.78, CI 
(0.42 – 0.52); CS2rate to CS4rate t(114) = 23.91, p = .0001, r = 0.83, CI (0.64 – 0.75); CS3rate 
to CS4rate t(114) = 19.18, p = .0001, r = 0.76, CI (0.20 – 0.25). There was a significant effect 
of task version F(4, 110) = 11.34, p = .0001, ηp2 = .29 and a significant interaction Λ = .47, F 
(8, 218) = 12.68, p = .0001, ηp2 = .32. Task speech rate differed between groups at 2-category 
switching F(4, 114) = 21.91, p = .0001 and at 3-categories F(4,114) = 3.04, p = .020 but not 
over 4-categories (see Figure 13) F(4, 114) = 1.38, p = .247. Follow up independent t-tests 
(alpha = .005) showed 2-category significance to widespread and to be sourced to a 
comparison between version A and version C t(43) = 4.29, p = .0001, r = 0.55,  CI (0.15 – 
0.42), version A and version D t(43) = 8.29, p = .0001, r = 0.79,  CI (0.45 – 0.74), version A 
and version E t(41) = 3.16, p = .003, r = 0.44,  CI (0.07 – 0.34), version B and version C t(46) 
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= 3.39, p = .001, r = 0.46,  CI (0.10 – 0.40), version B and version D t(46) = 7.13, p = .0001, 
r = 0.73,  CI (0.40 – 0.72), version C and version D t(46) = 4.18, p = .0001, r = 0.54,  CI 
(0.16 – 0.46) and between version D and version E t(44) = -5.19, p = .0001, r = 0.62,  CI (-
0.54 – -0.24). Three-category significance was associated with a single comparison between 
version A and version D t(43) = 3.86, p = .0001, r = 0.51,  CI (0.07 – 0.22). 
 
The analysis was repeated using reverse digit span stratified as an independent 
variable to determine covariance. Scores were grouped as follows: Low (scores of 3 or 4, N = 
39, M = 3.95), Medium (scores of 5, N = 50, M = 5.02) and High (score of 6, 7 or 8, N = 26, 
M = 6.20). In this format reverse digit span was found to have some independent effect F(2, 
100) = 17.89, p = .0001, ηp2 = .26 but did not interact with number of categories Λ = .88, F 
(4, 198) = 3.25, p = .053, ηp2 = .06, task version F (8, 100) = 0.70, p = .690, ηp2 = .05 or a 
combination of the two Λ = .89, F (16, 198) = 0.70, p = .788, ηp2 = .05. 
 
3.3.3 Switch cost 
Predictably there was a significant effect of number of categories (for means see 
Table 30) Λ = .12, F (2, 109) = 391.04, p = .001, ηp2 = .88 with cost increasing significantly 
across the task as difficulty increased (alpha = .017) CS2cost to CS3cost t(114) = -17.80, p = 
.0001, r = 0.74, CI (-15.39 – -12.47); CS2cost to CS4cost t(114) = -22.52, p = .0001, r = 0.82, 
CI (-22.87 – -19.17); CS3cost to CS4cost t(114) = -16.92, p = .0001, r = 0.72, CI (-7.81 – -
6.17). Task version also had a significant effect, F (4, 110) = 5.35, p = .001, ηp2 = .16 and 
there was a significant interaction between the two Λ = .51, F (8, 218) = 10.99, p = .0001, ηp2 
= .29. Groups differed significantly over 2-categories F(4, 114) = 9.49, p = .0001 and over 3-
categories F(4, 114) = 4.83, p = .001 but gain not over 4-categories F(4, 114) = 2.32, p = 
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.062. Follow up independent t-tests (alpha = .005) showed 2-category significance to be 
linked to a comparison between version, version A (M = 64.63) and version D (M = 78.63) 
t(43) = -4.71, p = .0001, r = 0.582, CI (-19.98 – -8.00), version B (M = 65.11) and version D 
(M = 78.63) t(46) = -4.89, p = .0001, r = 0.58, CI (-19.09 – -7.95) and version D (M = 78.63) 
and version E (M = 67.43) t(44) = 3.62, p = .001, r = 0.48, CI (4.97 – 17.44). Difference over 
3-categories was linked to a single comparison of version B (M = 85.59) and version E (M = 
81.08) t(44) = 2.95, p = .005, r = 0.41, CI (1.43 – 7.59). 
 
The analysis was again rerun with the stratified reverse digit span measure entered as 
a potential covariate. There was some independent effect of reverse digit span, F (2, 100) = 
7.81, p = .001, ηp2 = .14 but no interaction with either number of categories Λ = .88, F (8, 
198) = 3.29, p = .012, ηp2 = .06, task version F (8, 100) = 0.68, p = .710, ηp2 = .05 or a 
combination of the two Λ = .88, F (16, 198) = 0.80, p = .688, ηp2 = .06.   
 
In order to determine whether differences between groups at the 2-category level for 
both rate and switch cost were related to individual differences in non-switching production 
rate for the individual categories ‘numbers’ and ‘days’, one-way ANOVAs were run on 
baseline rates for those two categories. No significant difference between groups was found 
for either ‘numbers’ F(4, 57) = 2.25, p = .076 or for ‘days’ F(4, 57) = 1.13, p = .351. Full 
data for non-switching rates are given in Table 23. 
 
  
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
267 
 
Table 29 Non-Switching Baseline Production Rates (w/sec) for all Groups. 
 Non-switching rate (w/sec) 
 Numbers Days Months Letters 
Group A (n = 21) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.83 
0.38 
 
3.39 
0.50 
 
3.61 
0.50 
 
1.11 
0.32 
Group B (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.78 
0.43 
 
3.39 
0.61 
 
3.44 
0.78 
 
1.39 
0.70 
Group C (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.89 
0.33 
 
3.44 
0.53 
 
3.56 
0.73 
 
1.22 
0.67 
Group D (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.86 
0.38 
 
3.00 
0.00 
 
3.86 
0.38 
 
1.14 
0.38 
Group E (n = 22) 
Mean 
SD 
 
2.50 
1.23 
 
3.17 
0.41 
 
3.50 
0.84 
 
1.33 
0.52 
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Table 30 Task Speech Rate (w/sec) and Switch Cost (% w/sec increase) (N = 115). 
 Task speech rate (w/sec) Switch cost (% increase) 
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
Group A (n = 21) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.24 
0.20 
 
0.61 
0.13 
 
0.33 
0.09 
 
64.63 
7.47 
 
81.16 
5.12 
 
90.91 
3.18 
Group B (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.21 
0.28 
 
0.56 
0.19 
 
0.32 
0.10 
 
65.11 
6.89 
 
85.59 
4.18 
 
91.29 
2.26 
Group C (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
0.96 
0.24 
 
0.51 
0.15 
 
0.35 
0.08 
 
71.69 
9.63 
 
84.29 
4.51 
 
89.18 
3.26 
Group D (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
0.65 
0.27 
 
0.47 
0.13 
 
0.31 
0.10 
 
78.63 
11.67 
 
85.81 
5.14 
 
90.65 
2.97 
Group E (n = 22) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.03 
0.23 
 
0.57 
0.16 
 
0.29 
0.08 
 
67.43 
9.00 
 
81.08 
6.08 
 
91.46 
2.66 
Whole group (N = 115) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.01 
0.32 
 
0.54 
0.16 
 
0.32 
0.09 
 
69.66 
10.40 
 
83.69 
5.35 
 
90.68 
2.95 
CS rate: M = 0.63, SE = 0.01     CS cost: M = 81.26, SE = 0.45 
2-cat rate: M = 1.02, SE =0.02     2-cat cost: M = 69.50, SE = 0.85 
3-cat rate: M = 0.54, SE = 0.01     3-cat cost: M = 83.59, SE = 0.47 
4-cat rate: M = 0.32, SE = 0.01     4-cat cost: M = 90.70, SE = 0.27 
Group A rate: M = 0.73, SE = 0.03     Group A cost: M = 78.90, SE = 1.06 
Group B rate: M = 0.70, SE = 0.03     Group B cost: M = 80.66, SE = 0.99 
Group C rate: M = 0.61, SE = 0.03     Group C cost: M = 81.72, SE = 0.99 
Group D rate: M = 0.47, SE = 0.03      Group D cost: M = 85.03, SE = 0.99 
Group E rate: M = 0.63, SE = 0.03     Group E cost: M = 79.99, SE = 1.04 
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Figure 13 Task production rate (w/sec) for all task variation groups over 2, 3 and for category 
switching for the Continuous Series II 
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Figure 14 Switch cost (% w/sec increase+) for all task variation groups over 2, 3 and for category 
switching for the Continuous Series II 
 
 
3.3.4 Within-category errors 
A Friedman’s ANOVA showed that within category errors increased significantly as 
the task became more difficult (see Table 31) χ2(2) = 207.95, p = .0001. Follow up Wilcoxon 
signed ranks tests showed this significance to present at every level of difficulty CS2 to CS3 
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T = 23.30, p = .0001, r = -0.55, CS3 to CS4 T = 10.75, p = .0001, r = -0.60. Kruskal-Wallis 
tests revealed there to be no significant difference between task versions over 2-category 
switching H(4) = 4.37, p = .358 or over 3-category switching H(4) = 5.05, p = .282; however, 
there was a significant difference over 4-category switching H(4) = 10.88, p = .028. 
Appropriately adjusted Mann-Whitney follow up tests (alpha = .005) showed this difference 
to be linked to the comparison between task versions A (Mdn = 11.00) and C (Mdn = 8.00), U 
= 132.50, z = -2.73, p = .005, r = -0.18. Analysis of the type of errors showed 61.40% to be 
perseverative and 38.60% to be sequencing.  
 
3.3.5 Between category errors  
A Friedman’s ANOVA showed that between-category errors increased significantly 
as the task became more difficult (see Table 31), χ2(2) = 60.67, p = .0001. Follow up 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed this not to be significant between the first two difficulty 
levels CS2 to CS3 T = 0, p = .180, r = -.09 but was significant as the task became harder CS3 
to CS4 T = 2, p = .0001, r = -.32. Kruskal-Wallis tests showed there to be to be no significant 
difference between task versions over 3-category switching (2-category switching was not 
analysed as no between-category errors were made at that difficulty level), H(4) = 7.65, p = 
.105 and also no significant difference over 4-categories, H(4) = 4.80, p = .308. There was 
one perseverative error, accounting for 0.90% of the total; 95.54% were sequencing errors 
and 3.56% were errors of omission. 
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Table 31 Within and Between Category Errors at each Level of Difficulty (2, 3 or 4 Categories) for 
all Task Versions (A-E) on the Continuous Series II Task (N = 115). 
 Within-category errors Between-category errors 
 2 3 4 2 3 4 
Group A 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
9 
5 
0.43 
0.98 
 
59 
18 
2.81 
2.27 
 
251 
21 
11.95 
4.15 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
22 
5 
1.05 
2.31 
Group B 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
11 
7 
0.46 
0.93 
 
115 
23 
4.79 
3.89 
 
240 
24 
10.00 
4.43 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
5 
2 
0.21 
0.83 
 
15 
7 
0.63 
1.10 
Group C 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
13 
10 
0.54 
0.72 
 
70 
16 
2.92 
3.23 
 
207 
24 
8.63 
3.87 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
12 
5 
0.50 
1.18 
Group D 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
16 
13 
0.67 
0.70 
 
78 
22 
3.25 
2.31 
 
231 
24 
9.63 
3.47 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
39 
11 
1.63 
2.26 
Group E 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
15 
9 
0.68 
1.09 
 
83 
20 
3.77 
3.55 
 
254 
22 
11.55 
4.21 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
23 
6 
1.05 
2.10 
Whole group 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
64 
44 
0.56 
0.88 
 
405 
99 
3.52 
3.16 
 
1183 
115 
10.29 
4.15 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
5 
2 
0.21 
0.83 
 
111 
34 
0.97 
1.86 
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3.3.6 Analysis of errors according to category type 
The total number of errors per category type for each task version was analysed (see 
Table 32). A Friedman’s ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference between the 
number of errors committed overall in each category according to type, χ2(3) = 32.81, p = 
.0001. Appropriately adjusted follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests (alpha = .008) showed 
that Days2nd produced significantly more errors than all other categories, more than 
Numbers1st T = 1518, p = .003, r = .14, more than Months3rd T= 1052, p = .0001, r = .22 and 
more than Letters4th T = 793, p = .0001, r = .23 – see Figure 15 for a comparison between 
task versions. There were also significantly more errors in Numbers1st than in Letters4th T = 
1409, p = .006, r = .13. Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that the different task versions differed 
significantly on Numbers1st H = 16.79, p = .002 and on Days2nd H = 10.17, p = .038 but not 
on Months3rd H = 3.66, p = .453 or on Letters4th H = 3.29, p = .51. Follow up Mann-Whitney 
tests (adjusted alpha = .008) showed that differences between tasks versions were almost 
exclusively confine to the category Numbers1st and were evident between version A (Mdn = 
3.00) and version C (Mdn = 1.50), U = 126, z = -2.92, p = .003, r = -.03, between version C 
(Mdn = 1.50) and version D (Mdn = 4.00), U = 130, z = -3.301, p = .001, r = -.03 and 
between version C (Mdn = 1.50) and version E (Mdn = 4.00), U = 116, z = -3.301, p = .001, r 
= -.03. There was also a significant difference in the category Days2nd between version A 
(Mdn = 3.00) and version C (Mdn = 1.50), U = 130, z = -2.81, p = .0005, r = -.02. 
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Table 32 Mean Total Errors (Within and Between-Category) per Category Type for all Task 
Versions. 
 Mean errors per category 
 Numbers Days Months Letters 
Group A (n = 21) 
Mean 
SD 
 
3.05 
1.16 
 
4.52 
1.97 
 
2.76 
2.57 
 
2.67 
1.77 
Group B (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
2.83 
1.95 
 
3.13 
1.94 
 
2.00 
1.91 
 
2.67 
1.58 
Group C (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
1.71 
1.40 
 
2.88 
1.48 
 
2.42 
1.59 
 
2.13 
1.60 
Group D (n = 24) 
Mean 
SD 
 
3.46 
1.82 
 
3.29 
1.46 
 
2.42 
1.59 
 
2.00 
1.38 
Group E (n = 22) 
Mean 
SD 
Total (N= 115) 
Mean 
SD 
 
3.64 
2.11 
 
2.92 
1.89 
 
3.86 
1.94 
 
3.50 
1.83 
 
2.73 
1.42 
 
2.45 
1.83 
 
2.36 
2.04 
 
2.36 
1.67 
Group A: M = 3.25, SE = 0.25  Numbers: M = 2.94, SE = 0.17 
Group B: M = 2.66, SE = 0.24  Days: M = 3.54, SE = 0.17 
Group C: M = 2.28, SE = 0.24  Months: M = 2.47, SE = 0.17 
Group D: M = 2.79, SE = 0.24  Letters: M = 2.36, SE = 0.16 
Group E: M = 3.15, SE = 0.25  
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Figure 15 Sum errors per category type for task versions A-E over 4-category switching on the 
Continuous Series II (refer to Table 28 for differing task order) 
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4 Discussion 
 Task speech rate decreased for all task versions as the task became more difficult. The 
original version of the task resulted in the fastest speech rate, although this was overtaken at 
4-category switching by version C. Over 2-category switching version D was the slowest at 
over half the rate of version A; version A and B were similar, with versions C and E lying 
close to each other in between the two extremes. Versions A and D remained fastest and 
slowest respectively at 3-category switching, being the only significantly different 
comparison. Task speech rate converged at 4-category switching with all versions scoring 
within 0.06 w/sec of each other. Task versions followed the same pattern for switch cost 
running from least cost for version A to most for version D; convergence of scores again 
increased as the task became more difficult with scores ranging within 2.5% of each other 
over 4-categories.  
 
It is possible that individual differences could account for the differences in rate and 
switch cost seen over 2-category switching; individual differences in control have been 
related to activation and maintenance of task set (Adrover-Roig & Barceló, 2010). 
Convergence between task versions of the Continuous Series II at 4-category switching and 
also between different versions of the verbal task in Experiment 3 would suggest that 
increasing difficulty is a limiting factor for such differences in the task. It would seem 
intuitive that individual differences in strategy would more likely be seen when the task 
became more difficult – variability in strategic processes would seem less likely when the 
task involves only alternation between two categories. However, individual differences as 
well as inter-trial differences are a common feature of task switching studies (Karayanidis et 
al., 2010). Given the relatively short duration of the Continuous Series II it is possible that 
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normal order differences from both these sources are more obvious at the 2-category level, 
with slowing from increasing task difficulty masking the effect as the number of categories 
increase. Higher switch costs in the face of increased task difficulty have been noted as a 
factor to be controlled when probing individual differences in switching (Wager, Jonides & 
Smith, 2006) so it would follow that difficulty would exert this masking effect.  
 
Within and between-category errors also followed the established pattern of 
increasing as the task became more difficult. For within-category errors the most variation 
between the versions occurred during 3-category switching, with version B scoring at least 
30% more errors (and as much as almost 50%) than any other version. This variation reduced 
to around 17% at 4-category switching, although with the exception of version C all were 
within 9% of each other. Between-category errors occurred only at the 4-category level (with 
the exception of 2 individuals from version B scoring at 3-categories), with version D notable 
for a relatively high score.  
 
Difference between version A and all other versions of the task was not uniform as 
predicted. Version B, also beginning with ‘numbers’, scored very closely to version A for 
rate and switch cost. As predicted by the third hypothesis these two versions resulted in faster 
rate and lower cost than the other versions. All other versions of the task were significantly 
different from version A during 2-category switching but the convergence caused by 
increasing task difficulty overtook this difference. Beginning the sequence with the category 
‘numbers’ clearly facilitated some kind of anchoring or other beneficial effect during the task 
(anecdotally reported as due to the continuous nature of the category), in excess of any 
difference caused by separating out short and long categories. ‘Numbers’ also stands out from 
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the other categories in that it is much more strongly associated with spatial representation 
(Dehaene, Bossini & Giraux, 1993; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel & Cohen, 2003) which could also 
have contributed to this ‘anchoring’ effect. 
 
Overall ‘days’ produced the most errors – the only other significant difference was 
between ‘numbers’ and ‘letters’ with ‘numbers’ scoring higher. The category ‘days’ produced 
the highest number of errors in all task versions except for version D (see Figure 15) where 
‘numbers’ was highest. There was no consensus regarding placement of the other categories 
between task versions. The concentration of errors in ‘days’ at the highest difficulty level is 
therefore a feature of the category itself and not related to confinement after the first switch 
of the trial as would relate to cost distribution noted by Rogers and Monsell (1995). The 
concentration of errors moved with the category rather than remaining static at the second 
category of four. It should be noted that two of the task versions, A and B, included ‘days’ 
during 2-category switching and, in line with the usual patterns of costs at this level, hardly 
any errors were reported. The task related aspect of ‘days’ which causes increased error 
production only comes into play when the task overall becomes more difficult, possibly tying 
in with the as yet unspecified factor of 4-category switching that causes convergence of rate 
and switch cost at this level (and similarly with the two verbal tasks in Experiment 3).  
 
In this experiment the task preceding ‘days’ is different every time (although the same 
for versions A and B) so it cannot be said that there is a specific effect of a recently 
performed task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). Task difficulty (4-categories) enhances the propensity 
of ‘days’ for errors regardless of what the switch is from (with the exception of version D 
where ‘numbers’ (the third category) produces most errors with ‘days’ (the fourth category) a 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
279 
 
close second). Yeung & Monsell (2003) state that the ability of one task to interfere with 
another (as in the case of asymmetric costs, Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) is dependent on 
the relative initial strength of those tasks (in their case the relationship between the task and 
the stimuli). If the repeated ‘day’ suffix causes confusion as to which item was last produced 
and therefore which should be produced on the current iteration then ‘days’ could be 
considered to be a weaker task and more prone to interference by the proximity of multiple 
adjacent tasks. In this instance it would appear that three adjacent tasks is the rate limiting 
step for this category. As there is no exogenous component to the task (stimuli or cues) then 
reconfiguration to ‘days’, with the ambiguity of a repeated suffix, is done in an environment 
where the ‘path’ to the task is not entirely clear (Monsell’s mental gear shift idea (Monsell, 
2003)). Perhaps facilitation of the switch with the use of an external cue would negate the 
combination of complexity and task ambiguity and 4-category switching – this is addressed 
in Experiment 6, Chapter 8. 
 
5 Conclusion 
• In accordance with hypothesis 1, predicting greater difficulty with increasing 
categories, general patterns of rate, switch cost and error increasing in line with task 
difficulty are common to all versions of the task. These appear to not be artefacts of 
task design, although there appears to be evidence of inter-individual variation at the 
lower level of difficulty.  
• There is negation for hypothesis 2 (spatially separated versions of the task would 
relate in different cost to the original version) and support for hypothesis 3 (versions 
starting with ‘Numbers’ would result in lower cost). The order categories are placed 
within the task does not make a lot of difference to this overall pattern other than to 
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identify a beneficial effect of starting the sequence with ‘numbers’. This reflects a 
task specific feature but not one that seems to have a detrimental effect on switching 
measures.  
• In support of hypothesis 4 (differential within-category errors between categories), a 
similarly task specific artefact is that of the bulk of errors follow the category ‘days’, 
seemingly in accordance with the weakening (in terms of task and item maintenance) 
effect of suffix repetition in the category. This would suggest a degree of caution to be 
exerted when interpreting error data at the most difficult task level.  
• Overall the measure of switch cost and error in the Continuous Series II is a stable 
phenomenon, although a degree of each (certainly not the majority) is attributable to 
task related effects.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EXAMINING THE LOAD OF 
SWITCHING BETWEEN FOUR CATEGORIES  
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the issue of whether switching between 4-categories per se is 
the difficult aspect of the task or whether the nature of the categories (sequences which need 
updating on every iteration) is the main contributor to difficulty. This is of particular 
relevance to the convergence of both different types (Experiment 3) and different versions 
(Experiment 4) of the task seen at the most difficult level of switching. Switching in the 
alternating runs paradigm incorporates mixing costs (Fagot, 1994), the time costs of 
performing tasks in close proximity to each other additionally to the cost of switching 
between them, seen in repeats in the mixed (A-A-B-B…) block. Such costs are known to 
inflate measures of general switch cost and so the cost of performing four tasks next to each 
other may be additional to that of switching between them. Although mixing costs (as 
determined for the alternating runs paradigm) are caused by response competition for bivalent 
stimuli (Rubin & Meiran, 2005) still occurring on the repeat as opposed to switch trials, they 
could be seen to apply in a different form to the ‘quasi-multivalent’ stimuli of the Continuous 
Series II. Switching to the category ‘days’ for example would provide the ‘stimulus’, for 
which there are seven possible responses to compete. Mixing costs have also been said to 
reflect sequential elimination in search of the correct response (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2005) 
which would fit particularly well with the nature of response selection for overlearned 
sequences. Braver et al. (2003) concur that (from a neurological point of view) a significant 
degree of switch cost comes from the load of performing several tasks in close proximity to 
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each other rather than just the act of switching from one task to another i.e. most costs are 
global (that is including things other than the element related to switching). 
 
Switching between four tasks is not usual in the literature (an exception being 
Buchler, Hoyer and Cerella, 2008) unless, as previously noted, it is arrived at through a 
factorial combination of two response choices and S-R mappings (e.g. Allport, Styles & 
Hsieh, 1994, Experiment 1). The effect of these quasi-mixing costs (as they might apply for 
‘stimuli’ in the verbal paradigm) for four separate tasks with four separate multiple response 
sets is therefore unknown. By manipulating the content of categories and removing response 
competition it will be possible to assess switching in the absence of any mixing-style costs, 
As stated, they are thought the reflect response competition rather than working memory load 
related to the number of tasks (Rubin & Meiran, 2005). The current experiment comprises of 
four difficulty levels but keeps the number of switching categories constant at four 
throughout by utilising arbitrary non-updating categories of repeated colour names. As such 
the degree of competition for task responses will increase as the number of overlearned 
sequences increase. Therefore it will be possible to determine how much of the general cost 
relates to switching between four tasks and how much relates to the content of those tasks.  
 
One obvious question relating to the construction of the Continuous Series II is 
whether switch cost in the verbal task (particularly at the highest difficulty level) is due to 
high cognitive load from the content of the individual categories? While this undoubtedly has 
a degree of relevance to all types of task switching, it might be particularly so for sequential 
verbal tasks, which are more complex and ‘load worthy’ in the first place. Although the 
Continuous Series II has not been associated with additional memory load (Gurd et al., 2002) 
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this assertion has not been specifically tested. Memory load is thought to be dissociable from 
switching processes (e.g. Logan, 2004; Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2007) and as such would be 
a co-contributor to overall general cost as measured in the verbal task. While the use of 
overlearned sequences is not thought to be particularly taxing on working memory in itself 
(certainly not as much as semantic categories) the use of four switching categories may, by 
itself or in combination with such sequences, be the limiting factor for verbal task switching. 
It has been noted (Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck & Camos, 2008) that the act of 
switching increases load on working memory (rather than working memory contributing to 
switch cost). Recall was shown to decrease as a function of the number of task switches - the 
simultaneous load on item maintenance did not affect switch costs. Task switching itself 
incurs a cost on WM. So by this means the increased number of switches at the highest level 
of difficulty in the Continuous Series II might be contributing to working memory load and, 
by that circular mechanism, general cost accrued in the task. Conversely Ward, Roberts & 
Phillips (2001) posited that extensive time for preparation and reliable predictability of the 
switching task should extinguish the effects of cognitive load. It could therefore be argued 
that cognitive load should not overtly contribute to the convergence effect seen in the 
Continuous Series II.  
 
Reconfiguration accounts such as that of Rogers and Monsell (1995) consider 
reconfiguration processes to be separate from any task properties. Such separation is 
demonstrated by the attribution of task related decision errors and switch related wrong-task 
errors (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000). In the current study such errors are attributed to 
Kahneman’s (2011) automatic System 1 (for task errors) and the more effortful executive 
System 2 (for switching errors), still differentiating between task contents and switching.  
The type of difficulty experienced within-task in the Continuous Series II and switching itself 
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contribute to switch cost in an additive manner (Rubinstein et al., 2001). However, the 
isolation of switch cost from task effects, as presented by reconfiguration accounts, is 
questioned by results which show an effect of the type of task on switch cost (Chamberland & 
Tremblay, 2011). This is despite previous studies showing switch cost to be separable from 
aspects relating to the speed at which a task can be carried out (e.g. Rubinstein et al., 2001 
and Meiran, 2005). If the type of task/ category in the Continuous Series III (the colour 
version used in the current experiment) has a demonstrable effect on switch cost then 
reconfiguration might not be the sole cause of that cost. Although the calculation of general 
cost in the verbal task does not allow separation of task and switch related costs this does not 
preclude the notion that switch related cost itself might be vulnerable to the effects of task 
features. The effect of the faster production time for the single-syllable colour names is 
negated by calculation of non-switching rate from speeded production of those names in the 
baseline condition.  
 
In addition to the effects on switch cost, category content might also have an effect on 
the type of errors made during the task. It would follow that within-category task related 
errors cannot occur when the response is always the same, as in the arbitrary colour 
categories. There is however still the scope for errors to occur between categories which have 
thus far been associated with overall task difficulty and have occurred most readily during 4-
category switching. It is not clear whether such errors are a feature of switching between four 
categories or switching between four ‘complex’ categories. If they are caused by the number 
of switching categories then they should occur at all difficulty levels of the colour-based 
Continuous Series III as each level has the same number of categories. If individual task 
complexity is a contributor to between-category errors then their occurrence should change as 
the number of overlearned sequences categories increases. Any significant difference in the 
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number of between-category errors would suggest that ‘task identification’ errors do not 
entirely represent failure of executive processes as suggested by Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) 
or the current reference to System 2. They would in fact represent at least some element of 
task related factors. As such this would again call into question the suitability of a 
reconfiguration-only account of costs and the definition of error types. 
 
2 Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of this experiment is to determine whether cost at the most difficult level of 
the Continuous Series II is due to maintaining four separate tasks in memory or whether the 
content of those categories is a main contributor to cost.  
1. All measures will increase significantly as the number of overlearned sequences 
contained within the task increases. 
2. Within-category errors will only be committed in overlearned sequence categories – 
the distribution of errors according to category type will favour overlearned sequences 
over arbitrary categories, due to the repetitive nature of the colour categories. Errors 
will significantly increase as the number of overlearned sequences categories 
increases. 
3. Between-category errors will occur in both category types (overlearned sequences and 
colour categories) as they will reflect switching rather than task content. 
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3 EXPERIMENT FIVE 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
Task speech rate (w/sec), switch cost (% w/sec increase) and total number of errors 
made were assessed using a single 4-level factor, Difficulty Level (1, 2, 3 or 4 overlearned 
sequence (OS) categories). 
 
3.1.2 Participants 
The sample (n = 28, females = 21) were recruited from the University of 
Hertfordshire (undergraduate and taught postgraduate psychology students) and from the 
wider community by word of mouth. Students received course credit for participation; non-
students received no reward for taking part. Of the original 32 recruited and tested, one 
participant was withdrawn from the analysis due to a backward digit span score of 2 and a 
large number of errors over 3 and 4 category switching, suggesting undisclosed non-
compliance with exclusion criteria. A second participant was withdrawn due to an inability to 
complete the 4-category switching level and two more were withdrawn due to continual and 
disruptive non-target utterances throughout the task. All participants were right handed native 
English speakers, screened according to the criteria set out in Chapter 2. Mean demographic 
and baseline measures were as follows: Age M 22.22 (SD 6.96); NART IQ M 100.41 (SD 
8.21); WAIS-R vocabulary M 10.22 (SD 1.34); digit span forward M 6.85 (SD 1.10); digit 
span backward M 5.11 (SD 0.93); normal speech rate M 2.55 (SD 0.38). 
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3.1.3 Stimuli 
Unlike the original Continuous Series II, the Continuous Series III ‘dummy category’ 
task had four levels of difficulty instead of three. Each level continued for 23 iterations and 
included four categories, using a mix of overlearned sequences and arbitrary ‘low load’ 
categories which required the same word (colour names) to be repeated every time they 
occurred, unlike overlearned sequences where the item changed every time (e.g. “1-red-
green-blue-2-red-green-blue...”). Difficulty level was determined by changing the ratio of 
overlearned sequence: arbitrary categories rather than the absolute number of categories; at 
the lowest level the ratio was 1: 4, with overlearned sequence categories increasing 
incrementally at each level, as shown in Table 33. Non-switching speech rate was calculated 
thus: CatA + CatB + CatC + CatD / 4. 
 
Table 33 Category Order and Start Points for Dummy Category Verbal Switching Task. 
Difficulty level Categories & overlearned sequence (OS) start points 
Number of OS 
categories  
 
1 Numbers (‘3’) – Red – Green – Blue   
2 Numbers (‘6’) – Days (‘Tuesday’) – Blue – Red   
3 Numbers (‘4’) – Days (‘Friday’) – Months (‘October’) – Green  
4 Number (‘9’) – Days (‘Wednesday’) – Months (‘February’) – Letters (‘H’)  
 
 
3.2 Procedure 
The background measures and task were administered as indicated in Chapter 2 and 
as for previous experiments. For the verbal switching task participants were instructed recite 
four categories, progressing incrementally through items in sequence for the overlearned 
sequence categories and repeating the same word at each iteration for the colour categories. 
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3.3 Data analysis 
3.3.1 Data distribution 
Age and both digit span measures were found to be non-normally distributed: Age 
W(28) = 0.59, p = .0001, with 64% of the sample aged 18-20 years presenting a marked 
leptokurtic distribution; forward digit span W(28) = 0.91, p = .015, presenting as mildly 
platykurtic from scores 6-8; reverse digit span W(28) = 0.86, p = .001 had a slight positive 
skew with two high scores at 7. As previously noted the digit span measures were within a 
clinically normal range (Lezak et al., 2004). 
 
Task speech rate and switch cost were both non-normally distributed at the 4OS 
difficulty level, though this was not unexpected in comparison to previous results: 4OSrate 
W(28) = 0.89, p = .005, with a positive skew due to a high score of 0.66; 4OScost W(28) = 
0.85, p = .001, negatively skewed due to two lower scores (representing faster performance) 
at around 80%. The violations were within normal expectations for the task and so both task 
speech rate and switch cost were analysed parametrically.  
 
Colour categories produced no errors and so were disregarded for error distribution 
analysis according to category type; the overlearned sequence category from the 1OS 
Difficulty Level was excluded due to a lack of comparative categories. Both overlearned 
sequence categories in the 2OS Difficulty Level were non-normally distributed: 2OS errors 1st 
W(28) =  0.72, p = .0001, with a positive skew caused by single scores at 3 and 4; 2OS errors 
2nd W(28) =  0.68, p = .0001, positively skewed due to a single score at 3. The 3OS level was 
also non-normal throughout: 3OS errors 1st W(28) =  0.88, p = .004, presenting as platykurtic 
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due to a dip at score 2; 3OS errors 2nd W(28) =  0.91, p = .019, positively skewed by scores at 8 
and 10; 3OS errors 3rd W(28) =  0.89, p = .006, again showing a positive skew due to a score at 
5. The 4OS Difficulty Level presented non-normally for errors in the second and fourth 
categories: 4OS errors 2nd W(28) =  0.85, p = .001, showing a leptokurtic distribution due to 
almost half the participants scoring at 3; 4OS errors 4th W(28) =  0.86, p = .001, positively 
skewed due to an isolated score at 9. All measures of error per category position and the 
comparison of total errors were analysed using non-parametric methods. 
 
Between-category errors did not occur during 1OS or 2OS switching. Errors of this 
nature during the remaining difficulty levels showed non-normal distributions for 3OS W(28) 
= 0.34, p = .0001 and for 4OS W(28) = 0.48, p = .0001. Comparison of errors for these two 
difficulty levels was made using non-parametric measures. 
 
3.3.2 Statistical tests 
Task speech rate and switch cost were analysed using a single factor GLM repeated 
measures ANOVA; where indicated, potential covariates were additionally entered into the 
analysis as between-subjects factors, as indicated in Chapter 2. Errors per category type were 
analysed using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test for 2OS; 3OS and 4OS were assessed using a 
Friedman’s ANOVA, as were total errors per difficulty level. 
 
Significance levels for post-hoc contrasts made using t-tests or Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests were determined using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjustment throughout (Holm, 
1979). All non-parametric significance levels are exact measures; for Wilcoxon signed ranks 
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tests this is indicated in the text as one or two-tailed as appropriate. Effect size r was 
calculated in the following ways (Field, 2009): t-tests, √ ((t2 ÷ (t2 + df)); Wilcoxon signed 
ranks, test statistic Z ÷ √ number of observations. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive and preliminary statistics 
As predicted, speech during the task became slower and more costly as the number of 
overlearned sequence categories increased; the total number of errors also increased in line 
with this. ‘Days’ was only the most error-laden category during the 3OS difficulty level; at 2 
OS it was beaten by the first category, numbers, and at 4OS days only exceeded numbers by 
1 error.  
 
Age correlated significantly with NART IQ, r = .67, p = .0001, WAIS-R vocabulary, 
r = .50, p = .007 and 2OSrate, r = .41, p = .032. As expected NART IQ correlated significantly 
with WAIS-R vocabulary, r = .70, p = .0001 and also 2OSrate, r = .45, p = .016 and 3OSrate, r 
= .40, p = .036. WAIS-R vocabulary was also found to correlate with 2OSrate, r = .42, p = 
.026. Forward digit span predictably correlated with reverse span, r = .61, p = .001, with the 
three most difficult task speech rate measures and the middle two switch cost, 2OSrate, r = 
.50, p = .007, 3OSrate, r = .61, p = .001, 4OSrate, r = .50, p = .007, 2OScost, r = -.47, p = .011, 
3OScost, r = -.52, p = .005. Reverse digit span correlated with the same measures, 2OSrate, r = 
.55, p = .003, 3OSrate, r = .48, p = .010, 4OSrate, r = .44, p = .019, 2OScost, r = -.48, p = .010, 
3OScost, r = -.40, p = .037. Normal speech rate did not correlate with task speech rate or 
switch cost at any level of task difficulty. 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
291 
 
3.4.2 Task speech rate 
A one-way GLM ANOVA showed that difficulty level content had a highly 
significant effect on task speech (see Table 34) rate with rate reducing as the task became 
more difficult (see Figure 16), Λ = 0.02, F(3, 25) = 333.78, p = .0001, η2 = 0.98. 
Appropriately adjusted follow up paired samples t-tests showed this reduction to be 
uniformly significant, 1OS-2OS t(27) = 16.55, p = .0001, 1OS-3OS t(27) = 28.27, p = .0001, 
1OS-4OS t(27) = 31.11, p = .0001, 2OS-3OS t(27) = 18.76, p = .0001, 2OS-4OS t(27) = 
20.59, p = .0001, 3OS-4OS t(27) = 13.09, p = .0001. 
 
For the purposes of covariance, reverse digit span was stratified into a categorical 
variable, Low (score of 4, n = 9, M = 4), Medium (score of 5, n = 10, M = 5), High (score of 
6-7, n = 9, M = 6.22) and entered as an independent measures variable (see Chapter 2). There 
was no independent effect of reverse digit span, Λ = 0.76, F(6, 46) = 1.13, p = .358, η2 = 0.13 
and so no covariance attributed to this variable. 
 
Table 34 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (N = 28) on Task Speech Rate (w/sec) and Switch Cost (% 
increase) for the Continuous Series III. 
 Continuous Series III  
 1 OS cat 2 OS cat 3 OS cat 4 OS cat 
Task speech rate (w/sec)     
Mean 2.67 1.52 0.54 0.33 
SD 0.42 0.37 0.15 0.11 
Switch cost (% increase)     
Mean 23.21 55.00 81.95 89.99 
SD 11.52 10.63 5.75 3.50 
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3.4.3 Switch cost 
A one-way GLM ANOVA showed that content of difficulty level content had a 
highly significant effect on switch cost (see Table 34) which increased in line with difficulty 
level (see Figure 17), Λ = 0.02, F(3, 25) = 368.39, p = .0001, η2 = 0.98. Follow up pairwise 
comparisons indicated this to be uniformly significant , 1OS-2OS t(27) = -15.48, p = .0001, 
1OS-3OS t(27) = -29.42, p = .0001, 1OS-4OS t(27) = -32.94, p = .0001, 2OS-3OS t(27) = -
18.58, p = .0001, 2OS-4OS t(27) = 22.02, p = .0001, 3OS-4OS t(27) = -11.01, p = .0001. 
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Figure 16 Mean task speech rate (w/sec) for all difficulty levels of the Continuous Series III verbal 
switching task 
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Figure 17 Mean switch cost (% w/sec increase) for all for difficulty levels of the Continuous Series 
III verbal switching task 
 
 
3.4.4 Errors per category type 
For difficulty level 2OS, although errors decreased from Numbers1st to Days2nd (see 
Table 35), a Wilcoxon signed ranks test showed that this decrease was not significant T = 6, p 
= .506, r = -0.13. For difficulty level 3OS a Friedman’s ANOVA showed that the number of 
errors changed significantly according to category type, χ2(2) = 13.28, p = .001; Table 35 
shows Numbers1st and Months3rd to have similar scores, with Days2nd scoring almost twice as 
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highly. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed Numbers1st scored significantly lower 
than Days2nd T = 4, p = .005, r = -.53, that there was no significant difference between 
Numbers1st and Months3rd T = 12, p = .804, r = -.05 and that Months3rd also scored 
significantly lower than Days2nd T = 4, p = .001, r = -.60. Finally, for 4OS the Freidman’s 
ANOVA showed a significant difference in errors according to category type χ2(3) = 16.54, p 
= .001; Table 35 shows this as very similar high scores for Numbers1st and Days2nd and lower 
scores for the last two categories. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks test showed no 
significant difference between Numbers1st and Days2nd T = 10, p = .714, r = -.07 or between 
Months3rd and Letters4th T = 8, p = .135, r = -.28; errors in Numbers1st were significantly 
higher than in Months3rd T = 7, p = .026, r = -.42 or than in Letters4th T = 4, p = .001, r = -.60; 
errors in Days2nd were significantly higher than in Months3rd T = 8, p = .024, r = -.43 or than 
in Letters4th T = 4, p = .003, r = -.56. 
 
Table 35 Descriptive Statistics for Errors per Difficulty Level and Category Type (N = 28). 
 Continuous Series III 
 1 OS cat 2 OS cat 3 OS cat 4 OS cat 
 1* 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Sum 4 0 0 0 20 15 0 0 47 93 45 0 105 106 77 61 
n 3 - - - 12 10 - - 21 26 21 - 27 26 26 21 
Mean 0.14 - - - 0.71 0.54 - - 1.68 3.32 1.61 - 3.75 3.79 2.75 2.18 
SD 0.45 - - - 1.05 0.84 - - 1.33 2.61 1.42 - 1.94 1.81 1.62 2.20 
1 OS cat 1: Numbers 2 OS cat 1: Numbers 3 OS cat 1: Numbers 4OS cat 1: Numbers 
1 OS cat 2: Red  2 OS cat 2: Days  3 OS cat 2: Days  4 OS cat 2: Days 
1 OS cat 3: Green 2 OS cat 3: Blue  3 OS cat 3: Months 4 OS cat 3: Months 
1 OS cat 4: Blue  2 OS cat 4: Red  3 OS cat 4: Green 4 OS cat 4: Letters 
 
 
3.4.5 Between-category errors per difficulty level 
No between-category errors were made during 1OS or 2OS switching – descriptive 
data for the two difficulty levels was as follows: 3OS (sum = 7, N = 3, M = 0.25, SD = 0.84) 
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and 4OS (sum = 20, N = 6, M = 0.71, SD = 1.72). Using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
between-category errors for the two difficulty levels were found not to be significantly 
different, T = 8, p = .158, r = -0.27. None of the errors were perseverative – 90% wee 
sequencing errors and 10% were errors of omission. 
4 Discussion 
Both task speech rate and switch cost changed significantly at every level of 
difficulty, indicating that difficulty was related to some degree to the content of the categories 
and not just to the number of categories being switched between. It would seem that 
proximity costs relating to performing four tasks together, in a similar vein to mixing costs in 
the alternating runs paradigm, account for a lesser portion of the overall general cost. It had 
been suggested by Braver et al. (2003) and others (e.g. Los, 1996) that the majority of costs 
were related to this proximity effect but, for the Continuous Series III task at least, it would 
seem that task content-related costs account for more than proximity. General switch cost for 
the Continuous Series tasks incorporates both the cost of switching between tasks and the 
cost of switching within tasks. Although a substantial amount of cost is attributable to the 
content of the categories being switched between (an increase of almost 67% switch cost 
from 1 overlearned sequence to 4 overlearned sequences), this is not to say that Continuous 
Series switching is any less valid than switching paradigms using less complex dual decision 
(e.g. number parity) tasks. It also has to be acknowledged that complex task switching such 
as is carried out in everyday life involves manipulation of the tasks as well as switching 
between them. They are not empty place holders as is seen in real world studies of multi-
tasking. For example, managing multiple office activities (González & Mark, 2004), 
combining factual recall and game-play (Ratan, Santa-Cruz & Vorderer, 2007) or considering 
factors such as task urgency and duration in real life scenarios (Wickens & McCarley, 2007). 
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Switching within a task and the ensuing addition to cost of task complexity must be a feature 
of any realistic measure of task switching.  
 
Updating an item in an overlearned sequence should not be any more complex than 
configuring the correct S-R mapping and then choosing the correct response when both have 
a dual nature, for example Allport, Styles &Hsieh (1994). A highly overlearned sequence 
item will surely be more readily available than a recently learned and sometimes arbitrary 
combination of relationships which contradict themselves when mappings change. The 1 
overlearned sequence (easiest) condition also shows that there is still a notable cost of 
switching (almost 25%) between four categories when the need to switch within is removed. 
It must therefore be assumed that an undisclosed portion of the task related costs seen in 
relation to the increasing overlearned sequence content of the task must be accounted for by 
direct switch related costs. The limitation of the calculation of general cost is that task, 
proximity and switch costs are inevitably merged. If memory load is indeed dissociable from 
switching processes (Logan, 2004; Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2007) then both must be 
represented in what is taken to be non-proximity task-related costs, as demonstrated by the 1 
overlearned sequence condition . Separation of proximity costs at least (in comparison of 1 
overlearned sequence and 4 overlearned sequence conditions) is possible to a degree and so 
the contribution of these mixing-style costs can be acknowledged. 
 
It was posited that a demonstrable effect of category content on switch cost might 
indicate that reconfiguration is not the sole cause of cost, in line with recent work showing a 
direct effect of task type on cost (Chamberland & Temblay, 2011) and a consequent lack of 
separability between the two.  There is a clear effect of task content on switch cost in this 
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instance, although it is acknowledged that the nature of cost calculation in the verbal task 
masks direct switch costs within these task related costs. It must therefore be considered that 
other causes of cost such as carryover of activation from the last task might be at play. There 
is no overt indication of carryover in particular, as might be suggested by perseverative 
between-category errors. However, again the calculation of general cost places a limit on the 
degree to which finite sources of cost can be identified. A non-exclusively reconfiguration 
source for cost must at least be considered on that basis. However, Baddeley, Chincotta and 
Adlam (2001) suggest that recitation of overlearned sequences block the phonological loop, 
used presumably for recitation of task order sequence via the mechanism of inner speech 
(Bryck & Mayr, 2005), with little attentional demand. This would suggest that task related 
load and attentional switching processes could lend themselves to being separated out (as 
suggested by Rubinstein et al., 2001 and Meiran, 2005). The blocking of the phonological 
loop would tie in with the profusion of between-category errors of the sequencing type 
(categories in wrong order rather than perseveration of the last category. The lack of 
perseverative errors is already noted) and would seem, as evidenced by the low rate of 
between-category errors, to be a partial and surmountable effect. The suitable error pattern 
would seem to make Baddeley and colleagues’ explanation of overlearned sequence action 
more plausible. Thus the content related load of categories in the Continuous Series tasks 
would appear to give further evidence to an additive contribution to general cost and, if 
separable from attentional switching processes, would not preclude a reconfiguration-only 
source for those switching processes.  
 
Analysis of errors per category type at every difficulty level confirmed that, as 
predicted, there were no errors of either type in any of the colour categories. Removal of the 
need to update items in these categories confirmed that errors of the within-category type are 
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entirely task related as indicated by Arbuthnott and Frank’s (2000) interpretation and the 
suggestion that they are under the control of the automatic System 1 (Kahneman (2011). Both 
relate to task-related issues, albeit in different ways (Arbuthnott via WM and Kahneman via 
the type of control). Unusually the category ‘days’ did not produce significantly more errors 
at the highest difficulty level of 4 overlearned sequences – the category did produce 
significantly more errors during the 3 overlearned sequence trial. No clear reason for the lack 
of prominence for ‘days’ presented itself and so the finding could be anomalous. Any 
difference between Continuous Series III and previous presentations of the verbal task would 
have to be related to the preceding trial (3 overlearned sequences with four categories 
including one colour). There is no obvious reason why increased task difficulty in terms of 
number of categories on the preceding 3 overlearned sequence trial would increase errors for 
the category ‘numbers’ (this scored one error less than ‘days’).  
 
As well as being absent from colour categories, between-category errors were seen to 
increase with the number of overlearned sequence categories present in the task. That no such 
errors were committed in relation to colour categories would suggest that the content of the 
categories contributes to occurrence of the errors and so they may not be entirely executive 
related as suggested by Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) and the current work. However, this is 
not to say that such errors are necessarily entirely memory based . Gurd et al. (2003) have 
suggested that task switching errors are not inevitably memory related, although offer no 
further discussion as to their source. The lack of differentiation between error types in the 
literature and indeed the lack of consideration of error rates at all77give limited background 
against which to interpret the presentation of error rates in the current work. Interpretation of 
                                                           
77
 For example, Gilbert & Shallice (2002) disregard discussion of error rates in their work “…since reaction 
times have received greater attention than errors in studies of task switching…” (Gilbert & Shallice (2002), 
p.314) 
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between-category errors as relating to Kahneman’s (2011) System 2 would dictate that such 
errors are following interpretation of rules and are analytic and sequential (Tsujii & 
Watanabe, 2009), in effect executive errors. However, WM supports System 2 thinking, 
offering a workspace within which to reason. Between-category errors may therefore reflect 
some element of WM as well as (and inevitably concomitant to) executive function. 
However, accounting for memory in this error type goes no further in explaining why it does 
not occur of colours. Is it instead entirely task related?  
 
Equally it could be that repeating the same response over and over, as for the colour 
categories, does not constitute a task switch in the same way as a two choice decision (as in 
the Arbuthnott and Frank and many other studies). There could be a threshold for activation 
of executive errors which requires some executive content to the task. This might act in a 
similar way to the suppression threshold suggested by Yeung and Monsell (2003) for 
asymmetry related interference. In the same way that the ability of tasks to interfere with each 
other temporally was relative to their comparative content, the ability of tasks of categories to 
interfere with each other at an executive sequencing level may be relative to there being an 
executive choice-based element to that category. Under such conditions the assumption that 
between-category errors would occur in colour categories would be erroneous. Unlike the 
Arbuthnott and Frank study the majority of between-category errors were again sequencing 
rather than perseverative. This suggests that activation for the previous task is not ‘lingering’ 
as in a TSI-based account of switch cost (Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994), although again the 
limitation of not being able to differentiate between alternating and non-alternating per-
switch cost restricts the certainty of this supposition. However, the nature of between-
category errors may cautiously be taken as support for a reconfiguration basis for switch cost. 
This is in conjunction with the proposed threshold requirement for category content which 
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would support separation of task and switching processes (lack of errors in colour categories 
would otherwise suggest incomplete separation).  
 
As a caveat it should be noted that, as well as differentiating between decision (task 
related System 1) and switch (executive System 2) errors using surface features relating to the 
content of the errors (right task/ wrong item and wrong task respectively), Arbuthnott and 
Frank (2000) typified task related (within-category) errors as occurring uniformly across all 
switching conditions. Executive errors occurred more frequently in the alternating switch 
condition (A-B-A) than the non-alternating (A-B-C) and no-switch conditions. The no-switch 
equivalent in the Continuous Series tasks is the non-switching baseline, which is of limited 
duration (15 seconds per category) in comparison to the full task. Within-category errors 
(task-related decision error equivalents) at this baseline stage are rare, due to the overlearned 
nature of sequences and truncated length of the task. Due to the continuous nature of the task 
and the calculation of general switch cost it is not possible to make any comparison to the 
alternating and non-alternating switching conditions in the Arbuthnott and Frank study. The 
possible limitation of comparison of within/ between and decision/ wrong-task errors using 
only the surface features of error content should be acknowledged, although no other 
description of errors in the literature is as amenable to error production in the Continuous 
Series tasks.   
 
5 Conclusion 
• In line with both hypothesis 1 (difficulty would increase with number of categories) 
and all other versions of the task, rate, switch cost and number of errors increase as 
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the task becomes more difficult in terms of increasing the number of overlearned 
sequences.  
• More cost seems attributable to the content than the number of categories being 
switched between, although whether single response choice colour categories fully 
constitute a task in the more usual sense is questionable.  
• While calculation of general switch cost does not allow direct switch costs to be 
explicitly separated from task and task proximity costs, it is clear that some portion of 
overall costs are attributable to direct switch costs. 
• The effect of category content on switch cost is not taken to exclude reconfiguration 
as a source for switch cost – the task related cost of producing overlearned sequences 
is seen as separable from attentional switching costs, a requirement for 
reconfiguration accounts. 
• Hypothesis 2, that within category errors would occur only in overlearned sequence 
categories, is supported.  
• Hypothesis 3, that between-category errors would occur in both category types. is not 
supported. The lack of between-category errors in colour categories is interpreted in 
terms of a threshold relating to task content – rather than being tied to the content of 
overlearned sequence categories, which would suggest a non-reconfiguration basis for 
switch cost, the error production is suppressed (or not initiated) by the lack of content 
in the colour categories.  
 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
303 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: INVESTIGATING THE USE OF 
CONTINUOUSLY AVAILABLE EXPLICIT CUES DURING 
VERBAL TASK SWITCHING  
 
1 Introduction 
Chapter six discusses the use of cues with the Continuous Series II task. The verbal 
switching task typically makes no use of externally presented cues or stimuli. This arguably 
increases memory load during the task by reliance on foreknowledge, although the 
overlearned nature of the categories is asserted to minimise any such effects (Gurd et al., 
2002). Additionally this does away with the need to process any additional cue information 
(Logan & Bundesen, 2003, 2004). It has been asserted that uncued switching sequences are 
too burdensome to working memory (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) but this has been countered 
by the claim that highly familiar and explicit cues externalise too much of the decision 
process in switching (Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 2001). Reliance on foreknowledge places 
greater demands on self initiated preparation for switching than reliance on cues, which has 
the support of an external trigger for switching. It has been found that PD patients cannot 
make use of foreknowledge in the absence of cues (Werheid, Koch, Reichert & Brass, 2007), 
providing evidence for separation of these preparation processes. Logan and Bundesen (2003) 
go further by stating that the use of cues during switching entirely negates the need for self 
initiated control. However, Monsell and Mizon (2006) refute this with the claim that task 
predictability was not controlled for in the Logan and Bundesen study, removing the 
requirement for active use of cues to indicate the upcoming task. Clearly the comparison 
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between foreknowledge and cued task identity is not clear cut, with processing advantages 
and disadvantages associated with both.  
 
The use of cues more generally allows for manipulation of the cue-stimulus interval 
(CSI) and the utilisation of an unpredictable task order (e.g. Monsell, Sumner & Waters, 
2003). In such circumstances the longer the CSI the greater the reduction in switch cost due 
to maximal preparation time for the upcoming task. The incremental updating of items within 
categories in the Continuous Series II and the fixed order of the task sequence does not allow 
for random task order. Manipulation of CSI is therefore not practical (see Figure 18) and so 
cues used during the current task are continuously available. This has the advantage of only 
requiring cues to be processed once at the beginning of the task, much as the instructional cue 
paradigm employed by Logan & Schneider (2006a). 
 
 
 
Response 
detected 
Task cue Next stimulus 
RCI CSI 
RSI RT RT 
(a) 
Response 
detected 
Response 
detected 
RRI 
RT (continuous) 
(b) 
 
 
Figure 18 Typical cued switching task (a) and verbal switching task (b). RCI = response-
cue interval; CSI = cue-stimulus interval; RSI = response-stimulus interval; RRI = 
response-response interval; RT = reaction time 
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The type of cues used in the current study are whole word (‘Days’) and initial letter 
(‘D’ = Days) cues. Both are linguistic and related to the upcoming task but vary only in their 
physical length and explicitness. A similar format (using arbitrary rather than initial letters) 
has been used by Logan and Bundesen (2004) to investigate coincidence and divergence of 
cue and task repeats; differences in data were related to differential processing of the type of 
cue.  In accordance with this, Lavric, Mizon & Monsell (2008) found additional left 
hemisphere processing in response to a picture as oppose to a verbal cue, suggesting 
additional translational processing was required for the picture cue. Elchlepp et al. (2012) 
used ERP data to show that use of an explicit verbal cue has a ‘special efficacy’ in triggering 
advance TSR and refocuses attention automatically.  
 
It is expected that whole-word cues will have a beneficial effect on switch cost. 
Monsell (2005) states that explicit external word cues are supportive of verbal self-
instruction. Goshcke (2000) goes further in stating that linguistic self-instruction is critical for 
task-set reconfiguration. Monsell notes that it is difficult to directly compare verbal and non-
verbal (pictorial, symbolic) cues as it is hard to match all properties other than their linguistic 
content. It is likely that translation will be required for initial letter cues so these will be less 
successful than whole words – cue translation has been cited as a contributor to the inhibitory 
costs of backward inhibition (e.g. Grange & Houghton, 2010). It is unclear whether the cost 
of translation will supersede the assumed benefit of using a cue. Appropriate verbal cues such 
as full names should alleviate the need to make one’s own as in the use of inner speech as a 
self-cueing device (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Kray, Eber & Lindenberger, 2004). It has been 
found that use of a verbal cue (e.g. ‘colour’) partially overcomes the suppressive effect of 
irrelevant speech during switching (Miyake et al., 2004). Therefore full name cues should 
overcome any suppressive effect that rehearsing category order using inner speech has on 
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updating of items within categories. As a result use of full name cues (and to a lesser extent 
initial letter cues) should result in a reduction in the number of within-category errors as well 
as reducing switch cost.  
 
Although the Continuous Series II is not felt to overly load working memory during 
switching (Gurd et al. 2002), the ‘double switch’ nature of the task (switching between 
categories and updating items within categories) could be construed as more complex than 
tasks generally seen in the literature, particularly at the most difficult 4-category level. 
Increasing the number of switches has been found to increase interference with working 
memory (Liefooghe et al., 2008). The use of continuously available cues will remove the 
need to remember task order (removing the need to rely on foreknowledge of the task) as well 
as item order. Due to the more complex nature of the constituent tasks there will still be an 
executive element within the tasks, thus addressing Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans’s (2001) 
criticism that explicit cues remove too much of the decision making process from switching 
while still addressing the question of working memory load (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The 
need to rely on foreknowledge will be removed in a way that places less processing load on 
the use of cues. As such it is predicted that both types of cue will reduce the degree of switch 
cost produced at each level of difficulty. Whole word cues will be expected to be more 
successful in this due to the reduced processing requirement compared to initial letter. The 
benefit of whole word cues is expected to be most obvious at the 4-category switching level, 
due to the greater interference in working memory caused by the greater number of switches 
(as per Liefooghe et al., 2008). 
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 As well as reducing switch cost, the alleviation of memory load for category order is 
expected to extinguish between-category errors. Although such errors are posited as being 
under the control of System 2 (Kahneman (2011) in that they represent executive control of 
switching, it should be remembered that System 2 is underpinned by WM. Between-category 
errors occur as the task becomes more difficult and the need to rely on foreknowledge of task 
order increases – errors of this nature do not occur when switching between only 2-
categories. Reliance on foreknowledge in this way would explain why between-category 
errors in the Continuous Series II would appear to be at least partially memory reliant. It has 
been previously stated (Experiment 5, Chapter 7) that between category errors might not be 
fully representative of executive control over switching78. If between-category errors are just 
a case of forgetting then use of cues (particularly whole word cues) will eradicate them. If 
between category errors are not eradicated then it can safely be concluded that they are not 
wholly memory related and do largely draw on executive failure (which would also explain 
their rarity in healthy participants). 
 
2 Aims and Hypotheses 
 The introduction of full name and initial letter constantly available cues to the 
Continuous Series II is predicted to reduce reliance on foreknowledge for task order, resulting 
in a reduction in switch cost, a reduction in within-category errors and elimination of 
between-category errors. Full name cues are predicted to be more successful than initial letter 
cues. 
                                                           
78
 Although it was noted that the lack of between-category errors in colour categories could have been due to the 
lack of executive content in the task. 
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1. Cues of both types will reduce switch cost, initial letter cues to a lesser degree than 
whole word cues. 
2. Cues of both types will reduce within-category errors, due to their ability to overcome 
the suppressive effect that rehearsing category order might have on producing 
category items. 
3. Cues of both types will eliminate between-category errors as they will be supportive 
of verbal self-instruction/ inner speech. This will indicate a memory element for such 
errors as suggested in Experiment 5, Chapter 7.  
 
3 EXPERIMENT SIX 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
Task speech rate (w/sec) and switch cost (% w/sec increase were assessed using a 3 x 
3 mixed design, with a between-participants factor of Cue type (None, Low and High79) and a 
within-participants factor of Task Difficulty (2, 3 or 4 categories). Within and Between 
category errors were assed non-parametrically  
 
3.1.2 Participants  
The sample (N = 124, females = 93) were undergraduate and taught postgraduate 
students from the University of Hertfordshire who received course credit for taking part and 
individuals from the wider community recruited by word of mouth who received no payment.  
                                                           
79
 ‘Low’ and ‘High’ refers to the level of semantic content. 
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All participants were right handed native English speakers and were screened according to 
the criteria set out in Chapter 2. Of the original 136 participants recruited and tested one was 
excluded due to an extreme number of errors (only 40% accuracy) during 4-category 
switching, one was excluded due to a total inability to keep category order over 3 and 4-
category switching, six were excluded due to early discontinuation (completing 25-40%) of 
4-category switching, three due to very low NART IQ scores and one due to late disclosure 
of screening ineligibility. The cue groups did not differ significantly on demographic or 
baseline measures (see Table 36). 
 
Table 36 Demographic and Baseline Measures for Cue Sample. 
Group Age NART IQ WAIS-R 
vocab. 
Digit 
span 
forw. 
Digit 
span 
backw. 
Conv. 
speech 
rate 
Whole sample  
(N = 124*) 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
25.71 
(10.09) 
 
 
102.13 
(8.04) 
 
 
10.67 
(2.07) 
 
 
6.79 
(1.22) 
 
 
4.77 
(1.08) 
 
 
2.58 
(0.55) 
Cues = None (n = 41) 
Mean 
SD 
 
26.28 
(10.55) 
 
101.87 
(8.30) 
 
10.49 
(2.00) 
 
6.97 
(1.27) 
 
4.82 
(1.14) 
 
2.58 
(0.60) 
Cues = Low (n = 41) 
Mean 
SD 
 
25.40 
(9.68) 
 
101.48 
(7.58) 
 
10.78 
(2.21) 
 
6.83 
(1.01) 
 
4.80 
(0.99) 
 
2.55 
(0.61) 
Cues = High (n = 42) 
Mean 
SD 
 
24.90 
(9.79) 
 
102.88 
(7.94) 
 
10.61 
(2.02) 
 
6.63 
(1.34) 
 
4.80 
(1.10) 
 
2.63 
(0.45) 
* Whole sample N = 123 for WAIS-R, N = 121 for normal speech rate 
 
3.1.3 Stimuli 
For all cue conditions the Continuous Series II task was used, the only difference 
being the type of cues presented – no cues (‘None’), low semantic content cues (‘Low’) and 
high semantic content cues (‘High’). Low and high semantic content referred to the 
relationship between the cue and the target category, with the cue presenting either the initial 
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letter or whole name of the category e.g. ‘N’ or ‘Number’. Cues were presented centrally 
placed in black Arial font (bold, size 36) on a laptop PC, using MS PowerPoint 2007. 
 
3.2 Procedure: Deviation from general method 
The procedure followed that described in Chapter 2 up until commencement of the 
switching task.  Participants in the ‘no cue’ condition proceeded as per the general method 
description; those in the two cued groups were told that a visual aid would be placed in front 
of them (see Appendix D for full instructions).  As the order of categories for each level of 
the task was explained, the experimenter pointed to the relevant cues, which remained in 
place for the duration of that level of the task. The procedure was repeated for each difficulty 
level. The position of the cues was adjusted to the eye level of each participant and presented 
approximately 60 cm in front of them on a laptop computer, as previously described. The 
keyboard of the computer was covered with a sheet of white card so as to prevent any 
additional or conflicting letter or number cues.  
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Data distribution 
Normality of all variables was assessed using the Shapiro-Wilk’s test with 
significance set at .01 and a z limit of + 2.71 (equivalent to an α level of .01 (Field, 2009)) for 
assessment of skewness and kurtosis where applicable. Age was non-normally distributed 
W(120) = 0.73, p < .0001, as was WAIS-R vocabulary W(124) = 0.96, p = .001. Both digit 
span measures were non-normally distributed– forward W(120) = 0.93, p < .0001 and reverse 
W(120) = 0.89, p < .0001.  
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Task speech rate for the whole sample over 4-categories was found to be non-
normally distributed, W(120) = 0.93, p < .0001; this presented as a leptokurtic distribution 
peaking at around 0.25-0.35 w/sec with a significant z-score of 1.58 for kurtosis. However, 
non-normal distribution over 4-categories was expected, in line with previous experiments, 
and so parametric measures were used. Switch cost for the whole sample was non-normally 
distributed over 2-categories, W(120) = 0.96, p = .001, 3-categories, W(120) = 0.96, p = .003 
and 4-categories, W(120) = 0.95, p < .0001. However, as data was largely symmetrical and 
had no outliers, a transformation was not applied and data was analysed as is (Howell, 2002). 
 
Within-category errors were found to be non-normally distributed over 2-categories 
W(120) = 0.56, p < .0001 and over 3-categories W(120) = 0.90, p < .0001; due to the validity 
of a zero score for these variables, transformation was not considered and they were assessed 
non-parametrically due to the severe non-symmetrical distribution.  All levels of the task 
showed a non-normal distribution for between-category errors (no errors were scored over 2-
categories), 3-categories W(120) = 0.26, p < .0001, 4-categories W(120) = 0.41, p < .0001; 
these were again analysed using non-parametric tests. All measures of self-corrections from 
between-category errors presented non-normally p < .0001. 
 
3.3.2 Statistical tests 
Significance levels for post-hoc contrasts made using t-tests or Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests were determined using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjustment throughout (Holm, 
1979). All non-parametric significance levels are exact measures; for Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests this is indicated in the text as one or two-tailed as appropriate. Effect size r was 
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calculated in the following ways (Field, 2009): t-tests, √ ((t2 ÷ (t2 + df)); Wilcoxon signed 
ranks, test statistic Z ÷ √ number of observations. 
 
Task speech rate, switch cost and local switch cost were all analysed using GLM 
mixed ANOVAs and ANCOVAs, where potential covariates were indicated by bivariate 
correlational analysis. Within category errors were assessed using a Friedman’s ANOVA and 
between category errors using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive and preliminary statistics  
As with all previous presentations of the Continuous Series II, task speech rate 
decreased and switch cost increased as the task became more difficult (see Table 37) – cue 
groups did not appear to differ from each other noticeably in this regard. Within-category 
error distribution (see Table 38) did change between groups – ‘None’ and ‘Low’ groups 
returned around twice as many errors as ‘High’ over 2-categories. ‘Low’ and ‘High’ scored 
similarly over 3-categories, with ‘None’ scoring marginally less. There was more of a 
stepped distribution over 4-categories, with errors increasing as the cue became more explicit. 
No between-category errors were made over 2-categories. All cue types scored similarly over 
3-categories. However, there was a marked difference over 4-categories with ‘None’ scoring 
around 87% more errors than the two cue conditions.  
 
Age was found to correlate with NART IQ, r = .54, p < .0001 and with WAIS-R 
vocabulary, r = .30, p = .001 (all significance values two-tailed). NART IQ also correlated 
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with WAIS-R vocabulary r = .67, p < .0001, forward digit span r = .30, p = .001, reverse 
digit span r = .31, p < .0001, CS3rate r = .24, p = .006 and CS4rate r = .26, p = .004. WAIS-R 
vocabulary correlated with CS2cost r = .19, p = .036. Forward digit span correlated with 
WAIS-R vocabulary r = .35, p , .0001, reverse digit span r = .55, p < .0001, CS2rate r = .20, p 
=.025, CS3rate r = .39, p < .0001 and CS4rate r = .44, p < .0001, CS3cost r = -.27, p = .002 and 
CS4cost r = -.21, p = .018. Reverse digit span showed correlations with WAIS-R vocabulary r 
= .31, p < .0001, speech rate r = .20, p = .029 and all three rate measures CS2rate r = .34, p < 
.0001, CS3rate r = .36, p < .0001 and CS4rate r = .41, p < .0001. Consequently both forward 
and reverse digit span were highlighted as a possible covariates for task speech rate and 
forward digit span as one for switch cost. 
 
3.4.2 Task speech rate 
Task speech rate (see Table 37 and Figure 19) slowed significantly as the task became 
more difficult, Λ = .06, F(2, 120) = 990.29, p < .0001, η2 = .94. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons showed this difference to be significant at all levels, p < .0001. There was no 
significant effect of cue type F(2, 121) = 1.31, p = .273, η2 = .02 and no significant 
interaction, Λ = .93, F(2, 240) = 2.25, p = .064, η2 = .04. Both forward and reverse digit span 
were stratified – forward digit span (Low M = 5.58, High M = 8.2680), reverse digit span 
(Low M = 3.79, High M = 5.51). These were entered into the analysis to determine any 
covariate effect. These were found to be independently non-significant: digit span forward 
(stratified) F(2, 107) = 1.68, p = .192, η2 = .03; digit span reverse (stratified) F(1, 107) = 
0.82, p = .368, η2 = .01. 
 
                                                           
80
 Medium level for forward digit span was a constant of 7 
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3.4.3 Switch cost 
As predicted, switch cost (see Table 37 and Figure 20) increased as the task became 
more difficult, Λ = .07, F(2, 120) = 775.88, p < .0001, η2 = .93. Post hoc comparisons 
revealed this to be significant at all levels, p < .0001. For switch cost there was no significant 
effect of cue type, F(2, 121) = 2.71, p = .071, η2 = .04. There was however a significant 
interaction between the number of categories and the type of cue,  Λ = .92, F(4, 240) = 2.62, 
p = .036, η2 = .04. Digit span forward was found to have no independent effect as a covariate 
on switch cost, F(2, 115) = 2.09, p = .128, η2 = .04. 
Table 37 Descriptive Statistics for Whole Sample including Cue Groups (N = 124) for Task Speech 
Rate and Switch Cost. 
 Continuous Series II 
  
Speech rate 
(w/sec) 
 
Switch cost 
(% w/sec increase) 
Group 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
Whole sample  
(N = 124) 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
1.19 
0.24 
 
 
 
0.57 
0.20 
 
 
 
0.32 
0.10 
 
 
 
63.46 
9.23 
 
 
 
81.05 
6.71 
 
 
 
90.31 
3.41 
 
Cues = None  
(n = 41) 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
1.23 
0.23 
 
 
 
0.62 
0.21 
 
 
 
0.32 
0.09 
 
 
 
61.57 
9.89 
 
 
 
79.32 
7.36 
 
 
 
90.17 
3.49 
 
Cues = Low 
 (n = 41) 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
1.16 
0.25 
 
 
 
0.52 
0.20 
 
 
 
0.32 
0.10 
 
 
 
65.87 
7.51 
 
 
 
82.87 
5.81 
 
 
 
90.79 
3.22 
 
Cues = High  
(n = 42) 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
1.18 
0.25 
 
 
 
0.56 
0.19 
 
 
 
0.33 
0.11 
 
 
 
62.96 
9.76 
 
 
 
80.96 
6.54 
 
 
 
89.99 
3.56 
 
‘None’ rate: M = 0.72, SE = 0.02  ‘None’ cost: M = 77.02, SE = 0.87   
‘Low’ rate: M = 0.67, SE = 0.02  ‘Low’ cost: M = 79.84, SE = 0.87 
‘High’ rate: M = 0.69, SE = 0.02  ‘High’ cost: M = 77.97, SE = 0.86 
2-cat rate: M = 1.19, SE = 0.02  2-cat cost: M = 63.47, SE = 0.82 
3-cat rate: M = 0.57, SE = 0.02  3-cat cost: M = 80.67, SE = 0.79 
4-cat rate: M = 0.32, SE = 0.01  4-cat cost: M = 90.29, SE = 0.40 
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Figure 19 Task speech rate (w/sec) for Continuous Series II in conditions cue = None, cue = Low 
and cue = High 
 
 
 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
316 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 Switch cost (% w/sec increase) for Continuous Series II in conditions cue = None, cue = 
Low and cue = High 
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3.4.4 Within category errors 
The number of within category errors (see Table 38) was not significantly different 
between cue groups at any difficulty level: 2-categories, H(2) = 3.76, p = .153, 3-categories 
H(2) = 0.95, p = .623 and 4-categories, H(2) = 4.92, p = .085.  
 
3.4.5 Between category errors 
No between-category errors were made over 2-categories. There was no significant 
difference between cue groups over 3-categories H(2) = 0.28, p = .870 but there was over 4-
categories H(2) = 15.54, p < .0001. Post-hoc comparisons using Mann-Whitney tests (at an 
alpha level of .017) showed this significance to occur between cue groups ‘None’ and ‘Low’ 
U = 608.00, z = -3.05, p = .002, r = -0.34 and cue groups ‘None’ and ‘High’ U = 618.50, z = -
3.13, p = .002, r = -0.34 but not between groups ‘Low’ and ‘High’ U = 858.50, z = -0.05, p = 
.960, r = -0.06. In both significant conditions the no-cue group scored many more errors than 
the two cue groups.  
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Table 38 Descriptive Statistics for Whole Sample including Cue Groups (N = 79) for Within and 
Between Category Errors. 
 Continuous Series II  
 Within-category 
errors 
Between-category 
errors 
Group 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
Sample  
(N = 124) 
Sum 
n 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
36 
31 
0.29 
0.54 
 
 
506 
102 
4.08 
3.76 
 
 
1382 
122 
11.15 
5.34 
 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
31 
8 
0.25 
1.03 
 
 
66 
20 
0.53 
1.54 
Cues = None  
(n = 26) 
Sum 
n 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
17 
14 
0.41 
0.63 
 
 
164 
33 
4.00 
3.96 
 
 
419 
40 
10.22 
5.31 
 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
12 
3 
0.29 
1.15 
 
 
53 
14 
1.29 
2.34 
Cues = Low 
 (n = 27) 
Sum 
n 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
12 
10 
0.29 
0.56 
 
 
171 
33 
4.17 
3.09 
 
 
505 
40 
12.32 
5.48 
 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
10 
3 
0.24 
0.99 
 
 
7 
3 
0.17 
0.70 
Cues = High  
(n = 26) 
Sum 
n 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
7 
7 
0.17 
0.38 
 
 
176 
34 
4.07 
4.22 
 
 
576 
42 
10.90 
5.16 
 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
9 
2 
0.21 
0.98 
 
 
6 
3 
0.14 
0.65 
 
 
3.4.6 Self-corrections 
Self corrections were analysed to see how many occurred that were corrections away 
from a between-category error (e.g. in category days “March – no, Wednesday”). For this 
analysis both correct and incorrect self-corrections were considered together – it did not 
matter whether the correction was to a correct response, only that it was from a between-
category error. Comparisons were made for each level of difficulty using the Kruskal-Wallis 
test for several independent samples. For 2-category switching such corrections were only 
made by the whole word cue group (see Table 39); for 3 and 4 category switching they were 
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made by all three cue groups. Initial letters were highest followed by whole words and no 
cues. However, results were non-significant: 2-categories H(2) = 1.95, p = .377, 3-categories 
H(2) = 4.58, p = .101, 4-categories H(2) = 2.72, p = .257. Further to this, for 2-category 
switching 100% of corrections were made in the absence of between category errors; for 3-
category switching 96% of corrections were in the absence of between category errors; for 4-
category switching it was 85%. 
 
Table 39 Descriptive Statistics for Self-Corrections from Between-Category Errors.. 
 2-cats 3-cats 4-cats 
Whole group (n = 124) 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
1 
1 
0.01 
0.09 
 
40 
31 
0.32 
0.63 
 
47 
35 
0.40 
0.75 
None (n = 41) 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
7 
7 
0.17 
0.38 
 
10 
8 
0.24 
0.54 
Low (n = 41) 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
 
19 
15 
0.46 
0.71 
 
22 
14 
0.59 
1.02 
High (n = 42) 
Sum 
N 
Mean 
SD 
 
1 
1 
0.02 
0.15 
 
14 
9 
0.33 
0.72 
 
15 
13 
0.36 
0.58 
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4 Discussion 
Neither task speech rate nor switch cost exhibited a significant effect of cue; in both 
instances the original task with no cues was the fastest/ least costly and initial letter cues were 
the slowest/ most costly. Crucially the presumably non-translational full name cue did not 
have a beneficial effect. Despite the single continuous presentation of cues (assumed to result 
in reduced cue processing) and use of directly related cues there failed to be a beneficial 
effect. Foreknowledge in the absence of cued task identity (as in the no-cue condition) is the 
most effective approach to completing the task. Both measures displayed convergence of cue 
types at 4-category switching of the type seen previously with different task versions 
(Experiment 3) and with categories in different orders (Experiment 4). Convergence was 
previously partially attributed to the beneficial effect of largely error free switching at 2-
categories and partially to the slowing effect of switching between 4-categories; in the current 
study convergence could certainly be due to difficulty related slowing.  
 
As in the Logan and Bundesen (2004) study, full name cues resulted in faster results 
than initial letter cues (in that study arbitrary), reflecting as they stated the ‘transparent’ 
nature of the more meaningful cue. In that study the letter is assumed to be translated to the 
whole word and then used jointly with the target to retrieve the response from memory. In the 
current study this compound effect is not taking place in the same way, mediated by the fact 
that the Continuous Series II does not use externally presented stimuli. Internal representation 
of the category stimuli does not seem to have the same effect as overt presentation. Even 
though the cue is removing the load from working memory it is not being compounded by the 
presentation of a visible stimulus as is occurring in the Logan and Bundesen study. The 
strength of this compound effect is apparently such that, on its own, the processing of the cue 
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exerts a negative effect in that it contributes an extra step to be completed before the response 
is delivered. The compound cue effect itself is said to be sufficient to facilitate switching in 
the absence of reconfiguration (Logan & Schneider, 2010). The current study therefore 
supports those studies which highlight cue processing as an additional contributor to cost 
(e.g. Logan & Bundesen 2003, 2004), something which is emphasised in the absence of 
externally presented stimuli. The additional activity required to process the cue carried more 
weight in the overall cost equation than any beneficial effects to memory.  
 
Switching in the verbal task is predictable; preparation for the upcoming response can 
occur immediately after the last one is delivered. This has been noted by Monsell & Mizon 
(2006) to elicit the same type of reduction in switch cost as the cueing paradigm. So the no 
cue condition is perhaps the best level of cost to be achieved in the task – cues introduce an 
additional level of processing cost not able to be mediated by a compound stimulus 
presentation. Additionally the fact that full name cues do not have a beneficial effect does not 
fully equate with the conclusions of Logan & Schneider (2006) who suggest that cues trigger 
goals, and that goal awareness is adequate for a successful task response. The findings of the 
current study suggest that the opposing view of cues triggering rules, which in turn facilitate a 
successful response, may be more appropriate (see Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). Despite Monsell’s 
(2005) assertion that whole word cues entirely mimic and support self-verbalisation, it would 
seem that processing of even such transparent cues represent and additional costly step. Cues 
are beneficial (and of course necessary) in random order presentation but are not the most 
efficient approach for fixed order foreknowledge-based tasks.  
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Results for within-category errors did not support the hypothesis that errors would be 
reduced for the two cue conditions. There was no significant difference in the number of 
within-category errors between cue conditions at any difficulty level. The additional 
processing of the cue seems to be equally as catastrophic for error production as for speech 
rate and switch cost. It may have been reasonable to suppose that use of cues would support 
representation of the task order (mediated by phonological representation of the task as 
posited by Emerson & Miyake, 2003), freeing up inner speech to rehearse item order and so 
reduce within-category errors. However, the cost of processing the cues appears to overcome 
any supposed benefit of this nature. Anecdotally many participants reported that they found 
processing of the cues to be confusing – they found the extra level of phonological processing 
to interfere with production of category items. Thus rather than freeing up inner speech it 
would appear that representation of the externally presented cue is occupying this self-cuing 
device. Foreknowledge of the task, as in the non-cue condition, has the benefit of being a 
singly ‘presented’ cue that can be referred to without further effortful processing. Although 
one of the aims of having a constantly available cue was to prevent constant cue reprocessing 
this was not the case. The row of cues was read linearly at each iteration of the category order 
(e.g. numbers, days, months, numbers...). During silent reading the acoustic representations 
of inner speech are automatically activated (Abramson & Goldinger, 1997), thus there is no 
capacity for inner speech to be freed up for item rehearsal. Processing of the cue forces the 
use of inner speech. Again in terms of item accuracy it would seem that even transparent cues 
are not beneficial for fixed order foreknowledge-based language switching.  
  
Use of a cue was beneficial in greatly reducing but not extinguishing between-
category errors when the task was at its most difficult level only. The type of cue used made 
no difference to the reduction; use of no cue resulted in over seven times as many errors as 
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using either a full name or initial letter cue. Use of a cue therefore did not appear to entirely 
take over the role of foreknowledge in the task. Alleviation of cues was not triggered until the 
4-category switching level – when switching over 3-categories the number of errors was 
comparable for all three conditions. Task difficulty would seem to be a factor in the 
usefulness of cues to reduce between-category errors. However, this is not equivalent to the 
predicted extinguishment of errors. And why was the reduction only seen at the most difficult 
level? The phenomenon of participants not having to use cues unless stimulus information is 
ambiguous (in this case unless it is difficult) has been noted as a problem in application of 
cue use (Mayr & Keele, 2000 – page 55 of this document). When informally questioned after 
the task a notable number of participants stated that they only actively used the cues when the 
task reached the most difficult level. This incomplete application of cue use could also 
explain the continuing low level of between-category error production over 4-categories 
rather than complete elimination. Additionally the issue of between-category errors is 
compounded by the commission of such errors which are then corrected. If cues are acting as 
predicted no such corrections should occur. Corrected between category errors were 
committed by all three groups (more so by cue groups, but not significantly). The vast 
majority of such corrected errors were committed in the absence of any un-corrected 
between-category errors, meaning that commission of between-category errors was actually 
far more widespread than analysis of errors alone shows. The continued commission of 
between-category errors, both corrected uncorrected (albeit at a reduced rate), would give 
evidence that costs within the Continuous Series II are not overtly memory related. As such it 
is possible, along with results from previous experiments, to preclude memory-based 
explanations of switch cost such as the TSI and associative interference hypotheses that rely 
on carryover of task set within memory.   
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5 Conclusions 
• Hypothesis 1, that both types of cues would reduce cost, is not supported. Cue 
processing in the absence of externally presented stimuli to provide a compound 
effect offers an additional level of processing which adds to overall costs.  
• Similarly, hypothesis 2, that both types of cues would reduce within-category errors, 
is also not supported. Within-category errors are not reduced by the use of cues. 
Constant unforeseen reprocessing of the cue on every iteration takes precedent in 
inner speech and very likely interferes with self-verbalisation.  
• Finally hypothesis 3, that between-category errors would be eliminated, has also not 
been supported. Between-category errors are greatly reduced but not eliminated at the 
most difficult level of the task. Such failure of cues would suggest that memory-based 
explanations of switch cost do not apply for the Continuous Series II.  
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CHAPTER NINE: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
1 Introduction 
The current thesis has examined the Continuous Series II (a task which requires 
individuals to switch between increasing numbers of overlearned sequences), examining the 
effects of introducing semantic categories to the task, of changing the order of the 
overlearned sequences within the task, of manipulating the complexity of items within the 
sequences (by using single word repetitions instead of overlearned sequences) and of 
introducing explicit cues to prompt the sequences. It has been shown that the Continuous 
Series II offers a reliable measure of continuous task general switch cost – cost and errors 
consistently increase in line with the number of categories being switched between. A degree 
of this real time whole-task cost is attributable to the updateable ‘complex’ content of the 
category tasks. As indicated by the results of Experiment 5, the content of the task 
(overlearned sequences as oppose to repeated colour words) significantly contributes towards 
both switch cost and error rate. However, as seen from the results of Experiment 4, the order 
the categories are presented in does not contribute to the overall cost. A proportion of the 
switch cost in the verbal task is therefore task-related. Nevertheless, the complex nature of 
these real time tasks has intrinsic value that compensates for this merging of different sources 
of cost. As noted by Altmann (Altmann, 2004; Altmann & Trafton, 2004), discrete measures 
of per-switch cost occupy a fraction of the time period taken to complete whole tasks. 
‘Higher level’ tasks such as those used by Altmann & Trafton (2004) (a simulated war 
strategy task) and the Continuous Series II require a broader measure of whole-time costs to 
capture the continuous strategy employed to complete the tasks in an environment that 
includes recovery from, and avoidance of, errors. As such the calculation of a multi-
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component whole-task cost is valuable as it reflects the entire process of completing multiple 
tasks. Faster completion of the task was not facilitated by the inclusion of explicit external 
cues – reliance on foreknowledge rather than cues resulted in faster responses, although cues 
were successful in reducing errors. The implications of these findings apply themselves in 
three main areas as identified in the Thesis Aims – general costs of continuous switching over 
time, switching in working memory as a separable process to perceptual switching and 
interpretation of errors during switching. Additionally results are considered in terms of 
reconfiguration and carryover accounts of switch cost. 
 
1.1 Real time tasks and the use of general switch cost 
Switching between continuous tasks over time is not well represented in the literature; 
Altmann & Trafton (2004) question the usefulness in assessing true task switching of the 
more typical experimental tasks which in effect span one or two switches for the purposes of 
measuring switch cost. The Continuous Series II measures the cumulative effects of 
switching over time, as one might do in a real-life instance of multi-tasking (e.g. González & 
Mark, 2004). Although the constituent tasks themselves (repeating overlearned sequences) 
are not entirely ‘everyday’, their changing and interactive nature is more in line with the 
ecologically valid criterion set by Altmann. In all the experiments contained within the 
current work the Continuous Series II delivered a whole-task measure of switch cost that 
consistently rose as the number of tasks being switched between increased. As such the task 
offers a reliable measure of whole-task costs over time in the face of increasing same-task 
difficulty i.e. difficulty is not increased by introducing tasks of different types. The task 
reflects the “…global representational structures…” (Kleinsorge et al., 2004, p.31) within 
which switching behaviour takes place. These account not only for the responses that have 
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been made (current and preceding trial) but also for the potential responses that could have 
been made for the preceding, current and subsequent trials. It has been demonstrated by 
Kleinsorge et al. (2004) that certain aspects of switch cost are only apparent when four 
possible tasks are required to complete a whole block, rather than considering a switch 
between two tasks in isolation. Costs observed between Task A and Task B in a block where 
four tasks could potentially be employed were greater than for just an isolated switch between 
Task A and Task B. They proposed that such costs were separate from mixing costs (which 
are the extra time it takes to repeat a task in a switch block as opposed to a single task block) 
representing the cost of maintaining two tasks sets extra to switching. How difficult a task 
switch is deemed to be (and so how effectively it is achieved) depends on what other 
potential switches may have occurred in its place, which involves more than just the 
maintenance of tasks sets as is the case for mixing costs. Of course, Kleinsorge and 
colleagues’ interpretation only applies to situations where switching potentially occurs 
between more than two tasks, but as such is ideally employed in thinking about the 
calculation of cost for the Continuous Series II. Indeed, it is doubly applicable to the verbal 
switching paradigm as switching occurs within each task (choosing the correct item rather 
than always making the same response to particular task) as well as between tasks. The global 
“…task space…” (Kleinsorge et al., 2004, p.39) embeds representations of all potential 
behaviours. Task switches do not occur in isolation but in the context of a broader range of 
representations and behaviours, including the need to recover from interruptions (Altmann & 
Trafton, 2004) which in this context would be posed by errors.  
 
Although trials in the alternating runs paradigm (and others) are measured on an 
individual basis their presentation is within the structure of a lengthy block of trials. Work 
which has looked specifically at global effects (e.g. Gopher et al., 2000, Kleinsorge et al., 
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2004) has done so within the confines of an alternating runs paradigm. However, the current 
work (more akin to Jersild’s (1927) alternating tasks procedure) can still inform in a broad 
perspective about the nature of general costs as a direct measure. Measuring at the level of 
per-trial switch cost fails to take account of the influence of tasks which precede, follow and 
offer an alternative to the one currently being performed (Kleinsorge et al., 2004). 
Interpretation of data from Experiment 3 in the current work looking at ‘local’ cost for the 
Mixed Category II task (local in terms of a single task but not a single trial) incorporated a 
measure of the switch to the subsequent category as well as production of the word within the 
current category. The pattern of reverse asymmetry in the Mixed Category II task was seen in 
the context of this subsequent task switch. As such, this broader measure of switching 
between two tasks rather than for one task switch in isolation has informed an interpretation 
of switch cost that indicates a lack of carryover from the previous task. Local cost calculation 
in Experiment 3 accounted for the time taken to switch to the current task, calculating cost 
from the end of Task A to the end of Task B inclusive. As such, the whole-task contributors 
of disengaging from the previous task, considering the possible alternatives in terms of task 
and task item (as indicated by Kleinsorge et al., 2004), engaging the appropriate task set and 
(on occasion) discarding an incorrect choice were all accounted for. Any enduring carryover 
from Task A would have been captured as a delay to any one of these inclusive processes.  
 
In a wider context the findings of Experiment 5, using non-updating colour name 
‘categories’, can account for the effects of a broad global setting. In that experiment, at the 
most difficult level of the task (switching between four overlearned sequences) the category 
‘days’ departed from the previously seen trend of producing the greatest number of errors. In 
this instance it could be construed that performance was affected by the last ‘block’ (or 
difficulty level, switching between three overlearned sequences plus one colour category) 
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which was materially different to preceding trials in all other versions of the Continuous 
Series II. Every stage of the task for Experiment 5 included four categories, the number of 
colour categories being balanced against an increasing number of overlearned sequences. The 
constancy of the 4-category condition would have primed the cognitive system to deal with 
four categories per se from a much earlier stage in the task, thus providing practice at 
producing ‘days’ embedded within four categories, albeit ones with changing internal 
demands. Thus the ‘global workspace’ that encompassed the whole task had an effect on the 
pattern of error production. The number of subsequent categories in a constant 4-category run 
changed the ‘space’ in which the production of the category days occurred.  
 
In terms of the accessibility of more than one task set for the current response, as 
previously noted, the existence of mixing costs (Fagot, 1994) further emphasise the 
importance of  global considerations (Kleinsorge et al., 2004). In the alternating runs 
paradigm mixing costs are the reaction time difference between repetitions in switching 
blocks and pure task blocks – they represent the cost of mixing tasks together but not 
switching between them, attributed to having to maintain the availability of more than one 
task set. Experiment 5 in the current work identified proximity costs from performing four 
tasks together regardless of the need to update (as for the overlearned sequences) – in a 
comparable way to mixing costs they reflected the cost of switching between tasks but not 
switching within tasks as was usual with the Continuous Series II. For the verbal switching 
task the wider global context accounts for the changing content of categories as well as a 
linear combination of preceding/ alternative/ subsequent tasks – the current item within a task 
(category) has a direct relationship with the last item produced, the next item produced and 
the range of alternatives that may be produced in its place, so there is a ‘micro global 
workspace’ in operation as well. Global options (different responses preceding, subsequently 
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or as an alternative to the current response) at the micro/ local level had been removed 
showing the differential effect of the more complex updating content in the categories. 
Maintaining availability of alternative responses within each category (quasi-mixing costs) as 
well as alternatives for task choice are two separate sources for cost – in terms of global 
effects each is available to have an effect on the other. Updating of items within a category is 
a feature of the broader task that must impact switching between categories and vice versa.  
 
1.2 Switching in working memory as opposed to perceptual switching 
Task representation in the Continuous Series II is entirely reliant upon working 
memory as there are no externally presented stimuli or task cues. Switching between 
representations in working memory has been noted as separable from perceptual switching 
(Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2006). Comparison of switching between overlearned sequences 
and more memory-reliant semantic categories (the Mixed Category task) with the overlearned 
sequence-only Continuous Series II (Experiments 1-3) has shown that switch cost is 
increased, partially dependent upon the greater reliance on working memory for one of the 
task types81.  
 
In the verbal paradigm it has been shown that working memory representation is more 
effective than perceptual presentation. In Experiment 6 the introduction of external explicit 
(whole word) cues did not reduce switch cost, resulting instead in slower responses (though 
not significantly so). This was interpreted as the additional need to process the cue without 
the supportive compound cue effect usually found in explicit cueing studies, where cues are 
                                                           
81
 Increased switch cost is also sourced to the need to switch between two different verbal domains for the two 
types of verbal category. 
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accompanied by confirmatory externally presented stimuli. The compound cue effect in the 
alternating runs paradigm had been found strong enough to facilitate switching in the absence 
of reconfiguration (Logan & Schneider, 2010) and so the absence of a definitive 
compounding stimulus had a negative effect on cost. Previously it has been stated (Altmann 
& Gray, 2002; Altmann, 2004) that maintaining a fixed task order in memory is more 
efficient than to continually process external cues, due to the need to transform even the most 
explicit cue into a task response. The current work certainly supports such an assertion, 
although the continuous presence of cues in Experiment 6 was aimed to reduce the need to 
continually process them; cue processing could certainly be carried out anew every time there 
was a perceptual shift to the cue rather than a physical re-presentation.  
 
However, the fact that cues did not reduce cost would also suggest that, as proposed 
by Gurd et al. (2002), the Continuous Series II does not present a significant load to working 
memory. If the task was overloading a finite working memory resource then alleviating some 
of this by naming the tasks to be carried out would reduce the load. Working memory load is 
dissociable from other implicit switching processes (e.g. Barch et al., 1997). We know also 
that memory switching, such as is performed in the cue-free Continuous Series II is separable 
from perceptual switching (Wager, Jonides & Smith, 2007). It would seem that, as costs are 
not reduced by measures that clearly alleviate memory load, such a load is not contributing 
excessively to general switch costs in the Continuous Series II. Working memory is a reliable 
facet for carrying out the verbal task but is not excessively loaded, as proposed by Gurd et al. 
(2002). Cue processing costs are more of an issue than working memory load. Thus memory 
reliant accounts of switch cost, such as the task-set inertia hypothesis (Allport, Styles & 
Hsieh, 1994, page 26 of this document) do not seem so applicable for the Continuous Series 
II.  
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Switching in memory is more beneficial for the verbal task than semi-perceptual 
switching (semi in that cues and not stimuli were externally presented). Preparation for the 
upcoming response can be facilitated directly after the current response has been made, noted 
by Monsell & Mizon (2006) to be potentially as effective a preparatory period as that 
afforded by regular explicit cueing. This is at odds with the findings of Wager, Jonides and 
Smith (1994) who identified that selecting both the correct object and attribute to be switched 
were impaired with a working memory task but not for an externally presented task. They 
concluded that attributes (for the verbal task the category item) were inevitably rehearsed 
upon selection of an object (for the verbal task the category) – all attributes were triggered in 
the way that all potential items might be triggered for an overlearned sequence (e.g. items 
Monday through to Sunday for ‘days’). However, in the verbal task this is not a detrimental 
process due to the updating nature of the category items – each time a response is made it 
needs to incrementally advance from the preceding one. As noted costs relating to task 
switching and item updating inevitably feed into one another but they must also support each 
other; knowing that the last item produced was ‘Tuesday’ also flags the fact that the next task 
to be produced is ‘months’. The particular nature of the Continuous Series II means that 
conclusions must be drawn cautiously from dichotomous choice task data.  
 
1.3 Interpretation of errors made during task switching 
Errors made during verbal task switching were of two types, within-category 
(incorrect updating of an item e.g. Monday-Tuesday-Thursday) or between-category 
(incorrect order of categories e.g. ‘Numbers-Months-Days’ instead of ‘Numbers-Days-
Months’). Interpretation of these errors was aligned to Kahneman’s (2011) two-system 
approach to thinking. System 1 (fast and automatic) equated to within-category item errors 
and System 2 (effortful, slower and executive) to between-category task errors. Other work 
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(Arbuthnot & Frank, 2000) linked item errors to working memory and task errors to 
executive functioning. For the Continuous Series II a lack of perseveration (repeating of the 
last task) for between-category errors in all Experiments was a marked departure from the 
Arbuthnott and Frank findings (perseveration was seen in the results for neurological patients 
in Experiment 1). This was interpreted as evidence for greater presence of reconfiguration 
than inhibitory processes at play during the task. Unlike the Arbuthnott and Frank study 
participants were always able to switch task, although not always to the correct one – again 
this presents as evidence for the positive crosstalk between item updating and task changing. 
This mimics the measures taken by Gilbert and Shallice (2002) in their PDP model of 
switching to avoid perseverative errors by constantly updating the start state of the trial. 
 
Crosstalk between item and task update is also manifest in results from Experiment 5 
where between category errors are eliminated in the non-updating arbitrary colour categories. 
Switching between categories only becomes problematic when the content of those categories 
becomes complex and itself requires updating at every category repeat. However, rather than 
indicating between-category errors are in fact memory related rather than executive this is 
interpreted as an artefact of task design for this experiment – the repeating colour categories 
do not present a sufficient amount of executive content as a task to trigger executive errors. 
This again echoes the assertion of Altmann and Trafton (2004) that tasks need to have 
sufficient ecological validity as real-world activities in order to measure executive processes 
during task switching. Thus while the content of task categories may not directly cause 
between-category errors it does have to be of a type that requires executive processes to be 
engaged in order for the opportunity for errors to arise. However, in Kahneman’s model there 
is communication between System1 and System 2. System 1 takes things at face value, which 
could be another reason for the profusion of within-category errors. The responses are of the 
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correct category so are taken to be the correct responses82. This is a detrimental effect of the 
fast thought system. Errors in System 1 are slow to be detected by System 2 and so may 
present as System 2 errors if System 2 processing is on the basis of System 1 output. Intuitive 
automatic System 1 responses are taken for rational System 2 responses and so an error in 
System 1 (perhaps a pervasive error) could lead to a System 2 error. Mapping of error types 
between each other would be more informative about this relationship.  
 
One aspect of error production that is task related is the clustering of errors in the 
category ‘days’ when the task is at its most difficult level. This was found to be a feature of 
task type and not of task order as revealed by the variance on category order in Experiment 4. 
That accuracy costs should be related to the type of tasks being performed indicates that some 
portion of the general costs calculated for the Continuous Series II are task-related rather than 
switch-related costs. The increased errors were attributed to the relative ‘weakness’ of the 
category ‘days’ when subjected to proximity effects of three additional categories – the 
repeated common suffix ‘day’ in category items was found to obscure the route to item 
selection in this setting, impeding item production and resulting in a greater number of errors. 
These increased errors for ‘days’ (noted also in Experiment 3) were unusually not seen in 
Experiment 5, which utilised arbitrary colour categories to keep the number of categories 
constant at four for all levels of the task. In that instance the change in global space to four 
categories on preceding levels of the task was interpreted as priming the system for proximity 
effects. 
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 Referred to by Kahneman (2011) as the ‘halo effect’, acknowledging something that seems positive and 
automatically adding to it for consistency. 
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A particular phenomenon related to between category errors is their tendency to 
‘switch back’ to the correct response (see Chapter 2) – often sequencing errors will occur in 
clusters of four as two categories will swap over (e.g. ‘Days-numbers’ instead of ‘Numbers-
days’) and then after a few iterations will swap back again, seemingly undetected by the 
participant. It has been noted that self-initiated repairs of phonological errors are very often in 
response to inner rather than overt speech (Nooteboom, 2005); if the same can be said about 
content errors of the type seen here then the role of inner speech as a self-cueing device in the 
Continuous Series II is further reinforced. Given the seemingly automatic nature of the switch 
back to the correct categories it can be said that cueing by inner speech is particularly 
effective as it does not seem to be consciously referred to, unlike external utterances such as 
those noted by Monsell (2005); Baddeley, Chincotta and Adlam (2001) state that repetition of 
overlearned sequences require little attentional demand so the associated inner speech 
prompting would similarly follow as a low demand function.  
 
1.4 Verbal switching, reconfiguration and carryover accounts of task 
switching 
It is proposed by Rogers and Monsell (1995) that switch costs relate to additional 
processing steps required to reconfigure the cognitive system to carry out the upcoming task. 
Reconfiguration is completed in response to the presentation of stimuli, affecting an external 
component to control. The alternating runs paradigm used by Rogers and Monsell 
incorporates a cue for the upcoming task – allowing sufficient time to prepare for the task 
after the cue has been presented results in a reduction of switch cost as reconfiguration has 
been completed during the cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI). However, the persistence of a 
residual switch cost even at the longest CSI has lead others (e.g. Allport & Wylie, 2000) to 
speculate that switch costs are determined by carryover of preceding task activation and task 
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retrieval processes. Differing task requirements (in the case of Stroop stimuli where a 
coloured word can trigger either word reading or colour naming) lead to task-set conflict and 
wrong-task retrieval – the task-set associated with a recently carried out task is triggered and 
it is settlement of this conflict which leads to switch costs rather than proactive anticipatory 
reconfiguration.  
 
In Experiment 2 the absence of perseverative between-category errors suggests 
successful inhibition of the previous task set – activation for the previous category did not 
endure into the subsequent one, with errors instead mostly indicating the wrong task had been 
switched to. Error types were not equated as indicators of carryover in Allport’s original 
work (Allport et al., 1994) which instead used a general measure of accuracy. Allport did not 
determine the source of errors (for example, in the same way as Arbuthnott & Frank (2000) 
or Gurd (1995)) and so did not directly relate them to the carryover process.  Interpretation of 
verbal between-category errors in this manner lends itself ideally to identification of the type 
of processes at work, something not readily afforded by the calculation of general switch 
cost. Switch cost in the verbal task instead appears to be caused by active reconfiguration of 
task set as evidenced by the successful but erroneous switch made in between-category 
sequencing errors.  
 
In Experiment 5, where the Continuous Series III included arbitrary non-updating 
colour categories, the link between task content and switch cost (much more costly for 
overlearned sequences) initially suggested reconfiguration as an unlikely cause of switch cost 
in all forms of the Continuous Series task. A major assumption of the reconfiguration account 
is that the time needed to reconfigure (which switch cost is said to represent) is independent 
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of properties relating to the tasks (Chamberland & Temblay, 2011). There is a functional 
distinction between executive processes and task processes. However, the nature of the 
content in the verbal switching task (overlearned sequences) may provide a caveat to this. 
The lack of attentional demand required by recitation of overlearned sequences (Baddeley, 
Chincotta & Adlam, 2001) suggested separation of task related load and attentional switching 
processes – it is possible to recite such sequences with minimal attentional input. This would 
suggest that there is after all separation of task related load (recitation of the sequences) and 
attentional switching processes, due to the ‘special’ nature of the tasks. Thus a 
reconfiguration based source for switch cost cannot be precluded. Between-category 
sequencing errors again show support for this reconfiguration based cost. Such errors could 
reflect a blocking of the phonological loop, due to recitation of overlearned sequences as 
suggested by Baddeley et al. (2011).  
 
Further evidence in support of a reconfiguration-based account comes from the Mixed 
Category II task, which alternated switching between overlearned sequences and semantic 
categories and showed a result of reverse asymmetry when local per-category switch cost was 
compared in Experiment 3. Asymmetry typically occurs in Stroop-type tasks where it is 
harder (more costly) to switch to the easier task (e.g. Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994) and is 
said to show enduring carryover of activation for the – reverse asymmetry presents as more 
intuitively being harder to switch to the more difficult task (e.g. Monsell, Yeung & Azuma, 
2000) and refutes the carryover account, linking asymmetry to the relative ability of tasks to 
interfere with each other rather than a widespread repeatable effect. In the Mixed Category II 
task it was less costly to switch to the easier task type of overlearned sequences, deemed to be 
such due to their faster repetition during the non-switching condition and less reliance on 
verbal working memory. As such there was no evidence of carryover of activation from the 
Cognitive control in verbal task switching 
338 
 
preceding harder task type of semantic category production; the pattern of reverse asymmetry 
tied in more with the supposition of relative strength of interference (Monsell, Yeung & 
Azuma, 2000) – the semantic category task did not exert sufficient interference with the well 
embedded overlearned sequence task and so the more intuitive reverse asymmetry of being 
easier to switch to the easier task was displayed, contesting the existence of a uniform and 
reliable carryover of activation from the last task. 
 
In non-switching baselines for the Continuous Series II83, processing would be 
somewhat similar to non-switch trials in the alternating runs paradigm (see Figure 21A). 
Stimulus onset and encoding would be represented by foreknowledge of the task. 
Identification would be a confirmatory process. Response selection would very likely take 
longer as there are a range of possibilities – checking against the last response made would 
need to be carried out84. Response executing would be identical (see Figure 22A). During 
switching, the process would be somewhat different, but still comparable to that proposed for 
the TSR hypothesis (see Figure 21B). Foreknowledge and confirmation would be a more 
dynamic process as there would be up to four potential possibilities, in the absence of overt 
stimulus onset. This stage would involve template checking (see Figure 2B). Response 
checking also takes on a more dynamic role as this has to be done for both task and item. 
These would be areas where general cost for the Continuous Series II would be lengthier than 
cost for the alternating runs paradigm. Task (or ‘stimulus’) selection has already occurred at 
the earlier template checking stage but additionally it needs to be checked against the last task 
carried out (separate from checking against the template). This second levels of checking 
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 Where categories are recited in order at speed 
84
 For the semantic categories in the Mixed Category II task this would need to be checking against all previous 
responses made.  
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occurs after the ‘stimulus’ (the task) can be said to have arrived from the template checking 
stage.  
 
Endogenous control is implicated during switching to oversee template checking, 
response checking and response selection in light of the need to switch away from the 
previous response made. Reconfiguration occurs in the attention shift from one task to the 
next, which must occur at all of these three stages. Breakdown of the reconfiguration process 
(posited as an effortful, executive, System 2 failure) can result in a failure to switch correctly 
and production of the wrong category. This failure can occur in checking the template, in 
checking the response or in selecting the response. As stated by Monsell (2003) such 
reconfiguration may also involve inhibition of the previous task set as well as activation of 
the upcoming one. Evidence from the current work would suggest that inhibition is successful 
in the verbal task (as evidence by the lack of perseverative between-category errors) but that 
failure can occur in subsequent activation.  
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Figure 21 Representation of the task-set reconfiguration (TSR) account, where an extra process 
takes place on switch compared to repeat trials and of the task-set inertia (TSI) account, whereby 
carryover of priming from previous trials slows response. Taken from Monsell, Yeung & Azuma 
(2000) 
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Figure 22 Application of a modified version of TSR to Continuous Series II switching. Stimulus 
encoding and identification encompasses confirmation against template checking in memory, 
resulting in arrival of the ‘exogenous’ stimulus (task). Further checking occurs post-arrival, with 
identical response selection and execution 
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Exertion of endogenous control, albeit more dynamically and in a way that is more 
time costly, is therefore clear in the Continuous Series II. However, one element of the TSR 
hypothesis that appears absent from verbal switching is the arrival of an external stimulus to 
complete reconfiguration – the source of residual cost. This thesis has previously spoken 
about the ‘arrival’ of stimuli in the verbal task – however, this surely is under the influence of 
endogenous control, by virtue of retrieval of task order from memory. Does this present a 
problem for a TSR interpretation of the Continuous Series II? At first glance it would seem 
there is no scope for an exogenous completer in the Continuous Series II. Control of task (or 
‘stimulus’) arrival is top-down and intentional. However, could it be argued that once the 
task has been endogenously retrieved it is exogenously available to be responded to? The task 
(or ‘stimulus’) is there to be responded to in the same way as if it had been presented 
externally. It is only the method of its arrival that is different. 
 
Exogenous control is “…bottom-up, involuntary, automatic, and stimulus driven…” 
(Rubin & Koch, 2006, p.1034). According to Rogers & Monsell (1995) task set 
reconfiguration cannot complete until the stimulus appears. The appearance of the stimulus 
triggers the task sets associated with it. In the Continuous Series II searching days of the 
week is not activated until the task ‘days’ is presented to the system. The stimulus (or the 
task) itself prompts an individual to perform actions that are associated with it. This happens 
regardless of prior top-down intention and can indeed conflict with prior intention. The 
preponderance of perseverative errors in patients with frontal damage illustrates a failure to 
respond to exogenous control – this is a failure to respond to a stimulus attribute (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). Indeed, such errors are seen in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) in the single case 
series of neurological patients. In the case of bivalent stimuli exogenous control can evoke an 
inappropriate response which has to be overcome by endogenous control. The current verbal 
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task does not use bivalent stimuli but several responses are prompted by each stimulus by 
virtue of their sequential nature. The arrival of the stimulus (task) in the process after 
template checking, and before subsequent item and task checking against the last response, 
constitutes exogenous control as presented in the TSR hypothesis (See Figure 22B in 
comparison with Figure 21).  
2 Limitations 
2.1 Task-related costs 
A number of costs identified in relation to the verbal switching tasks are task related 
rather than indicative of the switching process. These costs are error costs and so outside the 
remit of a holistic general measure of reaction time switch cost, other than the degree to 
which error commission and recovery contributes to that cost. Evidence of task related costs 
limits the extent to which results can be interpreted as indices of executive control processes. 
Experiment 5 shows that between-category errors in the Continuous Series III task (using a 
constant 4-categories with decreasing numbers of arbitrary colour categories) only occur 
when the content of those categories are sufficiently complex as to trigger executive 
processing on the content. Results from Experiments 3 and 4 indicate the possibility of a task-
related artefact in the increased rate of errors for the category ‘days’ at the highest level of 
task difficulty, which occurred wherever the category was placed within the task order; 
increased error production was attributed to suffix repetition (‘day’) for category items, 
weakening the effectiveness of task and item maintenance.  
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2.2 Calculation of general switch cost 
While the inclusion of effects from the ‘global workspace’ (Kleinsorge et al., 2004) 
undoubtedly add holistic and ecological value to the overview of behaviour during verbal 
task switching, the calculation of general switch cost is necessarily limited in the degree to 
which specific contributors to overall cost can be identified. The inclusion of local ‘per 
category’ switch cost (see Experiment 3) refines this to an extent but in hindsight would be 
more informative if based on the inter-task gap alone rather than including last-task 
production costs. Experiment 5 would have been better able to attribute cost as task or switch 
related in response to differing task content with these measures. Additionally the Continuous 
Series II more closely follows the alternating tasks design proffered by Jersild (1927), 
resulting in a subtractive measure of switch cost compared to non-switch cost (see page 18). 
This has been criticised on the basis of differential numbers of tasks having to be held in 
working memory for switching and non-switching conditions, an issue addressed by the 
alternating runs paradigm (Rogers & Monsell, 1995 – see page 24 of this document). The 
continuous category-as-task design of the Continuous Series II does not lend itself directly to 
an alternating runs approach85 and so any potentially additional costs from the alternating 
tasks design must be absorbed and acknowledged within the measure of general costs, 
balanced against the advantages of using a holistic measure of all costs involved in switching 
and more everyday real-time tasks (Altmann & Trafton, 2004). Per-trial measures may be 
more flexible in allowing for analysis of within-trial factors such as the response-to-stimulus 
interval, but global contributors (which undoubtedly factor into any measure of cost) are lost 
by this method. The methodological limitation here is how far comparisons can be made 
between verbal task switching experiments and other studies (such as the interpretation of 
                                                           
85
 Although see section ‘Direction for future work’ for a suggestion as to how an approximation of this might be 
achieved.  
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verbal task switching in terms of reconfiguration and carryover explanations), though given 
the wide range of methods and tasks employed in the field this is not an unusual problem. 
 
3 Directions for future work 
3.1 Applying the alternating runs paradigm to verbal switching 
 To further investigate the conclusions drawn from the current work the task could be 
investigated using a local-switch cost alternating runs paradigm. Using experimental software 
the task could be presented on an incremental basis, with a visual cue presented before each 
response is due. Voice-activated timing via a microphone would measure the cue to response 
interval. This would not allow for manipulation of the response to stimulus interval (RSI) as 
in traditional experiments but it would allow for more accurate measurement of the time 
taken to produce a response. The cue signifies the switch to be made and does not require 
another level of stimulus (it would be difficult to foresee what such a separate stimulus would 
be). This would be of particular benefit for the Mixed Category II task (Experiment 3, 
Chapter 5). The task could be presented with repeats embedded in the mixed task block in the 
format A-A-B-B (Number, Number, Day, Day…), extended for the more difficult levels of 
switching (Number, Number, Day, Day, Month, Month…). This would not be identical to the 
original alternating runs paradigm but would allow criticisms of the Continuous Series II to 
be addressed.  
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3.2 Analysis of pre- and post-error responses 
An analysis of pre- and post-error responses in relation to those errors would assist in 
determining both the cause and effect of incorrect responses and setting error production in 
the wider context of processes underlying switch cost. Post-error slowing during task 
switching has been reported in various age groups (Themanson, Hillman & Curtin, 2006; 
Gupta, Kar & Srinivasan, 2009). This is akin to Altmann’s post-interruption resumption lag 
(Altmann & Trafton, 2004),  although the intended analysis would focus more on the nature 
of the response that the time taken to execute it. Many individuals completing the Continuous 
Series II commit errors in clusters. Mapping these to the surrounding pattern of self-
corrections and subsequent additional errors will give a more complete picture of verbal task 
switching behaviour. In particular the relationship between self-corrections and errors can be 
explored – error repair can be delayed i.e. further responses are made before the error is 
addressed, or they can be immediate. Self-corrections are often of the type specified by 
Levelt (1989) as instant, where the replacement response is the first word of the repair – 
however, unlike Levelt’s observations error repairs are not always conservative in that 
additional utterances to replacement target responses are sometimes made. Delayed self-
corrections could suggest a degree of enduring carryover as awareness of the error responses 
continues into production of subsequent categories. The lack of conservatism in error 
corrections would again suggest that in at least some instances carryover of a previous task 
set occurs as the repair of the error requires disambiguation between responses, as evidenced 
by the unusual (according to Levelt) additional utterances. Such indicators of task set 
carryover in an otherwise reconfiguration biased account of switch cost during verbal task 
switching warrant further analysis. 
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3.3 Introduction of planned interruptions 
The effect of interruptions on complex tasks has been shown to result in a ‘resumption 
lag’, a reduction in RT for a period after the interruption. Post-interruption responses take 
time to build up into a competent set in memory on which to draw for subsequent responses 
(Altmann & Trafton 2004, 2007), taking several seconds and task responses to complete. This 
has been described this as the need to reconstruct context in the original complex task 
(Altmann & Trafton, 2007). Anecdotally a number of participants carrying out the 
Continuous Series II experienced self-imposed interruptions when their mobile telephones 
went off unexpectedly during the test session (any such sessions were excluded from final 
analysis). A similar type of slowing to that recorded by Altmann was seen, with individuals 
taking time to build up ‘momentum’ in the task after the interruption86. Slowing was often 
accompanied by a repetition of the last few responses seemingly in an effort to regain the 
correct placement in categories and items. It is proposed that planned interruptions are added 
to the Continuous Series II, either by use of a telephone or by a confederate knocking on the 
door and entering the room. Recent work (Stoet et al., 2013) used a telephone call to interrupt 
task switching between planning tasks. Either method could be used to deliver an interrupting 
task such as a simple arithmetic problem, making the interruption more comparable to that 
used by Altmann – he interrupted a computer game with a superimposed screen displaying a 
classification task (Altmann & Trafton, 2007). The time course of actions following the 
interruption would reveal whether the recovery matched Altmann’s model of subsequent 
post-interruption responses (and their subsequent representations) building up to a 
reconstruction of the original task environment. 
 
                                                           
86
 Self-corrections, comprising of a pause and reiteration of a response or cluster of responses, also constitute 
interruptions (Levelt, 1989) although don’t offer the possibility of control in the same way. 
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3.4 Verbal task switching using cues in an older adult sample 
A pilot study using the cued version of the Continuous Series II (Experiment 6, 
Chapter 8) on older adults was carried out as preparation for the current work. Individuals 
aged 60 years and older were reluctant to continue with the task once they started committing 
errors, instead opting for early cessation. Some commented that they found cues distracting – 
given the greater reliance on verbal self-cueing in older adults (Kray, Eber & Lindenberger, 
2004; Kray, Eber & Karbach, 2008) this could shed more light on the underlying processes of 
the verbal task. As aging is known to deplete executive functioning (Rabbitt, 1968) it is 
presumed that there are fewer ways in which a person is able to affect a switch between one 
task and another, so resulting in greater switch cost and less accuracy. Use of cues should 
therefore benefit this population but in some individuals seem to clash with reliance on self-
cueing. Perseverative errors are more common in an older population (West, 1996); during 
switching this is possibly due to problems with set shifting rather than initiating rule-based 
behaviour or monitoring of performance. The lack of perseveration in the verbal task has 
been attributed to successful inhibition of the previous task set (Experiment 2); administration 
of the task to a sample who are more likely to experience difficulties with inhibition would 
give more scope for successful application of cues. 
 
3.5 Gender differences in verbal task switching 
Much popular interest has been engendered by recent work (Stoet et al., 2013) which 
highlights a female advantage in executing planning tasks during switching. Samples used in 
the current work were largely female so no gender comparison was possible. However, those 
individuals who excelled at the task were all male – general switch cost has been found to be 
faster for males (although no differences were found on specific task costs) (Reimers & 
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Maylor, 2005). Despite the popular assumption that women excel at multitasking the question 
is under researched in the literature. The current work took the stance that any factors relating 
to gender differences were varied and as such did not present a consensus view that gender 
would be a significant variable. However, the anecdotal finding that faster accurate 
completion of the verbal task was a male trait warrants further investigation, particularly in 
light of the discussion surrounding work by Stoet et al. (2013). Work using real-time 
switching tasks (completing word search and Sudoku puzzles) found females performed 
comparably to males and indeed were less likely to switch in a self motivated switch 
condition (Buser & Peter, 2011). Findings on gender effects for more complex switching 
tasks are varied and further analysis using the Continuous Series II would add to the as yet 
unclear picture of this variable, clouded as it is by popular assumption. 
 
4 Final Conclusion 
The Continuous Series II offers a multi-component general measure of switch cost 
over conditions of increasing task difficulty, encompassing switch, proximity and task 
specific costs and preceding, subsequent and alternative task responses. The task is suitable 
for individuals with a range of neurological deficits and is stable under a number of different 
manipulations. As such it is a useful tool for the measurement of switching over time for a 
more complex real world task.  
 
The measure of general switch cost reflects strategies and processes applied over the 
time course of the task. A degree of preparation and control of localised switches occurs 
globally – the structure within which switches are embedded affects them at a local level. 
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General costs over subsequent trials (Experiment 5) as well as within a single trial have been 
shown to have an effect on performance, expanding the scope of influence within the task. In 
this way proximity of additional tasks or categories has been shown to have a similar effect as 
mixing costs. Additionally measures of per-category cost (Experiment 3) show the effect of 
the task being switched to; the global workspace in which tasks and switches are embedded 
contribute to all measures of cost. 
 
Reliance on switching in working memory as oppose to perceptual switching is 
successful for the Continuous Series II, although there are limitations on the degree to which 
comparisons can be made between tasks relying on these two faculties. Memory load is not 
excessive and this is not a limiting factor for the task, bringing into question the suitability of 
carryover-based accounts of switch cost. Introduction of external cues (Experiment 6) failed 
to enhance performance on the task as the additional processing of cues was not cancelled out 
by compound stimuli as would be the case in more regular cueing experiments. The 
preparatory period afforded by the structure of the task in the non-cued condition was 
sufficient to allow adequate preparation. The naturally updating nature of categories within 
the overall task facilitated attribute selection once the individual task (category) had been 
selected, indicating that verbal switching of overlearned sequences lends itself to working 
memory reliance.  
 
Error patterns suggested inhibition of previous task sets were being completed 
successfully and so indicated reconfiguration as a more likely source for switch cost. 
Crosstalk between item and category updating, rather than direct equation of within-category 
errors with memory and between-category errors with executive processes, was evident 
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within the task. Certain aspects of error production, such as the lack of between-category 
errors found in colour categories for Experiment 5 and general clustering of errors around the 
category ‘days, were noted as task artefacts – task related factors have already been noted as 
limiting the general applicability of findings from the verbal task. 
 
Overall, switch cost in the verbal task appears to be determined by active 
reconfiguration of task set rather than passive carryover of previous task set activity, 
something which has not previously been proposed for the task. The general lack of 
perseverative errors between tasks suggests there is no enduring conflict between task sets to 
be resolved. As task and attentional processes are taken to be separable the link between task 
content and switch cost seen in Experiment 5 does not preclude a reconfiguration account. 
Reverse asymmetry in the local cost comparison of Experiment 3 further served to refute any 
carryover of preceding task set activity. Cautious acceptance of a reconfiguration basis for 
switch cost can be made, with the caveat that a lack of comparable finite per-switch cost 
measures for the verbal task limits the extent to which comparisons can be made between the 
verbal paradigm and alternating runs studies. However, at this time reconfiguration offers a 
far more convincing basis for switch cost than a passive carryover account. 
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS FOR VERBAL TASK 
SWITCHING 
1. Baseline measures 
Original task/ Order effects (Experiment 4) / Cues (Experiment 6)  
“When I tell you to start, I’d like you to recite numbers from 1 to 20 as fast as you can. When you get 
to 20, start again immediately at 1 and keep repeating that sequence over and over as fast as you can 
until I tell you to stop. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”    
[Repeat for days (sequence running from Monday through to Sunday), months (January to December) 
and letter of the alphabet (A to Z)] 
 
Mixed task (semantic categories and overlearned sequences, Experiments 1-3) 
[Follow previous instructions for overlearned sequences and following instructions for semantic 
categories] 
“When I tell you to start I’d like you to tell me as many different types of animal as you can think of – 
they can be any animals and in any order, but don’t repeat yourself. I’d like you to try and do this as 
fast as you can and to keep going until I tell you to stop. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? 
Go!”    
[Repeat in exactly the same way for all required semantic categories.] 
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Dummy categories (Experiment 5) 
[Follow previous instructions for overlearned sequences and following instructions for semantic 
categories] 
“When I tell you to start I’d like you to repeat the word ‘red’ over and over as fast as you can – I’d 
like you to keep going until I tell you to stop. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”    
[Repeat in exactly the same way using the colours blue and green.] 
 
2. Switching 
Original task/ Order effects (Experiment 4) / Cues (no cue condition, Experiment 6) 
Practice: 
“What I’d like you to do now is to alternate between telling me words from two of the categories I 
have just asked you to repeat – I’ll explain how I want you to do this. The two categories are going to 
be numbers and letters. The idea is to keep each category in the correct order as you have just done, 
but to alternate between telling me a word from each one – number, day, number, day. For example, 
1/ Monday/ 2/ Tuesday/ 3/ Wednesday and so on.  
Let’s try that out – starting with 1 and Monday, I’d like you to recite numbers and days in order but 
alternating between the two. The days will have to keep cycling round (as you did previously) as there 
are only seven of them, but this time the numbers will just keep going up and up – there is no need to 
stop at twenty as you did before. So when you get to “7/ Sunday” the next number will be ‘8 and the 
days will have to start again at ‘Monday’. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”    
[Allow the participant to go through ten iterations of the task order. If they are having difficulties or 
misunderstand the instruction allow them to continue for another ten. At this stage, either before or 
after attempting the practice session, it may be necessary to refer the participant to a printed version of 
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the correct responses, highlighting the incremental change in the number sequence and the point 
where the day sequence starts to repeat.] 
Full task: 
“Now I would like you to try that again but this time carry on for longer – I will tell you when to start 
and when to stop. There are a few rules for this longer version. I’d like you to try and complete the 
task as fast and as accurately as you can. I won’t be giving you any feedback while you are doing this, 
so I cannot indicate whether your responses are correct or not. However, even if you think you’ve 
made a mistake try to keep going for as long as you can. This time I don’t want you to start with ‘1’ 
and ‘Monday’ – I’d like you to start with the number ‘6’ and the day ‘Tuesday’ and to keep each 
category in the correct order from that point onwards. For example, the response would be “6/ 
Tuesday/ 7/ Wednesday/ 8/ Thursday” and so on. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”  
[It may be necessary to clarify that numbers and days are not tied to each other i.e. the starting point 
of ‘six’ and ‘Tuesday’ is permissible as the number six is not bound to Thursday as the sixth day of 
the week] 
“Now I’m going to make the task a little harder. I’d like you to do the same thing again but this time 
using three categories – numbers, days and months. I’d like you to start now with the number ‘4’, the 
day ‘Friday’ and the month ‘October’. Remember to try and do this as fast and as accurately as you 
can, and to keep going until I tell you to stop. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”  
[Instructions are repeated with the addition of the category ‘letters’ for four category switching, using 
the start points ‘nine’, ‘Wednesday’, ‘February’ and ‘eight’. The cues version of the task follows the 
same category order and use the same start points at each stage of the task. The order effects version 
uses a different category order for each of its five conditions. When switching between four 
categories, all versions of the order effects task use the same start points, although categories are 
necessarily in varying orders] 
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Dummy categories (Experiment 5) 
Practice: 
“What I’d like you to do now is to alternate between telling me words from two of the categories I 
have just asked you to repeat – I’ll explain how I want you to do this. The two categories are going to 
be numbers and the colour red. The idea is to keep numbers in the correct order, increasing by one 
every time (one, two, three...), but to alternate between telling me a number and saying the colour 
‘red’ – number, red, number, red. For example, 1/ red/ 2/ red/ 3/ red and so on.  
Let’s try that out – starting with one and red, I’d like you to recite numbers as you did before but 
saying the word ‘red’ in between each one. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”    
[Allow the participant to go through ten iterations of the task order. If they are having difficulties or 
misunderstand the instruction allow them to continue for another ten. An additional short practice 
session is required for this version of the task as switching between overlearned sequences is not 
introduced until the second stage of the task, unlike all other versions] 
Practice when two overlearned sequences introduced: 
“I’d like you to try that again but this time with three categories – numbers, letters and the colour 
red. So this time you need to keep both the numbers and the letters in their correct orders, followed by 
the colour red – number/ letter/ red/ number/ letter/ red. For example, 1/ A/ red/ 2/ B/ red/ 3/ C/ red 
and so on.  
Let’s try that out, starting with 1, A and red. Keep the numbers and letters in the correct order and 
alternating between the three word categories. And don’t forget to say red! Do you have any 
questions? Are you ready? Go!”    
[Allow the participant to go through ten iterations of the task order. If they are having difficulties or 
misunderstand the instruction allow them to continue for another ten. At this stage, either before or 
after attempting the second practice session, it may be necessary to refer the participant to a printed 
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version of the correct responses, highlighting the incremental change in the number sequence and the 
point where the day sequence starts to repeat.] 
Full task: 
“Now I would like you to try that again but this time for longer and with more word categories – I 
will tell you when to start and when to stop. There are a few rules for this longer version. I’d like you 
to try and complete the task as fast and as accurately as you can. I won’t be giving you any feedback 
while you are doing this, so I cannot indicate whether your responses are correct or not. However, 
even if you think you’ve made a mistake try to keep going for as long as you can. We are using four 
categories this time, a mixture of the sequential categories and the repeated colour names – they will 
be ‘numbers’, ‘red’, ‘green’ and ‘blue’. So the numbers will have to be kept in the correct order but 
the colours stay the same every time. Unlike before, the numbers aren’t going to stop at 20; they’ll 
just keep going up and up. I’d like you to start with the number ‘3’, followed by ‘red’, green’ ‘blue’. 
For example, the response would be “3/ red/ green/ blue/ 4/ red/ green/ blue” and so on. Do you have 
any questions? Are you ready? Go!”  
Instructions for increased OS categories:   
“Now I’m going to make the task a little harder. I’d like you to do the same thing again but this time 
using two sequential categories and two colours – ‘numbers’, ‘days’, ‘blue’ and ‘red’. I’d like you to 
start now with the number ‘6, the day ‘Tuesday, followed by ‘blue’ and ‘red’. The numbers will keep 
going up as before but the days will have to cycle round as there are only seven of them – the colours 
still repeat every time. Remember to try and do this as fast and as accurately as you can, and to keep 
going until I tell you to stop. Do you have any questions? Are you ready? Go!”  
[Instructions are repeated using the categories ‘numbers’ (start point ‘4’), ‘days’ (start point ‘Friday’), 
months (start point ‘October’) and repeated category ‘green’. The final version of the task uses no 
repeated colour names and is the same as for the original instruction].  
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT LEAFLET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• We are investigating how people are 
able to carry out several different 
tasks at once - for example, like typing 
an email and talking on the phone at the 
same time. 
• The study takes about 30 minutes to 
complete and involves reading and 
reciting different types of English 
words under different conditions 
For more information on the study, participant profile and to sign up, please go to: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/HFKXCV5 
 Or contact me on: 
f.essig@herts.ac.uk 
  
Everyone (non-psychology students & staff) who takes part will be 
entered into a draw to receive one of two prizes of £20 
  
Due to the nature of the task, we are currently recruiting right handed 
people who have English as a first language, with normal hearing and no 
speech or language problems. Full details given at the study website. 
Psychology students - please sign up via Sona so you can receive course 
credit. Cash draw is in lieu of course credit for non-psychology students and 
staff only. 
  
Students and staff welcome ☺ 
Would you like to take part in 
psychology research into multi- 
tasking? 
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APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Researcher: Fiona Essig 
Phone: 01707 284 761 
E-mail: f.essig@herts.ac.uk  
Affiliation: School of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire 
Introduction 
I am a PhD student conducting research assessing task-switching skills. Task-switching is something 
we all do frequently in our everyday lives, often without realising; for example, if you are reading a 
book and hear someone call your name, your attention switches from reading the book to listening 
to the person calling you. 
If you consent to take part you will initially be asked a few questions about your background. Then 
you will then be asked to carry out some verbal tasks involving explanation or repetition of various 
words. Following this you will be asked to switch between different language tasks (full instructions 
will be given before we begin). The session will be audio recorded for transcription purposes. There 
is no right or wrong way to do the tasks and you cannot pass or fail. No judgement will be made 
about you based on your performance. Please be assured that you can withdraw from testing at any 
time without explanation, should you wish to do so. All participation is anonymous and confidential; 
no information that could identify you will be stored along with any of your scores. Participation 
records (including any audio recordings) will be destroyed at the earliest possible opportunity. It is 
expected that testing will take approximately 30 minutes. 
At the end of the session you may ask for more details about the experiment, although it will not be 
possible to give feedback on your individual scores. If you have any questions at a later date or 
would like to discuss anything about the study, please feel free to contact me (details above). 
This study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology under 
delegated authority from the Ethics Committee of the University of Hertfordshire – Protocol no. 
PSY 10/05/FE 
If you have any questions before we begin please ask. Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX D: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
The nature and purpose of the assessment procedures to be used have been explained to me and I 
have had an opportunity to discuss this with the researcher. I understand that I have the right to 
withdraw my consent at any time and without giving a reason, and that my participation will be 
anonymous. 
 
I do / do not (delete as necessary) voluntarily consent to take part in this research. 
 
Name (participant) . . . .. . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
I do / do not (delete as necessary) voluntarily consent to this testing session being audio recorded. 
 
Signed (participant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
Signed (researcher) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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APPENDIX E: DEBRIEFING SCHEDULE FOR VERBAL TASK 
SWITCHING 
 
[Instructions to researcher are given in square brackets. If at any stage the participant indicates that 
they require more or less information, give as necessary] 
 
“We are interested in is how people manage to carry out a number of tasks at once (multi-tasking). 
We are also interested in what happens when multi-tasking becomes more difficult, which is why the 
number of word categories you had to switch between increased every time. One thing that is 
particularly useful is looking at the type of errors people make and what happens after an error – do 
people make more errors, slow down or manage to go back to performing the task correctly? Do they 
notice when they make an error or think they’ve made one when they haven’t? Obviously we can’t tell 
people we are interested in that at the beginning as it may affect the results; the last part of the task 
(switching between four categories) is where we expect most people to make errors, as it is quite 
difficult to switch between doing four different things”  
 
[Deliver the following passage as appropriate to the version of the test used] 
 
 “By using different types of cues / dummy (colour) categories / changing the order in which the 
categories are presented / asking people to repeat the task several times we hope to learn more about 
the underlying processes used during multitasking behaviour and whether presenting the task 
differently makes it more or less difficult.”  
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“We won’t be able to tell any of these things until we have finished the study and looked at 
everybody’s results together” 
[If necessary reiterate that results are anonymous] 
 
[If more information is requested – e.g. “Why are you interested in this?”, then continue as follows] 
“Other researchers have investigated how long people take to switch between different tasks, and 
have suggested several theories of how people manage to switch their attention between different 
things. We are suggesting a slightly different theory of how that might happen, particularly when 
switching between different language based tasks; the results from tests like the one you have just 
completed will hopefully support that theory.” 
 
[If necessary explain further why you weren’t able to disclose this at the beginning of the study. May 
be omitted in the case of participants who are psychology students] 
“In psychology we have to be careful not to give too many clues about the tasks we are asking people 
to do in case it affects their performance. For example, people who are told beforehand that they are 
going to be doing a memory task might remember more items than if they were not told what the task 
was for” 
 
 “Do you have any more questions?” 
 
“Thank you for giving your time to take part in this study, it was very much appreciated. Goodbye” 
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APPENDIX F: TRANSCRIPTS OF TARGET AND NON-TARGET 
UTTERANCES FOR THREE PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
 
 
Participant TW27L Continuous Series II 4-categories  
“9… Wednesday…February… H… 10… Tuesday… March… I…11… Wednesday… April… J… 12… 
Thursday… May… K… 13… 13… Friday… June… no, June-June-June-June-June, K – L… 14… Saturday… 
14… Saturday… July… M… 15…Sunday… August… N… 16… Monday… September… O… 17… Tuesday… 
October… P… 18… Wednesday… November… Q… 19… Thursday… December… R… 20… January – no 
it’s not, is it? It’s 20, days of the week, 20… Monday… January… S… 21… Tuesday… February… T… 
22… Wednesday… March… V… 23… Thursday… May – no, April… W… 24… 24-24… Wednesday… 
June… X… 25… Thursday… July… 25… Friday… August… Z… 26… Saturday… A… 27… Sunday… 
October… B” 
 
Participant TW28L Continuous Series II 4-categories 
“9… Wednesday… February… H… 10… Thursday… March… I… 11… Friday… April… J… 12… Saturday… 
June… K… 13… Sunday… July… L… 14… Sunday… August… M… 15… Sunday… September…  M… erm… 
15… Saturday, Sunday… Monday… September… N… 16…  October, no it’s a day next, Saturday, 
Sunday… Monday… October… O… 15… um… Tuesday… November… P… 16… December- no, it’s the 
days of the week, it’s not September… Monday… November… 17” 
 
Participant TW28R Continuous Series II 4-categories  
“9… Wednesday… February… H… 10… Thursday… March… I… 11… Friday… April… April – what was it 
after that? April… J… 12… Sunday… May… K… 13… Monday… June… L… 13… 14… Tuesday… July… 
M… 15… Friday… August… J… 16… Saturday… September… K… 17… Sunday… October… L… L… 17… I 
KEY 
Valid response  Non-word utterance  Word utterance 
Self-correction  Error 
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don’t know what I was up to, 17 – I’ll say Tuesday… November… M… 18… Wednesday… December… 
N… 19… Thursday… January… O… 20… Friday… February… P… 21… Friday… March… Q… 22… 
Saturday… April… R… 26… lost it – 26… Saturday… August… T… 27… Sunday… September… T… 26” 
 
 
